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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the impact of corporate governance practices on financial 
performance and outreach of microfinance institutions (MFIs) in Sri Lanka and 
India. Guidance and principles developed from prior research which has 
predominantly focussed on corporate governance relating to corporations in mature 
financial markets may not be efficacious. There is a need for a more specific 
approach to identify better governance structures for the microfinance sector which 
will support MFIs to attain long-term sustainability of the industry. In order to 
contribute to this debate, this research examines (i) the relationship between 
corporate governance practices, financial performance and outreach of Sri Lankan 
MFIs (ii) the relationship between corporate governance practices, financial 
performance and outreach of Indian MFIs (iii) MFIs’ corporate governance and 
performance differences between Sri Lanka and India and (iv) the relationship 
between corporate governance and performance of MFIs based on a combined 
sample and considering the influence of national governance quality.  
A study of corporate governance in the microfinance sector is timely and important 
as unfair practice accusations against MFIs raise questions around what is an 
appropriate framework for monitoring and control of MFI activities. A well-
structured corporate governance practice may reduce the impact of corruption and 
undue bureaucracy by increasing transparency and accountability of funds utilised 
in microfinance activities. Even though studies of corporate governance and firm 
performance in mature markets are largely and rapidly evolving, their impact on 
MFI performance is little researched and reported. It is argued that MFIs which 
maintain good corporate governance practices will be financially and socially 
sustainable.  
This thesis makes a number of contributions to the existing knowledge of corporate 
governance and MFI performance in several ways. First, it provides evidence from 
Sri Lanka and India of what aspects of corporate governance need to be 
strengthened and how much impact each individual component has on MFI 
financial performance and outreach. Second, the study identifies the importance of 
considering differences in institutional values, culture, and the environment of each 
country and points to the risk of applying normative assertions of corporate 
governance practices in the microfinance sector. Third, this study, through careful 
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diagnostic testing, uses microeconometric techniques to control endogeneity which 
may have negated some findings reported in the literature. In particular, unobserved 
heterogeneity, simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity inherent in the corporate 
governance–performance relationship studies are eliminated. Finally, in contrast to 
extant studies in the microfinance sector, this is the first direct study to 
accommodate corporate governance, financial performance and outreach of MFIs 
in both Sri Lanka and India. The impact of cross-country differences in government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality and rule of law on MFI performance is also 
considered. 
Data needed to test various hypotheses are sourced from the Microfinance 
Information Exchange (MIX) database, Lanka Microfinance Practitioners' 
Association (LMFPA) in Sri Lanka and Sa-Dhan, the microfinance network in India. 
Furthermore, firm-level corporate governance data are collected from the individual 
institutions by going through their annual reports, individual firm websites and 
through personally contacting the individual firms. The sample period for the Sri 
Lankan and Indian MFIs is 2007 to 2012. Fixed-effect, random-effect and system 
generalised method of moment (GMM) estimator approaches are used to answer 
the research questions.  
In Sri Lanka, female CEO, female chair, larger boards, client representatives on 
board and internal audit function improve the financial performance of MFIs. When 
there are more female directors and more international/donor representatives on a 
board, financial performance declines. The outreach of Sri Lankan MFIs improves 
when there are more international/donor representatives and fewer client 
representatives on boards.  
In the Indian context, the results indicate that international/donor representatives, 
client representatives and outside directors on board, and an internal audit function 
statistically significantly positively correlate with financial performance of MFIs. 
For female chair and number of female directors on the board there is a negative 
correlation. However, in India, better outreach can be achieved when there is a 
female chair and when there are more female directors and more international/donor 
agencies representatives on the board. Female CEOs and larger boards appear to 
have negative effect on MFI outreach.  
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The findings from Sri Lankan MFIs support the prediction of agency theory 
regarding the effective monitoring impact the performance of MFIs. But it is 
contrary to the number of board members as larger boards positively associate with 
MFI financial performance. This is consistent with resource dependency theory as 
larger boards provide a wide range of expertise and resources for the institution. In 
a voluntary organisation costs are reduced when board members are involved in a 
range of activities or functions that might otherwise have been covered by paid staff. 
This is also a way of aligning board members with senior management. The issue 
that arises is the extent to which this goal congruence is tilted toward management 
aspirations and produces a shadow agency cost. Even though agency theory 
emphasises the negative impact of duality, from the findings of this study it is 
difficult to make inferences about the separation of CEO and chair is better for MFI 
financial performance as well as there is no impact for MFI outreach. Findings of 
Indian analysis are also consistent with the perspectives of agency theory to a large 
extent, as diversified boards improve MFI financial performance. Similar to Sri 
Lanka, CEO/chair duality has no effect on MFI financial performance or outreach, 
which is not consistent with the predictions of agency theory. 
Importantly, the results of this study suggest that the impact of corporate 
governance on MFI performance persists in both countries even after the dynamic 
nature of the corporate governance and performance relationship is taken into 
consideration. Financial performance of both countries is improved with larger 
boards with more client representation. For both countries, more female 
representatives and outside directors on the board and internal audit function 
negatively affect MFI financial performance. Outreach in both countries is 
enhanced with more international/donor representative and fewer outside directors. 
Notably, the findings of this study indicate that the relationship between current 
MFI performance and past (one-year lagged) performance is statistically 
significantly positive for financial performance and outreach variables in both 
countries, suggesting that the corporate governance – performance relationship of 
MFIs should be examined in a dynamic framework. This highlights the importance 
of considering the past performance as an independent variable for current 
corporate governance and performance studies in the microfinance sector. 
Furthermore, this study shows the quality of national governance has a statistically 
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significantly positive effect on financial performance and outreach of MFIs in both 
countries.  
This research demonstrates that corporate governance practices in for-profit 
companies have some synergies with the microfinance industry. The results 
reported in this study reflect a deeper commitment to robustness and micro 
econometric issues than previous studies and this robustness provides a platform 
for industry and political policy developments that can significantly enhance the 
quality of life for the poorest and low income people in Sri Lanka and India. The 
opportunities for microfinance to make a significant difference to the poorest of the 
poor in low income countries and emerging economies are not waning. Further 
research in other countries is required to establish if this is a generalisable trend or 
unique to Sri Lanka and India. 
Finally, this research recommends that it is possible to improve corporate 
governance practices of MFIs in Sri Lanka and India by promulgating a regulatory 
and supervisory system. The sector needs a strong regulatory framework to 
strengthen its governance and institutional structures, and to enhance opportunities 
for the sustainability and development of the microfinance industry. 
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1 CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background of the Study 
This study investigates the impact of corporate governance on financial 
performance and outreach of microfinance institutions (MFIs) in Sri Lanka and 
India. Commencing with prior research into corporate governance in mature and 
emerging markets, this study shows how the nature and the impact of corporate 
governance in the microfinance sector differs from other sectors.  
The work presented in the thesis is significant and important because it examines 
the hitherto neglected issue of the contribution of corporate governance to the 
balance of financial performance and outreach. Without financial performance 
there is no sustainable outreach. Without outreach the MFI is just another credit 
granting institution. Corporate governance that promotes financial performance 
may not be the same as corporate governance that promotes outreach, and vice versa. 
By examining in detail, this research shows how corporate governance contributes 
significantly to an understanding of components that are common to both goals, 
financial performance and outreach, and those that relate to only one goal. The 
tension and trade-off is important new information for all stakeholders of MFIs. 
This research is important as MFIs are important service providers of finance for 
rural poor and other groups termed “unbanked people”. There are millions of people 
living without access to financial services, especially in developing countries. 
Demand for financial services surpasses the available supply (Barr, Kumar, & Litan, 
2007; Imboden, 2005) and in developing countries, the formal banking sector serves 
approximately 20% of the population (Berenbach & Churchill, 1997; Robinson, 
2001). The microfinance industry arose to challenge the prevailing low levels of 
financial servicing by building a financial market to meet the diverse financial needs 
of under-served people (Armendáriz de Aghion & Morduch, 2004; Hermes & 
Lensink, 2011), emerging with the objective of alleviating poverty, especially in 
developing countries (Brau, Hiatt, & Woodworth, 2009; Daley-Harris, 2006).  
Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
2 
 
Extensive interest in access to microfinance services has generated massive 
worldwide growth in the microfinance sector. It is estimated that there were around 
10,000 MFIs issuing loans around the world in 2007 (Ming-Yee, 2007). Data from 
the State of the Microcredit Summit Campaign Report 2009 shows that 106.6 
million of the world’s poorest clients had been reached at the end of 2007 and 83.2% 
were women (Daley-Harris, 2009). In 2010, the number of poor accessing credit 
and financial services was 138 million. This dramatic growth in the sector creates 
immense competition between MFIs which may ultimately become the source of 
serious complaints about their unfair practices and low transparency due to lack of 
governance.  
In the MFI literature, good governance is emphasised as one of the key elements 
for strengthening stewardship, achieving MFIs’ primary objectives and promoting 
further development of the industry (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Morduch, 2007; Gant, 
de Silva, Atapattu, & Durrant, 2002; Hartarska, 2005; Labie, 2001; Mersland & 
Strøm, 2009; Rock, Otero, & Saltzman, 1998; van Greuning, Gallardo, & 
Randhawa, 1998). Many MFIs struggle to achieve financial self-sufficiency while 
delivering quality service for their low-income clients. Good governance practices 
help MFIs to operate more efficiently and transparently. The Centre for the Study 
of Financial Innovation (CSFI, 2008) states that corporate governance practice is 
one of most challenging areas in the microfinance sector and has become a hot issue 
among policy makers. 
Empirical studies relating to better corporate governance practices in MFIs have 
not yet been well expanded. There are a few studies on the direct relationship 
between better corporate governance and greater performance of MFIs but the 
results are ambiguous. Although empirical evidence is relatively scant and 
inconclusive, there is a conventional wisdom among microfinance practitioners that 
improved corporate governance practices will lead to improved profitability and 
outreach (Bassem, 2009; Cull et al., 2007; Hartarska, 2005; Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 
2007; Mersland, 2009). It appears that there is an emerging consensus to conduct 
more studies on the corporate governance of MFIs to analyse the relationship 
between institutional success and corporate governance, especially for developing 
countries. Therefore, to examine the relationship between corporate governance and 
performance of MFIs, this study selects Sri Lanka and India to be the platform to 
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conduct the empirical research as they are the most closely related developing 
countries in terms of economic conditions in the South Asian region.  
The remainder of this chapter discusses the economic relationships and 
characteristics of Sri Lanka and India, followed by the objective of the study and 
the research questions. The chapter then briefly explains the significance of the 
study and the structure of the thesis. 
 
1.2 Comparative Study between India and Sri Lanka  
In order to address the research questions, this study selects Sri Lanka and India as 
the two emerging countries in the South Asian region. MFI research on corporate 
governance and performance in Sri Lanka and India is scant and the topic receives 
relatively little attention in the South Asian region in general. Both countries are 
recognised as low- and middle-income economies with seemingly diverse 
characteristics across a range of political, economic, social and demographic factors. 
Therefore, comparison between these two countries is factual and realistic. The 
following section 1.2.1 discusses some economic relationships between Sri Lanka 
and India. Similarities and differences between the two countries are briefly 
explained in section 1.2.21.  
 
1.2.1 Economic relationship between Sri Lanka and India  
The democratic socialist republic of Sri Lanka is an island in the Indian Ocean. The 
republic of India is also situated in the Indian Ocean. Sri Lanka and India 
commemorated internal political independence from British rule in 1948 and 1947 
respectively. After independence from Britain both nations joined several regional 
and multilateral organisations, such as the South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation, South Asia Co-operative Environment Programme and South Asian 
Economic Union, working to enhance cultural, strategic and commercial values for 
their own people. Ondaatjie (2007, September 25) found that since a bilateral free 
                                                 
1 See section 2.6 in Chapter 2 for more information about the microfinance sector in Sri Lanka and 
India and section 3.7 and 3.8 in Chapter 3 for corporate governance systems in Sri Lanka and India 
respectively. 
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trade agreement was signed and came into effect in 2000, Indo-Sri Lankan trade 
went up 128% by 2004 and quadrupled by 2006, reaching USD 2.6 billion. Among 
the global imports in Sri Lanka, India contributes 14% and is the fifth major export 
destination for Sri Lankan goods, accounting for 3.6% of its exports. Both nations 
are also signatories of the South Asia Free Trade Agreement and on-going dialogue 
is still in progress to expand this agreement to build stronger commercial relations 
and increase corporate investment and ventures in various industries between these 
two countries.  
 
1.2.2 Similarities and differences between Sri Lanka and India  
This section explains similarities and differences between Sri Lanka and India. 
While there are economic, political, demographical and cultural differences 
between the two countries, they are most similar when compared with other 
countries in the South Asia region.  
The population of India was 1,250 million in 2013 which is 17% of the total global 
population. Sri Lanka’s population was 20.48 million in 2013 (World Bank, 2014). 
The population of India is 60 times greater than Sri Lanka. Chronic poverty is a key 
issue for India and prevails in many parts of the country. In 2011, 32.7% of the 
population (394 million people) lived below the extreme poverty line (Zhang & 
Wong, 2014). In 2012, the poverty level in India was 23.6% (World Bank, 2014) 
and in Sri Lanka 6.7% in 2012 (Department of Census and Statistics, 2014).  
An uneven spread of socio-development indicators including health, education and 
infrastructure hold-ups are indicative of the challenges for Indian growth. Infant 
mortality, life expectancy and literacy of India were 48 deaths/1,000 live births, 65 
years and 63% respectively in 2010, whereas statistics for these same indicators in 
Sri Lanka were 14 deaths/1,000 live births, 75 years and 91% in 2010. There 
appears to be noticeable differences between the two countries for health and 
education indicators. However, there were similar indicators for birth and death 
rates in both countries. Birth and death rates in India were 22 births/1,000 
population and 8 deaths/1,000 population respectively in 2010, and 18 births/1,000 
population and 7 deaths/1,000 population respectively in Sri Lanka (World Bank, 
2012a). 
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India is now one of the world's fastest growing economies (Frankfurt School of 
Finance & Management, 2009) and the eleventh largest economy by Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) in the world, with GDP growing by 8.8% in 2010 (World 
Bank, 2012a). India had a similar level of annual growth rate of GDP as Sri Lanka 
in 2010 and better economic and trade conditions. India does not have a strong 
agricultural sector. In 2010, the service sector of India accounted for 55% of the 
country’s GDP but the industrial and agricultural sectors contributed only 26% and 
19% respectively (World Bank, 2012a). Sri Lanka’s economy grew more rapidly 
after the end of the civil war in 2009, which resulted in an increase in the GDP 
growth rate of 8% in 2010. It has been reported in recent years that Sri Lanka has 
strong growth rates with its GDP per capita ahead of other countries in the South 
Asia region. Similar to India, Sri Lanka too has a strong service industry consisting 
of 58% GDP, while the industrial and agriculture sectors’ contribution to the 
national economy were 29% and 13% respectively in 2010 (World Bank, 2012a).  
The microfinance sector in India has achieved greater authenticity with the 
government and registered non-banking financial companies (NBFCs) under the 
Reserve Bank of India (RBI). According to the South Asian Microfinance Network 
(SAMN, 2010), in 2009, 77% of the microfinance sector was regulated by the RBI. 
The Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX)2  states that India is the world 
leader in microfinance industries as there were 20 MFIs ranked in top 100 in 2009 
but no proper regulation to monitor them. In Sri Lanka, June 2015 Lanka 
Microfinance Practitioners’ Association (LMFPA) has drafted a legal framework 
for the regulation and supervision of MFIs. Modoran and Grashof (2009) point out 
that there is a lack of regulatory and supervisory frameworks in Sri Lankan MFIs. 
They suggest that the microfinance industry can be developed by putting more 
effort into adopting best practices and to ensure a regulatory environment for their 
growth. Unlike India, Sri Lanka had only one MFI among the top 100 MFIs in 2009 
but according to MIX, the SANASA Development Bank (SDB) of Sri Lanka is the 
second largest MFI in the world.  
                                                 
2  MIX is a non-profit private organisation focused on promoting information exchange in the 
microfinance industry worldwide. 
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Generally, the Asian markets are characterised by ineffective markets for corporate 
control (Nguyen, Locke, & Reddy, 2014). Also the World Bank (2012b) indicates 
that the South Asian region has weaker legal institutions and more expensive 
regulatory processes than other regions (except Sub-Saharan Africa). Weaker legal 
institutions refer to how weak the institutions are in protecting investors, enforcing 
contracts and resolving insolvency. Despite there being weaker legal institutions in 
South Asia, Sri Lanka and India attempt to maintain a good standard of governance 
practices in listed companies. Both Sri Lanka and India are ranked 46th out of 183 
economies for the protection of investors.  
India is a federation with a parliamentary system. Power has been distributed 
between the federal government and state governments. India has an executive 
president, parliamentary system, led by a prime minister and a three-tier 
independent judiciary that consists of the Supreme Court headed by the Chief 
Justice, high courts and a number of trial courts. Power decentralisation to the states 
may mitigate the geographic discrepancies. There was an instance where the 
Andhra Pradesh legislative passed a client protection law due to the high suicide 
rate in the province. Now discussion is in progress to formulate this law nationwide 
through the RBI.  
Sri Lankan history traditionally starts in 543 BC with the landing of Vijaya who 
came from southwest coast of India. Historical evidence shows that Sri Lankan 
dynastic history, commencing with Prince Vijaya, spanned a period of 2,359 years 
from 543 BC through to when the British Empire captured the hill country kingdom 
in 1815 AD. There was a tradition among Sri Lankan kings to bring their first queen 
from India, which created an opportunity to increase Indian people in Sri Lanka so 
that their habits and religious belief became common practice and tradition in the 
Sri Lankan culture. Sri Lanka is a democratic republic and a unitary state which is 
governed by a semi-presidential system and a parliamentary system. The president 
of Sri Lanka is the head of the government and has executive powers. Parliament 
in Sri Lanka is a mixed legislative system with 196 members elected in multiseat 
constituencies and 29 members elected by proportional representation. The judicial 
system is quite similar to India, as the Supreme Court is the highest and headed by 
the Chief Justice. A Court of Appeal, high courts and district courts are part of the 
judicial system.  
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Both countries are multi-cultural. The Census of India in 1961 identified that there 
were 1,652 mother tongues throughout India. In 1991 they formally estimated the 
number of languages was 400. The Official Languages Act 1963 states that when 
the constitution was formed, Hindi and English became the official languages of 
the Union of India till 1965. However, due to protests by many non-Hindi speaking 
states, the Act was amended and now there are total of 22 languages recognised as 
the official languages in addition to Hindi and English. Individual states have been 
given an option to adopt one of their own languages for official work (Amritavalli 
& Jayaseelan, 2007). Sri Lanka has only three major languages (Sinhala, English 
and Tamil) in all nine provinces of the country (Dharmadasa, 2007). The major 
religion in India is Hinduism, followed by Islam, Christianity, Buddhism and 
Sikhism. Buddhism, which emigrated from India, is the main religion of Sri Lanka. 
As with India, there are different types of communities and religions in Sri Lanka, 
including Hindu, Islam, Christian, etc. The immigration of people from India to Sri 
Lanka and similarities in the judicial, parliamentary and executive systems means 
these two countries, cultural, social and religious beliefs are quite similar, especially 
with the southern states of India.  
Although these two countries have similar characteristics in the economic, social, 
cultural and political arenas, some important discrepancies exist in demographic, 
legislative and geographic areas. These similarities and differences may be 
embodied in the performance of MFIs in the two countries. This research conducts 
a cross-country comparison to identify the differences in corporate governance 
practised by MFIs in Sri Lanka and India. In this study, national governance quality 
indicators are used to shed light on the impact of country-level factors on MFI 
performance. 
 
1.3 Objectives and Research Questions of the Study 
The relationship between corporate governance, financial performance and 
outreach of MFIs in Sri Lanka and India is investigated in this thesis. Prior research 
into the microfinance industry has identified good corporate governance practices, 
such as board diversity, board independence and leadership structure, as key factors 
in strengthening MFIs to attract more clients and more investors, which will lead to 
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further development of the industry (CSFI, 2008; Cull et al., 2007; Gant et al., 2002; 
Labie, 2001; Mersland & Strøm, 2009; Rock et al., 1998; van Greuning et al., 1998). 
Good corporate governance practices ensure that an MFI’s strategy, operations and 
results are all aligned with its mission. However, consideration of the empirical 
investigations into the microfinance sector, as they relate to corporate governance, 
suggests a low general awareness of the impact of corporate governance. Labie and 
Mersland (2011, p. 283) state that “the issue of corporate governance has therefore 
been of increasing interest for microfinance as it is today considered to be one of 
the weakest areas in the industry”. There is an emerging consensus for the need to 
conduct more studies on corporate governance of MFIs to analyse the relationship 
between institutional success and corporate governance of MFIs, especially for 
developing countries (Bassem, 2009; Cull et al., 2007; Hartarska, 2005, 2009; 
Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2007; Mersland, 2009; Mersland & Strøm, 2009). 
Inferences about what ought to be done, as good governance in MFIs are largely 
based on analyses of problem cases. This current research expands upon prior 
research, which has been limited to analysing a number of projects, with the aim of 
identifying the impact of corporate governance on MFIs’ performance.  
In order to achieve this aim, this study has established five specific research 
objectives.  
i. To understand the key corporate governance components that impact upon 
the performance of MFIs in Sri Lanka and India by examining prior 
theoretical and empirical research on corporate governance 
ii. To analyse the impact of recognised corporate governance practices on 
financial performance and outreach of MFIs in Sri Lanka 
iii. To analyse the impact of recognised corporate governance practices on 
financial performance and outreach of MFIs in India 
iv. To examine whether corporate governance practices of MFIs differ 
between Sri Lanka and India 
v. To analyse the impact of recognised corporate governance practices on 
performance of MFIs in two South Asian countries by considering an 
aggregated sample 
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To achieve these research objectives the following more specific research questions 
are need answered: 
Q1. Based on the empirical research, what factors are proposed as highly 
important in the corporate governance of MFIs? 
Q2. Do the factors noted in response to Q1 appear adequate to explain the 
financial performance and outreach of MFIs in Sri Lanka and India?  
Q3. Do the factors noted in response to Q1 appear adequate to explain 
difference in the two countries? 
Q4. Do the factors noted in response to Q1 appear adequate to explain 
difference in a combined sample with the use of a dynamic modelling 
approach and the quality of national governance indicators? 
Q5. Based on the data analysis, what corporate governance practices are most 
significant and may potentially be included in a framework to achieve 
better performance of MFIs in Sri Lanka and India? 
 
1.4 Significance of the Study  
This study is novel in that it is the first to explore the corporate governance – 
financial performance and outreach nexus of MFIs in Sri Lanka and India by using 
a deep, historical database. Studying a single country provides deep and narrow 
conclusions and suffers from a lack of generalisability. Multi-country studies 
conducted on the corporate governance-performance relationship provide broad 
and shallow analysis that can be potentially generalisable. They also suffer from the 
absence of historical and comprehensive data on corporate governance, which can 
make it difficult to provide robustness conclusions (Black, de Carvalho, Khanna, 
Kim, & Yurtoglu, 2014). This indicates that the database should be comprehensive and 
have many firm-year observations across countries. However, collecting corporate 
governance data for many institutions across many countries is often difficult, 
especially in emerging sectors like microfinance. To address this, the current study uses 
two countries, which helps to promote generalisability of the findings with a deep and 
historical database. The contribution of this form of research is the examination of 
corporate governance practices and their impact on financial performance and 
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outreach based on a comprehensive sample of MFIs, including many firm-year 
observations across two selected countries.  
There have been a few studies conducted for different countries and regions, but 
not particularly for the South Asian region. A comparison of Sri Lankan and Indian 
MFI governance is helpful and new. A simple survey conducted at the end of 2013 
to find publications on the corporate governance and MFI performance relationship 
in Sri Lanka and India found no empirical research considering the case of either 
country3. This research fills the gap in the extant corporate governance literature as 
it compares two similar countries in relation to MFIs operations. In the context of 
these countries, it is important to answer the question: how do corporate governance 
practices contribute to achieve superior performance of MFIs in Sri Lanka and India? 
Furthermore, unlike mature financial markets, in general, Asian markets are 
characterised by ineffective markets for corporate controls (Nguyen et al., 2014). 
Therefore, it is important to consider whether the internal corporate governance 
structure impacts MFI financial performance and outreach in Asian countries, 
which have less effective external corporate governance systems.  
Consistency in the findings of the corporate governance – performance nexus is 
rare and struggles to identify the significant impact (Labie & Mersland, 2011). 
Mixed results support the view that corporate governance practices may vary based 
on institutional differences between countries and the use of different estimation 
methods (Ahrens, Filatotchev, & Thomsen, 2011; Bhagat & Bolton, 2008). 
Augustine (2012, p. 660) states that the “researchers have not been able to explain 
the heterogeneity in corporate governance practices and performance of 
microfinance firms operating in the same competitive and institutional contexts”. 
This study uses an agency theory framework, interpreted in a broad stakeholder 
context, which is not incompatible with ideas promulgated in studies using 
narrower models, such as stewardship theory, stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory 
and resource dependency theory, in order to investigate empirically how corporate 
                                                 
3  In line with Love (2011), researcher has used the key words of ‘corporate governance’ + 
‘performance’ + ‘microfinance’ + ‘Sri Lanka’ for Sri Lankan studies, and ‘corporate governance’ + 
‘performance’ + ‘microfinance’ + ‘India’ for Indian studies to search related empirical work in 
www.SSRN.com, www.proquest.com and https://scholar.google.co.nz databases. The search results 
show zero results for both countries. 
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governance practices may enhance financial performance and outreach in the 
microfinance sector. This study emphasises guidance for selecting directors to MFI 
boards in relation to achieving board diversity. The findings contribute to knowledge 
and will assist MFIs to better structure their boards in terms of achieving financial 
performance and better outreach.  
Prior studies reveal the importance of considering the country-level characteristics, 
in addition to the firm level characteristics, for cross-country studies (Aslan & 
Kumar, 2014; Filatotchev & Jackson, 2013; Kumar & Zattoni, 2013; van Essen, 
Engelen, & Carney, 2013). They highlight that the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance may be impacted by the quality of national 
governance mechanisms, such as legal system, rule of law and political situation. It 
is important to consider national governance quality measures for corporate 
governance – performance studies. In this cross-country study the national-level 
corporate governance indicators are assessed in terms of their impact on MFI 
performance. Prior studies on the South Asian region have not used the quality of 
national governance systems in which the MFI operates; this is the first study that 
incorporates national governance quality indicators on the corporate governance – 
performance relationship. The findings of this study are, to a certain extent, 
generalisable to the countries with similar national governance characteristics and 
the extent will be the concern of future research. 
For micro-econometric empirical research in corporate governance, the biggest 
challenge is to deal with the endogeneity issue of corporate governance variables 
(Love, 2011; Marinova, Plantenga, & Remery, 2010; Schultz, Tan, & Walsh, 2010). 
There is no consensus on the nature of endogeneity as it is difficult to identify the 
exogenous factors in a governance structure (Wintoki, Linck, & Netter, 2012). In 
the literature on corporate governance three major sources of endogeneity are noted: 
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity across companies, simultaneity and 
dynamic endogeneity. Most empirical studies employ a fixed/random effect 
approach or a traditional instrumental variable (IV) approach to overcome 
endogeneity issues arising from unobserved heterogeneity and/or simultaneity. 
These methods, however, are not designed to deal with dynamic endogeneity that 
arises when the corporate governance-firm performance relationship is influenced 
by past performance. If it is not controlled then it is not possible to establish causal 
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effect from the estimations (Wintoki et al., 2012). The current study examines 
whether or not corporate governance practices have any effect on MFI performance 
after controlling for the potential sources of dynamic endogeneity. The existing 
MFI corporate governance literature is added to by a new understanding of the 
dynamic nature of the corporate governance-performance relationship in MFIs. The 
combined dataset of Sri Lanka and India is used as it has enough data for the results 
to be meaningful. This is the first study that considers the dynamic nature of the 
corporate governance-performance relationship in the microfinance sectors in these 
two countries.  
Microfinance has become a prominent poverty alleviation tool for India, facilitating 
the achievement of national policies and Millennium Development Goals. The 
Indian government and the RBI emphasise the need for enhancement of 
microfinance activities as a major contributor to poverty reduction and 
empowerment of Indian women (Sinha, 2012). The Andhra Pradesh microfinance 
crisis precipitated the need for policy makers and practitioners to reform the 
industry. Emerging from the crisis, the Indian government prepares to enact a law 
for MFIs to regulate their activities to ensure the clients’ interests are addressed. 
The findings of this study may contribute to the development of the microfinance 
sector in India. 
Sri Lanka is currently recovering from 30 years of devastating war and terrorism, 
only enjoying peace and harmony since May 2009. It is imperative for Sri Lanka to 
lift economic development and the enhancement of microfinance activities has 
become one of its major economic development goals. However, there is a lack of 
governance guidelines for Sri Lankan MFIs on how to improve their services in a 
broader context (Modoran & Grashof, 2009). In June 2015, LMFPA has introduced 
a new draft legal framework for the regulation and supervision of MFIs in Sri Lanka. 
The findings of this study do have significance for the analysis of policy 
implications of the microfinance sector in this recovering country. 
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The East Asian financial crisis of 1997, the global financial crisis of 2007 and large 
corporate scandals4 have indicated deficiencies in investor protection and corporate 
governance practices (Brunnermeier, 2009; Erkens, Hung, & Matos, 2012; France, 
Carney, McNamee, & Borrus, 2002 ; Lockhart, 2004; Radelet, Sachs, Cooper, & 
Bosworth, 1998) and raised concerns about the corporate governance practices of 
firms. To avoid future failures, it is important to reform corporate governance 
systems by reviewing the weaknesses in board composition, the failure of non-
executive directors and the decisions of the board members (Brown & Gladwell, 
2009). For countries such as Sri Lanka and India, foreign investments and trading 
are the major factors that drive the regulatory reforms in corporate governance. 
Corporate failures in Sri Lanka and India have increased the focus on good 
corporate governance in every sector, suggesting it is necessary for the transparency, 
accountability and efficiency of firm operations. Investors, creditors, donors and 
others stakeholders, such as employees, clients and governments, are now 
demanding transparency and accountability concerning how money is being utilised 
in microfinance activities. To attract more support from investors and donors, and 
to compete successfully with other worthy causes for donor funds, MFIs need to 
run their micro-financing activities more transparently (Caudill et al., 2009). 
Investors are also turning their attention to the characteristics and quality of MFIs’ 
governing bodies (Otero, 2005). Unappealing governance practices may damage an 
MFI’s reputation and increase the challenge faced in attaining a sustainable position 
in the microfinance industry (Caudill, Gropper, & Hartarska, 2009; Hartarska & 
Nadolnyak, 2007; Lapenu & Pierret, 2006; Sinclair, 2012). Therefore, it is 
important to focus on ways to improve corporate governance practices across 
industries and sectors which lead to better performance. 
The health of a particular economy is highly dependent on the performance of banks 
and other financial institutions (Adams & Mehran, 2003). Advocates in the banking 
industry highlight the importance of ensuring an environment which supports sound 
corporate governance and the role of supervisors (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 1999; Morrison, Linda, & Colin, 2007; Mortlock, 2003). The presence 
                                                 
4 Enron and Tyco International (USA), HIH Insurance and OneTel (Australia) and Air New Zealand 
(New Zealand). 
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of sound regulation for the microfinance sector should help design comprehensive 
internal governance mechanisms. Substantial delays in implementing proper laws 
and regulations may cause failure in the industry. This study encourages policy 
makers to implement a sound regulatory framework for the sector. Morrison et al. 
(2007, p. 632) highlight that “given the breadth and depth of the financial services 
sector, analysis of the corporate governance features/requirements of specific sub-
sectors is appropriate”. More studies are needed that focus on institutions other than 
banks in the financial sector. MFIs represent a considerable proportion of the 
financial sector, especially in developing countries. Regulators and policy makers 
have concerns regarding the effect of governance on the performance of financial 
institutions as safe and sound financial institutions improve the health of the overall 
economy (Adams & Mehran, 2003). As a result, the boards of directors in financial 
institutions have a crucial role to implement an effective corporate governance 
structure for their firms. 
The significance of this study is further increased due to the growing international 
attention microfinance has received since the announcement by the Economic and 
Social Council of the United Nations (UN) that 2005 would be the “year of 
microcredit” and the following year, the awarding the Nobel Peace Prize to the 
Grameen Bank and Mohammad Yunus (Hermes & Lensink, 2007; Viada & Gaul, 
2012). Eight years earlier, in 1997, the Micro Credit Summit boosted awareness of 
MFIs as an initial step of a decade-long campaign to provide credit to 100 million 
of the world’s poorest families by increasing self-employment (Daley-Harris, 2006). 
As a result, more people are aware and extol the merits of microfinance and that 
has encouraged more people to become involved (Labie & Mersland, 2011). These 
initiatives have attracted more attention from national authorities and from 
international donor and development communities (Labie & Mersland, 2011). 
Furthermore, during the last decade, the industry attracted large amounts of money 
from international banking and investment communities. As a result, foreign capital 
investments (both debt and equity) in this industry more than tripled to USD 4 
billion (Reille & Forster, 2008) between 2004 and 2006. At the end of 2010, these 
investments had quadrupled and were calculated to be valued at USD 13 billion 
(Reille, Forster, & Rozas, 2011). This tremendous growth in the sector also creates 
a greater number of clients, assets and management structures. 
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MFIs have been criticised for drifting away from their mission. The performance 
of MFIs encompasses both financial performance of microfinance activities and the 
outreach to poor borrowers (Mersland & Strøm, 2009; Rock et al., 1998) which are 
not necessarily compatible (Hermes, Lensink, & Meesters, 2011). When MFIs 
concentrate more on financial performance, there is a risk of losing the vision of 
serving rural poor, achieving financial success through consumer loans to clients in 
urban areas (Hermes et al., 2011; Montgomery & Weiss, 2011; Rooyen, Stewart, & 
Wet, 2012). The New York Times also criticised the microfinance sector in general 
with a front page article titled: “Banks making big profits from tiny loans” (Sinclair, 
2012). Research has observed that this is related to MFIs’ corporate governance 
practices (Arena, 2012; Varottil, 2012) because corporate governance has the 
potential to significantly advance the mission duality of MFIs. This has become an 
important issue among policy makers, considering which model of corporate 
governance practices should be recommended for MFIs to enable them to perform 
better (Milana & Ashta, 2012) both financially and socially. The future success of 
the sector is dependent on finding ways to reconcile financial viability with social 
efficacy. However, there is limited scholarly research covering the social 
performance (outreach) of MFIs in relation to corporate governance. No studies 
have been conducted in South Asian countries to identify specific characteristics of 
corporate governance for MFI performance. This current research contributes to the 
body of knowledge by incorporating governance factors relating both to financial 
performance and outreach of MFIs.  
 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis  
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. 
Chapter 2 explains profound information about the microfinance sector. It discusses 
the definitions, historical expansion, developments and market size of the 
microfinance sector around the world. It then describes in depth the evolution of 
the sector, roles performed by different institutions and challenges prevailing in Sri 
Lankan and Indian microfinance sectors.  
Chapter 3 provides a review of theoretical and empirical literature relating to 
corporate governance which is significant to the focus of this study. In addition, this 
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chapter describes the nature of corporate governance in Sri Lanka, India and the 
microfinance sector. For regulators and professionals, it is necessary to understand 
why corporate governance is important and what factors contribute to firm 
performance. This chapter reviews significant theories and extant corporate 
governance literature to identify important corporate governance mechanisms for 
MFI performance.  
Chapter 4 reviews extant empirical corporate governance research and then 
considers the financial performance and outreach link, establishing nine hypotheses. 
The relationship between corporate governance, financial performance and 
outreach of MFIs in Sri Lanka and India are presented as testable propositions. 
Finally, this chapter discusses the independent, dependant and control variables 
employed in the analysis to follow, along with their respective measurement. 
Chapter 5 presents the research method, data collection process and the model 
specification used for the empirical analysis of the thesis. It further explains the 
MFI definition, sampling procedure, sample size, data cleaning and editing, the 
research model, data analysis techniques and specification tests.  
Chapter 6 describes the investigation of the nature of the relationship between 
corporate governance, financial performance and outreach of MFIs in Sri Lanka. 
Through this analysis, the study contributes to the understanding of how corporate 
governance affects MFI performance in Sri Lanka. 
Chapter 7 presents the examination of the relationship between corporate 
governance, financial performance and outreach of MFIs in India. The findings 
presented in Chapter 7 compare with Chapter 6 to understand the differences. The 
Indian results do differ from Sri Lankan results, and the question why is answered. 
Chapter 8 provides a discussion of the corporate governance and MFI performance 
based on a combined Sri Lanka – India sample, taking into account the national-
level governance characteristics. This analysis considers how national governance 
quality impacts MFI financial performance and outreach. Chapter 8 also 
investigates the relationship between corporate governance and MFI performance 
after controlling for potential sources of endogeneity.  
Chapter 9 concludes the thesis by providing brief information about the focus of the 
study, a summary of the findings, how the study contributes to the existing literature, 
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policy implications, limitations of the study and recommendations for potential 
future studies. This chapter summarises the results of testing hypotheses in chapters 
6, 7 and 8 and provides germane conclusions for the MFI sector. 
 
1.6 Conclusion 
The corporate governance - performance link is not a new research topic but there 
is much to learn because the impact of corporate governance on MFI performance 
has been under-emphasised. There is no substantive work using multiple MFI 
outcomes over a number of years that has been previously undertaken for South 
Asian countries. This lack of scholarly work is in part attributable to a preference 
for corporate governance studies to be directed towards for-profit companies in 
mature and emerging markets. Which corporate governance practices can help in 
promoting MFI sustainability and outreach among low-income people have not 
been investigated, especially in emerging countries such as Sri Lanka and India. 
Prior studies have also indicated unsuccessful implementation of corporate 
governance practices, but have not given weight to country-specific characteristics, 
which to date have not been well researched. It is hoped that this research will 
contribute to further development of corporate governance practices by offering 
useful lessons on how to improve MFI financial performance and outreach with 
better governance. 
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2 CHAPTER TWO 
BACKGROUND OF MICROFINANCE INDUSTRY 
 
2.1 Introduction  
The microfinance industry serves as an important provider of credit to poor and low 
income people who seek small amounts of money with little or no assets to offer as 
collateral. World Bank (2012a) data indicates 40% of the world’s population live 
with less than USD 25 per day. In developing nations around the world, MFIs are 
seen to play a significant role in eradicating poverty (Caudill et al., 2009; Zohir & 
Matin, 2004) as they can help low-income people by allocating resources and 
providing consultation to assist them with the aim to improve their standard of 
living (Helms, 2006). Public media has also extensively commentated on 
microfinance as an important instrument to combat extreme poverty in some nations 
(Hermes & Lensink, 2007). This promotes a need to determine frameworks for 
MFIs that promote sustained long-term services to underprivileged people 
(Mersland, 2009).  
Millions of people live without access to financial services and the demand for these 
services far exceeds the currently available supply. According to Sinclair (2012), 
the gap between demand and supply is known as the “missing middle.” This gap 
has arisen not due to the shortage of funds in the formal financial sector but due to 
lending to poor people, resulting in high transaction costs, moral hazards and high 
risk (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). Most of the formal banking sector and capital market 
systems in developing countries focus on people who are already have wealth and 
are better established (Daley-Harris, 2006; Wang, 2007).  
The formal banking sector only serves around 20% of the world’s population 
(Berenbach & Churchill, 1997; Robinson, 2001). Due to the lack of contribution by 
                                                 
5
 USD 2 is the median poverty line for developing countries which is higher than the average rate 
of USD 1.25 a day. According to Chen and Ravallion (2008), there are five international poverty 
lines. The lowest of these was USD 1.00 a day at 2005 prices, which is very close to India’s official 
poverty line. The next lowest was USD 1.25 a day, which is the average line of the poorest 15 
countries. The highest was USD 2.50 a day, which is the median of all countries except the poorest 
15 countries. 
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the formal banking sector to low income people, MFIs have a great chance to play 
a significant role at macro level to eradicate poverty in developing countries 
(Caudill et al., 2009; Helms, 2006; Zohir & Matin, 2004). Significant impacts on 
the living standards of millions of people who are usually unable to access financial 
services may be achieved through improvements in the performance of MFIs (Brau 
et al., 2009; Hermes & Lensink, 2007). It is important to understand the role of 
microfinance activities for economic growth and the regulatory and supervisory 
framework imposed by governments for MFIs. This chapter explains the history of 
MFI activities, definitions, growth and size of microfinance activities and the 
regulatory framework of different types of institutions in Sri Lanka and India.  
 
2.2 History of Microfinance Activities  
Small scale or local level self-help finance has been practised for years and has a 
long history (Helms, 2006) due to the importance of providing financial services to 
unbanked people in the world (Sinha, 2009). Group credits, moneylenders and 
informal small savings have been operating for many centuries across the world. 
Ardener (1964) and Khanka (2010) stated that informal microcredit and savings 
programmes have existed in many countries under different names, such as “susu” 
in Ghana, “chit funds” and “arisan” in India, “tandas” in Mexico, “tontines” in West 
Africa and “cheetu’ in Sri Lanka. The success and survival of various microcredit 
programmes have encouraged an expansion of geographically and regulatory 
frameworks and seen them embraced by the formal sector (Sinha, 2009). However, 
there has been very little study undertaking regarding the informal microcredit 
history due to the lack of documentary evidence.  
In the early 15th century Europe, the Catholic Church founded pawn shops as a 
substitute for moneylenders who were charging high interest rates from low income 
people. Throughout the century these types of shops became popular and numerous 
in urban areas across Europe (Helms, 2006). Formal financial institutions that 
provide microcredit and savings for the low income people, normally ignored by 
commercial banks, have also been around for generations in Europe. By the 18th 
century, the micro-bank development had begun in Europe (Robinson, 2002). In 
1778, the savings banks model began in Germany and spread widely into many 
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European countries in early 19th Century. The first saving bank was established in 
Prussia (Germany) with the objective of supporting the poor people. In the 1850s, 
two regions of Germany established financial co-operative banks and aimed to 
improve the welfare of rural people as they had been highly dependent on usurious 
moneylenders (Helms, 2006). 
In the mid-1800s, American political philosopher Lysander Spooner expressed the 
benefits of giving small credits to entrepreneurs and farmers who did not have their 
own capital to start their own businesses. He saw this process as a way to get people 
out of poverty. This concept made a big impact after the end of World War II with 
the Marshall Plan which provided monetary support to rebuild European 
economies. Microcredit activities were distinctly seen in late 18th century when 
Jonathan Swift inspired the Irish Loan Fund system and provided small loans to 
poor traders (Helms, 2006; Robinson, 2002). This model was extensively copied by 
the other wealthy individuals (Robinson, 2002) and activity expanded to middle 
Europe in the first half of the 19th century.  
The Dutch Colonial administrators had introduced several forms of People’s Credit 
Banks in Indonesia, and they became the largest microfinance system in Indonesia 
in 1895. Most of these new banks were owned by the government agencies or 
private banks. Many rural savings and credit themes appeared in the early 1900s in 
Latin America and were aimed to modernise the agriculture sector. During the 
period 1950 to 1970, the focus was on providing agricultural loans to small and 
marginalised famers with the intention of increasing their productivity and income 
(Helms, 2006). In this era, the formal microcredit sector began in various ways, 
resulting in more formal savings and credit institutions for the urban and rural 
people (Srnec & Svobodová, 2009). These institutions were established as People's 
Banks, Credit Unions, Savings and Credit Co-operatives and generated many 
different forms of microcredit and savings methods to the finance industry. 
According to Sengupta and Aubuchon (2008), the 1980s were the turning point in 
the history of microfinance due to the introduction of new lending approaches that 
mainly emerged among registered non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and in 
banks with special charters, such as the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, BancoSol in 
Bolivia and the village banks of Bank Rakyat Indonesia. These institutions are now 
commonly referred to as MFIs.  
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Many important personalities need to be merited in the subsequent upturn of the 
microfinance industry. The founder of the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh, the 
economics professor Muhammad Yunus, is the pioneer of microfinance who 
targeted poor people with the goal of lending mainly to women (Yunus, 2007). In 
2006, he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to reduce poverty in 
Bangladesh (Sengupta & Aubuchon, 2008). The Grameen Bank, regarded as the 
foremost bank of its kind to offer microcredits to the poor, confirms that not only 
are the poor creditworthy, but also their repayment rates are better than customers 
of traditional commercial banks (Yunus, 2007).  
Others who have contributed to the progress of the microfinance sector are Akhtar 
Hameed Khan (social scientist) who pioneered microcredit and microfinance 
initiatives by promoting participatory rural development through Rural Support 
Programmes in Pakistan (Srnec & Svobodová, 2009); John Keith Hatch (an 
American economic development expert) pioneered modern day microfinance and 
is regarded as the founder of the Foundation for International Community 
Assistance and Rural Development Services. He is well known for innovating 
village banking. In the early stages of MFIs, many new innovations entered the 
sector with a new wave of microfinance initiatives and numerous groundbreaking 
enterprises beginning to investigate ways to provide loans to poor people. 
 
2.3 Definitions for Microfinance and MFIs 
Over the last two decades, the microfinance field has grown from a narrow concept 
of microenterprise credit to more comprehensive concept of microfinance. This 
microfinance concept includes a range of services for low income people, such as 
savings, money transfer and insurance in addition to microcredits (Helms, 2006). 
Current interest in microfinance activities stems from the Microcredit Summit held 
on 2 - 4 February, 1997. Microfinance was formally defined at the summit as a 
programme that extends small loans to very low income people for their self-
employment projects, allowing them to care for themselves and their families.  
Definitions of microfinance naturally differ from country to country as there is no 
universally accepted definition. Important criteria used to define microfinance at 
the Microcredit Summit include:  
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 Size - loans are micro or very small in size  
 Target users – micro entrepreneurs and low income households  
 Utilisation - the use of funds for income generation and enterprise 
development, but also for community use (health, education and 
consumption) 
 Terms and conditions - most terms and conditions for microfinance loans 
are flexible and easy to understand, and are suited to the local conditions of 
the community 
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) defined microfinance as “the provision of a 
broad range of financial services as deposits, loans, payment services, money 
transfers and insurance to poor and low income households and their 
microenterprises” (2000, p. 2).  
Robinson (2001, p. 9) defines microfinance in an extensive way as,  
“small-scale financial services – primarily credit and savings - provided to 
people who farm or fish or herd; who operate small enterprises or 
microenterprises where goods are produced, recycled, repaired, or sold; 
who provide services; who work for wages or commissions; who gain 
income from renting out small amounts of land vehicles, draft animals, or 
machinery and tools; and to other individuals and groups at the local levels 
of developing countries, both rural and urban”. 
Burkett and Sheehan (2009, p. 2) define microfinance in the Australian context as, 
“a set of tools, approaches and strategies addressing the needs of people 
who are financially excluded. Microfinance offers low-income people 
access to basic financial services such as small loans, savings, insurance, 
bill-payment and money-transfer facilities, superannuation and financial 
advice. Microfinance seeks to provide fair, safe and ethical financial 
services for people who […] are not able to access mainstream financial 
services. Its purpose is to alleviate and eliminate poverty”.  
They have excluded the exploitative, predatory or unfair lenders in the definition.  
Hudon (2008, p. 3) stated that the task force on microfinance in India defined 
microfinance as the “provision of thrift, credit and other financial services and 
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products of very small amounts to the poor (mostly women) to enable them to raise 
their income and improve their living standards”. Some people argued that 
microfinance loans needed to provide only for income-generating activities, but the 
Centre for Microfinance of borrowers in Hyderabad states that “Microfinance is 
useful in smoothening consumption and relieving seasonal liquidity crises that visit 
poor families and that it obviates the need for high-cost borrowing from informal 
sources” (RBI, 2011, p. 6). Based on the recommendations of the Malegam 
Committee (a sub-committee of the Central Board of Directors of RBI) report, a 
separate category of NBFC-MFIs has been created to encourage the growth of the 
microfinance sector with an appropriate legal framework. Accordingly, NBFC-
MFIs defined as:  
“a company (other than a company licensed under Section 25 of the 
Companies Act, 1956) which provides financial services predominantly to 
low-income borrowers with loans of small amounts, for short-terms, on 
unsecured basis, mainly for income-generating activities, with repayment 
schedules which are more frequent than those normally stipulated by 
commercial banks and which further conforms to the regulations specified 
in that behalf” (RBI, 2011, p. 5).  
Section 40 of the Draft Legal Framework for the Regulation and Supervision of 
Microfinance Institutions in Sri Lanka 2015 (p. 16) describes the microfinance 
business as “accepting deposits and providing financial accommodation in any 
form; other financial services; or financial accommodation in any form and other 
financial services, mainly to low income persons and microenterprises”. 
 
2.4 Development of Microfinance Activities in the World 
Modern microfinance has its roots in the 1970s. Srnec and Svobodová (2009), 
indicate that development of MFIs can be divided into four phases: expansion (1970 
- 1980), growth (1980 - 1990), commercialisation (1990 - 2000) and transformation 
secularisation (2000 - present). During the expansion period, MFIs spread mostly 
in developing countries and those institutions did not consider profitability; they 
focussed solely on poverty reduction. People had much enthusiasm for MFIs that 
were characteristically self-sustaining, self-expanding and self-perpetuating. More 
informal types of MFIs, such as voluntary groups, were established to help change 
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the living standards of people who were unable to sustain themselves with basic 
needs. During this period, microcredit was generated through group lending 
methods and village banking methods.  
The growth period of MFIs was characterised by different types of MFIs which had 
significant financial dualism due to the coexistence of formal and informal MFIs. 
Even when formal MFIs dominated the municipal environment, they could not 
access the low income clients who were living in the municipal area due to their 
lack of familiarity with the needs of low income people. The informal sector was 
more wide-spread in rural areas but it was not quite transparent. Financial 
relationships were mainly based on historical, tribal, familiar and traditional 
relationships and the principle of these relationships was honour and promise. 
Formal MFIs had larger scope and were governed and controlled by the given 
public institutions with rapid growth in the number of served clients. 
Continuous growth of microfinance activities and the acceleration of transformation 
of informal MFIs to formal MFIs were the characteristics of the period of 
commercialisation in 1990-2000. Many organisations dealing with MFI activities 
accelerated the transformation, e.g. UNITUS6  in the USA. During this period, 
microcredit experienced considerable support from NGOs, governmental 
organisations and rapid growth in the number of served clients.  
During the transformation secularisation period (year 2000 onwards), microfinance 
created financial markets by attracting small- and medium- sized investors. This 
created a rapid rise in the entry of financial investors into financial markets in poor 
countries and led to increased interest rates in the sector. The rapid early growth of 
the microfinance movement primarily consisted of non-profit, socially motivated 
lenders seeking to reach as many low income clients with credit. Later they 
demonstrated that through the use of new lending technologies, such as joint 
liability contracts and dynamic incentives, a substantial portion of this new market 
could in fact be lent to profitably. This realisation has drawn profit-motivated 
lending institutions into these markets. With the growth of microfinance activities 
                                                 
6 UNITUS is a donor organisation which provides donations to worthy NGOs worldwide. Currently 
it leverages the Unitus Acceleration Model to partner with 23 MFIs in India, Southeast Asia, 
South/Latin America and East Africa to deliver quality microfinance service to poor people. 
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in developing countries financial regulators suggested the need to frame policies to 
be integrated with some of the MFIs in order to regulate the financial services 
(Sinha, 2009). 
The widespread enthusiasm for microcredit generated a dramatic increase in the 
microfinance activities in developing countries. In 1997, the Micro Credit Summit 
boosted awareness of MFIs as an initial step of a decade-long campaign to provide 
credit to 100 million of the world’s poorest families to enable them to become self-
employed and thereby move away from poverty (Daley-Harris, 2006). The year 
2005 marked a turning point for MFIs with the announcement of the International 
Year of Microcredit by the Economic and Social Council of the UN and the award 
in 2006 of the Nobel Peace Prize to Mohommed Yunus for his Grameen Bank 
concept (Hermes & Lensink, 2007; Viada & Gaul, 2012). According to the 
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP, 2010), there is a plan for further 
expansion of microfinance activities as they contribute to mitigating poverty and 
assist in the development process of a country. Possibly, there is more extensive 
support for microfinance today than any other single tool for fighting world poverty. 
McIntosh and Wydick (2005) found that activities of the microfinance movement 
have been both admired and sustained by a broad range of academic scholars and 
major development finance institutions such as the World Bank development 
practitioners and donors.  
Based on microfinance activities, microfinance providers can be divided into four 
general categories (Helms, 2006, pp. 35-57).  
1. Informal financial service providers – The informal sector is considered to 
be unorganised with non-institutional entities that transmit traditional, retail 
and subsistence socioeconomic services directly to poor and low-income 
clients. This sector comprises moneylenders, pawnbrokers, savings/deposit 
collectors, money-guards, Rotating Savings and Credit Associations 
(ROSCAs) and Accumulating Savings and Credit Associations with friends 
and neighbours. These providers live in the same community and know each 
other very well, so they can provide money in a very flexible, convenient 
and fast manner.  
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2. Member-owned organisations – These organisations include self-help 
groups (SHGs), credit unions, savings and credit co-operative, Financial 
Service Associations and Self-Managed Village Savings and Credit Banks. 
Similar to the informal sector, these organisations are also small, local and 
viable financial service providers with low transaction costs and offer 
convenient and flexible credits for their members. These organisations 
commonly rely on the savings of members as their main source of funds and 
group into federations at regional or national level.  
3. NGOs – Since the mid-1980s, NGOs have conducted their activities and are 
the true pioneers of the microfinance sector as they emerged with the 
objective to serve the poor people. Some NGOs are highly dedicated to 
microfinance activities, while other NGOs provide microfinance as an 
additional service with their range of other services. NGOs can be fully local 
or associated with international networks. Due to growth constraints, some 
leading NGOs are performing in a commercial way. 
4. Formal financial intuitions – Formal financial institutions are identified as 
those institutions which are monitored and supervised under the accepted 
rules and regulations imposed by the government. Formal institutions 
consist of government-owned agricultural, development, savings and postal 
banks, private commercial banks and non-banking financial institutions 
(NBFIs) and rural or community banks. These institutions offer a wide 
range of financial services through branches which are spread across the 
country and internationally. 
 
2.5 Market Size of MFIs  
Since the beginning of the Grameen Bank, microfinance has grown significantly on 
all continents and in numerous countries. By 2005, the Grameen Bank had 
experienced high growth rates and disbursed more than USD 5 billion loans to 
around five million borrowers in which more than 96% were women. Figure 2.5-1 
shows membership of Grameen Bank has grown by 817% from 0.9 million 
members in 1990 to 8 million members in 2009. 
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Figure 2.5-1: Grameen Bank Membership 
 
 
The Grameen Bank concept has also expanded to Bolivia, Chile, China, Ethiopia, 
Honduras, India, Malaysia, Mali, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, 
United States and Vietnam. According to the State of the Microcredit Summit 
Campaign Report 2012 (Maes & Reed, 2012), the total number of microfinance 
clients in the world grew by 15 times (13 million to 205 million) from 1997 to 2010 
(See Figure 2.5-2), which is the latest aggregate data available. However, the 
number of people MFIs serve is only small compared to the amount of people in 
need of such services in the world (CGAP, 2006; Ivatury & Reille, 2004). 
 
Figure 2.5-2: Client Growth 
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The Microfinance Global Valuation Survey (CGAP, 2010) shows that the level of 
poverty in some countries (such as Cambodia, India, Bangladesh and the 
Philippines) has reduced due to an increase in the number of MFIs in these countries. 
According to Daley-Harris (2009), the number of MFIs in the world increased from 
618 to 3,552 from 1997 to 2007. It is estimated that around 10,000 microfinance 
programmes existed in 2007 in the world (Ming-Yee, 2007), serving over 100 
million clients. The recent available estimations show that 1,000 to 2,500 MFIs 
have served 67.6 million clients in more than 100 countries (Sengupta & Aubuchon, 
2008). Figure 2.5-3 presents the median value of numbers of customers per 
institution served by each region in 20147. The highest value is represented by the 
South Asian region followed by the Middle East and North Africa. 
 
Figure 2.5-3: Number of Active Borrowers (median) per Institute by Region - 
2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The growth of foreign capital investment (both debt and equity) more than tripled 
to USD 4 billion (Reille & Forster, 2008) between 2004 and 2006. In 2010, it 
reached USD 13 billion, indicating that interest in MFIs is growing tremendously. 
Ivatury and Reille (2004) stated that nearly 90% of USD 1.1 billion of total 
microfinance investments received in 2003/4 came from governments, donors, and 
                                                 
7
 Microfinance Information Exchange Network; www.mixmarket.org. 
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multilateral agencies8. Although funds provided by governments and donors have 
increased over the years, evidence shows that most MFIs are faced with significant 
financial turbulence and uncertainty. As a result, the number of MFIs operating in 
many countries has declined over the years. According to the MicroBanking 
Bulletin (autumn 2007) survey based on the MIX 2006 dataset of 704 MFIs, almost 
41% of MFIs are not financially self-sustainable and are dependent on donor 
support to keep afloat (Mersland & Strøm, 2010). 
Accountability and transparency of donated funds are the important areas where 
MFIs need to improve. MFIs need good financial and management practices to 
operate their micro-financing activities more transparently and sustainably (Caudill 
et al., 2009). According to Otero (2005), investors are now turning their attention 
to the characteristics of the management structures and the quality of MFIs’ 
governing bodies. Any MFI that neglects adequate control and monitoring may 
suffer loss of reputation and face increased challenges in terms of achieving a 
sustainable position in the industry (Caudill et al., 2009; Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 
2007; Lapenu & Pierret, 2006).  
 
2.6 Microfinance in Sri Lanka and India 
This section provides background information relating to MFI activities in Sri 
Lanka and India. In addition to the structural evolution of MFIs in Sri Lanka and 
India, this study also provides information regarding the number of clients they 
serve, different types of organisational settings and their existing supervisory and 
regulatory requirements.  
 
                                                 
8 Multilateral agencies include International Financial Institutions, World Bank, UN and they have 
provided six times more funds for MFIs than bilateral donors.  
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2.6.1 Microfinance in Sri Lanka 
2.6.1.1 Evolution of MFIs in Sri Lanka  
GTZ-ProMiS (2010)9 stated that the microfinance movement in Sri Lanka began in 
1906 with the establishment of Thrift and Credit Co-operative Societies (TCCSs) 
during the British ruling period. Due to the growing number of TCCSs, the Co-
operative Societies Ordinance No.7 of 1911 was enacted to provide guidance and 
observation. The Dumbara Co-operative Credit Society was the first co-operative 
enacted in 1911 with the registration of the ordinance. These TCCSs fulfilled a 
wider role during the early decades of the 20th century, also being involved in 
procurement of inputs and distribution of products. The role was eventually taken 
over by the Multi-Purpose Co-operative Societies (MPCSs) which were first 
established during the 1940s as Consumer Co-operative Societies and were later 
renamed MPCSs in the 1950s (SAMN, 2010). 
The Country-Level Effectiveness and Accountability Review in Sri Lanka (Duflos, 
Ledgerwood, Helms, & Moyart, 2006) observes that the network of TCCSs was 
weak and had declined by the late 1970s. However, TCCSs have been re-organised 
under a new name, “SANASA 10 ”. The SANASA TCCSs are member-owned 
societies, grouped together as a federation but coming under the purview of the 
Department of Co-operative Development (DCD), which was established in 1930. 
Parallel to the SANASA TCCSs, the MPCSs and Co-operative Rural Banks (CRBs) 
also fall under the purview of the DCD (Modoran & Grashof, 2009). 
GTZ-ProMiS (2010) indicates that by the late 1980s and early 1990s several local 
and international NGOs entered the microfinance business. Many of these NGO-
MFIs initially combined their microfinance activities with other social and 
community development activities. However, more recently, the trend has been to 
separate the microfinance and non-microfinance activities of some of these 
                                                 
9 GTZ-ProMiS is a microfinance sector promotion programme (ProMiS) implemented by the Sri 
Lankan Ministry of Finance and Planning in partnership with the Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) on behalf of the German Federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development. 
10 SANASA is a specialised bank having the majority shareholding with the primary societies and 
the district unions and provides loans direct to qualified primary societies. 
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institutions due to the fact that operation of microcredit activities is completely 
different from charitable activities. Through this period, the Sri Lankan government 
established 17 Regional Rural Development Banks (RRDBs) by enacting the 
Regional Rural Development Banking Act, no 15 of 1985. These institutions were 
given the task of reaching remote rural areas and smallholders who lacked access 
to financial services from commercial banks (Modoran & Grashof, 2009). 
However, their success was limited by internal structural weaknesses and excessive 
geographical fragmentation. In addition, the RRDBs lacked sound lending and 
monitoring policies, and operations were difficult to improve and standardise.  
A significant restructuring and recapitalisation took place in 1998-1999 and the 17 
state-dominated RRDBs were amalgamated into six independent Regional 
Development Banks (RDBs) with more autonomous management, a broader 
ownership base and board members appointed by shareholders (SAMN, 2010). The 
intention was to create more professional operations and improve viability and 
sustainability. However, it is unlikely to be a viable institutional form for NGO-
MFIs which yearn for formal status in the industry. In May 2010, under a new 
parliamentary Act of Pradeshiya Sanwardana Bank Act No.41 of 2008 (amended 
by No.30 of 2011), the six RDBs were merged into a single RDB. It was expected 
that the mergers would result in reduced costs and improve operating efficiency. As 
a large nationwide entity, the new bank is also expected to be more successful in 
securing credit lines from international funding agencies (GTZ-ProMiS, 2010) for 
the development of regional infrastructure and small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs).  
 
2.6.1.2 Role of formal financial institutions in the microfinance sector 
Competition in the microfinance sector has encouraged financial deepening as 
formal financial institutions seek to reach lower income clients. An emerging trend 
is the entry of commercial banks, Registered Finance Companies (RFCs) and other 
large corporate entities into the microfinance business (Duflos et al., 2006). The 
microfinance industry report of Sri Lanka (GTZ-ProMiS, 2010) indicates that 
Hatton National Bank’s “Gami Pubuduwa” (“Village Awakening”) microfinance 
programme is probably the oldest microfinance programme among the licensed 
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commercial banks, having been established in 1989. The Gami Pubuduwa loan 
portfolio stands at Sri Lankan Rupees (LKR) 2.0 billion reaching 15,000 micro 
entrepreneurs across the country. According to the Duflos et al. (2006), among all 
Sri Lankan RFCs, Lanka Orix Leasing Company Micro Credit (LOMC), which is 
a partnership of the local Lanka Orix Leasing Company (LOLC) and FMO11 of the 
Netherlands was the first company that has provided financial services to the low-
income population. Since its entry into the microfinance business in 2003, LOMC 
has grown to reach a loan portfolio of LKR 3.2 billion serving a client base of close 
to 23,000 through a network of service centres located in post offices and fuel 
stations. This has been followed by the establishment of several other RFCs such 
as Alliance Finance Company, Arpico Finance Company, Bimputh Finance 
Company, Chilaw Finance Limited etc. However, for many formal financial 
institutions, their entry into microfinance is more a corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) or image building activity. 
 
2.6.1.3 Government involvement in the microfinance sector 
The Government of Sri Lanka is playing a key role in strengthening the regulatory 
and supervisory framework for financial services and in the delivery of 
microfinance services to the low-income people. Various government initiatives in 
the microfinance sector have been implemented from time to time. Approximately, 
65% of microcredit in Sri Lanka is provided through the government. The Samurdhi 
Development Programme, which was introduced in 1995, replacing the previous 
Janasaviya Programme, is the largest microfinance programme in Sri Lanka 
(Modoran & Grashof, 2009) and is the government’s poverty alleviation program, 
targeting the low-income population. It covers nearly 50% of total households. 
GTZ-ProMiS (2010) states the programme is administered under the Samurdhi 
Authority of Sri Lanka, under the Ministry of Samurthi, Agriculture, and Livestock, 
but is essentially self-supervised. Samurdhi Bank Societies (SBSs) are the 
government’s main subsidised institutions established in 1996 as a part of the 
                                                 
11 FMO (Dutch word) is known as the Netherlands Development Finance Company and it is the 
international development bank of the Netherlands. It invests money for private sector projects in 
developing countries and emerging markets. 
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Samurdhi Programme. In July 2007, there were around 1,038 SBSs in Sri Lanka 
(SAMN, 2010), which account for more than 5 million depositors and almost 
500,000 borrowers. Further the state-owned RDBs have a combined market share 
of around 18% and a broad customer base, especially in agriculture, livestock, small 
industries, and trade (ADB, 2012). 
 
2.6.1.4 Growth and challenges for prevailing MFIs 
Following the tsunami which struck Sri Lanka in 2004, there was an influx of 
foreign aid to the country and a substantial amount was channelled to the 
microfinance sector. While many donors worked through established MFIs, some 
funded the establishment of multi-sectorial livelihood programmes which include 
microfinance components. These were largely unsustainable in the long-term and 
had some detrimental impacts on the sector in the short-term through their mix of 
grants and subsidised loans, resulting in damage to the established credit culture. 
GTZ-ProMiS (2010) shows that regional MFIs such as BRAC Bangladesh12 also 
entered the sector after the tsunami and rapidly scaled up to become a significant 
player among NGO-MFIs. BRAC’s operations in Sri Lanka had an outreach of 
100,000 microfinance clients by the end of 2009, less than five years after its entry 
into the sector. 
A report into the state of microfinance in Sri Lanka prepared by Institute of 
Microfinance13 states that there were about 1,061,457 active borrowers in 2008 in 
20 key MFIs, compared to 981,724 in 2006 from the same 20 MFIs. In terms of 
portfolio growth, the total outstanding loan balance was around LKR 18 billion 
(USD 157 million) in 2008 which is around a LKR 6 billion (USD 52 million) 
increase compared with 2006. Growth indicators for a sample of institutions (not 
including CRBs and SBSs), mainly comprised of key NGO-MFI players, show that 
                                                 
12 BRAC Bangladesh is a development organisation founded in Bangladesh in 1972, dedicated to 
poverty alleviation. 
13 Institute of Microfinance is a non-profit organisation which conducts research and training needs 
for national as well as for global microcredit and poverty reduction programmes. 
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the number of active clients is growing. The growth will continue with the 
expansion of microfinance activities in North and East Sri Lanka. 
Absence of a cohesive regulatory and supervisory system for the microfinance 
sector has in recent years become a barrier to growth of the sector (Modoran & 
Grashof, 2009). Normally, the formal MFIs are regulated by the banking and non-
banking regulations. But this does not apply for semi-formal institutions, especially 
the NGO-MFIs, which receive substantial donor support for their operations. 
Presumably the formal sector regulations are effective than the semi-formal and 
informal sector, in terms of internal controls, governance and ownership structure 
(Haq, Hoque, & Pathan, 2008). Therefore, it is important to have a sensible 
regulatory framework for MFIs in Sri Lanka, similar to the banking industry.  
In the Sri Lankan microfinance sector, funding has become a key issue, especially 
for NGO-MFIs, which are currently not authorised to accept public deposits and are 
further restricted from obtaining off-shore debt and equity funding under prevailing 
exchange control restrictions. CGAP (2010) shows that accessing domestic funding 
is also an issue, as local banks and other funding agencies are still reluctant to lend 
to or invest in the microfinance sector due to the perception of high risk. In these 
circumstances, both the government and microfinance practitioners have come to 
recognise the need for an appropriate regulatory and supervisory mechanism for the 
sector. As a result, a draft legal framework for the regulation and supervision of 
MFIs has been submitted to the government by LMFPA in 2015. 
 
2.6.1.5 The financial sector of Sri Lanka  
The financial system of Sri Lanka consists of financial institutions such as the 
Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL), Licensed Commercial Banks (LCBs), Licensed 
Specialised Banks (LSBs), RFCs, Specialised Leasing Companies (SLCs), 
Insurance Companies (IC), unit trusts, merchant banks, venture capital companies, 
authorised primary dealers, stock brokers and dealers, and contractual savings 
institutions such as the Employees’ Provident Fund and the Employees’ Trust Fund. 
These are operated within formal financial markets (e.g. the bond market, foreign 
exchange market, money market and equity markets) and supported by financial 
infrastructure containing payment and settlement systems. In addition, there are 
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number of rural banks, TCCSs, pawnbrokers and MFIs. Further, there are a large 
number of moneylenders and ROSCAs.  
The apex financial institution in the banking sector in Sri Lanka is the CBSL, which 
is responsible for supervision and examination of banks and the financial sector in 
Sri Lanka. It operates under the provisions of Monetary Law Act No 58 of 1949 
which determines the functions of, confers powers, and imposes responsibilities 
upon the Monetary Board of the CBSL. Among 24 LCBs, two were owned by the 
government in 2012. Of the remaining LCBs, nine are owned locally and 13 are 
owned by foreign banks. The number of LSBs declined from 14 to nine during the 
period 2007 to 2012 and currently they are engaging in more narrowly defined 
functions which means they are not allowed to offer current accounts to customers, 
but are allowed to offer savings accounts. However, during the period 2007 to 2012 
the RFCs have increased from 31 to 4514. RFCs are permitted by the CBSL to accept 
public deposits, whereas SLCs can raise funds from the public by issuing debt 
securities and usually they are attached to banks or finance companies to meet their 
funding requirements. 
 
2.6.1.6 Types of MFIs in Sri Lanka 
There are various categories of MFIs operating under different regulation and 
ownership in Sri Lanka, such as banks, finance companies, guarantee companies, 
co-operatives, NGO-MFIs (GTZ-ProMiS, 2010). Classification of MFIs leads to a 
focus on the nature of MFIs so that the researcher investigates the different 
regulatory requirements applicable for each and every classification of MFI (See 
Figure 2.6-1). As per the CGAP (2006), all the MFIs in Sri Lanka are broadly 
categorised into three sectors;  
1.) Formal microfinance sector  
This sector comprises the LCBs, LSBs, RFCs, SLCs, SBSs and ICs. LCBs, LSBs, 
RFCs and SLCs are under the regulation and supervision of the CBSL. Among the 
24 LCBs, nearly six banks provide finance to low-income people in Sri Lanka. The 
                                                 
14 See http://www.cbsl.gov.lk/htm/english/05_fss/popup/registered_fc.htm.  
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more significant players in LCBs are the government-owned People’s Bank and the 
privately owned HNB and Commercial Bank. The RDB caters to the higher end of 
the microfinance market and the SME sector. The RDB and SDB are the only LSBs 
with a focus on microfinance. RFCs such as LOMC, Alliance Finance Company, 
Arpico Finance Company, Bimputh Finance Company and Chilaw Finance 
Limited, etc, are engaged in the microfinance activities. 
2.) Semi-formal microfinance sector 
This sector comprises the 1,608 CRBs, more than 7,400 TCCSs, SANASA 
Societies (SSs) and NGOs. CRBs, TCCSs and SSs are member-owned societies and 
are permitted to mobilise savings which they use to fund credit facilities but they 
can take savings from the public only. CRB branches are associated with MPCSs, 
but their performance has been hindered by weak governance of MPCSs. TCCSs 
are setup by the SANASA movement and they have access to the SDB. 
Enormous local and international NGOs are involved in microfinance activities, 
while some are now operating their microfinance activities separately from their 
other operations (SAMN, 2010). NGO-MFIs in Sri Lanka operate in a grey area as 
their microfinance activities are neither governed nor supervised by any specific 
regulation. Some NGO-MFIs are registered with the Department of Social Services 
or established as limited by guarantee companies or private companies, initially 
under the Companies Act No. 17 of 1982 and subsequently required by law to 
register under new Company Act No. 7 of 2007.  
3.) Informal sector /non-institutional suppliers  
Funeral societies, savings associations, credit associations, traders, and 
moneylenders are the main categories of this section. ROSCAs, which are 
commonly known as “Cheetu”, are the popular method of informal money supplies 
in Sri Lanka. Similar to most of other countries, Sri Lanka also has moneylenders 
who provide credit to low-income people at usury rates (more than 20% per month) 
and pawnshops that are conducting their financial services under the informal 
sector. This study does not consider this category for data collection. 
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Figure 2.6-1: Categories of MFIs in Sri Lanka 
 
 
 
 
2.6.1.7 Regulatory framework of MFIs 
The term ‘regulation’ refers to the different laws in Sri Lanka that precisely deal 
with microfinance organisations, whereas the term ‘regulated’ refers to the 
institutions that are under the supervision of CBSL (Atapattu, 2009). Different types 
of MFIs exist as legal entities because they are registered under various types of 
laws, however, there is no any specific regulatory or supervisory authority to 
regulate or monitor MFI activities. Some institutions are regulated by many 
authorities and some may not have any regulation at all. The scope of the 
regulations is presented in Appendix 01. 
 
2.6.2 Microfinance in India 
2.6.2.1 Evolution of MFIs in India 
The microfinance industry in India has been progressing for many years. The 
SAMN (2010) stated that the evolution of the Indian microfinance sector can be 
broadly categorised into four segments based on various time dimensions: the co-
operative movement (1900–1960); subsidised social banking (1960–1990); SHG 
Bank linkage programme (SHG-BLP) and growth of NGO–MFIs (1990–2000); and 
Commercialisation of microfinance (after 2000).  
During the co-operative movement, credit co-operatives were recognised and 
established a vast network of rural co-operative credit banks in the 1950s (Basu & 
Srivastava, 2005) under government sponsorship. Co-operatives did not receive 
continuous government funding from the national budget so they raised funds by 
themselves or borrowed money from commercial banks at competitive interest 
rates. In early 1960, many co-operatives failed and it affected the credit flow of 
agriculture and small industry (Mohan & Prasad, 2005, p. 26). 
Informal Sector 
Semi-Formal 
Sector 
Formal Sector 
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With the failure of co-operatives, the Indian government and state provinces 
focused on nationalisation of commercial banks (Zhang & Wong, 2014), expansion 
of rural branch networks, establishment of Regional Rural Banks (RRBs) and the 
setting up of the Apex15 institutions. This was the era between 1960 and 1990 and 
the concept was known as subsidised social banking, which exerted the social 
objectives rather than commercial purpose or profitability (Mohan & Prasad, 2005, 
p. 26). This 30-year period was characterised by large scale misuse of credit which 
created a negative perception about the credibility of micro borrowers among 
bankers, which further hindered access to banking services (Basu & Srivastava, 
2005). 
The SHG-BLP and the NGO-MFIs became effective during 1990 to 2000 (Zhang 
& Wong, 2014) due to the failure of subsidised social banking and increased 
competition in the banking sector (Basu & Srivastava, 2005). The failure created a 
paradigm shift in delivery of rural credit with the National Bank for Agriculture and 
Rural Development (NABARD) 16  forming the SHG-BLP, aiming to connect 
informal women’s groups to formal banks (Sinha, 2009). The programme helped to 
increase the banking system among low income people, unbanked people, and 
initiated a change in the banks’ outlook towards low-income families from 
beneficiaries to customers (Kumar & Sahoo, 2011).  
Commercialisation of microfinance became a key concept in the first decade of the 
new millennium reforms (Zhang & Wong, 2014). NGO-MFIs increasingly began 
transforming themselves into more regulated legal entities, such as NBFCs, to 
attract commercial investment (Srinivasan, 2010; Zhang & Wong, 2014) and 
mobilise deposits (Basu & Srivastava, 2005). MFIs set up after 2000 observed 
themselves less in the developmental model and more as businesses in the financial 
services space, catering to an untapped market segment while creating value for 
their shareholders (Sriram & Rajesh, 2004). On September 28, 2006, the RBI 
arranged broad guidelines on fair practices that are framed and approved by the 
                                                 
15 An Apex institution is a second-tier or wholesale organisation that channels funding (grants, loans, 
guarantees) to multiple MFIs in single country or region. Funding may be provided with or without 
supporting technical service (Basu & Srivastava, 2005; Mohan & Prasad, 2005; Tsai, 2004). 
16 NABARD is a specialised country-level rural credit agency which was established in 1982. 
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boards of directors of all NBFCs. This guidelines state that relevant provisions of 
fair practices to be incorporated in the Customer Protection Code that NBFC-MFIs 
should adopt (RBI, 2011, p. 23).  
 
2.6.2.2  Role of formal financial institutions in the microfinance sector 
Competition in the banking sector has encouraged financial deepening as formal 
financial institutions seek to reach lower income clients. There has been an 
emergence of a new generation of private sector banks, such as ICICI bank, UTI 
bank and HDFC bank, which have become important players in the microfinance 
sector. In one notable example, the ICICI17 bank has shown a great interest in 
entering the rural financial sector in India and introduced new approaches, and 
financial products to the rural market (Basu & Srivastava, 2005).  
On the other hand, commercial banks along with government Apex institutions 
have been the major sources of debt funding to Indian MFIs. As per RBI regulations 
in India, domestic and foreign commercial banks were required to lend 40% and 
32% of funds respectively to the priority sectors and lending to microfinance 
qualifies as priority sector lending (RBI, 2011). As of March 2009, banks and 
financing institutions had a total exposure to MFIs of USD 2.45 billion. This 
represents an almost 150% increase from the exposure in March 2008. 
Consequently, as at 31 March 2010, the total funds given by banks and financial 
institutions was USD 3.11 billion. However, to the RBI (2011), this is not a 
significant amount. There has been a rise in non-traditional products such as non-
convertible debentures, securitisations and portfolio buyouts available to MFIs 
through domestic as well as foreign debt funds. As a result, today, larger MFIs have 
adequate and easy access to debt financing. However, smaller and emerging MFIs 
are still struggling to find adequate funds as they have unproven business models 
and present a higher default risk to banks. Alternative debt providers are emerging 
                                                 
17 ICICI bank is the second largest private commercial bank in India. ICICI utilises a new approach 
called a partnership model which allows several hundred MFIs to partner with ICICI bank by 
functioning as an agent for the bank. It provides funds to partner MFIs for their lending operations. 
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in an attempt to fill this gap with subordinated-debt, guarantees and pooled 
securitisations.  
 
2.6.2.3 Government involvement in the microfinance sector 
The Indian government is playing a key role in strengthening the regulatory and 
supervisory framework for financial services and in the delivery of microfinance 
services to low-income people (Basu & Srivastava, 2005). In 1995, the Indian 
government established Rural Infrastructure Development Fund in NABARD as a 
solution for the shortfall in providing funds by the commercial banks to priority 
sector lending (RBI, 2012b). In order to provide access to credit, the Indian 
government announced an interest subsidy for public sector banks, RRBs and Co-
operative banks. During 2011 and 2012, it was decided to provide a new line of 
short-term refinance facilities for public sector banks and RRBs from NABARD to 
strengthen finance position of primary agricultural credit societies. In association 
with the Indian government, a scheme for promotion and financing of Women 
SHGs in 150 districts in India was implemented (RBI, 2012b).  
Sa-Dhan and the Microfinance Institutions Network work together in discussions 
with the government and RBI about the issues affecting the microfinance sector. 
Highmark Credit Information Services Limited, which is a credit information 
bureau that focuses on MFIs, initiated its operations during 2011 and provided 
credit information services to a large number of for-profit and not-for-profit forms 
of MFIs in India. Further, in 2010, Microfinance Transparency implemented its 
operations in India and in February 2011 published data for around 80 MFIs. The 
Ministry of Rural Development, launched the National Rural Livelihoods Mission 
as a plan to invest significantly in intermediate-level institutions that are providing 
financial services to poor people (Srinivasan, 2011). 
 
2.6.2.4 Growth and challenges for prevailing MFIs 
The overall coverage of the sector (outstanding accounts of members of SHGs and 
clients of MFIs) reached 76.6 million by March 2009. After adjusting for overlaps, 
the net client base of the microfinance sector is estimated at 70 million with an 
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outstanding microcredit portfolio of about USD 4.4 billion (Srinivasan, 2009). In 
2010, this sector added 10 million new clients and USD 1.56 billion increment in 
outstanding loans (Srinivasan, 2010). Customer growth between 2008 and 2010 
totalled 140.52% and the outstanding portfolio rose by 201.34% (RBI, 2011). The 
number of MFI loan borrowers in 2011 was approximately 26 million, one of the 
highest in Asian region (Zhang & Wong, 2014). MIX stated that India was the world 
leader in the microfinance industry as 20 MFIs in India were ranked in the world 
top 100 MFIs in 2009.  
One of the major challenges ahead for India is to ensure broader access to financial 
services (Basu & Srivastava, 2005). In India, up to 87% of the poorest households 
do not have access to credit while approximately 90 million low income households 
remain under served. The World Bank and the National Council of Applied 
Economic Research pointed out that more than 70% of rural people in India do not 
have a bank account, although recent government initiatives announced in 2014 are 
making inroads into the numbers. As a whole in India, less than 5% of rural poor 
households have access to microfinance, whereas borrowers only account for 2.2% 
of the total population (Zhang & Wong, 2014). A significant variation exists across 
the states in India where 75% of the microfinance funds flow to southern states 
which have the highest GDP and number of bank branches (Basu & Srivastava, 
2005).  
Transformation of MFIs still continues among NGO-MFIs as they seek to become 
for-profit companies in the NBFC model. But then again these institutions have 
ignored the issues related to the post transformation as how they balance and fulfil 
the needs of customers and investors (Srinivasan, 2010). Furthermore, the amount 
of grants and savings has declined over the years. Therefore, another enormous 
challenge that MFIs in India face is their financial returns. In 2011, return on assets 
(ROA) is recorded as negative 10.1% which is a significant decrease from 2.67% 
in 2005-2010. The main reason for this drop is the Andhra Pradesh crisis18 in 2010 
                                                 
18 There was a microfinance crisis in Andhra Pradesh which is the capital of microfinance in the 
country (as rumour has it about 30% of MFI loans), with increasing numbers of suicides among 
over-indebted clients in some of India’s biggest MFIs: SKS Microfinance, Spandana, Share, and 
others. In order to meet MFIs’ growth targets, credit officers often sell loans to clients who are 
already indebted to other organisations and increase their indebtedness. This resulted in a number 
of suicides among MFI clients as they were unable to settle their loans. Further, the default rates of 
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and the enactment of Andhara Pradesh Act by the state government of Andhra 
Pradesh soon after the crisis which meant MFIs were prevented from collecting 
unpaid loans and accessing bank funding to protect borrowers (Zhang & Wong, 
2014). The crisis brought government attention to the matter and highlighted the 
need to regulate and monitor MFI activities in India. The minister of finance in 
India indicated in his budget speech that “the Government is considering putting in 
place appropriate framework to protect the interests of small borrowers” 
(Srinivasan, 2011). 
  
2.6.2.5 The financial sector of India 
The financial sector of India consists of a variety of financial institutions such as 
189 commercial banks, 96 RRBs, 1,854 urban co-operative banks, 31 state-level 
co-operative banks, seven development finance institutions, 13,020 NBFCs, around 
100,000 village-level co-operative societies and other financial institutions, 
including 155,000 post office network (Basu & Srivastava, 2005; Frankfurt School 
of Finance & Management, 2009; Sinha, 2009). RBI controls all the banking 
operations in India, which is the national central bank of India established in 1935. 
RBI is the regulator of the financial and banking system in India as the authorisation 
was given by the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 and the RBI Act, 1934 in India 
(RBI, 2012b).  
NBFCs in India are an important part of the microfinance sector. These institutions 
engage in various financial activities by providing different kinds of financial 
services to Indian communities, such as loans, investments, and asset financing 
(leasing and hire purchases). NBFCs are incorporated under the Companies Act of 
1956 and categorised into two broad areas based on the liability structure; they are 
NBFCs accepting public deposits and NBFCs not accepting/holding public deposits 
(NBFCs-ND). During 2011 and 2012, three new categories of NBFCs were created: 
the Infrastructure Debt Funds NBFC (NBFC-IDF), Micro Finance Institution 
NBFC (NBFC-MFI) and NBFC-Factors (RBI, 2012b). Accordingly, NBFCs are 
                                                 
microfinance loans tended to increase. The reported unpaid loan balance of 10 large MFIs in the 
state of Andhra Pradesh was around USD 550 million by the end of March 2011. This increases the 
portfolio at risk in the sector (Srinivasan, 2011). 
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also classified into Asset Finance Companies, Investment Companies, Loan 
Companies, Infrastructure Finance Companies, Core Investment Companies, 
NBFC-IDF, NBFC-MFI and NBFC-Factors, based on the activities they conduct. 
As per the RBI (2012a), an NBFC-MFI needs to be an NBFC-ND organisation with 
minimum net-owned funds of Indian Rupees (INR) 50 million (INR 20 million for 
the North-Eastern Region), not less than 85% of its assets in the nature of 
‘qualifying assets’ and the income derived from the remaining 15% assets must 
comply with the specified regulations. Further, NBFC-MFI must satisfy the 
following criteria:  
 loan disbursed by an NBFC-MFI to a borrower with a rural household 
annual income not exceeding INR 60,000 or urban and semi-urban 
household income not exceeding INR 120,000; 
 loan amount does not exceed INR 35,000 in the first cycle and INR 50,000 
in subsequent cycles; 
 total indebtedness of the borrower does not exceed INR 50,000; 
 tenure of the loan not to be less than 24 months for loan amount in excess 
of INR 15,000 with prepayment without penalty; 
 loan to be extended without collateral; 
 aggregate amount of loans, given for income generation, is not less than 
75% of the total loans given by the MFIs; 
 loan is repayable on weekly, fortnightly or monthly instalments at the 
choice of the borrower. 
 
2.6.2.6 Types of MFIs in India 
The microfinance sector in India comprises the SHG-BLP, NBFC-MFIs that are 
registered with the RBI and all the other small not-for-profit MFIs that are 
registered as charitable trusts or societies (RBI, 2012b). However, according to 
SAMN (2010) and Sinha (2009) there are only two major microfinance delivery 
models in India - the SHG-BLP and MFI model. Agreeing to the RBI (2011), these 
MFIs can be categorised broadly in four ways as follows; 
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1. SHG-BLP – This model 19  was started in 1980s by social-development 
NGOs (Basu & Srivastava, 2005). At present 50% of the SHC-BLPs are promoted 
by the government (the rural branches of state-owned commercial banks, RRBs and 
co-operative banks) and the rest of them are promoted by the NGOs and other banks. 
These programmes are pursued to be strengthened through the grants, training and 
capacity building assistance provided by the NABARD. This model was pioneered 
by the NABARD in 1992 with the guidelines issued by the RBI. SHG-BPLs 
account for around 58% of the outstanding loan portfolio and more than 75% of 
disbursements are in the Southern region.  
2. MFIs – Under the two principal lending models, most top MFIs apply the 
Grameen group lending methodology to deliver their loans to poor as it allows them 
to expand their activities quicker than those using the SHG-BLP model. According 
to the Frankfurt School of Finance & Management (2009) there are around 800 
MFIs in India. However, it is difficult to estimate the exact number of Indian MFIs 
due to the diversity of registration authorities in the country. A survey conducted 
by MIX market in 2006 found that the seven largest MFIs served around 67% of 
the borrowers and the three largest institutions served around 54% of borrowers, 
based in south India20. 
3. NBFCs registered with the RBI - Most of the top MFIs are dominated by 
NBFCs as their aggregate outstanding loan portfolio is 60% of the total loans in the 
MFI sector. NBFCs are recognised as an important service provider to the small 
clients because of their localised presence, a higher level of customer orientation 
and lower documentation requirements. In order to improve such services, the RBI 
started to regulate NBFCs from 1996. Malegam Committee prepared a report to 
study the issues and concerns in the MFI sector in India. This committee reviewed 
definitions of microfinance and MFIs for the purpose of regulating the NBFCs 
undertaking microfinance activities and studied the issues and concerns relating to 
interest rates and lending and recovery practices of the microfinance sector. Also 
                                                 
19 In this model, women are encouraged to form a SHG group and required to contribute small 
savings to the group. Individual savings in the group can be used to lend by the members in the 
group for income-generating activities and other livelihood promotions. 
20 MIX Market, 2006, Performance and Transparency: A Survey of Micro Finance in South Asia, 
MIX Market, Washington, DC. 
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they scrutinised the role of MFI bodies to enhance the best practice and 
transparency of the sector (RBI, 2011). For-profit MFIs are most widely recognised 
under this category due to the nature of their operations. Under this model, people 
in villages are encouraged to form Joint Liability Groups (JLGs) and provide loans 
to the members of the JLG. These individual loans are guaranteed by the other 
members of the group. The Microfinance India State of the Sector Report 2010 
highlighted an increasing trend for JLGs to get the advantage of loans from MFIs 
(Srinivasan, 2010).  
4. Other small not-for-profit MFIs – These types of MFIs such as trusts, 
societies, section 25 companies are account for about 8% of the total outstanding 
loan portfolio. Further, they represent a large number of entities. These categories 
also have a long history and are governed by different regulatory authorities. The 
governance structure of these institutions is mostly informal except for section 25 
companies as they have relatively better and more formal governance. These 
institutions are not allowed to mobilise deposits as per the RBI guidelines (Sa-Dhan, 
2006).  
In addition to the above categories, there are co-operative societies in between for-
profit and not-for-profit entities (Sinha, 2009). They were introduced in India in the 
early 19th century as a defensive organisation to deal with problems of rural 
indebtedness of famers to moneylenders. Co-operative credits on easy terms freed 
the famers from borrowing money at usurious rates of interest through 
moneylenders and became the dynamic economic tool to achieve the social 
objectives in India.  
 
2.6.2.7 Regulatory framework of MFIs 
The coverage and scope of regulations related to MFIs in India are particularly 
different from other countries due to not only the industry size but also the strong 
formal public sector (Sinha, 2009). When compared to other South Asian countries, 
India has a comprehensive regulatory framework to govern its financial intuitions, 
but there is no sector-specific regulatory or supervisory framework to monitor 
microfinance activities (Kaladhar, 1997; Sa-Dhan, 2006) except for NBFC-MFIs. 
Advocates of Indian MFIs argue that the immediate action needs to be taken to 
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develop a set of prudential norms and set up a supervision mechanism to monitor 
those norms, enabling MFIs to better serve their clients (Basu & Srivastava, 2005). 
The different types of MFIs, according to their institutional status, are regulated 
under their respective Apex body. The scope of the different regulations is 
presented in Appendix 02. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter explains how microfinance activities evolved around the world. With 
the widespread enthusiasm for microfinance activities, many people and 
organisations have contributed to the growth of this sector. This chapter discusses 
the different definitions related to microfinance activities and institutions as there 
is no universally accepted definition for microfinance. An overview of the 
development of microfinance activities around the world is provided followed by a 
discussion on the market size of MFIs. While the concept of microfinance is not 
entirely new, as similar forms have been operating for many centuries across the 
world, the rapid expansion does present challenges for its development and this 
study can contribute to the development of the sector. The role of MFIs in both Sri 
Lanka and India is surveyed in depth whilst identifying the contribution to be made 
through this research. Further, this chapter presents the evolution of the sector, the 
role of formal financial institutions in the sector, government involvement in the 
sector, growth and challenges prevailing in the sector and finally, different types of 
organisations in the microfinance sector with regard to Sri Lanka and India. This 
chapter has reviewed the microfinance industry around the world with special 
reference to Sri Lanka and India. 
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3 CHAPTER THREE 
LITERATURE REVIEW ON CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Prior studies find that good corporate governance practices affect the performance 
of a firm. It is suggested that “Good corporate governance is essential to the 
effective operation of a free market, which enables wealth creation and freedom 
from poverty” (Financial Reporting Council, 2010, p. 1). MFIs play an important 
role in development and it is germane to examine how the evolvement of corporate 
governance systems impacts the performance of MFIs. In order to have a better 
understanding of the relationship between corporate governance and MFI 
performance, a starting point is to review prior research on corporate governance 
and organisational performance.  
This chapter first describes the evolution of corporate governance systems around 
the world, different definitions given by various authorities and the importance of 
corporate governance for entity performance. There are several major theories 
relating to corporate governance and consideration of these sheds light on key 
corporate governance characteristics that impact firm performance. The potential 
for scrutinising the implications of corporate governance practices in terms of Sri 
Lanka and India is reported in this chapter. The discussion can then link the nature 
of corporate governance as it exists in the microfinance sector and its impact on 
MFI performance, both financial and outreach. Finally, the corporate governance 
characteristics are discussed as an initiation for the model specification of the next 
chapter.  
 
3.2 Evolution of Corporate Governance 
In 1776, Adam Smith, in his well-known book ‘The Wealth of Nations’, expresses 
a concern about separating ownership from management, noting that shareholders 
need to develop a mechanism to control managers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In 
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the early seventeenth century, meetings were conducted by men sitting on stools 
around a long board laid across two sawhorses. The group of men became, known 
as the “board”. The board’s leader was given a chair instead of a stool and became 
known as the “chair-man” (Monks & Minow, 2004, p. 180). Tricker (2000, p. 289) 
states that “although the theoretical exploration of the subject is relatively new, the 
practice of corporate governance is ancient” as it has been practised for more than 
a thousand years.  
In academic studies, corporate governance has been a more recent field of study. 
According to Pye (2000) and Tricker (2000), phrases like ‘corporate governance’ 
and ‘shareholder value’ were almost absent in the literature in the early 1980s as 
people ran their organisations smoothly without any tactical, ethical and profitable 
difficulties. In the late 1980s curiosity in corporate governance grew rapidly among 
academics and other stakeholders such as practitioners, legislators, policymakers, 
creditors and shareholders, as their organisations experienced difficulties in raising 
money and more difficult economic times beset them (Pye, 2000; Vinten, 1998).  
Stakeholder concerns for corporate governance are more noteworthy with stock 
market crashes in 1987 and 199221, the Lloyds Underwriters22 disaster and Long 
Term Capital Management collapses 23 . In response to such matters numerous 
reports were written by, for example, the Cadbury Committee, the Greenbury 
Committee, ISO 9000, the Hampel Committee and Turnbull in UK (Pye, 2000; 
Vinten, 1998). Comparable reports were written in the USA and were followed by 
Canada, South Africa, Australia and Japan, including collaborative partnerships 
with the management accountants and internal auditors (Vinten, 2001a).  
Stakeholders still find the behaviour and quality of corporate governance 
unacceptable due to the world famous corporate scandals which were associated 
with the failure of corporate governance systems. As a result of the scandals, new 
                                                 
21 1992 stock market crash occurred on 16 September 1992 (Black Wednesday), when the British 
government was forced to withdraw the pound sterling from the European Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM) due to the fluctuating pound sterling from other member currencies by more 
than 6%. In UK, many people recall Black Wednesday as a “National Disaster” while others says 
that forced ejection is a “Golden Wednesday” or White Wednesday”. 
22 Lloyd’s underwriters is one of the top underwriters in the world, registered in UK. 
23 Long Term Capital Management was a hedge fund management firm in USA. 
Chapter 3 Literature Review on Corporate Governance 
 
49 
 
governance rules have been introduced by legislators around the world, such as 
CLERP 9 in Australia, Combined Code in the UK, and the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Code. The East Asian financial 
crisis and the global financial crisis brought another wave of introspection to 
corporate governance and highlighted the importance of having a broader 
understanding of corporate governance and its impact on firm performance. 
Company annual reports now contain more information concerning governance 
practice of company boards. 
 
3.3 Definitions of Corporate Governance  
While there are many definitions of corporate governance in the literature, no single 
definition has gained overwhelming acceptance. The definitions may vary 
depending on the author and the dominant theory upon which the author draws. 
When ownership of a company is separated from the management, then issues 
relating to governance arise. Tricker (2000, p. 289) suggests the following questions 
are important when ownership is not applied directly to control the investment:  
“How is oversight to be exercised over those delegated to the task of 
running the venture; how are the owners’ interests to be protected; who 
sets the direction of the enterprise and ensures its accountability; how is 
power over the enterprise legitimised; to whom is a company accountable 
and, ultimately responsible? […] Corporate governance is about the 
exercise of such power”.  
The Cadbury Committee Report (1992) suggests: "Corporate governance is the 
system by which companies are directed and controlled" (para 2.5). Those control 
mechanisms are necessary for organisations to achieve their corporate missions 
(Bassem, 2009). Sir Adrian Cadbury, in his speech to the Global Corporate 
Governance Forum, stated that “the corporate governance framework is there to 
encourage the efficient use of resources and equally to require accountability for 
the stewardship of those resources. The aim is to align as nearly as possible the 
interests of individuals, corporations and society” (Cadbury, 2000, p. 1). Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997, p. 737) explain that “Corporate governance deals with the ways 
in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return 
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on their investment”. This is a narrow but precise definition for corporate 
governance capturing the core concern in the finance literature with agency costs 
and their resolution. 
According to Mathiesen (2002), corporate governance is a field of economics that 
investigates how to secure/motivate efficient management of corporations by the 
use of incentive mechanisms such as contracts, organisational design and legislation. 
This is often limited to the question of improving financial performance, for an 
example, how corporate owners can secure/motivate the managers, which leads to 
delivery of a competitive rate of return. Solomon (2007) states that most 
institutional investors’ views on corporate governance are strongly aligned with 
Parkinson’s (1994 cited in Solomon, 2007, p. 13) definition where “corporate 
governance is the process of supervision and control intended to ensure that the 
company’s management acts in accordance with the interests of shareholders”. 
Blair (1995, p. 3) points that corporate governance refers “to the whole set of legal, 
cultural and institutional arrangements that determine what publicly traded 
corporations can do, who controls them, how that control is exercised and how the 
risks and returns from the activities they undertake are allocated”. 
In a recent view, Brown, Beekes, and Verhoeven (2011) state that corporate 
governance is the process, customs, laws and policies that the board of directors use 
to direct, monitor and control firms and ensure the accountability and transparency 
in relationships of firms with its financiers, customers, managements, employees, 
creditors and government. They highlight the importance of external parties in an 
organisation and distinguish between internal and external corporate governance 
characteristics. Structures and processes that are within the control of the firm’s 
shareholders and the board of directors are considered to be internal governance 
characteristics. The external governance characteristics are based on the results of 
decisions by external parties, such as the decisions of financial institutions, auditors, 
financial advisors, and corporate and government regulations. 
 
3.4 Importance of Corporate Governance for Entity Performance  
The East Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the global financial crisis in 2007 are, 
in part, indicators of non-compliance of corporate governance practices and failures 
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in investor protection (Brunnermeier, 2009; Erkens et al., 2012; Radelet et al., 1998). 
Many famous corporate scandals and failures have occurred, for example Enron, 
Tyco International and Qwest Communications in United States of America, HIH 
Insurance, One.Tel, Harris Scarfe in Australia and Air New Zealand24. These led to 
a call for backing investor protection and good corporate governance practices 
(France et al., 2002 ; Lockhart, 2004; Radelet et al., 1998). Similarly, evidence 
relating to the microfinance sector also suggests that a lack of corporate governance 
practices can cause problems relating to firm sustainability and loss of clients. The 
malpractices of some MFIs in Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka in India are said to 
have ultimately increased the debt liability of low income borrowers and forced 
them to commit suicide (Galema, Lensink, & Mersland, 2012). 
It has been thoroughly argued by many scholars, why and how boards and 
shareholders could let these scandals happen and more specifically, why the 
corporate governance systems failed so massively. Varma (2005, p. 200) 
emphasises that “the performance penalty that comes from governance failures in 
companies is too serious for the institutions to ignore”. Deficient risk management 
practices, weaknesses in board composition and the failure of non-executive 
directors and shareholders to effectively monitor and scrutinise the decisions of the 
boards are highlighted as key areas, requiring reforms to avoid future failures 
(Brown & Gladwell, 2009).  
The debate that follows each “crisis” focuses on ways to improve corporate 
governance practices across industries and sectors. Evidence shows that improved 
corporate governance practices lead to an improvement in firm performance 
(Chung, Wright, & Kedia, 2003; Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998; 
Hossain, Cahan, & Adams, 2000). It is asserted that organisations need good 
corporate governance practices to achieve better performance and to build their 
reputation. It helps decision makers, such as investors, donors, managers and 
government authorities, to reach their decisions efficiently and effectively. These 
ideas have support in various reforms and standards, established at individual 
                                                 
24 Air New Zealand has agreed to pay a penalty of $7.5 million to settle the long-running, multi-
airline cargo price-fixing scandal. Air New Zealand colluded on fixing the prices of fuel and security 
surcharges for air cargo (Georgina Bond, 2013). 
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country level and also at an international level (e.g., the Sarbanes-Oxley [SOX] Act 
2002 in the US, CLERP 9 in Australia, Combined Code in the UK, and the OECD 
Code).  
 
3.5 Theories in Corporate Governance 
There are two main parties in an organisation; principals (owners/shareholders) and 
agents (management/employees) and the separation of owners from company 
control gives rise to potential conflicts of interest between the principal and the 
agent appointed by the owners to manage the company operations (Cadbury, 2003; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Solomon, 2007; Tricker, 2000). It is necessary to have a 
comprehensive structure of controls that encourages efficient performance and 
responsible behaviour to operate within the organisation in order to limit any 
discrepancy in interests and ensure appropriate accountability of resources. 
Corporate governance is therefore used to prevent any conflicts of interest between 
principal and agent that may result in fraudulent behaviour or cause a decrease in 
shareholder wealth. 
There are ongoing debates regarding mechanisms that allow shareholders to control 
their managers and encourage goal congruence between shareholders and managers. 
Based on the arguments of separation of ownership, several theories have been 
developed for corporate governance. There is no unified corporate governance 
theory (Carver, 2007; Kiel & Nicholson, 2003; Letza, Sun, & Kirkbride, 2004; 
Pettigrew & McNulty, 1995) as many theories are used in this field, such as agency 
theory, stewardship theory, stakeholder theory and resource dependence theory. 
Although most corporate governance literature is written from an agency theory 
viewpoint, an increasing portion of the literature is looking at corporate governance 
through different theoretical lenses (Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003).  
 
3.5.1 Agency theory 
The problem of principal and agent has been debated since Berle and Means (1932) 
gave their focus to the separation of modern corporate management from its owner. 
Agency theory is considered to be the ‘Bible’ of corporate governance (Huse, 2007) 
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and dominates the academic literature (Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004). Its theoretical 
arguments are in economics, finance and organisational theory, and it has 
influenced regulators in several countries when looking to reform corporate 
governance activities (Cornforth & Edwards, 1999). Many studies of corporate 
governance emphasise the impact of agency theory on company value in 
maximising the wealth of shareholders, as this theory is highly concerned with the 
owners’ perspective (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Mitchell, 
Agle, & Wood, 1997). 
An agency relationship is defined as “a contract under which one or more persons 
(the principal/s) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their 
behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent” 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 308). There is a likely conflict of interest between the 
owner and the agent, arising from separating the ownership from control, as both 
parties wish to obtain maximum benefit for themselves from minimum possible 
expenditure (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Monsen & Downs, 1965). According to 
John and Senbet (1998), agency issues arise due to the excessive perquisites, 
underinvestment, overinvestment, risk shifting, asymmetric information, 
bankruptcy and financial distress. 
Both parties have different interests and the principal cannot ensure the agent is 
always taking decisions that best meet the principal’s interests. For example, when 
a firm makes a considerable amount of money, agents might spend the money on 
wasteful projects or use the money to buy other companies which may not be able 
to maximise the value of the firm. Agency theory highlights that when the interests 
of the principal and the agent vary, the principal incurs agency costs to implement 
several internal and external mechanisms to control their agents (Davis, Schoorman, 
& Donaldson, 1997; Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Hill & Jones, 1992; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973; Short, Keasey, Wright, & Hull, 1999).  
Hansmann (2000, p. 38) defines agency costs as “the sum of the costs incurred in 
monitoring and the costs of managerial opportunism that result from the failure or 
inability to monitor with complete effectiveness”. Principals need to bear a number 
of agency costs, such as monitoring expenditure, bonding expenditure and residual 
losses (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and the costs of structuring, monitoring and 
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enforcing contracts (Fama & Jensen, 1983). However, to reduce the effects of 
agency cost, principals need to implement effective and efficient corporate 
governance practices in their organisations (Eisenhardt, 1989; Hill & Jones, 1992; 
Ross, 1973). 
Agency theory has been used by many disciplines as an important theory as well as 
a controversial theory when studying corporate governance (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Mitchell et al., 1997). It provides a suitable way of explaining relationships when 
both interests are at odds and better agreements can be implemented through 
appropriate monitoring and a well-organised compensation system. According to 
agency theory, director boards are appointed by the shareholders to monitor the 
activities of management, and this monitoring process can be performed through 
independent non-executive directors and CEO/chairman duality. 
Researchers have argued that this theory is simple and human beings are more 
complex than described in this model which doesn’t capture the fruitfulness of 
human relations (Doucouliagos, 1994). Therefore, additional theory is needed to 
clarify other types of human behaviours and this is found in literature outside the 
economic perspective.  
 
3.5.2 Stewardship theory 
Agency theory has its roots in economics and finance and other disciplines have 
brought forward theories. Stewardship theory emerges from the disciplines of 
psychology and sociology (Muth & Donaldson, 1998). As a result of the arguments 
in agency theory, Donaldson and Davis (1991) developed a new theory, known as 
‘stewardship theory’ as a counter strategy to agency theory. They argued that 
agency theory was simplistic and ambiguous and suggested that the usual conflicts 
of interest between the principal and agent could be prevented by having senior 
executives act as stewards for the betterment of shareholders’ interest. This theory 
assumes that the manager makes decisions in the best interest of the organisation, 
even when their interests are not aligned with the principals’ interests, because they 
think the ultimate benefit comes when the organisation thrives.  
Stewardship theory pinpoints that managers work not only for financial reasons but 
for non-financial motives such as recognition, intrinsic satisfaction of successful 
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performance, respect for authority and a work ethic (Muth & Donaldson, 1998). 
Further, concepts like these are well supported in the organisational literature 
(Herzberg, 1966; McClelland, 1961). According to stewardship theory, stewards 
are working to maximise the organisational performance with the objective of 
getting benefit from a strong organisation. They perceive better value in co-
operative behaviour and therefore behave accordingly; their behaviour can be 
considered rational. The stewards attempt to achieve organisational objectives such 
as profitability and this behaviour benefits the principals through better profits. 
They maximise shareholder wealth by achieving good performance so that stewards 
are able to maximise their utility functions.  
Arthur, Garvey, Swan, and Taylor (1993) claimed that Donaldson and Davis (1991) 
misunderstood agency theory because they analysed shareholders’ interest 
incorrectly. This view revitalised agency theory to a modern perspective. Further, 
Arthur et al. (1993) argue that the Donaldson and Davis (1991) theory is on the 
grounds that managers are motivated by the debt and capital structure of the firm 
so that the firm creates long-term wealth for their owners.  
Agency and stewardship theories of management explore the extent to which 
authority should be given to managers and examine the set of assumptions that the 
owner has regarding the manager, as well as the effect those assumptions have on 
management decision making. In agency theory, the owner begins with the 
assumption that the manager seeks to maximise his or her individual utility whereas 
stewardship theory begins with the assumption that there is a strong relationship 
between the success of the organisation and the principals’ satisfaction. However, 
both theories focus on the leadership philosophies adopted by the owners of an 
organisation. 
 
3.5.3 Stakeholder theory 
Stakeholder theory is an extension of agency theory and was developed by R. E. 
Freeman from the 1984 publication of Strategic Management - A Stakeholder 
Approach. In response to the changes that occurred in the business environment in 
the 1980s, scholars developed a new conceptual framework and broadened the word 
‘stockholder’ by defining stakeholders as “any group or individual who can effect 
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or is affected by the achievement of the organisation’s objectives” (Freeman, 2010, 
p. 25) such as owners, employees, customers, competitors, suppliers, 
environmentalists, governments, local community organisations and all the other 
groups who play a vital role in the success of a business in today’s environment. 
The origins of stakeholder theory are in politics, law and management theory. But 
in recent years this theory has been dominant in corporate governance studies 
(MacMillan & Downing, 1999). In stakeholder theory, the board role is to perform 
as the representatives of stakeholders in the corporation (Freeman & Reed, 1983). 
When boards are making their corporate decisions, they need to consider the 
interests of other stakeholders, not only the interests of shareholders. Based on the 
various assumptions about the stakeholder theory, Huse and Rindova (2001, p. 157) 
outline different board functions, such as advice, influence, information, initiation, 
legitimation, lobbying, monitoring, ratifying and supporting.  
Donaldson and Preston (1995) state that stakeholder theory rejects shareholder 
wealth maximisation as morally untenable. Jones and Wicks (1999) suggest that 
this theory understands that human behaviour is more complex than self-serving. If 
a company looks after its stakeholders, acts morally and attends to social purposes 
then the company will be more successful (Letza et al., 2004). Boards have to 
explore the expectations of various stakeholder groups by explicating and 
comparing, and they also need to assess the importance and power of stakeholders 
as they diverge (Freeman & Reed, 1983; Huse & Rindova, 2001). They have to 
maintain an appropriate balance between the various demands and make trade-offs 
between stakeholders (Vinten, 2001b). However, boards need different types of 
measures to recognise aspects of firm performance, such as generation of goodwill 
(MacMillan & Downing, 1999, p. 19) and CSR (Jones & Wicks, 1999, p. 209).  
According to Donaldson and Preston (1995), stakeholder theory does not provide 
any guidance for the board about the legitimate stakeholders. Even though 
stakeholder theory has become a staple in management theory, Sternberg (1998, p. 
127) states that it is “fundamentally misguided, incapable of providing better 
corporate governance, corporate performance or corporate conduct. The 
stakeholder doctrine [theory] is indeed intrinsically incompatible with all 
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substantive corporate objectives, and undermines both private property and 
accountability”.  
 
3.5.4 Institutional theory 
Institutional theory provides a rich and complex view of an organisation and has 
spread rapidly due to the influences of institutional forces on organisational and 
decision making processes (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000; Zucker, 1987). 
This theory emphasises that an organisation’s activities and behaviour are affecting 
and encircled by the political, social and economic systems surrounding the 
organisation (Scott, 2001). In recent years, institutional theory has evolved as a 
major theory for explaining an organisation’s structure and its actions, as it 
“emphasises that organisations, organisational fields, and nations are more than a 
means to produce goods and services – they are also social and cultural systems” 
(Judge, Douglas, & Kutan, 2008, p. 766). The fundamental rationale behind 
institutional theory is that people can increase their understanding of an 
organisation by examining the normative environment in which an organisation 
exists (Martinez & Dacin, 1999) and it suggests that the actions of organisations 
occur as a response to conditional and pressures inherent in the environment (Badry, 
2009, p. 18).  
Scott (2001) pinpoints that institutional theory has three levels of analysis. The 
highest level consists of the societal and global institutions which smooth and shape 
the structures and actions in lower levels. The second level has governance 
structures that consist of organisational fields and organisations themselves. These 
governance structures are based on the rules, norms, understandings and routings 
(March & Olsen, 1989). At the final level, there are the actors who may be the 
individual or groups. Each level is highly important as it influences “the forces of 
diffusion and imposition of institutional norms while inventing new ways of 
operating and negotiating the establishment of institutional norms” (Judge et al., 
2008, p. 768). These influences lead organisations to be guided by legitimated 
elements, from standard operating procedures to operational certificate and state 
requirements (Zucker, 1987). This highlights that institutional theory is 
heterogeneous and its adoption depends on the individual organisation and the 
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institutional environment (Scott, 2001). Further, this theory is highly important for 
developing countries, because the development of formal and informal institutional 
systems is a main characteristic of these countries. 
Organisational theorists continue to devote their attention to finding increased 
convergence and integrative efforts among the organisational theories as they strive 
to provide a better understanding of organisational activities. As such, Martinez and 
Dacin (1999) integrate the relevant aspects of transaction cost theory and 
institutional theory in order to strengthen the explanatory power of both theories. 
However, in contrast to the traditional agency theory or transaction cost theory, 
Davis (2005) highlighted that the most promising and significant corporate 
governance studies try to recognise the institutional environment which occurs from 
a sociological perspective. Also, new institutional economics are now moving their 
focus from firm-level individuals to institutional environments as a strategy to 
explain corporate governance behaviour and its results in a better way 
(Groenewegen, 2004). An important area of concern is the interaction of firms and 
institutions, resulting from market imperfection and efforts to obtain legality with 
the corroboration of social expectation and embeddedness of the organisation 
(Badry, 2009).  
 
3.5.5 Resource dependency theory 
Resource dependency theory has its roots in economics and sociology and, in the 
opinion of some researchers, has become one of the most influential theories in 
organisational theory and strategic management (Collins, Withers, & Hillman, 
2009). The theory highlights that organisations are interdependent with their 
environment as they have to survive with other organisations and their resources 
(Collins et al., 2009; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Provan, 
1980). Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) state that “to understand the behaviour of an 
organisation you must understand the context of that behaviour - that is, the ecology 
of the organisation” (p.1). The ecology of organisations has three major themes; the 
importance of the environment or the social context of organisations, the 
importance of opportunities to do things such as co-opting, and the importance of 
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the construct of power for understanding both intra-organisational and inter-
organisational behaviour (p. xii). 
This theory characterises the organisation as an open system and as a result it needs 
to find ways of managing this system by ensuring that it gets the resources and 
information it needs. In this theoretical context, the role of the corporate board is 
boundary-spanning as the board is part of the organisation and its environment. As 
per the theory, boards decrease ambiguity by creating powerful links between 
organisations and try to co-opt external influences (Provan, 1980). The main 
function of the board is to maintain good relationships with key external 
stakeholders to ensure the resources flow and to assist the organisation to react to 
external change. 
Board members include stakeholders and influential community parties who can 
provide legitimacy and prestige with their knowledge, skills and important external 
links (Hillman, 2005; Huse & Rindova, 2001; Provan, 1980) which are aligned to 
environmental dependencies (Hillman, 2005; Westphal, 1999). Based on this theory, 
organisations require larger boards with greater external linkages to resources and 
higher quality advice to improve firm performance (Dalton, Daily, Johnson, & 
Ellstrand, 1999; Provan, 1980). Therefore, boards are driven by external directors 
with some executive directors required for firm-specific information (Dalton et al., 
1999). Researchers argue that this theory raises firm performance and increases 
returns to shareholders (Dalton et al., 1998; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003) but does not 
envisage boards as evaluators of management (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Boards 
can advise management on the external environment where it helps to reduce the 
uncertainty and aid firm survival by dealing with external threats (Dalton et al., 
1998). 
 
3.5.6 Legitimacy theory 
Legitimacy is a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity 
are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of 
norms, values, beliefs, and definitions (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). Legitimacy is 
socially constructed. It reflects the congruence between the behaviours of the 
organisations and the shared beliefs of some groups in society. Legitimacy 
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improves the organisation’s stability and compensability of its activities. This 
theory is based on the idea that in order to continue operating successfully, 
corporations must act within the bounds of what society identifies as socially 
acceptable behaviour (O'Donovan, 2002). When an organisation fails to conform 
with society in an acceptable manner, it can lead to restrictions being imposed on 
the organisation’s operation, resources and demand for its products and ultimately 
its survival. 
Why should organisations be socially responsible or legitimate? In the corporate 
arena, it appears to be a necessary condition to generate acceptable returns for 
shareholders. However, there is growing body of research emphasising that 
organisations should satisfy a broader group of stakeholder expectations reflecting 
an interest in more than just financial aspects of the organisation (Dowling & 
Pfeffer, 1975; O'Donovan, 2002). Organisations operate in a social system and 
society gives them permission to own and utilise natural resources and obtain 
human resources (Deegan, 2006; Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975). They should fulfil the 
expectations of society at large, not merely the investors’ requirements as 
mentioned in shareholder theory. Therefore, organisations should be socially 
responsible in the way they operate and in their use of resources.  
Legitimacy theory signifies that organisations in the business environment have a 
social contract with society and the existence of those organisations depends on 
society approval (Deegan, 2006). The aim of the social contract between the 
organisation and individual members of society specifies that an organisation can 
make a profit but at the same time they have a moral obligation to act in a socially 
responsible manner (O'Donovan, 2002).  
When there is an actual or potential disparity between organisational actions and 
society values then there will be a threat to the organisational legitimacy which 
creates a legitimacy gap. This threat may take place in the form of legal, economic 
or other social sanctions (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975). Corporate governance plays a 
vital role in recognising any legitimacy gap between organisation and society and 
responsible to bring about congruence with the organisation’s objective to 
legitimise its operations within the society in which it operates. 
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3.6 Empirical Implication of Corporate Governance 
In 1992 the Cadbury Committee identified many issues in theories relating to 
corporate governance in terms of management discipline. It made recommendations 
for best corporate governance practices, for which standards are determined by the 
actions that companies are using to direct and control their firm and by the legal, 
financial, and ethical environment in which they work (Cadbury, 2003). Hart (1995) 
points out that the Cadbury recommendations on corporate governance are general 
and help to ensure that companies are managed appropriately. But the Cadbury 
recommendations are not a substitute for governance mechanisms. As Hart (1995, 
p. 688) argues:  
“corporate governance issues arise wherever contracts are incomplete and 
agency problems exist […] a market economy can achieve efficient 
corporate governance by itself […] it is important to ensure that existing 
mechanisms can operate freely to provide appropriate checks and balances 
on managerial behaviour”. 
Traditional firms have faith in corporate governance as a technique to mitigate 
agency cost by managing and monitoring agents’ work in principals’ business entity. 
At present, in a contemporary turbulent business environment, corporate 
governance is an essential adherence function. Shareholders and boards need to take 
various corporate governance actions, such as selecting board members, 
establishing committees and their members, appointing the CEO and appointing 
company auditors. Then they can delegate powers, duties and responsibilities 
accordingly to different functionaries against a framework of common practices or 
the practices recommended in codes of best corporate governance. 
Although there are several theories that relate to corporate governance practices, 
such as, agency theory, stewardship theory and resource dependence theory, there 
is no unified corporate governance theory (Carver, 2007; Kiel & Nicholson, 2003; 
Letza et al., 2004; Pettigrew & McNulty, 1995). Furthermore, evidence shows that 
different countries and industries react differently in terms of corporate governance 
practices (Bonn, 2004; Craswell, Taylor, & Saywell, 1997; Farrar, 2001; Hanson, 
Dowling, Hitt, Ireland, & Hoskisson, 2002). For example, SOX Act 2002 in the US, 
Combined Code in the UK, and the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance in 
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OECD member countries. Also, corporate governance researchers have tended to 
focus attention on developed economies whereas studies on corporate governance 
issues relating to emerging economies (such as India and Sri Lanka) have not been 
well-developed (Daily et al., 2003).  
 
3.7 Corporate Governance System in Sri Lanka 
The Code of Best Practice on matters related to financial aspects of corporate 
governance was first issued in 1997 as a voluntary best practice code by the Institute 
of Chartered Accountants of Sri Lanka (ICASL), which was the first appearance of 
corporate governance in Sri Lanka. To be in line with the Combined Code of UK 
the existing code was subsequently updated and issued in 2003 as the Code of Best 
Practice on Corporate Governance. The corporate governance system in Sri Lanka 
is heavily influenced by the British model and covers not only financial aspects of 
corporate governance but also directors, shareholders and auditors in the firm. 
In 2008, with the collaboration of Securities and Exchange Commission of Sri 
Lanka, the ICASL revised the Sri Lankan Code of Best Practice on Corporate 
Governance. The revision in 2013 was also jointly initiated by these two regulatory 
bodies after reviewing the UK Corporate Governance Code, Code of Corporate 
Governance in Singapore, Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations 
of the Australian Securities Exchange, Report of the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) Commission on Corporate Governance, the Malaysian Code on Corporate 
Governance and Corporate Governance Voluntary Guidelines in India.  
Corporate governance codes have evolved in Sri Lanka during the past 15 years 
from a voluntary code of compliance to mandatory rules. Listed companies in Sri 
Lanka have had to comply with these codes since 2008 after it was incorporated 
into the Colombo Stock Exchange (CSE) 25 listing rules from 2007 (section six of 
the listing rules deals with the corporate governance rules). These mandatory rules 
are to help listed companies to enhance their board effectiveness and strengthen 
their business integrity. In addition, there has been a positive effect on corporate 
                                                 
25 The CSE is the main stock exchange in Sri Lanka and has 243 listed companies which represent 
20 different business sectors. 
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governance practices in Sri Lanka through the economic and financial sector 
reforms and capital market development in recent years. For example, the CBSL 
issued Direction on Corporate Governance for LCBs and RFCs in 2008 (CBSL, 
2012b, 2013). 
In the Code of Best Practice on Corporate Governance, the company boards should 
have a balance of executive and non-executive directors. Sufficient number of non-
executive directors is considered necessary to promote more transparent and 
unbiased decision making. Accordingly, a company board should consist of at least 
two non-executive directors or one third of the total number of directors, whichever 
is higher. Further, these non-executive directors should be independent of 
management and free of any relationship with the business. The code also highlights 
that there should be a clear division of responsibilities between chair and CEO of 
the company, and if both roles are combined then there should be a justification 
included in the annual report. Where both roles are embraced by one person, then 
the majority of the board should comprise non-executive directors. In addition, all 
listed companies should have an independent internal audit function to provide a 
reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of company objectives. The 
internal auditor reports to the board subcommittees, such as the audit committee. 
(Code of Best Practice on Corporate Governance 2013).  
 
3.8 Corporate Governance System in India 
The concept of corporate governance was emphasised in India after commercial 
liberalisation began in 1991 and the establishment of the Securities and Exchange 
Board of India in 1992 (Afsharipour, 2009). There has been spectacular growth in 
the size of the Indian stock market since then but also many corporate scams such 
as the Ketan Parikh scam, the Harshad Mehta Stock Market scam and Vanishing 
Company scam. Indian companies had poor disclosure practices, boards of directors 
without adequate fiduciary responsibilities, disagreeable stock market practices and 
a general lack of transparency in commercial activities. Therefore, it was necessary 
to establish reforms and global standards for the companies to reformative actions 
for economic stabilisation.  
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With the launch of the Cadbury Committee Report, the Confederation of Indian 
Industry (CII)26 , the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Security and 
Exchange Board of India (SEBI) initiated development and promotion a code for 
corporate governance which could be adopted by the corporate entities in India. The 
first voluntary code of corporate governance in India has launched by the CII and 
it was in line with the Cadbury Committee Report, which was the primary source 
for Indian corporate governance rules. This endeavour came in April 1998 under 
the name of “Desirable Corporate Governance: A Code (CII Code)”. The second 
major initiative was undertaken by SEBI in 1999 by establishing two committees 
to improve the standards of good corporate governance. In early 2000, these two 
committees made key recommendations concerning the existing code of corporate 
governance in India and changes were incorporated into Clause 49 of the Listing 
Agreement of the Stock Exchange (Afsharipour, 2009; Som, 2006). 
Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement applies to all listed companies in India. Indian 
listed companies should appoint an optimum combination of executive and non-
executive directors to their boards. This leaves company boards to exercise 
objective judgments on corporate matters which are independent from management 
whenever there is a conflict of interest (SEBI, 2004). Furthermore, Clause 49 has 
both mandatory and non-mandatory requirements for listed companies. As an 
example, the constitution of an audit committee is mandated for the listed 
companies but the constitution of a remuneration committee is a non-mandatory 
provision in Clause 49 (Som, 2006).  
After the introduction of Clause 49 in the Listing Agreement of the Stock Exchange, 
the importance of corporate governance reached a dominant phase in India. The 
MCA established the National Foundation for Corporate Governance in association 
with CII, the Institute of Company Secretaries of India and Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of India to enhance the awareness of implementing good corporate 
governance in corporations. Concurrently with the above initiatives, the MCA and 
the Ministry of Finance of the Government of India also formed committees to 
operationalise enhanced corporate governance in India by reforming the Companies 
                                                 
26 CII is the India’s largest industry and business association. 
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Act of 1956 to Companies Act of 2013, which is the backbone of Indian corporate 
law. To align with the new company Act of 2013, SEBI made amendments to Clause 
49 of the Listing Agreement in 2014.  
 
3.9 Nature of Corporate Governance in MFIs  
In the microfinance literature, governance first appeared in 1997 in the CGAP report 
under the topic of “Effective Governance for Microfinance Institutions”, 
emphasising the relationship between boards of directors and the management of 
MFIs (Lapenu & Pierret, 2006). The literature contributes to emphasise the 
importance of corporate governance for the microfinance sector because it is a 
significant factor for enhancing the viability of the industry (Hartarska, 2005; Labie, 
2001; Mersland, 2011; Mersland & Strøm, 2009; Varottil, 2012). MFI principals 
hire agents to manage their MFI’s operation and in many instances there is 
ultimately a negligible return achieved. Principals, it is suggested, expect to gain 
assurances on the funds/donations made by them for MFI activities (Sinclair, 2012). 
It is very difficult for principals to monitor the actual flow of money with 
information independent of the MFIs (Sinclair, 2012). When corporate governance 
incorporates a high level of continuous disclosure market forces respond to the 
information and impose pressure on the firm to shape up (Varma, 2005). These 
pressures tend to be absent from the MFI sector. 
In addition to the high growth rate of microfinance around the world and an 
increasing number of heterogeneous institutions in the microfinance sector, there 
have been some serious complaints of unfair practices and low transparency in MFI 
affairs. Potentially, these have arisen due to increasing competition between MFIs 
and the evidence available suggests that the lack of corporate governance practices 
contributes to problems relating to firm sustainability and loss of clients. 
Malpractice by some MFIs in Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka, India, ultimately 
increased the debt liability of poor borrowers and was even attributed to causing the 
suicide of some clients (Galema et al., 2012; Rooyen et al., 2012). MFIs need good 
financial and management practices to operate their micro-financing activities more 
transparently and sustainably (Barry & Tacneng, 2014; Caudill et al., 2009). Sound 
corporate governance practices are viewed as a way of helping MFIs to operate 
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more effectively and efficiently (Hartarska, 2005). It has become a hot issue among 
policy makers ruminating over which model of corporate governance practices 
should be recommended for MFIs to enable them to perform well (Milana & Ashta, 
2012).  
There is a substantial body of consultancy reports and general guidelines on 
governance. Some reports relate to all industries and some are more focussed, 
promulgating guidelines for specific industries. However, general guidelines on 
corporate governance have not been put into practice by MFIs (Arthur et al., 1993; 
Mersland, 2009). General guidelines for corporate governance are deemed adequate 
for MFIs as there are cultural and regional differences that require the development 
of a specific framework for corporate governance (Gant et al., 2002). Varottil (2012) 
states that MFIs need a specific corporate governance framework even when they 
are examined from a theoretical perspective. A view of corporate governance, which 
suggests that the corporate governance is an area where market discipline is more 
valuable than regulation (Varma, 2005), is important and may be reflected in the 
pursuit of higher returns by MFIs and by concentrating their work in urban areas. 
Similar to the early savings banks, many MFIs struggle to identify board members 
with an appropriate background who are able and willing to dedicate the time to 
effective monitoring (Armendariz & Labie, 2011). Mersland (2009) identifies 
corporate governance factors that affect the performance of MFIs; CEO/chairman 
duality, international directors, internal board auditor, board size, shareholder 
ownership, female CEO. Furthermore, Mersland and Strøm (2010) examine the 
relationship between firm performance and corporate governance in MFIs by using 
secondary data of third-party rating agencies. They find that the local directors, 
internal auditors and female CEOs can help to improve the financial performance 
of MFIs. Also the number of credit clients of the organisation increases if there is 
CEO/chairman duality. They suggest an industry-specific approach to MFI 
governance.  
As stated by Labie (2001), an agency cost framework can be applied to the 
microfinance sector, and emphasising outreach performance rather than financial 
performance should be a priority for MFIs. This is highly important for MFIs 
compared with traditional firms in terms of assessing their corporate governance. 
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However, Mersland and Strøm (2009) state that an agency cost framework cannot 
be applied to MFIs to deal with the relationship between financial performance and 
outreach. In the microfinance sector, corporate governance issues are subjected to 
a different set of factors that successfully target the core of the relationship between 
financial performance and outreach.  
Bassem (2009) uses a self-conducted survey, annual reports and MIX market data 
for a study on governance and performance of MFIs in Euro-Mediterranean 
countries. He highlights how governance mechanisms can improve the performance 
of Euro-Mediterranean MFIs in relation to outreach and sustainability. Lapenu and 
Pierret (2006, p. 10) state that the “good functioning” of the board of directors is 
not enough to guarantee the success of MFIs. Other governance mechanisms 
probably play a more important role. It is necessary to broaden the scope of a study 
to include all stakeholders involved (employees, managers, elected officials, clients, 
donors, bank partners, shareholders, the government, etc.) as well as any 
organisational form with a “governing” role that may have been set up at the 
inception of the institution. Mersland (2011) recommends in his study that 
stakeholders such as donors, depositors, local communities and bank associations 
can provide a monitoring system to boost the existence of MFIs. 
Mersland (2009) states that in order to identify the various relationship dimensions 
within MFIs through a corporate governance viewpoint, it is necessary to develop 
a three dimensional approach which comprises the relationships between MFIs and 
their equity investors, debt financiers, employees, borrowers, community, 
competitors and government regulations. Figure 3.9-1 demonstrates the 
diagrammatic representation of the three dimensional approach. Further, Mersland 
emphasises the importance of having more studies in this sector to better understand 
the governance system for MFIs. He also recommends further research should be 
conducted to identify how the combination of organisational types enhances 
competition in the microfinance industry and affects performance of MFIs. 
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Figure 3.9-1: Relationship-Dimensions of MFIs 
 
 
However, the increasing popularity of microfinance as a development and anti-
poverty tool has pushed the industry towards financial self-sufficiency and created 
a tension between the MFI’s dual mission of financial self-sufficiency and social 
orientation (Sinclair, 2012). Furthermore, Varottil (2012) and Sinclair (2012) point 
out that the commercialisation of MFIs from non-profit institutions to for-profit 
institutions has created several issues in the industry. Even if the commercialisation 
of MFIs has assisted in scalability and outreach by broadening the scope of financial 
support for poor people, it has caused MFIs to turn back their social goals. 
According to Arena (2012), microfinance providers are drifting away from their 
mission and corporate governance is being blamed. This is because the existing 
corporate governance practices available to MFIs are only influencing their ability 
to raise capital and that has created a perception that private interests are benefiting 
from the vulnerability of the poor.  
It is important to investigate the extent to which corporate governance pays 
attention to the interests of the poorer sections of society as stakeholders (Mersland 
& Strøm, 2010). Through the application of social corporate governance, MFIs can 
give more attention to the poor stakeholders and mitigate the problem of getting 
away from the mission. As Arena (2012, p. 269) states:  
“Unlike traditional corporate governance mechanisms, the social corporate 
governance is designed to vindicate the organisation's social and 
development goals. This note argues that social corporate governance 
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mechanisms, when properly balanced against traditional corporate 
governance structures, alleviate the tension between financial and social 
development goals and provide a solution to mission drift in microfinance”.  
Consideration of both financial performance and outreach encompasses a generally 
overlooked consideration that these concepts are not necessarily compatible 
(Hermes et al., 2011). While the mission might be outreach to the rural poor, the 
practice may focus on financial performance which is more ready achieved through 
consumer loans to clients in urban areas (Hermes et al., 2011; Montgomery & Weiss, 
2011; Rooyen et al., 2012). This has been confirmed by the New York Times in a 
front page article, “Banks making big profits from tiny loans,” which criticised the 
microfinance sector in general (Sinclair, 2012). By shifting from financial aspects 
of governance, it is timely and important to focus on social aspects of governance 
to identify the appropriate corporate governance mechanisms for MFIs. The 
financial feasibility of MFIs can develop by having a rational approach toward 
financial objectives (Mersland, 2011). Accordingly, among policy makers there is 
a hefty debate on the compatibility or trade-off between financial sustainability and 
outreach of the microfinance sector (Hermes et al., 2011). Lapenu, Foose, 
Bédécarrats, and Verhagen. (2009) state that the integration of social mission with 
strategic and operational decisions is therefore essential to mitigate the mission 
drifting of MFIs.  
 
3.10 Corporate Governance Characteristics 
Even though many studies have been conducted to identify the relationship between 
corporate governance practices and firm performance, there are limited scholarly 
studies conducted for the microfinance industry in relation to corporate governance. 
Many prior studies have mainly concentrated on the innovative lending 
technologies to increase lending to the poor and their impact on borrowers’ welfare. 
Therefore, the empirical analysis of good corporate governance practices in relation 
to MFIs is still at an immature stage and it is important to conduct more studies in 
this field to enhance MFIs’ development (Bassem, 2009; Cull et al., 2007; Hartarska, 
2005, 2009; Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2007; Mersland, 2009; Mersland & Strøm, 
2009).  
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Studies undertaken in the for-profit sector have shown that good corporate 
governance enhances the financial performance of firms. The same rationale 
recommends that good governance practices by MFIs would enhance their 
performance, sustainability and reduce risk. Questions such as who is serving on 
the board, how they are selected and what motivates them to take a seat on the board 
are important to examine, as they help to understand the reality of corporate 
governance (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989). The future of the firm will be decided on 
the board’s effectiveness (Abdullah, 2004; Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004). Therefore, 
it is important to examine the empirical evidence of corporate governance 
mechanisms that improve firm performance. 
However, the debate regarding what constitutes good corporate governance 
practices is not yet finalised, due in part to the scandals that contributed to the failure 
of corporate governance systems and subsequent regulations in many jurisdictions. 
In addition, prior testing of the relationship between corporate governance practices 
and firm performance in the for-profit companies reported inconclusive evidence 
(Bathula, 2008; Bhagat & Black, 1999; Weir, Laing, & McKnight, 2002). Some 
researchers find evidence of a positive relationship between corporate governance 
and firm performance (Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003; Kyereboah-Coleman & 
Biekpe, 2006), while others observe evidence of a negative relationship between 
governance and performance (Hambrick, Cho, & Chen, 1996; Rose, 2007; Sheridan 
& Milgate, 2005). In addition, some studies report no evidence to support a link 
between corporate governance and firm performance (Abdullah, 2004; Baliga, 
Moyer, & Rao, 1996; Dalton et al., 1998). Dalton et al. (1998) and Weir et al. (2002) 
suggest there is little evidence to support the view that board characteristics have 
an impact on firm performance.  
In a Sri Lankan context, the study conducted by Heenetigala (2011) using a sample 
of 37 companies from the top 50 CSE listed companies, shows there is a positive 
relationship between board composition and return on equity (ROE). Similarly, 
Hewa-Wellalage (2012) finds a positive relationship between corporate governance 
and financial performance and a negative relationship between corporate 
governance and agency costs for multinational company subsidiaries and local 
public companies in Sri Lanka.  
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However, governance studies undertaken in India detect both positive and negative 
relationships (Chugh, Meador, & Kumar, 2011; Dey & Chauhan, 2009; Jackling & 
Johl, 2009; Kota & Tomar, 2010). Chugh et al. (2011) and Jackling and Johl (2009) 
find a significant negative relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance whereas Kota and Tomar (2010) note a positive relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance. Another study conducted for Indian 
state-owned enterprises exhibited a significant positive relationship between 
corporate governance reforms and performance (Locke & Duppati, 2014). 
Furthermore, a study conducted for Indian banks showed that there is no significant 
relationship between corporate governance structures and financial performance 
(Pandya, 2011). Evidence suggests that Indian banks have a very weak governance 
mechanism as their agency costs did not decline during 2005 to 2013 (Acharya, 
Dupatti, & Locke, 2015). 
This conflicting evidence supports the view that corporate governance practices are 
very much related to the country, its history, industry and the nature of the firms. 
Therefore, it suggests that further investigation relating to corporate governance 
practices and performance of MFIs may contribute to a better understanding to 
promote a country’s longer-term economic development. 
Within the literature, various corporate governance mechanisms are identified as 
having the potential to stimulate good corporate governance, such as board size (de 
Andres, Azofra, & Lopez, 2005), board composition (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003), 
board diversity (Mersland, 2009), gender diversity (Erhardt, Werbel, & Shrader, 
2003), CEO/chairman duality (Dey, Engel, & Liu, 2011) and internal audit function 
(Bassem, 2009; Sarens, Abdolmohammadi, & Lenz, 2012), which guides to 
improved financial performance and outreach. These corporate governance 
mechanisms are compatible with the agency theory perspective as they can possibly 
mitigate agency problems in a firm. Agency theoretical literature suggests that 
reduction in agency costs leads to improved financial performance. Therefore, the 
following section provides a brief review of the literature relating to good corporate 
governance mechanisms that are utilised in this study. 
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3.10.1 Board diversity 
The phrase “board diversity” has become entrenched in corporate governance 
vocabulary in recent years. According to van der Walt and Ingley (2003), board 
diversity is a mixture of attributes, characteristics and expertise that supports board 
processes and decision making. Diversified boards have moral obligations to their 
stakeholders and are interested in obtaining consensus relating to broad decisions. 
Arguably, diversified boards understand the market place better and have creativity 
and leadership that may promote valuable global relationships (Robinson & 
Dechant, 1997).  
Boards of directors in a company need to have the right composition to provide 
diverse viewpoints (Milliken & Martins, 1996). The Alliance for Board Diversity 
in 2010 found that 72.9% of directorships in Fortune 100 companies were held by 
white men and the rest were held by minorities and women. The situation has 
existed since 2004 (Krus, Morgan, & Ginsberg, 2012, p. 1). However, recent studies 
on corporate governance have focused on increasing the diverse representation on 
corporate boards because greater diversity means a more independent board (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976) which monitors managers’ behaviour better.  
Researchers using agency theory and resource dependency theory argue that the 
relationship between board diversity and firm performance should be positive. 
According to agency theory proponents, companies that have the right composition 
of board directors provide diverse viewpoints which lead to improved firm 
performance. Supporters of resource dependency theory emphasise that an increase 
in board diversity leads to an increase in linkages to additional resources (Keasey, 
Thompson, & Wright, 1997), connections to the firm’s external environment 
(Pfeffer, 1973) and improvement in organisational value and performance (Huse & 
Solberg, 2006).  
Exponents of legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory argue that maximising 
shareholder interest is not the sole objective of a firm because the rights of different 
stakeholder groups should also be considered. Proponents of legitimacy theory 
argue that organisations are bound by the social contracts that they have with the 
societies in which they operate their business. Therefore, the continued existence 
of a business depends on society’s approval of its existence (Deegan, 2006). 
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Compared to agency theory, supporters of legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory 
argue that organisations cannot only maximise owners’ or investors’ expectations. 
They also need to consider the expectations of society, otherwise business 
continuation becomes an issue (Gray, Owen, & Adams, 2010).  
On the other hand, stakeholder theory tends to be concerned with the relationship 
between an organisation and its stakeholders. According to Freeman (2010), 
stakeholders tend to include employees, customers, competitors, suppliers, 
environmentalists, governments, local community organisations and all other 
groups that play a vital role in the success of a business in today’s environment. As 
claimed by stakeholder theory, the role of the board is to represent the stakeholders 
in the corporation (Freeman & Reed, 1983). The proponents of stakeholder theory 
believe that by looking after the stakeholders, acting morally and attending to 
stakeholders’ social purposes, the company can become more successful (Letza et 
al., 2004).  
Heenetigala (2011) states that listed companies in Sri Lanka show there is a positive 
relationship between board composition and ROE. In the MFI context, many firms 
struggle to determine the right composition of board members who are dedicated to 
improving, monitoring and supervising the MFI (Armendariz & Labie, 2011). Most 
of the board members of not-for-profit MFIs are generally upper or middle class 
professionals. Furthermore, Mersland and Strøm (2009) state that stakeholders such 
as donors, customers, employees and debt holders are generally absent from MFI 
boards. They require corporate boards to consist with different stakeholders in the 
organisation as the directors are safeguarding their values and need to know their 
stakeholder expectations.  
 
3.10.2 Gender diversity 
The board diversity concept suggests that boards should reflect the structure of 
society and properly represent the gender, ethnicity and professional backgrounds 
of those within it. Gender diversity is considered part of the broader conception of 
board diversity (Milliken & Martins, 1996) and several empirical studies have 
investigated elements of gender diversity as a corporate governance factor (Adams 
& Ferreira, 2009; Ahern & Dittmar, 2012; Farrell & Hersch, 2005; García-Meca, 
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García-Sánchez, & Martínez-Ferrero, 2015; Goergen & Renneboog, 2014; Matsa 
& Miller, 2013; Milliken & Martins, 1996). The majority of corporate governance 
studies emphasise that there is very limited participation by women on corporate 
boards (Huse & Solberg, 2006; Matsa & Miller, 2013; Milliken & Martins, 1996; 
van der Walt & Ingley, 2003). For example, Catalyst census shows that in the USA 
in 2001 there were only 12.4% women directors among Fortune 500 companies and 
overall 6.4% in UK companies in the same year (Singh & Vinnicombe, 2004). 
Based on the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Report 2014, Mlambo-
Ngcuka (2014), the UN Women Executive Director, states that progress on gender 
equality is very slow and shockingly, it may take another 81 years to reach gender 
parity in the workplace.27  
Even though Daily, Certo, and Dalton (2000) find similar results in the USA, they 
also note that women’s representation on boards is gradually increasing because 
companies around the world are now under pressure to appoint female directors to 
their boards. In Fortune 500 firms, women’s representation on corporate boards had 
grown to 15.2 in 2010 (Matsa & Miller, 2013). This is true, because Cann (2014) 
states that there has been only a small improvement in gender equality in the 
workplace after the nine years of measuring the global gender gap, and that progress 
remains uneven. There is still a long way to go. Many governance reforms stress28 
the importance of gender diversity in boards with a view that women on boards 
have potential to add value to firm performance in a significant way (Adams & 
Ferreira, 2009; Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003; Erhardt, Werbel, & Shrader, 
2003). In Norway, all public listed companies were required to increase female 
board membership to 40% in 2008 (Matsa & Miller, 2013). The Government of 
India has also moved through SEBI to prescribe rules requiring a minimum number 
of women on boards of Indian listed companies (Ministry of Law and Justice, 2013). 
                                                 
27 However, the UN Commission on the Status of Women (CSW59) Session has set 2030 as the 
expiry date for gender inequality. See http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2015/3/press-
release-galvanizing-global-attention-world-leaders-celebrities-and-activists  
28 Governance reforms in UK, Sweden, Norway and Spain have explicitly stressed the importance 
of gender diversity in the boardroom. 
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Accordingly, Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement in India emphasises that Indian 
corporate boards should have at least one woman director.  
Gender is one of the most discussed issues, not only in the corporate governance 
research but also in political and societal environments (Mlambo-Ngcuka, 2014). 
In the 1980s and 1990s, women had more opportunities to enter corporate boards 
as the size of boards gradually increased (Bathula, 2008). Most women directors 
are not from the corporate sector but are usually outsiders or non-executive directors 
(Hillman, Cannella, & Harris, 2002). When compared with men, most women 
directors possess staff/support managerial skills, such as legal, public relations, 
human resources and communications rather than operating and marketing skills.  
The relationship between women directors and firm performance has received 
ongoing attention (Ahern & Dittmar, 2012; Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003; 
Farrell & Hersch, 2005; Liu, Wei, & Xie, 2014; Smith, Smith, & Verner, 2006). 
According to Smith et al. (2006), women directors on boards have a significant 
positive impact on firm performance. Carter et al. (2003) find a positive relationship 
between gender diversity and firm performance. Gender diversity in the top 
management of Fortune 500 firms is positively correlated with performance and 
stock valuation of those firms. Conversely, the mandatory quota 29  for female 
directors on corporate boards is negatively correlated with the performance of 
Norwegian firms (Ahern & Dittmar, 2012). A recent study of listed companies in 
Sri Lanka conducted by Hewa-Wellalage and Locke (2013) also finds a significant 
negative relationship between female directors and firm performance. The 
researchers explained that this result was because of the number of “silent” women 
directors who were wives of male directors. Farrell and Hersch (2005) were unable 
to find a relationship between firm performance and women directors on the board. 
The question of whether gender diversity assists firms to improve performance is 
one of the most debated issues in corporate governance and requires further 
exploration incorporating more contextual variables.  
 
                                                 
29 The law mandate that at least 40% of female representation in Norwegian corporate boards. 
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3.10.3 Board size 
Board size is the number of members serving on a company board. There is a belief 
that the number of directors can affect the performance of a company, especially its 
financial performance. This is supported by Cicero, Wintoki, and Yang (2008) who 
provide evidence that around two-thirds of USA firms are changing their board size 
due to its impact on firms activities. Also, some governance reforms mention the 
minimum and maximum number of directors that can constitute a board. According 
to the Direction No. 3 of 2008 on Corporate Governance for finance companies 
registered under the Finance Companies Act, the number of directors on finance 
company boards in Sri Lanka shall be no less than five and no more than 13 (CBSL, 
2012b). For LSBs, the CBSL recommends that the number of directors on the board 
be no less than seven and no more than 13 (CBSL, 2013). 
Various views in the corporate governance literature support the contention that 
board size has the potential to improve the performance of a company. Usually, 
resource dependency theory researchers argue that a larger board provides greater 
linkages to the external environment and improves company access to essential 
resources (Adams & Mehran, 2003; Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 2008; Hillman & 
Dalziel, 2003; Klein, 1998; Pfeffer, 1972). A firm that is diversified in its operations 
and operates in multiple segments increases demand for expertise service for the 
CEO (Yermack, 1996). Due to the complexity of the organisation, the CEO of the 
organisation needs many advocates (Klein, 1998). Chaganti, Mahajan, and Sharma 
(1985) report that board size in successful companies is higher than those of failed 
companies, suggesting the existence of a positive relationship between board size 
and firm success (Chaganti et al., 1985; Coles et al., 2008; Yermack, 1996).  
On the other hand, there is a volume of research supporting smaller boards. Persons 
(2006, p. 37) states that “… smaller board size is likely to be more effective in 
monitoring management” and is a determinant of audit committee independence 
(Klein, 2002). Chiang (2005, p. 96) observes that “Efficiency is reduced if the 
number of directors is too large because there is an increased difficulty in achieving 
agreement concerning decisions”. As noted by Lipton and Lorsch (1992), smaller 
boards will, on average, have more group cohesiveness and provide more effective 
discussion for the firm. However, the ideal size of an MFI board depends on its 
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organisational responsibilities, strategic direction and its funding need. Also, an 
MFI board should have an odd number of members to avoid the possibility of 
having a tied vote (McConaghy, 2013).  
Juran and Louden (1966), in an earlier work, discard the relationship between board 
size and company performance. Thirty years later, Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg, 
Sundgren, and Wells (1998) find a negative relationship between board size and 
firm value in USA firms. Other researchers do not provide any support for a 
relationship between board size and firm performance (Bhagat & Black, 1999; 
Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991). Contrary evidence from Vafeas (1999) finds the 
number of board meetings held by a company is positively related to board size, 
which is consistent with resource dependency theory. There are other factors which 
influence board size, such as managerial ownership, firm age and takeover defence 
mechanisms (Boone, Field, Karpoff, & Raheja, 2007). 
On balance, empirical research findings point toward an optimal board size of seven 
to eight people (Jensen, 1993; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). Mersland and Strøm (2009) 
note in their MFI study that most MFIs have a board of seven to nine directors. In 
the Sri Lankan context, the average board size of listed non-financial companies is 
7.6 (Hewa-Wellalage & Locke, 2011). According to Indian firm performance, 
board size is becoming an insignificant variable in determining the performance of 
Indian Public Sector Undertakings (Dey & Chauhan, 2009). On the other hand, 
Dwivedi and Jain (2005) in their study on board size and firm value suggest that 
larger boards improve the governance of firms, leading to lower agency cost and 
positive relationships with firm value. However, the right board size for a company 
is difficult to identify due to the sectorial and industrial differences. Clearly, the 
mixed results indicate the appropriate number of board members is a matter for 
continuing debate and needs further examination (Dalton et al., 1999; Hermalin & 
Weisbach, 2003; Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996). 
 
3.10.4 Board independence 
To achieve better firm performance, the proponents of agency theory suggest that 
the board of directors should be configured largely, if not exclusively, with 
independent directors, outside of management (Milliken & Martins, 1996; Muth & 
Chapter 3 Literature Review on Corporate Governance 
 
78 
 
Donaldson, 1998), which is typically required in many countries. For example, 
Lorsch and MacIver (1989) highlight that 74% of directors are outsiders and among 
them, 69% are non-management personnel with no other contacts with the 
organisation. Outside directors in India are defined as directors who are not paid 
employees of the company or do not have any family association with the company 
(Jackling & Johl, 2009, p. 506), which is a broad definition that summarises non-
executive directors and independent directors in a firm. Clause 49 of the Listing 
Agreement by the SEBI describes the optimum combination of inside and outside 
directors for listed companies. For example, in a company with an executive 
chairman at least 50% of board members should be outside directors. This 
requirement comes down to 30% for companies having a non-executive chairman 
(SEBI, 2004). 
The Listing Rules issued by the CSE require listed companies in Sri Lanka to 
maintain a proper mix of executive and non-executive directors on their boards. 
Therefore, boards should consist of a minimum of two non-executive directors or 
one third of the total number of directors, whichever is higher. According to the 
Banking Act Directions, the number of executive directors shall not exceed one 
third of the number of directors of a bank’s board. Once there is compliance with 
the above rule, one of the executive directors can be appointed CEO of the bank. In 
addition, a bank’s board should have at least three independent non-executive 
directors or one third of the total number of directors, whichever is higher (CBSL, 
2013, p. 177). Finance Companies (corporate governance) Direction No. 3 of 2008 
mentions that the number of executive directors in Sri Lankan finance companies 
shall not exceed one-half of the number of directors of the board. If the company 
complies with above rule then one of the executive directors can be appointed CEO 
of the company. Furthermore, the number of independent non-executive directors 
of the financial companies’ board shall be at least one fourth of the total numbers 
of directors (CBSL, 2012b, p. 69).  
It is assumed that outside directors provide more effective monitoring compared to 
inside directors. Lorsch and MacIver (1989, p. 17) state that “there has been a 
growing predominance of outside directors who are there not only to provide a new 
perspective to top management’s thinking, but also to provide the necessary 
oversight only possible from an outsider”. Mishra and Nielsen (1999, p. 22) find 
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that “… independent boards make greater use of compensation contracts to bring 
the financial interests of managers in line with those of shareholders”. Abdullah 
(2004) states that boards of Malaysian companies are generally dominated by the 
outside directors and suggests that the structure of the board of directors is largely 
independent from its management due to the absence of any dominant personality. 
Furthermore, Cicero et al. (2008) also state that two-thirds of USA firms change 
their board’s independence once in a two-year period.  
Board independence plays an important role in developing countries and emerging 
markets as it is more effective in aligning the interests of managers and shareholders 
(Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2012). In Sri Lanka, investors are now highly concerned 
about non-executive directors on corporate boards. The corporate governance 
survey in Sri Lanka (2007) states that 87% of respondents consider balance between 
non-executive directors and executive directors is important in Sri Lankan listed 
companies. In the corporate governance survey in Sri Lanka (2007), more than 90% 
of participating companies had non-executive directors on their boards. Unlike Sri 
Lanka, this situation was not always there in India (Varma, 2005). In the Indian 
context, surprisingly, board independence is insignificant for firm performance 
across four categories of Indian firms: public sector undertakings, stand-alone firms, 
private business group affiliated firms and subsidiaries of foreign firms (Dey & 
Chauhan, 2009). Due to the surprising results of this study, its authors called for 
more detailed studies in this area. A study of top Indian companies showed that a 
greater proportion of outside directors on boards is associated with improved firm 
performance (Jackling & Johl, 2009). However, Kota and Tomar (2010) state that 
non-executive independent directors fail in their monitoring role. Chugh et al. (2011) 
identified that a high proportion of independent directors (excessively autonomous 
board) leads to lower firm performance.  
Theoretically, from an agency perspective, it is claimed that a greater proportion of 
outside directors on the board should have a positive effect on performance. 
However, mixed results have been reported for the empirical studies undertaken on 
the relationship between outside directors and firm performance. Agency theorists 
argue that independent boards will increase firm performance (Dalton et al., 1998; 
Lynall, Golden, & Hillman, 2003; van den Berghe & Levrau, 2004). Uzun, 
Szewczyk, and Varma (2004, p. 33) state that the “… number of independent 
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outside directors increased on a board and in the board’s audit and compensation 
committees, the likelihood of corporate wrongdoing decreased”. In this regard, 
Dahya, Dimitrov, and McConnell (2008) report a positive relationship between firm 
performance and the proportion of outside directors. As illustrated by Dahya et al. 
(2008), there is a positive relationship between firm performance and the proportion 
of outside directors. However, some studies undertaken on corporate governance 
and firm performance find that there are no facts to confirm an independent board 
leads to enhanced firm performance (Bhagat & Bolton, 2008; Dahya et al., 2008). 
Meanwhile, Ashbaugh, Collins, and LaFond (2004) reported a negative relationship 
between the cost of equity and independence of a board. Therefore, it is important 
to investigate this factor further as there is general concession on the need for 
balance between inside and outside directors of the firm.  
 
3.10.5 Duality 
Duality occurs when the roles of CEO and chairman are carried out by the same 
person. Due to the recent spate of large corporate scandals in the USA, CEO/chair 
duality acquired more attention as many CEOs abused their power for their own 
benefit. Efendi, Srivastava, and Swanson (2007) state that the board of directors in 
restarting firms which have the CEO as chairperson are “… more likely to give the 
CEO a salary increase that is not warranted by the firm’s performance” (p.3). Their 
finding is required to ensure that these deficiencies in oversight are likely to 
increase organisational costs and subsequently lower organisational performance 
(Brockmann, Hoffman, & Dawley, 2006). However, Faleye (2007, p. 240) stated 
that “in 2001, there were only three shareholder proposals calling for the separation 
of CEO and chairman positions. In contrast, there were 20 such proposals in 2003 
and 32 in 2004”. 
As a result, corporate governance regulators put more pressure on companies to 
separate CEO and chairman roles. After the corporate governance reforms in India, 
having a number of outside directors on a board has addressed the challenge of 
duality in listed companies (SEBI, 2004). For example, Clause 49 of the Listing 
Agreements requires 50% outside directors on the board if there is a full-time 
chairman on the board. This unique characteristic of corporate governance implies 
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that the duality issue has been closely considered by Indian regulators who argued 
that the majority of the board should be represented by outside directors in order to 
balance the power and authority of the company. Abdullah (2004) finds that 
generally Malaysian companies practise a non-dual leadership structure. 
In Sri Lanka, directions on corporate governance issued by the CBSL suggest that 
the LSBs separate the roles of chair and CEO; they should not be performed by the 
same individual. The directions also state that the chairperson shall be a non-
executive director, preferably an independent director. When the chair is not an 
independent non-executive director, the board may designate an independent non-
executive director as the senior director to ensure a greater independence of the 
company (CBSL, 2013). Similar conditions are applicable for RFCs in Sri Lanka 
(CBSL, 2012b, pp. 67-68). 
Proponents of agency theory have suggested splitting the role of CEO and chairman 
(Dalton et al., 1998; Jensen, 1993; Muth & Donaldson, 1998) because the main role 
of the corporate board chairperson is to appraise the performance of top 
management (Jackling & Johl, 2009). If the function of the chair is to hire, fire, 
evaluate and compensate the CEO, then this role cannot be successfully fulfilled if 
both roles are combined and are under the control of the CEO (Jensen, 1993). For 
example, a CEO who is also the chairperson of the board receives more salary than 
a CEO who does not hold both positions. The reason for the higher compensation 
level is that the board of directors of the company is hired and removed by the CEO 
of the company and therefore they set a favourable compensation level for their 
CEO (Core, Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999). Further, Carcello and Nagy (2004) 
propose that when the CEO of the company holds the position of chairman it will 
“… yield significant internal influence and power and may have the wherewithal to 
orchestrate a financial fraud” (p.13). 
However, the proponents of stewardship theory argue that managers make decisions 
that are in the best interest of the organisation, even when their interests are not 
aligned with the principals’ interest. Stewardship theory suggests that stewards 
work hard to maximise organisational performance with the objective of getting 
benefit from a strong organisation. Based on stewardship theory, it is evident that a 
CEO doubling as board chairman leads to higher firm performance (Donaldson & 
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Davis, 1991). The researchers highlight that duality can create strong leadership for 
the organisation and provide a clear sense of strategic decision making. If the roles 
are separated then the decision making will be ineffective.  
To the contrary, empirical studies report mixed findings relating to CEO duality. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that splitting the role of chairman and CEO 
improves performance, whereas other studies report no relationship between CEO 
duality and firm performance. Chen, Chen, and Wei (2006) assert that when firms 
transform their leadership structure from duality to non-duality, there is no evidence 
of improved firm performance. The studies conducted for short-run performance 
found that the USA market is indifferent to change in a firm’s duality status (Baliga 
et al., 1996). Kiel and Nicholson (2003, p. 202) find that the issue of CEO duality 
might be contingent on a company’s size and challenges. Although the empirical 
findings on duality and firm performance have mixed results, the agency theory 
approach adopted in this study establishes it as a key issue that does need more 
investigation. 
 
3.10.6 Internal audit function 
Boards of directors in a firm, as an internal governance mechanism, help to monitor 
and, if necessary, control management behaviour on behalf of the shareholders 
(Cornforth & Edwards, 1999; Dalton et al., 1998; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Huse, 
2007; John & Senbet, 1998). To achieve this task, a board of directors needs an 
independent viewpoint of the organisational operations, which may be achieved by 
having a proper internal audit function in the organisation.  
The execution of the internal audit function is highlighted in several papers 
(Antoine, 2004; Goodwin & Kent, 2004; McCollum, 2006) and governance reports 
(Institute of Internal Auditors Professional Guidance, 2002; NYSE, 2002) as a 
mechanism for improving companies’ internal governance. Furthermore, prior 
studies have established the fact that an effective internal audit function is critical 
to the success of a company (Carcello, Hermanson, & Raghunandan, 2005; Sarens 
et al., 2012). An emphasis on internal auditing has increased noticeably since 2001. 
In response to world-famous corporate scandals, regulators took steps requiring 
companies to have an internal audit function. For example, the NYSE amended its 
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listing requirements by mandating that all listed companies have an internal audit 
function. 
The firm’s internal audit function is an internal governance mechanism and it links 
with firm performance. The internal auditor’s functions are to offer firms an 
independent assurance to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of risk 
management, control and governance processes (Institute of Internal Auditors, 
2012). Therefore, an internal audit function in firms can be performed by having a 
separate internal audit department, an internal entity that fulfils the role of internal 
auditor, or an outsourced provider (Carcello et al., 2005). The significance of an 
internal audit function is becoming appreciated in boardrooms and newsrooms, by 
investors, analysts and regulators (Antoine, 2004). If the internal auditor reports 
directly to the board and is independent, then good accountability and transparency 
will prevail (Mersland & Strøm, 2009; Sinclair, 2012).  
Even though there are rigorous accounting standards, supervision of accounting 
statements is essential as it reflects a true and fair picture of the firm. Internal 
supervision can check and verify the accounts randomly with the objective of 
ensuring sound information in the statements provided by management and 
detecting any misrepresentation or fraud in accounting processes. Companies 
whose accounts are found not to be appropriately disclosed can be penalised or 
prosecuted for violations. Supervisors can disclose negligence in a variety of ways, 
ranging from warnings, display through the website and through rating agencies, to 
disbarring directors from serving on boards and increased monitoring of 
management to prevent them conducting further frauds (Rajan & Shah, 2005). This 
internal supervision is not limited to a specific type of institution. It is important to 
all institutional sectors. When an economy becomes more competitive and the 
financial activities become more sophisticated, the risk of conducting financial 
activities becomes more difficult to measure. Accordingly, supervision of financial 
sector institutions is essential as most of the supervision should undertake internally 
(their own supervision system) rather than externally (external audit). 
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3.11 Conclusion  
Chapter 3 first presented the evolution of corporate governance as an introduction 
to the literature review on corporate governance and then an overview of the 
definitions pertaining to corporate governance. The chapter then explains the role 
of corporate governance for entity performance. The general information in the 
chapter provides a brief summary of how corporate governance has changed and 
developed overtime in the world, especially in developed countries. To develop a 
research model it is important to identify the theories relating to that model. 
However, prior research on corporate governance utilises multiple theories and 
offer different lenses to understand the board governance. This chapter reviewed 
six theories in corporate governance; agency theory, stewardship theory, 
stakeholder theory, institutional theory, legitimacy theory and resource dependency 
theory which helped identify and develop the corporate governance characteristics 
for this study. The link between corporate governance theories and the variables to 
be tested is reported in Table 3.11-1. 
 
Table 3.11-1: Link between corporate governance theories and variables 
Theories 
Expected signs for corporate governance variables 
Board 
Diversity 
Gender 
Diversity 
Board 
Size 
Board 
Independence 
Duality 
Internal 
Audit 
Function 
Agency 
theory 
+ + - + - + 
Stewardship 
theory 
- - + - + - 
Stakeholder 
theory 
+ + +/- +/- - + 
Institutional 
theory 
+ + +/- + - + 
Resource 
dependency 
theory 
+ + + + - + 
Legitimacy 
theory 
+ + +/- + - + 
 
An overview of empirical implications of corporate governance was presented and 
then followed by a brief discussion of corporate governance system developments 
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in Sri Lanka and India. This discussion helps in understanding the development of 
regulations that support the corporate governance systems in those countries. 
Chapter 3 also explains the nature of corporate governance practices and their 
impact on the microfinance sector as a whole. The chapter proceeds to examine 
relevant empirical studies pertaining to the relationship between corporate 
governance practices and firm performance in relation to six corporate governance 
characteristics. Finally, the chapter provides a broad overview of the corporate 
governance practices and their impact on MFI financial performance and outreach. 
 
 
Chapter 4 Hypotheses and Empirical Research Model Development 
 
86 
 
4 CHAPTER FOUR 
HYPOTHESES AND EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter noted that boards of directors, their membership, and directors’ 
performance are all important matters that are impacted when changes in legislation 
or new codes of best practice are proposed or issued. Prior research investigating 
the relationship between corporate governance practices and firm performance have 
lacked consensus in conclusions. Some have reported evidence of corporate 
governance leading to an increase in firm performance, while others have reported 
corporate governance practices leading to a decline in performance. Other research 
suggests little or no evidence to support a relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance.  
The inconclusive and ambiguous empirical evidence concerning corporate 
governance and firm performance may be attributable to different estimation 
methods used, lack of controls for other factors that influence results and a number 
of other unobserved factors not considered (Smith et al., 2006). Most studies have 
focused on developed markets and large enterprises. Research reveals that legal, 
cultural and socio-economic dissimilarities in individual countries may affect 
corporate governance practices among countries (Aslan & Kumar, 2014; 
Globerman, Peng, & Shapiro, 2011; Kumar & Zattoni, 2013). Globerman et al. 
(2011, pp. 1-2) state that “one needs to understand the institutional framework in 
which organisations operate in order to understand the rationale for and 
consequences of specific corporate governance models”. Therefore, it is evident 
that corporate governance practices are very much related to the country, its history, 
industry and the nature of the firms.  
Since the focus of prior research has been on publicly listed companies, both the 
nature of corporate governance practised by MFIs and its impact on performance is 
less understood. No studies exist based on multiple MFI outcomes over a number 
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of years in South Asia. Research relating to MFIs has focused on innovative lending 
technologies to increase lending to the poor, and impacts on borrowers’ welfare. 
The focus of this study is to identify significant corporate governance factors that 
have potential to influence the financial performance and outreach of MFIs. Similar 
to publicly listed companies, good corporate governance practices in MFIs will also 
enhance the financial performance and outreach (Bassem, 2009; Cull et al., 2007; 
Hartarska, 2005; Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2007; Mersland, 2009). As a result, it is 
important to determine whether corporate governance practices impact MFI 
performance, which will eventually contribute to MFIs’ sustainability in the long 
run. Therefore, the investigation of corporate governance practices and 
performance of MFIs in Sri Lanka and India could contribute to a better 
understanding of corporate governance practices relating to the sector and also in 
the context of unique institutional settings. 
Chapter 4 presents the empirical model of the thesis and discussion of the variables 
drawn from the theoretical perspectives of Chapter 3. Chapter 4 is structured as 
follows: Section 4.2 develops the hypotheses based on the theoretical and empirical 
links between corporate governance and MFI performance. This study considers a 
series of hypotheses which are developed based on the research questions that are 
related to the relationship between independent and dependent variables. Section 
4.3 presents the conceptual framework and section 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 explain the 
independent, dependent and control variables used in this study, respectively. 
Finally, section 4.7 concludes the chapter. 
 
4.2 Hypotheses Development 
MFIs need good corporate governance practices to make their microfinance 
activities more transparent and sustainable (Barry & Tacneng, 2014; Caudill et al., 
2009) because good corporate governance increases monitoring efficiency of the 
organisation. Proponents of agency theory argue that the board of directors has a 
responsibility to ensure the survival and success of the organisation (Gabrielsson & 
Huse, 2004, p. 29). The role of the board of directors is to rectify and monitor 
critical decisions, ensure controls are in place to minimise the potential abuse of 
delegation, evaluate the company performance and strategies, and ensure funds are 
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not expropriated (Davis et al., 1997; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Huse & Rindova, 2001; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  
In this regard, prior research has identified a number of different board 
characteristics as important mechanisms that have potential to promote good 
corporate governance, such as board size (de Andres et al., 2005), board 
composition (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003), board diversity (Mersland, 2009), gender 
diversity (Erhardt et al., 2003), CEO/chairman duality (Dey et al., 2011) and 
internal audit function (Bassem, 2009; Sarens et al., 2012). These variables fit 
within an agency theory perspective of financial performance and outreach, and 
determination of their respective and joint impact in MFIs is important. While 
respecting the evidence, there may be negative or no effects in relation to these 
variables, it is appropriate to investigate the variables’ impact in the MFI context. 
Therefore, the following board characteristics are modelled into this research to 
examine the impact they have on the performance of MFIs, financially and in 
outreach in Sri Lanka and India.  
 
4.2.1 Gender diversity 
Gender diversity of management staff and board members is an important indicator 
for good corporate governance (Smith et al., 2006) because management teams of 
heterogeneous composition are more likely to make decisions by evaluating more 
alternatives than homogenous boards or management groups. Women directors can 
bring different experiences from men to the board, from their working and non-
working lives. They also have better understanding of some segments of the market 
place and are able to take quality decisions. MFIs serve women clients to a large 
extent and many MFIs are run mostly by women. Strøm, D'Espallier, and Mersland 
(2014) observe that women make up a comparatively large proportion of customers, 
top management and boards of directors in MFIs. Mersland and Strøm (2009) and 
Strøm et al. (2014) find that women managers and directors induce a higher MFI 
performance as they can better understand the opportunities and challenges of the 
markets they serve. When an MFI is matched with a leadership that has the same 
traits (gender) then it will perform better. Strøm et al. (2014, p. 61) state that MFIs 
favouring women clients are matched with female leadership. Iskenderian (2013, 
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October 3) suggests that “in order to be the best place for women customers, an 
institution [MFI] should be the best workplace for women employees and women 
leaders”.  
Governance studies on the relationship between gender diversity and firm 
performance provide ambiguous predictions (Erhardt et al., 2003; Hewa-Wellalage 
& Locke, 2013; Marinova et al., 2010; Milliken & Martins, 1996; Rose, 2007). 
Smith et al. (2006), using data for 2,500 large Danish firms during the period 1993-
2001, indicate that women in top management jobs and on boards of directors tend 
to have a significant positive impact on firm performance. Among small capital 
companies in New Zealand, Reddy, Locke, Scrimgeour, and Gunasekarage (2008) 
find a significant positive relationship between female directors on the board and 
financial performance. In the MFI context, Bassem (2009) and Chakrabarty and 
Bass (2014) note that board diversity with a higher percentage of women enhances 
MFI performance by lowering operating costs, where Mersland and Strøm (2009) 
pinpoint that the financial performance of MFIs improves with a female CEO.  
However, Marinova et al. (2010) studied 102 Dutch- and 84 Danish-listed firms and 
find gender diversity has no effect on firm performance. Similarly, Rose (2007) did 
not find a significant relationship between gender diversity and firm performance 
from a cross sectional analysis of all Danish companies listed on the Copenhagen 
Stock Exchange from 1998 to 2001. After a study of 240 YMCA organisations, 
Siciliano (1996) highlights that gender diversity has a positive impact on social 
performance, but a negative impact on the amount of funds received. In an Asian 
context, Bonn, Yoshikawa, and Phan (2004) report mixed evidence in Japan and 
Australia after comparing the impact of female directors on the board and firm 
performance.  
Based on the indication given by empirical studies, it is important to further explore 
the impact of gender diversity of boards on MFI performance as it may lead to better 
corporate governance, provide diverse viewpoints, values and new ideas for boards 
and provoke lively boardroom discussions (Daily, Certo, & Dalton, 1999; Huse & 
Solberg, 2006; Singh & Vinnicombe, 2004). As predicted by agency and resource 
dependency theories, this study argues that MFI boards are likely to have a high 
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level of gender diversity and proposes the first three hypotheses relating to gender 
diversity in MFI top management and boards as: 
Female Board Members 
H1a: There is a positive relationship between the number of female directors 
on the board and the financial performance of MFIs  
H1b: There is a positive relationship between the number of female directors 
on the board and the outreach of MFIs  
Female CEO 
H2a: There is a positive relationship between a female CEO and the financial 
performance of MFIs  
H2b: There is a positive relationship between a female CEO and the outreach 
of MFIs  
Female Chair 
H3a: There is a positive relationship between a female chairperson on the 
board and the financial performance of MFIs  
H3b: There is a positive relationship between a female chairperson on the 
board and the outreach of MFIs  
 
4.2.2 Duality 
CEO/chairman influence on the board is recognised as duality, which is one of the 
important practices in corporate governance. Agency theoreticians highlight the 
separation of the role of CEO and chairperson (Dalton et al., 1998; Jensen, 1993; 
Muth & Donaldson, 1998). Fama and Jensen (1983) state that non-duality firms, 
which separate the decision and risk-bearing functions can control for agency 
problems. CEO duality restricts the independence of board and reduces the ability 
of boards to perform their oversight and governance roles (Millstein & Katsh, 2003). 
Similarly, Ryan and Wiggins (2004) state that if a CEO is not the chairperson then 
firms reduce their percentage of executive directors. Webb (2004, p. 271) 
emphasises that “… a board more likely to protect shareholders from agency 
problems, would be one with separate individuals controlling the firm and the 
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board”. Heenetigala (2011) states, based on 37 companies from the top 50 CSE 
listed companies in Sri Lanka, that there is a positive relationship between separate 
leadership and ROE. 
However, some studies have reported that there is no relationship between CEO 
duality and firm performance (Chen et al., 2006). Based on the study conducted in 
Indian firms, Chugh et al. (2011) state that CEO duality does not create any 
quantifiable synergies in financial performance among Indian firms, as combined 
positions create agency costs and lower the ROA, and is not consistent with 
stewardship theory. The empirical results of a sample of public and private banks 
operating in India show that there is no relationship between the separation of CEO 
and chairman roles and firm performance in relation to ROA and ROE (Pandya, 
2011). Jackling and Johl (2009) report similar findings from a sample of 180 top 
listed companies in India. In the MFI context, Mersland and Strøm (2009) comment 
that CEO/chairman duality has a positive influence on MFI portfolio yield and 
credit clients but a negative influence on average operational self-sufficiency 
(OSS)30, ROA and loan size. Further, they highlight that they cannot prove whether 
the MFI is better governed when the CEO and chairman are separate. Therefore, it 
is important to use this characteristic to understand the power of an MFI, whether 
both important positions belong to one person or not. 
The influence of CEO/chairman on the board is used to clarify the impact on firms’ 
performance. However, studies that examine this relationship reach inconsistent 
results. Although the empirical research findings on duality and firm performance 
are mixed, the agency theory approach adopted in this study points to a key issue 
that requires more investigation. Companies with CEO/chairman duality can 
restrict the independence of the board, control the information given to the board, 
and increase the board’s ineffectiveness when discharging its monitoring duties. 
Similar reasoning can be applied to the microfinance industry where CEO/chairman 
duality has a negative effect on firm performance due to the tremendous powers in 
duality (Allen & Gale, 2000). Based on the above mentioned empirical studies on 
duality, this study proposes the following hypotheses:  
                                                 
30 OSS is widely used for measuring the MFIs’ financial performance. 
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H4a: There is a negative relationship between duality and the financial 
performance of MFIs  
H4b: There is a negative relationship between duality and the outreach of 
MFIs  
 
4.2.3 Board diversity 
Lapenu and Pierret (2006) state that the scope of the governance discussion on MFIs 
should be broadened to include the involvement of all stakeholders, such as 
employees, managers, elected officials, clients, donors, bank partners, shareholders, 
the government, etc. Therefore, stakeholder analysis approaches of MFI 
governance are rather more important than the restrictive approaches like 
shareholder analysis. Proponents of institutional theory, legitimacy theory and 
stakeholder theory emphasise the importance of having different stakeholders 
involvement in decision-making as it helps to maximise the interest of all the 
stakeholders in an organisation. Incorporating representatives from stakeholders on 
the MFI board enhances the board diversity too.  
One of the main characteristics in board diversity is directors’ nationality. 
International directors on the board increase the managerial expertise, creativity and 
innovation of boards (García-Meca et al., 2015). Non-profit MFIs are mainly 
promoted by international/donor organisations as they devote significant resources 
to microfinance activities and they represent the vertical dimension of the firm 
network (Mersland, 2009). Large donors in non-profit organisations act in a similar 
way to blockholders in for-profit organisations by ensuring that the organisation’s 
resources are used in an effective manner (de Andrés-Alonso, Romero-Merino, & 
Cruz, 2006). Frumkin and Kim (2001) state that large donors act like efficient 
monitors with their skill and power by demanding detailed plans, budgets and 
information for each project, even though these investments may offer minimum 
returns but have a social value. Therefore, one of the main stakeholders in an MFI 
is the representative of international/donor agencies as the MFI is highly dependent 
on the donors’ funds (CGAP, 2006). However, Mersland and Strøm (2009) report 
that when boards comprise international directors, MFI performance can still fall. 
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Mersland (2009) argues that it is important to have client representation on MFI 
boards as they are also one of the major stakeholders. Incorporation of client 
representatives, who represent the horizontal dimension of the MFI network, to the 
MFI board increases board diversity and is also valuable for MFI performance. 
Research has identified that diversified boards tend to produce unique information 
sets for management and reduce the information asymmetry, which results in 
effective and efficient decisions (Carter, D'Souza, Simkins, & Simpson, 2010; 
García-Meca et al., 2015). Client representatives on MFI boards tend to give more 
precise information on market behaviour and its demand for MFI loan products.  
Therefore, having stakeholder representation on boards enables organisations to 
have better understanding of the environment in which they operate (Letza et al., 
2004, p. 242). However, stakeholders, such as international/donors representatives, 
and customers are generally absent from MFI boards yet they are important to 
consider as they represent the vertical and horizontal relationship with the MFI 
network (Mersland & Strøm, 2009). Furthermore, as per stakeholder theory, MFIs 
can deal with their managerial, legal and social constraints with the support and 
interaction of stakeholders in the firm as they affect a firm’s long term success 
(Freeman & Reed, 1983; Letza et al., 2004). As emphasised in resource dependency 
theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), it would be beneficial for MFIs to invite their 
major international/donor representatives and clients’ representatives to sit on their 
boards to make effective decisions for MFI success. Based on the above theoretical 
and empirical justification, this study proposes the following hypotheses relating to 
board diversity: 
International/donor directors 
H5a: There is a positive relationship between international/donor 
representatives on the board and the financial performance of MFIs  
H5b: There is a positive relationship between international/donor 
representatives on the board and the outreach of MFIs  
Directors representing clients 
H6a: There is a positive relationship between directors representing clients 
and the financial performance of MFIs  
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H6b: There is a positive relationship between directors representing clients 
and the outreach of MFIs  
 
4.2.4 Board independence 
Corporate governance actions in a firm encompass constructing the optimal mix of 
inside and outside directors on the board (Morin & Jarrell, 2001). Lapenu and 
Pierret (2006) highlight the tradeoffs between outreach and financial performance 
of MFIs, finding tradeoffs to be influenced by stakeholders’ representation on the 
board and providing strong support for independent boards with limited employee 
participation. Based on agency theory, the answer relating to the effect of board 
independence on firm performance is undetermined.  
Empirical studies report mixed results regarding the relationship between the 
proportion of independent directors and firm performance (Bhagat & Bolton, 2008; 
Dahya et al., 2008). For example, Dahya et al. (2008) and Rosenstein and Wyatt 
(1990) have reported a positive relationship whereas Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) 
report a significant negative relationship between outside members on the board 
and firm performance. Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) point out that there is little 
cross-sectional relationship between board composition and firm value. Kiel and 
Nicholson (2003) do not find any evidence of a positive relationship between the 
proportion of outside directors and the market-based measure of firm performance. 
Chatterjee (2011) states that board independence is insignificant across all 
categories of Indian firms: public sector undertakings, stand-alone firms, private 
business groups, affiliated firms, and subsidiaries of foreign firms. 
In an MFI context, Hartarska (2005) uses rated and unrated MFIs in Eastern Europe 
to investigate the relationship between corporate governance and MFI success. Her 
analysis indicates that more independent directors provide a better ROA whereas 
lower financial performance and outreach show when executive directors operate 
MFIs. Similarly, Kyereboah-Coleman and Osei (2008) observe that MFI boards 
with independent directors have a positive impact both on profitability and outreach. 
In line with agency theory and the findings of prior studies relating to MFIs, the 
proposed hypotheses connecting to outside directors and firm performance are: 
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H7a: There is a positive relationship between non-executive directors on the 
board and the financial performance of MFIs  
H7b: There is a positive relationship between non-executive directors on the 
board and the outreach of MFIs  
 
4.2.5 Board size 
Predictions from the previous empirical evidence are ambiguous on the board size 
variable and deliver mixed results. A number of scholars have contended that larger 
boards have their benefits. When board size increases, firm performance also goes 
up as more board members provide greater monitoring and advice, and make 
available better linkages to the external environment (Adams & Mehran, 2003; 
Coles et al., 2008; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Klein, 1998; Pfeffer, 1972). It is easier 
for larger boards to monitor their managers’ activities more effectively, but it would 
be difficult for the CEO to control the board (Pearce & Zahra, 1989). Smaller board 
sizes produce a result for lower profitability and decreased firm value (Eisenberg et 
al., 1998). In contrast, Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg et al. (1998) report evidence 
of an inverse relationship between board size and firm performance in USA firms 
whereas Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) propose that there is no relationship 
between board size and firm performance.  
Since firms differ by size, industry and sector, it is hard to determine the right board 
size. In non-profit organisations, research indicates that a higher number of trustees 
makes it easier to deal with operational issues while having more control over 
operating activities (Oster & O'Regan, 2002). For this reason, Tinkelman (1999) 
suggests that charitable organisations can improve their efficiency with larger 
boards as they have extra duties, such as supervision of fundraising. Bassem (2009) 
and Kyereboah-Coleman and Osei (2008) argue that large boards with a range of 
expertise are able to provide better performance for MFIs. Also, larger boards are 
found to be hard for powerful CEOs to dominate. The larger board size is likely to 
be associated with lower costs as members provide voluntary services. To the 
contrary, Hartarska (2005) finds that larger boards are associated with lower 
performance for MFIs, which will be reflected in lower OSS and ROA, due to less 
effective monitoring. It can be argued that larger board size is associated with free 
Chapter 4 Hypotheses and Empirical Research Model Development 
 
96 
 
volunteer time, reducing cost for MFIs and alternatively it reduces ROA due to 
monitoring issues. Mersland and Strøm (2009) do not find significant relationship 
between board size and performance. Arguably, the ideal size of an MFI board 
depends on its organisational responsibilities, strategic direction and its funding 
need. McConaghy (2013) suggests that MFI boards should have an odd number of 
members to avoid tied votes. 
The optimal size of boards in firms has been continually debated because research 
to date provides mixed results (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003; Jensen, 1993; 
Yermack, 1996). Empirical studies in India also report mixed results. For example, 
Chatterjee (2011) argues that larger boards are less effective for Indian firms 
whereas Jackling and Johl (2009) find that larger boards in top Indian companies 
provide greater exposure to external resources and improve firm performance. 
Nonetheless, larger boards are less effective for the performance of other Indian 
firms, such as stand-alone firms, private business group affiliated firms and 
subsidiaries of foreign firms (Dey & Chauhan, 2009). Kota and Tomar (2010) also 
find similar results in 106 mid-sized firms in India between 2005 and 2007. In a Sri 
Lankan context, Hewa-Wellalage, Locke, and Scrimgeour (2012) find a significant 
positive relationship between the board size and family firms’ financial 
performance. It is difficult to find a consensus perspective regarding the 
relationship between board size and MFI performance in Sri Lanka and India. 
However, larger boards tend to provide greater opportunities to raise funds, offer 
more linkages with local communities, and link the organisation to its environment 
more than smaller boards do (Pfeffer, 1973). Given the positive relationship 
between board size and MFI performance predicted by resource dependency theory, 
this study proposes the hypotheses as follows: 
H8a: There is a positive relationship between board size and the financial 
performance of MFIs  
H8b: There is a positive relationship between board size and the outreach of 
MFIs  
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4.2.6 Internal audit function 
Investors may be less hesitant and more inclined to invest in a company that has an 
internal audit function, believing the financial statements are less likely to be 
materially misstated. According to the Corporate Governance Survey in Sri Lanka 
(2007), 96% of senior executives rely on the functioning of the audit committee to 
ensure good corporate governance in Sri Lankan companies. The internal audit 
function is not limited to a specific type of institution as it is perceived as identifying 
problem areas and helping to avoid major collapse (Bassem, 2009). Bassem (2009) 
and Mersland and Strøm (2009) highlight that audited financial statements improve 
MFI performance. Strøm et al. (2014) emphasise that internal auditing means more 
monitoring and when it links with the board, it can provide more independent 
information to the directors.  
There has been an increase in regulatory attention given to internal auditing over 
the years and still more needs to be known about its existence in firms (Carcello et 
al., 2005) and the extent of its influence on firm performance, especially for the 
microfinance sector (Bassem, 2009). Sinha (2012) comments that Indian for-profit 
MFIs that are controlled by promoter shareholders have inadequate internal checks 
and balances for executive decision-making. MFIs that fail to present sound internal 
supervisory systems end up reducing the investors’ and donors’ confidence in the 
institution.  
Bassem (2009) and Mersland and Strøm (2009) state that the impact of an internal 
audit function on MFI performance needs to be subject to further examination. The 
internal audit functions in MFIs provide more transparency and accountability for 
stakeholders, which is a significant value to donors and investors. Selecting the 
firm’s internal auditor is an internal governance mechanism and it links with firm 
performance. It appears that the internal audit function is a good mechanism for 
effective supervision to enhance MFI performance: 
H9a: There is a positive relationship between the internal audit function and 
the financial performance of MFIs  
H9b: There is a positive relationship between the internal audit function and 
the outreach of MFIs  
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4.3 Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework of this study is based on the theoretical and empirical 
research on corporate governance practices that contribute to the improvement of 
financial performance and outreach of MFIs in Sri Lanka and India. Figure 4.3-1 
depicts the conceptual framework for this study. 
The left hand side of Figure 4.3-1 presents the corporate governance variables for 
the study, derived from prior studies, governance principles and practice guidelines. 
Performance variables that are linked with corporate governance variables are 
illustrated on the right hand side of Figure 4.3-1. The performance variables of this 
study are twofold; financial performance and outreach. Consideration is given in 
this study to MFIs that are regulated by the banking authority, firm age, firm size, 
leverage and organisation type. These are the control variables because the 
relationship between corporate governance and MFI performance may potentially 
be affected by the firm and industry-specific factors in India and Sri Lanka. Due to 
the organisational, economical and socio-cultural differences, it is certain that the 
impact of corporate governance on MFI performance in Sri Lanka may vary from 
the performance of MFIs in India. 
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Figure 4.3-1: Conceptual Framework 
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4.4 Independent Variables  
In order to understand the corporate governance and MFI performance variables in 
Sri Lanka and India, it is necessary to identify the key corporate governance 
practices that contribute to the performance of MFIs in these countries. The 
independent variables employed in this study are related to the theoretical and 
empirical studies that have identified important corporate governance mechanisms 
that impact on firm performance. Furthermore, the variables in the prior studies 
reflect either a positive or negative impact. This study examines variables for which 
previous studies have reported mixed results in relation to performance in 
companies. A brief description of the independent variables is given as follows.  
 
4.4.1 Gender diversity 
The gender diversity variable of this study contains three sub variables; female 
directors on boards, female CEO and female chair. 
 
4.4.1.1 Proportion of female directors on board 
Proportion of female directors on board (FemDir) is based on the number of female 
directors divided by total board size. In recent articles on gender diversity, female 
representation on boards has attracted attention as part of advocacy initiatives for 
women’s equal rights. It is suggested that female directors on boards are more 
efficient and are more active monitors than male directors (Adams & Ferreira, 
2009). Liu et al. (2014) find corporate boards with three or more female directors 
have a strong impact on firm performance when compared with those with fewer. 
However, female representation on corporate boards is very low and various efforts 
have been undertaken to increase their number on corporate boards (Adams & 
Ferreira, 2009). 
With regard to the microfinance industry, women’s leadership grasps more 
attention than traditional firms as women borrowers are a specially targeted 
clientele of MFIs and they are very successful in serving women clients (Aggarwal, 
Goodell, & Selleck, 2015; Strøm et al., 2014). As a result, these institutions are 
highly operated by women employees and the female proportion of directors is 
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much higher than the corresponding figures in other industries. For example, Strøm 
et al. (2014) state that around 29% of the all board seats are held by women, which 
is a reasonably high number when compared to other types of firms. Therefore, this 
study uses the FemDir variable to identify its impact on MFI performance. 
 
4.4.1.2 Female CEO 
A potentially important variable of MFI governance studies is female leadership. 
To a great extent, microfinance is a business for women, run by women. Strøm et 
al. (2014) state that 27% of CEOs in their sample are females. It is suggested that 
women leaders are a good communicating channel to connect with their female 
customers and women in the labour force due to their different life experiences and 
perspectives (Liu et al., 2014). Furthermore, prior research points out that the firms 
with female executives make better decisions and create better value for their 
shareholders than their male counterparts (Huang & Kisgen, 2013). 
Liu et al. (2014) state that female executive directors have a strong positive effect 
on firm performance. Investors also react more favourably to major corporate 
finance decisions made by firms with female executives (Huang & Kisgen, 2013, 
p. 835). Similarly, in the MFI industry Strøm et al. (2014) and Mersland and Strøm 
(2009) find a positive relationship between female CEO and MFI performance. 
Therefore, it is important to include the female CEO (FemCEO) variable for 
governance studies in microfinance sector. The FemCEO of this study is measured 
as a dummy variable by indicating a value of one, if the CEO of MFI is a woman, 
otherwise zero. 
 
4.4.1.3 Female chair 
Female chair (FemChair) highlights whether a female director chairs the board. Liu 
et al. (2014) find that 4.1% of board chairs are held by a female from a panel of 
over 2000 Chinese listed firms for the period 1999–2011. This situation differs in 
the microfinance sector. A global panel of 329 MFIs in 73 countries indicates that 
23% of the MFIs have a female as chair (Strøm et al., 2014). Furthermore, they 
reveal that a female chair is positively related to MFI performance. It is important 
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to know whether the female chair can improve the performance of MFIs in Sri 
Lanka and India. FemChair is used to find the relationship between governance and 
performance of MFIs. It is recorded as a dummy variable which equals one when 
the board chair is a female and zero otherwise. 
 
4.4.2 Duality 
In examining the relationship between governance and performance, Duality has 
been taken into account as a key board governance indicator (Kyereboah-Coleman 
& Osei, 2008). CEO/chair duality measures whether the CEO and board 
chairperson roles are held by the same person. If it is held by the same person, then 
the value takes one and zero otherwise. Berle and Means (1932) argue that the 
separation of ownership and control of corporations reduces managers’ incentives 
to maximise corporate efficiency, which gives an indication that for MFIs, the CEO 
and chair should be the same person. However, proponents of agency theory argue 
it is necessary to separate the roles. When both roles are combined, it may lead to 
conflicts of interest and higher agency costs. It is prudent to examine the duality in 
the context MFIs’ performance evaluation.  
 
4.4.3 Board diversity 
Board diversity in this study consists of two variables, viz, international director 
and/or donor agency representatives on the MFI board, and client representatives 
on the board. 
 
4.4.3.1 International directors/donor agency representatives on board 
The unique nature of the microfinance board is that it includes different 
stakeholders, such as donors, creditors and clients. It is important to examine the 
impact of international/donor agency representatives on MFI performance for 
evidence as to whether diversity improves performance. International 
directors/donor agency representative on board (IntDorDir) is recorded as a value 
of one if the firm has at least one international and/or donor director on board, 
otherwise zero. This variable has been recognised by prior studies in the MFI sector 
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(Hartarska, 2005; Mersland & Strøm, 2009). Hartarska (2005) illustrates how MFIs 
with more donor representatives have better outreach but worse OSS as they highly 
focus on increasing outreach to the undeserved people at their own cost (fund). 
 
4.4.3.2 Client representatives on board 
There is discussion in the microfinance industry about whether MFI boards should 
have client representatives (ClientDir), as evidence suggests that board diversity 
improves firm performance (García-Meca et al., 2015; Hartarska, 2005). 
Proponents argue that client representatives on MFI boards help to provide precise 
information on the target market. Others argue that client representatives weaken 
the MFI operation. Therefore, it is important to evaluate the role of these directors 
on the MFI board to see whether a mix of board member skills can affect the 
efficiency of board decisions and ultimately, firm performance. ClientDir takes the 
value of one if there is a client director on the MFI board, otherwise zero.  
 
4.4.4 Board independence  
Empirical studies illustrate that the quality of the board depends on board 
independence (Bhagat & Jefferis, 2002; Hartarska, 2005) asserting that independent 
directors, who are not employees in the organisation, can act as better monitors 
(Hartarska, 2005). Normally, banks have a larger proportion of outside directors 
than other companies (Adams & Mehran, 2003). MFIs may be similar to banks. 
When the firm has a large number of outside directors then the board is more 
independent (Kyereboah-Coleman & Osei, 2008). The proportion of independent 
directors is an important characteristic for board governance as it helps MFIs with 
effective monitoring. However, prior studies found both positive and negative 
relationships between governance and performance. Based on the agency theory 
perspective, the expected coefficient for this study is positive for both financial 
performance and outreach. Board independence for this study is measured based on 
the percentage of the total number of non-executive directors divided by the total 
number of board directors (IndDir). 
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4.4.5 Board size 
Board size (Bsize) is an important measure of board efficiency and it has obtained 
a higher rank among corporate governance variables in prior studies investigating 
firm performance (Kyereboah-Coleman & Osei, 2008). Financial intermediaries 
often have large boards and they tend to be less effective (Adams & Mehran, 2003). 
However, Hartarska (2005) highlights that the impact of board size on performance 
is not clear for non-profit firms. It is suggested that non-profit and charitable entities 
need to have larger boards due to the extra duties of members in relation to 
supervision and fundraising (Oster & O'Regan, 2002; Tinkelman, 1999). Bassem 
(2009) and Kyereboah-Coleman and Osei (2008) clarify that MFIs need large 
boards to have better performance. Bsize is the number of members on the board 
and is included as a corporate governance characteristic for this study.  
 
4.4.6 Internal audit function 
The internal audit function (IntAudit) in MFIs can provide more independent 
information to the board for goal fulfilment (Strøm et al., 2014). Internal auditing 
helps to reduce the information asymmetries among stakeholders. Unlike traditional 
firms, most MFIs do not have true owners and are highly dependent on donor funds. 
When the microfinance industry grows, the competition for donations also grows. 
Donor agencies rely on the information that is disclosed under rules and regulations 
(Hartarska, 2005) and benefit from independent and effective supervision of MFI 
activities (Bassem, 2009). When the MFI has an internal audit function, it appears 
there is more monitoring of MFI activities, which is a good corporate governance 
indicator. Strøm et al. (2014) highlight less internal audit in MFIs strengthens 
CEOs’ power position. However, the impact of internal audit on MFI performance 
has not gained much attention in prior studies. IntAudit takes the value of one if the 
MFI has an internal audit function and otherwise zero. 
 
4.5 Dependent Variables 
MFIs work similarly to traditional banks and financial intermediaries (Aggarwal et 
al., 2015; Hartarska, 2005) as they collect money and lend to people; the major 
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difference is their target markets. MFIs lend small amounts of money to people who 
are not in a position to borrow from the formal banking sector, as they do not have 
sufficient collateral to obtain loans (Morduch, 1999). The formal financial sector 
refuses to take the risk of lending to poor or low income people. Another difference 
is that unlike traditional banks, MFIs accept grants from donor agents and generally 
do not depend on customer deposits (Aggarwal et al., 2015). Even though these 
MFIs and traditional banks have some differences both are dealing with the funds 
of depositors or donors. MFIs’ performance need monitoring to ensure there is 
adequate accountability. Their performance can be measured through tools that 
have been used to measure traditional banking performance but those tools need to 
be adapted for the MFI context.  
Mainly from within the banking literature, there are two approaches to assess the 
bank performance (Yong & Christos, 2012). One is focused on the efficiency 
estimation using non-parametric data envelopment analysis or parametric stochastic 
frontier analysis (Casu & Molyneux, 2003; Chen & Chiu, 2011; Fiordelisi, 
Marques-Ibanez, & Molyneux, 2011). In the second approach a large number of 
studies in the literature have investigated the determinants of bank profitability by 
using financial ratios, such as ROA, ROE and the net interest margin (de Andres & 
Vallelado, 2008; Goddard, Molyneux, & Wilson, 2004; Karim, Mohamed Sami, & 
Hichem, 2010; Kundid, Skrabic, & Ercegovac, 2011; Poghosyan & Fungáčová, 
2011; Srdjan & Ognjen, 2010; Wong & Zhou, 2008).  
Unlike traditional banks, MFIs are a special form of financial institution. They need 
to fulfil the expectations of agents who grant money and other providers of funds 
to MFIs because they may value the social aspects more than the financial aspects. 
Contributors want to be sure their funds have been used according to the intended 
purposes. Therefore, MFIs have to fulfil the twofold objectives or double bottom 
lines of achieving sustainable financial performance and outreach (Aggarwal et al., 
2015; Gutiérrez-Nieto, Serrano-Cinca, & Mar Molinero, 2007). In MFI literature, 
scholars try to investigate the performance determinants of MFIs by taking into 
account both of these aspects. Since MFIs are established as non-listed firms, it is 
important to use accounting indicators to measure performance (Tchakoute-
Tchuigoua, 2010). Market performance measures are not feasible (Strøm et al., 
2014). In this study, the core MFI performance indicators recommended by CGAP 
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(2006) in Good Practice Guidelines for Funders and by Rosenberg (2009) in a 
Technical Guide are used as the basic tools to measure the MFI performance. In 
addition, variables suggested in prior empirical research are utilised to better 
understand MFI performance. 
 
4.5.1 Financial performance measures 
Empirical measures of the financial performance of MFIs have included 
profitability and viability indicators (Cull et al., 2007; Hartarska, 2005; Mersland 
& Strøm, 2008; Mersland & Strøm, 2009; Tchakoute-Tchuigoua, 2010). As this 
study’s sample comprises different institutional forms of MFIs, it is important to 
adopt a common set of performance indicators to measure financial performance. 
This will help interpretation and comparison among the MFIs. This study uses 
Operational Self-Sufficiency (OSS), Return on Assets (ROA), Yield on Gross Loan 
Portfolio (YOGLP), Operating Cost Ratio (OCR), Capital Asset Ratio (CA) and 
Portfolio at Risk (PAR) more than 30 days, as metrics of financial performance. A 
summary of various indicators used to measure the financial performance of MFIs 
follows. 
 
4.5.1.1 Operational self-sufficiency (OSS) 
Operational self-sufficiency (OSS), the most frequently observed performance 
measure is used to quantify MFIs’ institutional performance and sustainability 
(Bassem, 2009; Hartarska, 2005; Mersland & Strøm, 2009). MFIs require sufficient 
operating income to cover operational costs such as salaries, loan losses, and other 
administrative costs. OSS measures how well an MFI covers its costs, through 
revenues, by comparing financial revenue with financial and operating expenses, 
including provision for loan impairment (Lin & Ahlin, 2011; Nawaz, 2010). 
According to Strøm et al. (2014, p. 63) OSS is “free from bias resulting from 
different capital structure, access to subsidised funding and possible differences in 
default policies in the MFI”. Sometimes this measure is also referred to as 
operational sustainability and is calculated as: 
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OSS = financial revenue/(financial expenses + loan loss provision expenses + 
operating expenses) 
 
4.5.1.2 Return on assets (ROA) 
Return on assets (ROA) measures the ability of the MFI to utilise its total assets to 
generate returns (Microfinance Consensus Guidelines, 2003) or to determine how 
effectively the MFI’s management generates earnings from its investments. Unlike 
ROE, ROA measures the profitability of MFIs without considering the financial 
structure of the institution (Bruett, 2005; Tchakoute-Tchuigoua, 2010).  
The most commonly used profitability measure for banking and commercial 
institutions is ROA (Gutiérrez-Nieto et al., 2007; Rosenberg, 2009). Many 
microfinance studies use ROA for a financial performance measure to show how it 
is going to be impacted by the corporate governance (Barry & Tacneng, 2014; 
Hartarska, 2005; Mersland & Strøm, 2009; Strøm et al., 2014). ROA uses net 
income after taxes but before donations, which is a non-operating income, as the 
numerator, and total assets for the period as the denominator. It shows how an MFI 
is profitable relating to its total assets, expressed as a percentage. ROA for this study 
is calculated as: 
ROA   = Net income after taxes and before donations  
Total Assets 
 
4.5.1.3 Yield on gross loan portfolio (YOGLP) 
Yield on gross loan portfolio (YOGLP), which is also known as portfolio yield, is 
an indicator of the loan portfolio’s ability to generate financial revenue from 
interest, fees and commissions (Microfinance Consensus Guidelines, 2003). 
According to Gutiérrez-Nieto et al. (2007) profitability of MFIs can be measured 
through the YOGLP.  
YOGLP = Interest on loan portfolio + fees and commissions on loan portfolio 
Gross Loan Portfolio  
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4.5.1.4 Operating expenses ratio (OCR) 
Operating expenses ratio (OCR) is the most commonly used indicator for efficiency 
and productivity of MFIs (Barry & Tacneng, 2014; Gutiérrez-Nieto et al., 2007) as 
it measures how well the MFI masters its operations (Mersland & Urgeghe, 2011), 
and is also known as operating cost ratio (Rosenberg, 2009). This proxy of financial 
performance measures the MFI’s administrative efficiency by comparing total 
operating costs to the average gross loan portfolio or to the total assets.  
The most appropriate denominator for calculating the OCR is total assets. The 
reason for selecting total assets relates to the consideration of number of loans and 
loan size which could impact OCR. For example, if MFIs provide small loans to 
borrowers, then their operation cost is high due to the loan processing (loan 
preliminary assessment cost, site visit cost, loan application cost, etc.), loan 
monitoring expenditure (client visit cost, loan collection cost, such as fuel, and 
reimbursement, etc.). Technically, gross loan portfolio represents the portfolio of 
micro loan credit. However, there are circumstances where some MFIs provide 
other services, including micro savings31, micro business consultation, in which the 
amount is not represented in the gross loan portfolio. In that instance, it is 
unfavourable to compare operating cost against gross loan portfolio as it does not 
represent other savings balance which remains in the total assets.  
Total assets are viewed as the most appropriate measure to mitigate disadvantage 
of such distortion as total assets represents gross loan portfolio, savings and other 
nature of assets 32  which have been generated to disburse micro loan credit 
(Microfinance Consensus Guidelines, 2003; Rosenberg, 2009). A low ratio implies 
that the institution is more profitable and shows its ability to cover its costs 
                                                 
31 MFIs retain clients’ savings in their liability and corresponding cash received on client savings 
are deposited in banks as term deposits. However, significant personal cost is paid for monitoring 
clients’ savings, which include under the administrative expenditure.  
32 Usually, MFIs use loan tracing systems (IT software) for monitoring credit. The value of loan 
tracking system is recorded under the intangible assets and amortised within specified period. That 
amortised cost includes under administrative expenditure. Also MFIs have given motor vehicles for 
their loan officers to collect repayments. Associated cost on vehicle, such as fuel, vehicle 
maintenance are included in the administrative expenditure. 
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effectively, which is strongly related to the sustainability of the MFI. OCR of this 
study is calculated as:  
OCR = Annualised Operating Expenses 
Total assets 
  
4.5.1.5 Capital asset ratio (CA) 
Capital asset ratio (CA) provides information on the capital structure of an MFI and 
it signals its capital strength. CA ratio measures an institution’s resiliency against 
both expected and unexpected losses. This is an important factor in determining risk 
in financial institutions, particularly in banks (Karim et al., 2010; Tulchin, Sassman, 
& Wolkomir, 2009) as an explanatory variable, which indicates the risk that the 
institution has when there is insufficient capital to continue its operations.  
The proportion of total assets financed by the MFI's equity capital is explained by 
the CA ratio (Bruett, 2005; Tulchin et al., 2009). They point out that CA ratio as an 
important measure for MFI performance in the framework for reporting, analysis 
and monitoring of MFI performance. Also Tchakoute-Tchuigoua (2010) and 
Gutiérrez-Nieto et al. (2007) have identified the CA ratio as a MFI performance 
measure. Institutions with higher capital assets ratios have low leverage levels and, 
therefore, less risk which reduces the cost of capital and increases profitability of 
the firm. The higher CA signifies that the institution is better positioned to meet its 
financial obligations and addresses an unexpected losses (Tulchin et al., 2009). 
Normally, the expected coefficient for capital asset ratio is a positive coefficient. 
It is important for an institution to comply with internally set or externally 
prescribed minimum capital standards, especially for financial institutions where it 
is calculated as a percentage of equity in relation to risk-weighted assets. Bank 
supervisors in Latin American countries set the limit of capital adequacy between 
8% and 11% (Jansson, 2003), however in Sri Lanka, where the banks are regulated 
under the Central Bank’s capital adequacy ratio, the requirement is between 14% 
and 20% (CBSL, 2012a). In India, banks are required to maintain a minimum 
capital adequacy ratio of 9% on an on-going basis, however, non-bank subsidiaries 
are required to maintain the capital adequacy ratio prescribed by their respective 
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regulators (RBI, 2013). New RBI norms required NBFCs to have a capital adequacy 
ratio of 12% by April 2014.  
Banks with more equity capital operate more efficiently than banks with less capital 
(Kwan & Eisenbeis, 1997) because they can amply offset the risk of potential losses 
with equity capital. This situation is relevant for other types of financial institutions 
such as MFIs. Accordingly, this study uses CA to measure MFIs’ financial 
performance. CA is calculated by using total equity capital to total assets (Tulchin 
et al., 2009). 
CA = Total Equity 
Total Assets 
 
4.5.1.6 Portfolio at risk more than 30 days (PAR) 
Portfolio at risk is the standard international measure as well as the most widely 
accepted measure of portfolio quality in the banking and MFI sectors (Gutiérrez-
Nieto et al., 2007; Rosenberg, 2009). The loan portfolio is the main source of risk 
for financial institutions as it is the largest asset (Mersland & Urgeghe, 2011). The 
repayment of loans is a vital indicator of their performance. The strong repayment 
patterns emphasise that the loans are of real value to the client.  
Portfolio at risk (PAR) means the value of outstanding loan balances that are past 
due by at least one day (excluding the interest receivable on the loan, but including 
the entire unpaid principal balance) and have not yet been written off (Microfinance 
Consensus Guidelines, 2003). In microfinance, 30 days is a common breakpoint 
(Rosenberg, 2009, p. 6) and the most widely used PAR ratio (Mersland & Urgeghe, 
2011, p. 7). This measure reflects the percentage of gross loan portfolio at risk of 
non-repayment by including the complete outstanding balance of loans that have 
payments in arrears of more than 30 days (Rosenberg, 1999). In this calculation, 
the value of restructured loans is also included. As a rule of thumb, PAR above 10% 
must be reduced quickly because a decreasing PAR is a positive signal for financial 
sustainability and low delinquency. PAR which is more than 30 days is calculated 
(Rosenberg, 1999) as: 
PAR = Outstanding balance of portfolio overdue borrowers for more than 30 days 
Gross Loan Portfolio for Borrowers 
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4.5.2 Outreach measures 
Lafourcade, Isern, Mwangi, and Brown (2006) emphasise outreach as “efforts to 
extend microfinance services to the people who are underserved by financial 
institutions”. In simple terms, most studies refer to outreach of MFIs as the number 
of clients now served (Caudill et al., 2009; Cull et al., 2007; Hartarska & 
Nadolnyak, 2007; Mersland & Strøm, 2009). However, Meyer (2002) expresses the 
view that outreach is a multidimensional concept and different dimensions are 
needed to measure it, such as the value of the loan portfolio, average loan size, depth 
of reach, worth of users, cost to users, breadth, length and scope, among others. 
Navajas, Schreiner, Meyer, Gonzalez-vega, and Rodriguez-meza (2000) similarly 
indicate that there are six aspects for measuring outreach: depth, worth of users, 
cost to users, breadth, length and scope. However, obtaining measurable and 
robustness data to measure social impact of MFIs is difficult (Mersland & Urgeghe, 
2011). In the microfinance literature, a number of variables are proposed to measure 
the outreach of MFIs. This study uses three measures, which are common outreach 
variables: total number of active clients (Breadth of outreach), Depth of outreach 
and the proportion of female clients served by the MFI. 
 
4.5.2.1 Breadth of outreach (Breadth) 
The breadth of outreach is calculated as the number of people to whom the MFI 
provides loans, or the number of borrowers over a specific period of time who 
currently have an outstanding loan balance with the MFI (Microfinance Consensus 
Guidelines, 2003; Quayes, 2012; Schreiner, 2002). These calculations of active 
clients do not include borrowers whose loans have been written off. This variable 
has been used in most of the governance and performance studies of microfinance 
enterprises (Barry & Tacneng, 2014; Bassem, 2009; Hartarska, 2005; Mersland & 
Strøm, 2009). Due to the high level of dispersion between the minimum and 
maximum number, this study uses the natural logarithm value of the number of 
active borrowers in the MFI (Breadth).  
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4.5.2.2 Women borrowers (FemBorr) 
Traditionally, MFIs have tried to achieve deeper outreach by targeting people who 
are most vulnerable, such as women (Lafourcade et al., 2006) and the fourth World 
Conference on Women, at Beijing in 1995, declared that 70% of the world’s poor 
were women (Freeman, 1996). Once women in the world are empowered, they 
contribute to the economic growth and sustainable livelihoods of their families and 
communities. As a result, women’s empowerment through microfinance is 
identified as a key component in promoting the International Labour Organisation’s 
(ILO) Decent Work Agenda (ILO, 2009, p. 4). Many MFIs, in some cases 
exclusively, target female clients to make this contribution and ultimately 
contribute to the ILO core values of greater gender equality and non-discrimination. 
The wider discussion on gender and the role of finance recognises that when women 
have opportunities to raise their productivity, then households, firms, communities 
and whole economies perform significantly better and accelerate their growth (ILO, 
2009). In Latin American and Caribbean countries, even though they have relatively 
well developed capital markets, the biggest regional weakness is access to finance. 
Formal financial products are lacking and women are underprivileged by traditional 
credit scoring models that rely on credit history and collateral (Lee, 2013, 
September 30). There is continuing recognition that it is important to concentrate 
on women borrowers because females continue to remain a symbol of poorest of 
the poor and vulnerable population, based on evidence of prior studies.  
The success of microfinance highly depends on lending to female clients as they 
are the largest market (Aggarwal et al., 2015; Armendariz & Morduch, 2005). MIX 
market data analysis shows that most MFIs targeted women borrowers (74%) while 
half of them declare women empowerment and gender equality as their objective 
(Iskenderian, 2013, October 3; Women’s World Banking, 2013). A survey of 13 
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean suggest that women are strongly 
motivated to start businesses (Lee, 2013, September 30). When compared to men, 
the women are generally viewed as reliable re-payers and more loyal clients 
(Aggarwal et al., 2015). The study shows that women clients exhibit lower portfolio 
at risk than men at all loan sizes and a higher retention rate, which is around 68% 
(Iskenderian, 2013, October 3). 
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According to Quayes (2012), “outreach to women is measured by the number of 
women borrowers as a fraction of the total number of borrowers”. This is an 
important indicator to measure MFI performance (Aggarwal et al., 2015) as women 
entrepreneurs face significant barriers when accessing financial services and MFIs 
can facilitate overcoming barriers as a key part of their mission (Women’s World 
Banking, 2013). In 2011, Women’s World Banking launched the Gender 
Performance Initiative to evaluate how effectively MFIs are serving women, to 
demonstrate the benefits of financial inclusion for women. They have subsequently 
launched a comprehensive tool to track the gender performance of their firms 
(Iskenderian, 2013, October 3). This study uses percentage of women borrowers to 
the total number of active borrowers (FemBorr) to measure the outreach of MFIs.  
 
4.5.2.3 Depth of outreach (Depth) 
Depth of outreach refers to "the value the society attaches to the net gain from the 
use of the micro credit by a given borrower" (Navajas et al., 2000, p. 335). Quayes 
(2012, p. 3423) pronounces that “access of credit disbursement to poor people, 
wherein the poorer the borrowers are the greater is the depth of outreach”. This 
measure evaluates how well MFIs reach the very poor and focuses on poverty 
lending within a specific context by comparing the loan size to the Gross National 
Income (GNI) 33 per capita of a country. With the development of the microfinance 
sector more attention focuses on the overall social outreach of the sector (Barry & 
Tacneng, 2014).  
A higher value of depth indicates that they serve a lesser number of poor clients 
(Hartarska, 2005). From a poverty-alleviation perspective, the preferred value for 
this variable should be a smaller value (Bassem, 2009). The MicroBanking Bulletin 
defines the poorest microentrepreneurs or “low-end” clients as those with a depth 
of outreach less than 20% or an average outstanding loan balance which is less than 
USD 150. However, low account sizes do not guarantee a focus on low income 
                                                 
33 GNI comprises with the total value of goods and services produced within a country which is 
known as GDP, plus its income received from other countries, less similar payments made to other 
countries. See World Bank website to get GNI values for countries. 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.ATLS.CD (See also Rosenberg, 2009). 
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clientele, and as a result, this is a very rough proxy for the poverty level of 
borrowers at a given time period (Rosenberg, 2009). However, due to a lack of data 
more sophisticated indicators are not available.  
The variable is usually presented as a percentage by weighting the GNI per capita 
(Barry & Tacneng, 2014), which is calculated based on GNI divided by mid-year 
population. Instead of GNI per capita, some studies use GDP per capita to measure 
the Depth of outreach (Bassem, 2009; Hartarska, 2005). 
Depth = Average outstanding loan balance per client 
GNI per capita 
 
Even though, GNI per capita is the only measure available for comparative studies 
among countries, it is not an ideal measure of income as it is skewed by high 
inequalities in income distribution (Lafourcade et al., 2006). When computing this 
ratio, rather than taking the reported GNI per capita, the figure can be transformed 
to account for real impact for poor people, making it more useful. Based on the 
available data about the income disparity in each country, an adjusted GNI per 
capita excluding the outlier impact on high income is proposed. 
 
Sri Lankan GNI per capita calculation as an example: 
According to the inequality of income distribution, the top 20% of the population 
has the large percentage of income (Weede, 1981). Therefore, this study excludes 
the outliers in the income distribution and calculates adjusted GNI per capita for Sri 
Lanka by distributing 45.9% of the income among the bottom 80% of the 
population. 
The following steps to exclude the impact of inequalities in income distribution and 
calculating adjusted GNI per capita value are (See Table 4.5-1), 
1. From the total population, 20% as the highest income component is 
excluded. 
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2. From the total GNI value, income that is distributed among the top 20% of 
wealthy people in the country, i.e. 54.1%34 is excluded. 
3. To calculate adjusted GNI per capita income, the adjusted GNI is divided 
by adjusted mid-year population. 
 
Table 4.5-1: GNI per capita in Sri Lanka 
Year 
GNI per capita 
(LKR) 
Adjusted GNI per 
capita (LKR) 
2007 176,893 101,346 
2008 212,972 122,193 
2009 233,716 134,095 
2010 267,967 153,746 
2011 310,124 177,933 
2012 365,699 209,821 
 
A similar method is applied to Indian GNI per capita calculations and Table 4.5-2 
presents the GNI per capita before and after the adjustment.  
 
Table 4.5-2: GNI per capita in India 
Year 
GNI per capita 
(INR) 
Adjusted GNI per 
capita (INR) 
2007 42,306 30,481 
2008 47,001 33,864 
2009 53,321 38,418 
2010 62,987 45,382 
2011 71,673 51,640 
2012 77,225 55,641 
 
                                                 
34 This upper quintile value is extracted from the Department of Census and Statistics - Household 
Income and Expenditure Survey 2009/10 report. See page no. 5 of 
http://www.statistics.gov.lk/Newsletters/HIES200910FinalBuletin.pdf and page no. 8 and 9 of 
http://www.statistics.gov.lk/HIES/HIES2009_10FinalReportEng.pdf  
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4.6 Control Variables 
There are variables that affect the performance of MFIs other than the corporate 
governance variables. It is important to consider these control variables.  
 
4.6.1 Regulated by banking authority (Regbank) 
MFIs are diverse in character and can operate as regulated or unregulated 
institutions (Hartarska & Mersland, 2009). Regulatory status is an important 
institutional control variable for MFI studies (Mersland & Strøm, 2009; Strøm et 
al., 2014) and it can impact MFI performance because the presence of sound 
regulation can change the design of an internal governance mechanism of an 
organisation (Adams & Mehran, 2003; Hartarska & Mersland, 2009). Regulation 
by a banking authority may be positively related with profitability due to implicit 
regulatory protection or it might reduce profitable opportunities or increase cost. 
Cross country studies on MFIs reveal that regulatory status or regulatory power of 
the supervisory body has no effect on MFI financial performance and outreach 
(Hartarska, 2009; Mersland & Strøm, 2009). A different finding is suggested by 
Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) based on data from 114 MFIs in 62 countries, 
including one Sri Lankan MFI and 13 from India. They emphasise that there is an 
indirect effect of regulatory status on MFI outreach (the number of borrowers). This 
study considers regulation by banking authority as a control variable. Regulated by 
a banking authority is coded as a dummy variable taking the value of one where the 
MFI is regulated by a banking authority (Regbank), such as CBSL or RBI, 
otherwise zero. 
  
4.6.2 Firm age (Fage) 
Number of years in operation (Fage) is an important control variable (Liu et al., 
2014) and it has been used by prior MFI governance and performance studies (Barry 
& Tacneng, 2014; Kyereboah-Coleman & Osei, 2008; Mersland & Strøm, 2009; 
Strøm et al., 2014). As an MFI matures in age it tends to learn what governance 
mechanisms work best for the institution and how to achieve profitability through 
it. That MFIs perform better with age, as they have more experienced staff than 
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newly established MFIs, is testable. This study calculates Fage control variable by 
using the number of years of operation in the microfinance industry.  
 
4.6.3 Firm size (Fsize) 
MFI and bank governance literature employs firm size as a control variable 
(Kosmidou, 2008; Strøm et al., 2014) to capture any scale effect and has been noted 
as important in the relationship between corporate governance and financial 
performance (Hovey, Li, & Naughton, 2003). In general, the size of bank relates 
positively to profitability (Karim et al., 2010; Kosmidou, 2008). This is consistent 
with the argument that the large banks obtain benefits from economies of scale (low 
cost) and their economic scope, having a diversified range of loans and other 
products (Karim et al., 2010). Also, they lend money to clients with lower risk 
profiles which increases their profits. They may gain higher market power through 
stronger brand name or sound regulatory protection (Goddard et al., 2004). 
However, there is no prior expectation developed for bank size in the South Asian 
context (Perera, Skully, & Chaudrey, 2013).  
It is expected that larger MFIs tend to adopt more formal governance mechanisms 
than smaller MFIs as they need to monitor their complex operational activities more 
effectively and efficiently. A large MFI performs better as it has more funds, 
resources and opportunities to diversify its loan portfolio (Barry & Tacneng, 2014; 
Chakrabarty & Bass, 2014). This study uses MFI size as a control variable. Scholars 
have used different proxies to measure the firm size, such as total assets, fixed assets, 
annual sales, paid up capital, shareholder equity and the market value of the firm. 
Consistent with prior studies in the MFI context (Barry & Tacneng, 2014; 
Chakrabarty & Bass, 2014; Hartarska, 2005; Mersland & Strøm, 2009) natural 
logarithm of an MFI’s total assets (Fsize) is used for MFI size.  
 
4.6.4 Leverage ratio (Lev) 
The leverage ratio compares the total debt to total assets in a firm (Liu et al., 2014) 
and it helps give an idea of the proportion of MFI assets financed by debt. When an 
MFI has a low proportion of debt then this implies that the MFI is less dependent 
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on the money borrowed from outside. This ratio is used to check the long-term 
solvency of the MFI. In general, if an MFI has higher leverage ratio then the MFI 
has more risk in continuing operations. This ratio controls the leverage level of an 
MFI and large MFIs tends to acquire more debts than small MFIs. The leverage 
(Lev) ratio is calculated by dividing the MFI’s total debt by the total assets.  
Leverage Ratio    =  Total debts  
Total assets 
 
4.6.5 Organisation type (Orgtype) 
A study by Kosmidou, Pasiouras, and Tsaklanganos (2007) for 19 Greek bank 
subsidiaries operating in 11 nations (including UK, USA, Canada and South Africa) 
covering the period 1995 to 2001 shows privately owned banks generate more profit 
than government owned banks. This argument is true in developing countries like 
those in South Asia (Perera et al., 2013) as most government bank lending is 
supported by government direct credit programmes, with interest rate ceilings and 
other bank-specific regulations imposed by the government. Varma (2005, p. 200) 
points out that “the ability of the domestic financial institutions to play a role in 
corporate governance is constrained by their ownership structure”. 
Ownership types of MFIs varies as there are diverse legal incorporations in 
microfinance sector (Hartarska, 2005). MFIs in this study are also diversely 
incorporated and this circumstance is similar in other countries (Hartarska & 
Mersland, 2009). They are registered as NGOs, private banks, NBFIs or member-
owned co-operatives. Hartarska (2005) and Strøm et al. (2014) use different types 
of MFI as a firm specific control variable to find the link between governance and 
MFI performance. It is appropriate to consider the impact of organisation type; 
whether the MFI is a non-profit organisation, for-profit organisation, member-based 
co-operative, or shareholder owned firm as a variable to control for firm 
heterogeneity.  
Many policy papers report that the most appropriate ownership type for MFIs is a 
shareholder firm that can be regulated by the banking authorities and remain 
independent from donors (Christen & Rosenberg, 2000; Hardy, Holden, & 
Prokopenko, 2003; Jansson, Rosales, & Westley, 2004). Such MFIs are able to 
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benefit from corporate governance too. This underlines a need to transform non-
profit MFIs to for-profit ownership (Ledgerwood & White, 2006). A trend toward 
MFIs commercialising their institutions from non-profit to for-profit, based on a 
belief that shareholder firms can perform better than non-profit organisations 
(Hardy et al., 2003; Ledgerwood & White, 2006), is apparent. It is further suggested 
they can provide low-cost credit to greater outreach (Varottil, 2012). However, 
Mersland (2009) and Sinclair (2012) highlight that there is minimal difference 
between shareholder owned MFI performance and other MFI performance. 
Mersland and Strøm (2009) reveal that ownership of MFIs does not directly impact 
performance. Due to the ambiguous evidence suggested in prior research, this study 
employs organisation type (Orgtype) variable as a control variable to mitigate its 
effect on the link between governance and MFI performance.  
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Table 4.6-1: Definitions of dependent, independent and control variables 
Variables Acronym Predicted 
Sign 
Definition 
Dependent Variables 
Financial Performance Variables  
Operating self-sufficiency OSS 
 Operating self-sufficiency is the total financial revenue divided by 
the financial expenses, loan loss provision expenses and operating 
expenses. 
Return on assets  ROA 
 Return on assets is the net income after tax and before donations 
divided by the total assets. 
Yield on gross loan 
portfolio 
YOGLP 
 Yield on gross loan portfolio is the interest on loan portfolio and 
fees and commissions on loan portfolio divided by the gross loan 
portfolio.  
Operating expense OCR 
 The operating expenses/cost is the operating expenses divided by 
the total assets.  
Capital to Asset CA  Capital to asset is the total capital divided by the total assets. 
Portfolio at risk more than 
30 days 
PAR 
 The portfolio at risk more than 30 days is the loans that are more 
than 30 days divided by the gross loan portfolio for borrowers.  
Outreach Variables 
Breadth of Outreach Breadth  The natural logarithm of the number of active borrowers in the MFI. 
Percentage of female 
borrowers  
FemBorr 
 The ratio of female borrowers to total number of active borrowers. 
Depth of Outreach Depth 
 The average loan balance per borrower divided by the adjusted GNI 
per capita. 
Independent Variables 
Percentage of female 
directors 
FemDir Positive (+) 
The ratio of female directors to total number of directors on the 
board. 
    Female CEO FemCEO Positive (+) 
Dummy explanatory variable that takes a value of one if the CEO 
of the firm in a female. 
    Female chairperson FemChair Positive (+) 
Dummy explanatory variable that takes a value of one if the 
chairperson of the firm in a female. 
    Duality Duality Negative (-) 
Dummy explanatory variable that takes a value of one if the firm’s 
CEO and chairperson are same. 
Board of directors who 
represent international 
and/or donors agencies of 
the firm 
IntDorDir Positive (+) 
Dummy explanatory variable that takes a value of one if the firm 
has at least one international and/or donor director on board. 
Board of directors who 
represent 
clients/borrowers of the 
firm 
ClientDir Positive (+) 
Dummy explanatory variable that takes a value of one if the firm 
has at least one director representing clients/borrowers of the firm.  
Non-executive directors 
on board 
IndDir Positive (+) 
The ratio of non-executive directors on the board to total number of 
directors on the board. 
   Board size Bsize Positive (+) The total number of directors on the board. 
Internal auditor IntAudit Positive (+) 
Dummy explanatory variable that takes a value of one if the firm 
has an internal auditor reporting to the board. 
Control Variables 
Regulated by banking 
authority 
Regbank 
 Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm regulated by 
banking authority in the country. 
   Firm Age Fage 
 The natural logarithm of the number of years from the date of 
establishment as an MFI. 
   Firm size Fsize  The natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets. 
   Leverage Lev  The ratio of the firm's total debt to its total assets. 
  Organisation type dummy   
variables 
Orgtype 
 Dummy variables for each of the organisation type: NGO-MFIs, 
NBFCs, Co-operatives, Credit Unions, Rural Banks, Urban Co-
operative Banks, Private Companies. 
  Year dummy variables year  Six year dummies for each of the years from 2007 to 2012. 
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4.7 Conclusion 
Sustainability of MFIs emphasises not only the financial viability of the 
organisations but also transparent and efficient organisations that are accepted by 
all the stakeholders involved in the organisation. Most of these requirements can be 
achieved through good corporate governance. However, the empirical studies 
relating to good corporate governance practices of MFIs are still in their infancy 
and further studies are needed to find out how improved corporate governance 
practices may increase profitability and sustainability of MFIs.  
This chapter provides a rational description of the corporate governance 
characteristics used in the empirical model and their relationship with firm 
performance by developing the nine hypotheses to be tested in three analysis 
chapters. These hypotheses will facilitate the understandings of the corporate 
governance mechanisms in MFIs in Sri Lanka and India. This chapter presents the 
conceptual framework of this study in relation to the developed hypotheses. Based 
on the conceptual framework, the dependent and control variables used in the study 
are explained. The next chapter demonstrates the data collection method and 
econometric methods that are used for testing the hypotheses. 
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5 CHAPTER FIVE 
DATA COLLECTION AND RESEARCH METHOD 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter explains the research method used to investigate the research 
questions, the data collection process, the empirical model and research techniques 
used in this study. Corporate governance has been extensively investigated in for-
profit sectors but there are limited prior studies focusing on the corporate 
governance of MFIs. The link between corporate governance and MFI performance 
remains unexplained. This study investigates empirically the nexus between 
corporate governance practices and MFI performance.  
This study has adopted diverse research methods to determine an appropriate 
research method which is suitable for the study of corporate governance of MFIs. 
This enables researcher to decide the research philosophy, empirical data and 
analysis techniques to come from the findings of the research. A panel data analysis 
approach is used to search for patterns in MFI data which are collected over time 
for the same organisations and then a regression is run to identify the association 
between governance and performance of MFIs.  
 
5.2 Research Method 
The research questions have guided the methodological and method approach 
followed in this study. As Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill (2007) note, the most 
important determinant of the research philosophy depends on research questions. 
To find the linkage between governance and performance requires looking at the 
data, the research which points to a positivism methodology, which is a critical and 
objective-based method to examine the research issue. The positivism research 
philosophy of human knowledge is extended when people come to rely on empirical 
data, reason and the development of scientific laws to explain phenomena (Bernard, 
2013, p. 16). There is a concentration on quantifiable observations and the use of 
statistical methods to evaluate the results. The research method for this study is 
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quantitative and data analysis techniques are based on secondary data collected 
from several sources. Quantitative research outlines a distinctive research strategy 
which is described as:  
“entailing the collection of numerical data, as exhibiting a view of the 
relationship between theory and research as deductive and a predilection 
for a natural science approach (and of positivism in particular), and as 
having an objectivist conception of social reality” (Bryman, 2012, p. 160). 
 
5.3  Data Collection Process 
The data collection process begins with the identification of a suitable definition for 
the MFIs in Sri Lanka and India. Data are obtained from various sources which may 
require cleaning and editing in order to process a consolidated dataset for each 
country. It is necessary to test for missing data and outliers in the dataset to 
maximise consistency and reliability of the database. Finally, diagnostic testing is 
performed before applying the linear regression model to see if the regression 
model is appropriate.  
  
5.3.1 MFI definition 
There is no universal accepted definition for MFIs. It is important to develop a 
working definition for MFIs in this study for the convenience of data collection. As 
noted in Chapter 2 above, scholars, governments, policy makers and various 
institutions (ADB, 2000; Armendariz & Labie, 2011; Burkett & Sheehan, 2009; 
Helms, 2006; Hudon, 2008; LMFPA, 2015; RBI, 2011; Robinson, 2001) have 
developed different definitions for the microfinance sector. The MIX market 
classifies financial institutions as MFIs when the average outstanding loan balance 
is less than 250% of GNI per capita (Rosenberg, 2009). Definitions of MFIs vary 
from country to country, region to region. Therefore, to conduct an empirical 
investigation of the MFI sector, it is important to have a precise definition to 
operationalise the data analysis process, because most of the given characteristics 
in the different definitions cannot be operationalised in the real world. After 
considering the narratives given by different scholars, this study has taken into 
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account the following benchmarks to select the institutions that need to be included 
in the data collection.  
This study confines the focus to institutions that predominantly have a mission to 
provide credit to poor or low-income individuals and groups with the following 
attributes: 
 Dedicated towards alleviating poverty by supporting low income people to 
come out of poverty 
 Offer easy access to credit for people who are unable to obtain credit at a 
reasonable rate from traditional sources without collateral 
 Enable women’s empowerment by lending mostly to women 
 Provide small amounts of credit for short time periods which require 
repayment at concessionary interest rates  
 Generally, lend money for income-generating activities, although loans are 
given for consumption, housing and other activities  
There are some other categories of financial institutions such as ICs, leasing 
companies and pawnshops which do not merely provide credit/loans to poor or low-
income people with no collateral, but provide services by acting as an insurance 
agent, agriculture adviser, and household product agent. This study employs data 
of MFIs which are generating more than 75% of income from lending loans than 
the other services (RBI, 2011). Some commercial banks are also engaging in 
microfinance activities under their normal operations or as a separate unit. These 
types of banks are not reporting their microfinance activities separately in their 
audited financial statements or annual reports. Commercial banks and formal 
financial institutions that do not report microfinance activities separately are 
excluded from the dataset.  
 
5.3.2 Sampling procedure and sample size 
The precise number of MFIs in Sri Lanka and India cannot be readily determined 
due to the diverse legal forms in the microfinance sector. MFIs for this study are 
restricted to the formal and semi-formal financial institutions, conducting their 
microfinance activities under regulations. Informal service providers, such as 
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moneylenders, thrift and saving societies, are excluded. There is no clear and 
concise evidence to trace the microfinance activities of informal organisations as 
they neither register under any regulation nor are regulated by any government body. 
Furthermore, they are not required to submit financial and other information to any 
regulated body. As this study employs board characteristics as the independent 
variables, director information is necessary and is generally limited to the formal 
and semi-formal institutions.  
The sample size of this study is purposely selected and the sample period is 
constrained by the data availability and accessibility. The year 2007 is selected as 
the start for data collection due to the availability of MFI annual reports, audited 
financial statements and corresponding financial and governance information, 
which is diminished for earlier years. Some MFIs are omitted due to the 
unavailability of annual reports, unpublished financial statements, missing data 
and/or insufficient time span of operation. Data collection for the sample ends in 
2012 as it was the most recent year of data availability at the time data collection 
was completed. The time period for this study is six years. Data are collected from 
various sources.  
MFI databases such as MIX market, LMFPA, the Sri Lankan microfinance network 
in Sri Lanka and Sa-Dhan, the Indian microfinance network are employed to obtain 
financial data for the sample of MFIs from both countries. The MIX market 
database is the best publicly available financial data for individual MFIs around the 
world (Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2007). Recent studies (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, & 
Morduch, 2011; Gonzales, 2007; Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2007; Lin & Ahlin, 2011; 
Quayes, 2012; Shahzad, Tripe, Matthews, & O-Balli, 2012) have drawn on using 
the MIX market database for their empirical studies. MIX collects its data mainly 
through contracted consultants and country-level networks (Lafourcade et al., 2006). 
The database contains financial and social information of MFIs from around the 
world with 81% of the sample audited externally and 28% rated independently 
(Gonzalez & Rosenberg, 2006). These data were self-reported by MIX and 
reclassified based on the international accounting standards (Lafourcade et al., 
2006). Sa-Dhan has 246 members, comprising 97 primary and 149 associate 
members. LMFPA has 84 members, comprising 61 ordinary members and 23 
associate members. In both countries, large MFIs account for a significant 
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percentage of total loan portfolio in the microfinance sector in which they operate 
and they may register either with MIX market and/or with country-level 
microfinance networks (Sa-Dhan and LMFPA respectively).  
Data on firm-level corporate governance indicators are individually collected from 
the annual reports, individual firm websites and by personally contacting the 
individual firms. 
These different data sources have been amalgamated into two separate, country-
specific databases that include 54 MFIs for Sri Lanka and 113 MFIs for India, after 
eliminating the double-counting. This dataset covers the majority of MFIs of 
significant size that generally provide small uncollateralised loans to underserved 
people. There are many other financial institutions, such as government 
development banks, state-owned banks, commercial banks, postal and other savings 
banks, co-operative and rural banks, all of which provide some significant 
proportion of loans to low income people amongst their clientele.  
The research design is longitudinal (panel). The panel is an unbalanced panel35 due 
to the number of time periods (t) for all the individual firms (i) not being same. The 
panel dataset comprises 300 MFI-year observations for Sri Lanka and 575 MFI-
year observations for India over the period 2007 to 2012. Table 5.3-1 summarises 
information of the sample sizes employed in the analysis for the two countries. The 
number of MFIs included for the sample of Sri Lanka and India varies due to the 
non-availability of secondary data when there are no audited financial reports 
available in the MIX database for some MFIs. A STATA statistical package is used 
to analyse data for interpretation. 
Table 5.3-1: Sampling size of MFIs in Sri Lanka and India 
Country 
Year Total firm-year 
observations 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Sri Lanka  50 51 52 49 49 49 300 
India  62 82 103 108 110 110 575 
                                                 
35 Unbalance Panel has some missing data for at least one time period for at least one entity (See 
Stock & Watson, 2007). 
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5.3.3 Sample survivorship bias 
Sample survivorship bias can misguide readers as it encourages spurious reversals 
(Carpenter & Lynch, 1999). This kind of bias cannot explain the patterns of 
performance as it uses only survivors during the period, not the non-survivors 
(Stock & Watson, 2007). It is important to solve the problem of estimation bias 
when measuring performance when only surviving MFIs are included and this is 
done by including all the firms without considering their disappearance over the 
sample period. Therefore the sample taken for this study is free from sample 
survivorship bias as all the MFIs in the database (survivors and non-survivors) were 
selected without considering the continuation of their activities for the entire sample 
period. 
 
5.3.4 Data cleaning and editing 
The data are supplemented and verified through annual reports and published 
audited financial statements in the MIX market website, individual websites and 
the different communication channels of MFIs. This helps to ensure the validity and 
the reliability of the secondary data in the MIX market, LMFPA and Sa-Dhan, 
mitigating the effect of missing values in their datasets. In addition, reports and 
documents were obtained by contacting individual MFIs in Sri Lanka and India. 
Further, as there is no significant difference in the data collection and reporting 
approaches of each of the database networks, this provides a further means of cross 
checking data. Country-level networks in Sri Lanka and India follow the same 
guidelines available in the MIX market. There are signed technical agreements with 
the MIX market (LMFPA, 2012; Sa-Dhan, 2012). Data entering errors in the dataset 
are checked and corrected if there are any data input errors noted. 
One of the main issues arising in secondary data analysis is missing data (Little & 
Rubin, 1989) and it needs to be considered during the data analysis stage, otherwise 
findings may be misinterpreted (Bryman, 2012). In this study care has been taken 
to ensure all the missing data in the dataset are coded correctly. With the dataset 
available, careful handling of missing values in regression estimations is essential, 
which means not dropping or ignoring observations with missing data (Field, 2009; 
Little & Rubin, 1989). In the STATA statistical package, dots (“.”) are used to 
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represent the missing values by indicating there are no recorded values to represent 
for a certain variable, and in these instances, there is no zero (“0”) for each 
particular missing case.  
STATA uses only the completed data for any variable by excluding missing data 
variables in the model, which is similar to the default setting in most statistical 
packages. A common approach in econometrics to deal with missing values is to 
drop the observations with missing data, restricting the analysis to subjects with no 
missing values in the variables. However, this so-called complete-case or listwise 
deletion technique can yield biased estimations by creating missing data bias 
(Raghunathan, 2004) and sample selection bias in regression. Therefore, to 
overcome the problem of missing data bias, this study considers mean, median and 
last value carry forward methods to replace missing variables in the sample dataset. 
It is appropriate to compare characteristics of individual firms with missing data 
and those with complete data when replacing missing values and this is the most 
common method used for missing value replacement. Even though the replacement 
values are not perfect replacements for missing values, they are likely to provide a 
better reflection of the sample than disregarding them would.  
 
5.3.5 Data outliers and winsorizing 
The presence of outliers in a dataset can exert a disproportionate effect on statistical 
analyses (Salkind, 2010) and provide misleading results (Stock & Watson, 2007). 
When the data are substantially different, it should be noted and treated 
appropriately. A Grubbs’ test can be used to identify the outliers in a univariate 
dataset which is based on the assumption of normally distributed population. 
Outliers are removed from the dataset by detecting one outlier at a time, signifying 
1 for outlier case and 0 otherwise, and repeated until no outliers are detected. The 
Grubbs’ test indicates that there are no outliers included in the current dataset.  
However, the Grubbs’ test is based on the assumption that data are normally 
distributed. To overcome the limitations in the Grubbs’ test, this study utilises 
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winsorization36 to handle the spurious outliers in the dataset. Salkind (2010, p. 
1637) states the advantage of winsorizing the data is to “protect against some of the 
harmful effects of outliers” and it falls within a field known as robustness statistics. 
This method can be used for small sample size. Therefore, all the financial and 
outreach variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to control for the noise effects 
arising from outliers in the dataset. 
 
5.3.6 Normality test 
Normality data is a criterion for parametric statistical tests. Non-normally 
distributed variables such as these that are highly skewed have large kurtosis, or 
have substantial outliers which can misrepresent the relationships and significance 
of the tests. It is important to check whether the data in the sample are normally 
distributed (bell-shaped curve) (Field, 2009). There are several visual checks that 
may be used, such as laying out the interval variables graphically, particularly in 
the ways of histograms, frequency polygons, box-and-whisker plots and normal 
probability plots. Among these graphic methods, the frequency polygon is an 
appropriate method to interpret pure shape of normal distribution which is a line 
drawing by connecting tips of the histogram bars (Bernard, 2013). It is easy to 
confirm whether the plot of the model is not too far from a straight line by using a 
normal probability plot.  
Graphical representation of the data indicates that the data are substantially skewed. 
It is conventional to transform data into a symmetric distribution before starting the 
statistical analysis. Once the data are transformed, the normal distribution of these 
data is tested using the Jarque-Bera test for normality, which is based on the sample 
skewness and kurtosis. It indicates that all data are normally distributed. When the 
Jarque-Bera test statistic value is sufficiently greater than the chi-squared value, it 
suggests the rejection of the null hypothesis that errors are normally distributed. 
Transformation of data into its natural logarithm is one method to have a strong link 
between the variables and have the effect of making the distribution more normal 
                                                 
36 Winsorization is the transformation of statistics by limiting extreme values in the dataset to reduce 
the effect of possibly spurious outliers. 
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when it is highly dispersed or skewed (Bernard, 2013). However, in the real world, 
it is difficult to find perfect normal distributions because most distributions tend to 
be skewed. The slight changes, ones that are less skewed37, in the data can be 
accepted and can be clearly identified by using the box-and-whisker plots. In this 
regard, it can be concluded that the data are not highly skewed from the central 
tendency. Therefore, these variables satisfy the assumption of normality in 
parametric test analysis (Field, 2009).  
 
5.4 Methodology 
This section specifies the research model used to test the association between 
corporate governance and performance of MFIs in Sri Lanka and India and the data 
analysis techniques used for this study. The analysis techniques are broadly divided 
into two phases: descriptive and inferential, where inferential analysis consists of 
univariate, bivariate and multivariate analysis techniques.  
 
5.4.1 Model specification for MFI governance and performance 
This study sample comprises cross-sectional and time-series data which allows use 
of panel data analysis techniques. Panel data analysis uses multiple entities of data 
where each entity is observed at two or more time periods (Stock & Watson, 2007).  
However, before setting up a panel, it is important to test the homogeneity of 
collected data. A poolability test indicates whether panel regression is appropriate 
by testing whether a pool or a single cross-sectional model is more robustness. The 
poolability test helps to select the panel model to be estimated within fixed effect 
framework; 
1. Are there individual effects or is it better to omit individual effects to 
estimate by pooled ordinary least squares (OLS)? 
2. Are there time effects over the individual effect? 
3. Are the coefficients of β really constant across individuals? 
                                                 
37 A rule of thumb is that a variable is reasonably close to normal if its skewness has values between 
–1.0 and +1.0. 
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The null hypothesis of the poolability test is: 
H0: βik = βk 
This is suggesting that slopes remain constant in both fixed-effect and random-
effect models and only the intercept and error variance matter. The simplest 
poolability test is performed to determine whether the regression lines from 
different pools have a common slope and a common time-zero intercept. If the test 
rejects the hypothesis of equality of slopes (if there is a significant difference in 
slopes among pools), it is not appropriate to combine the data. The implicit 
assumption of pooled OLS is that all the values in the cross-section have the same 
intercept.  
The Chow test is performed to check whether the data can be pooled (Baltagi, 
2008), which determines whether independent variables in the dataset have similar 
or different impacts on various subgroups of the population. The Chow test does 
not suggest to rejecting the null hypothesis of poolability and confirm that the data 
can be pooled. 
 
Panel Data Analysis 
A linear multiple regression model is employed to provide empirical evidence of 
the impact of corporate governance on MFI performance. The commonly used 
multiple regression analysis is initially applied to the panel data analysis. The panel 
data has a large number of observations and allows control of unobserved variables 
such as differences in business practices across companies or cultural factors; 
variables change over time but not necessarily across entities. Further, the 
regression model can permit solving for omitted variables and enables the 
estimation of dynamic equations with lagged dependent variables on the right hand 
side.  
Following Hartarska (2005), Kyereboah-Coleman and Osei (2008), Mersland and 
Strøm (2009) and others, this study has also employed the panel data estimation 
methodology. To carry out the analysis in this study, the basic panel data analysis 
regression equation can be written more generally as follows: 
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𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐹𝑒𝑚𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑒𝑚𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑒𝑚𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽4𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐷𝑜𝑟𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽7𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐵𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽11𝐹𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐹𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 +  𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 +
𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡                                      (1) 
Where, i indexes firm observations which takes 1-n, t indexes time which takes the 
values of 2007 to 2012, α denotes the intercept of the straight line and β denotes the 
slope of the regression line.  
The dependent variables for this study can be viewed as; financial performance or 
outreach. OSS, ROA, YOGLP, OCR, CA and PAR are used as proxies for the 
financial performance variable, whereas outreach variable proxies are Breadth, 
FemBorr and Depth. FemDir, FemCEO, FemChair, Duality, IntDorDir, ClientDir, 
IndDir, Bsize and IntAudit denote the corporate governance variables of the study 
(The variables are defined in Table 4.6-1). According to the hypotheses (See 
Chapter 4) positive coefficients are expected for β1, β2, β3, β5, β6, β7, β8 and β9, while 
negative coefficients are predicted for β4. These coefficients indicate how much of 
the variance in the dependent variable is predictable from the scores of the 
independent variable. The remaining variables are used as control variables which 
are expected to associate with dependent variables. εit is denoted the inherent 
unexplained variation (error term).  
Based to the hypothesis developed in Chapter 4, H1a, H2a, H3a, H5a, H6a, H7a, H8a 
and H9a imply that OSS, ROA, YOGLP and CA are expected to have a positive 
relationship with corporate governance while OCR and PAR are negatively related. 
H4a implies that OSS, ROA, YOGLP and CA are expected to have a negative 
relationship with corporate governance while OCR and PAR are positively related. 
For outreach variables, H1b, H2b, H3b, H5b, H6b, H7b, H8b and H9b imply that 
Breadth and FemBorr are expected to have a positive relationship with corporate 
governance while Depth is negatively related. H4b implies that Breadth and 
FemBorr are expected to have a negative relationship with corporate governance 
while Depth is positively related. 
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5.4.2 Data analysis techniques 
The hypotheses presented in Chapter 4 are tested using a sequence of data analysis 
techniques.  
 
5.4.2.1 Descriptive analysis of data 
Descriptive statistics describe and summarise data in a meaningful way, making 
them more useful for analysis. Mean, median, variance, standard deviation, 
histograms and pie charts are suggested by Bernard (2013) and Field (2009) to 
promote understanding of the data through summary.  
Considerations necessary for this dataset start with what is the best measure of 
central tendency. First, the arithmetic mean is used to explain the average value of 
the variables. A mean can be heavily influenced by the outliers or big gaps in the 
sample. If the data distribution is skewed, then the median may be a better measure 
as it gives the mid-point of the distribution. To understand whether the data are 
homogeneous or heterogeneous the standard deviation, a well-known measure of 
dispersion for an interval data sample, is computed. In addition, minimum and 
maximum values of a variable are used in this study to identify the extreme values 
in a particular variable and the range over which data are scattered.  
Careful consideration of the descriptive statistics provides important information to 
identify the overall behaviour of the data. This stage was completed diligently, 
especially to be sure parametric procedures were appropriate.  
 
5.4.2.2 Inferential analysis of data 
Inferential statistics assist in making generalisations about the population from 
which sample were drawn. Inferential data analysis techniques are used to make 
statements about the world beyond the data in hand (Bernard, 2013, p. 551). In this 
relation, bivariate and multivariate analysis is used to check the association between 
independent and dependent variables (Bernard, 2013; Bryman, 2012). 
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T-test analysis: Comparing two means 
T-test checks whether the means of two groups are statistically significantly 
different from one another and there are two types of t-tests: one-sample t-test and 
two-sample t-test. This study considers a two sample t-test to compare the means 
of corporate governance characteristics and performance of MFIs between Sri 
Lanka and India as it examines the means by which two independent groups differ 
on any given variable (Bernard, 2013). t-Statistics will be positive if the first sample 
mean value is larger than the second sample, and negative if the first sample mean 
is smaller than the second. The null hypothesis of the mean value of the distribution 
of a measurement for Sri Lanka and India can be written as follows: 
H0: mean value of Sri Lankan variable = mean value of Indian variable 
 
Wilcoxon test (z-test): Comparing two samples 
The Wilcoxon test (z-test) is used to compare two related samples that have data 
from repeated measures. This is an alternative test for the two sample t-test and 
appropriate for non-parametric statistical testing where data are not normally 
distributed. This study employs two sample z-tests to investigate whether there are 
any statistically significant differences in median values between Sri Lanka and 
India for a given categorical variable. The null hypothesis asserts that the median 
value of the distribution of a measurement for Sri Lanka and India is identical and 
can be written as follows:  
H0: median value of Sri Lankan variable = median value of Indian variable  
 
Analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) 
Analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) is the appropriate technique to analyse data 
when there are both categorical/dichotomous and interval/continuous predictor 
variables in the model. Interval/continuous variables that predict the dependent 
variable can be included in the analysis as a covariate (Field, 2009). The research 
model for this study includes a mixture of interval/continuous and 
dichotomous/categorical independent variables. For interval/continuous variables 
multiple regression is a preferred approach whereas for dichotomous/categorical 
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independent variables ANCOVA is suggested as more stable. However, it is unclear 
in the literature which statistical analysis technique is most suitable if there is a 
mixture of interval/continuous and categorical/dichotomous independent variables 
in a model. Most prior studies (Bassem, 2009; Mersland & Strøm, 2009) have used 
multiple regression statistical technique to analyse the nexus between corporate 
governance and performance variables even though they have both interval and 
dichotomous independent variables in their model. Therefore, this study applies 
ANCOVA statistical technique as a robustness check to see whether there are any 
significant differences in the results when compared with the multiple regression 
technique. If the results obtained from the ANCOVA analysis are also similar and 
indicate that there is no significant difference with multiple regression analysis 
results, then the OLS technique can be used for further estimating the unknown 
parameters of the study. 
 
Direction and shape of covariations 
Direction and shape of the relationships are important when discussing the findings 
in connection with the numerical results. The direction of covariation deals with the 
positive or negative signs of the covariation, but the shape of covariation refers to 
the linear or non-linear relation of the covariation. Scatterplots can be created to 
identify the shapes and directions of the relationships (Bernard, 2013). 
 
Statistical significance of the study 
Statistical significance provides an indication of the level of confidence of findings. 
This can be generalised to the population by which sample is selected (Bryman, 
2012). This study employs three levels of statistical significance. The most 
commonly used level of statistical significance (p-value or probability value) in 
hypotheses testing is 0.05 (**) significance level (Bernard, 2013; Field, 2009). 
Furthermore, p-values contain 0.10 (*) and 0.01 (***) are also considered in this 
study as moderately significant and very significant respectively.  
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Pair-wise correlation matrix 
The pair-wise correlation is allowed to identify independent variables that are 
highly correlated with each other. A proximity matrix of variables is used to 
measure the relationships between variables and can be applied when at least one 
of the variables in a bivariate relation is interval or ratio (Bernard, 2013). This 
simplifies the process of controlling for prospective multicollinearity. It measures 
whether the changes in one variable correspond with equivalent changes in other 
variables (Bernard, 2013, p. 622), by giving a value between +1 and −1.  
 
Multicollinearity 
The problem of multicollinearity refers as the influence of one predictor variable 
may not be free from the influence of another variable with which it is correlated 
(Bernard, 2013, p. 666). This increases the standard errors of the coefficients by 
making some variables statistically insignificant when they should be significant. 
In the correlation matrix, if the correlation coefficients among the regressors do not 
exceed 0.8, then multicollinearity is not a serious problem for multivariate analysis 
(Gujarati & Porter, 2004). Kennedy (2008, p. 196) states correlation coefficients 
need to be in the area of 0.8–0.9 to detect collinearity among two variables. 
The most frequently used method to measure the multicollinearity is the variance 
inflation factor (VIF) which measures the increment of variance of an estimated 
coefficient when the predictor variables are correlated. The given rule of thumb is 
that when the VIF is 10 or more, there are multicollinearity issues among the 
independent variables, which need to be addressed (Nguyen et al., 2014).  
 
Multiple linear regression analysis 
Multiple linear regression analysis, called multiple-R is used in this study to 
estimate the combined correlation of a set of independent variables on the 
dependent variables (Bernard, 2013). The most common way of analysing the effect 
of corporate governance mechanisms on MFI performance is to estimate the pooled 
OLS regression, which is the most widely used method of estimating the unknown 
parameters in a multiple linear regression model (Stock & Watson, 2007). There 
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are some classical assumptions to be met by OLS, being the best method for 
regression analysis.  
The following common pooled OLS model is used to find out the impact of 
independent variable (X) on dependent variables (Y): 
Υ𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1Χ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
In this model, i indexes firm observations, t indexes time, where i = 1,2,…,N cross 
sectional units (firms) for periods t = 1,2,…..,T. X is vector for corporate 
governance variables, Z is vector for control variables while the inherent 
unexplained variation (error) is denoted by εit and the coefficients are denoted by 
the β.  
In a panel dataset, two types of residual errors can occur. First, the unobserved firm 
effect, which is the residual of a given firm which may correlate across a year 
(Wooldridge, 2009) and second, the time effect, which is the residual of a given 
year which may correlate across different companies. Due to these unobserved 
heterogeneity effects, the explanatory variables may be endogenous and correlated 
with the residuals (ε) in the regression model. These heterogeneity effects offend 
the requirements for using an OLS model where all the independent variables 
should be exogenous (De-Min, 1973). To overcome this problem, the residual term 
(ε) of the basic panel data regression of equation is decomposed into firm-specific 
(individual specific) effect of ui which captures all time invariant variables 
(including omitted variables) that affect Y (unobservable individual specific effect), 
and the remainder of the disturbance of vit that varies cross-sectionally and over 
time (firm year heterogeneity).  
𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝑢𝑖  +  𝜈𝑖𝑡 
The two competing methods, fixed-effect and random-effect estimations are 
normally used to diagnose the unobserved firm characteristics in a panel model. 
 
Fixed-effect model  
Scholars (Himmelberg, Hubbard, & Palia, 1999; Yermack, 1996) use a fixed-effect 
procedure to overcome the estimation issues related to endogeneity (corporate 
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governance and ε are correlated) in order to produce consistent parameter estimates 
that are robustness to unobserved heterogeneity (individual firm characteristics) 
across firms. In a panel dataset, the fixed-effect model denotes a common, unbiased 
method to control for omitted variables’ bias within the firm (Hausman & Taylor, 
1981). This method is appropriate when the unobserved heterogeneity is constant 
over time for an individual firm (Schultz et al., 2010). Adams, Hermalin, and 
Weisbach (2010) recommend the fixed-effect estimation method to mitigate the 
time-invariant heterogeneity in a dataset.  
When using a fixed-effect model, it assumes that all the x values are not 
homogeneous and hence have different intercepts. In a fixed-effect model the 
parameter estimation of the dummy variable is a part of the intercept and it allows 
unobserved individual effects to be correlated with other variables in the model 
(Greene, 2012). It means that differences across groups can be captured in 
differences in the constant term. This model assumes that the corporate governance 
and control variables in a firm are orthogonal to past, present and future innovations 
in performance (Schultz et al., 2010). This model can be formulated as follows. 
Υ𝑖𝑡 = (𝛽0 + 𝑢𝑖) +  𝛽1Χ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 
Where i denotes the individual MFI and t denotes the time. In these circumstances, 
i represents the cross-section dimension and t represents the time-series dimension. 
𝑢𝑖 is heterogeneity specific to firm i. β0 denotes the scalar, β1 is a K x 1 vector 
coefficients, Xit is the it
th observation on the K dimensional vector of explanatory 
variable, Zit is the it
th observation on the K dimensional vector of control variable 
and εit is the error term (residual term).  
 
Random-effect model 
Unlike the fixed-effect model, the random-effect model explores the differences in 
error term across the individual firms and time periods. In this model, the parameter 
estimation of the dummy variable is a part of the error term (Greene, 2012) and 
treats individual effects as uncorrelated with the other regressors (predictor 
variables) in the model. The variation across firms is assumed to be random and 
distributed independently of explanatory variables. A random-effect estimation 
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procedure should be used when the differences across firms have some effect on 
the outcome variables (Adams et al., 2010). The following is the formation of 
random-effect model. 
Υ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1Χ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑍𝑖𝑡 + (𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡) 
Where i denotes the individual MFI (cross-sectional) and t denotes the time (time 
series). β0 denotes the intercept, β1 is a K x 1 vector coefficients, Xit is the itth 
observation on the K dimensional vector of explanatory variable, Zit is the it
th 
observation on the K dimensional vector of control variable and εit is the error term 
(residual term). 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is heterogeneity specific to firm i and year t. 
The random-effect model has the advantage of investigating the time-invariant 
effect on outcome variables whereas the fixed-effect model lets them be absorbed 
by the intercept (Adams et al., 2010). The random-effect model is suitable for 
individual firms that face different sorts of tradeoffs in governance mechanisms. It 
allows time-invariant variables to act as explanatory variables and allows for 
generalisation of the implications beyond the sample used in the model. Prior 
corporate governance and MFI performance relationship studies have used the 
random-effect estimation method to accommodate the impact of time-invariant 
variables (Bassem, 2009; Hartarska, 2005; Mersland & Strøm, 2009). 
However, the random-effect model is not the explicit model for unobserved effects 
as it assumes that the explanatory (corporate governance) variables are uncorrelated 
with unobserved firm heterogeneity (MFI characteristics such as managerial quality 
or firm structure), that is ui (Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2007).  
𝐸(𝑢𝑖/𝑥𝑖1, … , 𝑥𝑖𝑇) = 𝐸(𝑢𝑖 ) 𝑜𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑢𝑖) =  0 
This is a very powerful assumption and it can be tested by using the Hausman test 
as it indicates that the random-effect model assumptions do not hold (Hartarska & 
Nadolnyak, 2007; Hausman & Taylor, 1981). 
 
Hausman test  
The Hausman test is a widely used econometrics test in the context of panel data to 
choose between fixed-effect and random-effect models as it tests for orthogonality 
of the common effects and the regressors (Greene, 2012; Hausman, 1978). It 
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examines whether the individual effects (unique errors) are correlated with other 
regressors in the model. The null hypothesis of the Hausman test assumes that 
individual effects are random and uncorrelated with the regressors. Therefore 
estimators for both models should be similar (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010, p. 266). If 
it fails to reject the null hypothesis (where p-value is insignificant and greater than 
0.05 level), it suggests that the random-effect model is more appropriate for the 
study. If the null hypothesis rejects it, then the fixed-effect model can be used for 
this study.  
 
Breusch-pagan lagrange multiplier (LM) test 
Researcher of this study uses the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier (LM) 
test for random effect, such as robustness checking, to test whether the random-
effect model is appropriate. This test facilitates the decision to use either a random-
effect regression or OLS regression. The null hypothesis in the test is that variances 
across entities are zero. Rejection of the null hypothesis suggests that the random-
effect model is appropriate; otherwise OLS is the preferred method.  
 
5.4.3 Robustness estimations with panel 
Dynamic panel generalised method of moment (GMM) estimation 
Prior studies on the corporate governance and performance relationship have 
employed the traditional IV approach to mitigate the potential sources of 
endogeneity arising from unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity with the 
identification of set of valid instruments (Z) for corporate governance. However, it 
is extremely difficult to identify the reliable instrument for endogenous variables as 
the identified instrument should be correlated with endogenous variables and 
uncorrelated with the error term of the model (Flannery & Hankins, 2013). Also, 
the instruments should have high correlation with the endogenous variables. 
Otherwise they are weak instruments, which undermine the precision of the 
estimator. Therefore, it is not an easy task to determine a set of instruments for this 
study.  
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Another weakness in this approach is that it is not designed to deal with the dynamic 
endogeneity, which is more likely to arise in the relationship between corporate 
governance structure and firm performance (Wintoki et al., 2012). Most of the 
previous studies in the microfinance sector do not explore the dynamic nature of 
this relationship (Bassem, 2009; Hartarska, 2005; Mersland & Strøm, 2009; Mori 
& Mersland, 2014). Taking in-to account the possibility of endogeneity arising from 
the dynamic nature of this relationship and the unavailability of appropriate 
instruments for MFI corporate governance research, this study adopts the dynamic 
panel generalised method of moments (GMM) technique to provide robustness 
results.  
The GMM technique, which was developed by Hansen (1982) and further 
developed by Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988), Arellano and Bond (1991), 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), produces unbiased, 
consistent and efficient estimators for dynamic panel data models by employing 
valid internal instruments for potential endogenous variables. GMM estimation 
provides a non-parametric approach to estimate parameters (Schultz et al., 2010) 
and helps to account for possible correlations among independent variables 
(Athanasoglou, Brissimis, & Delis, 2008; Baltagi, 2008) by overcoming the 
estimation problems inherent in unobservable heteroskedasticity, simultaneity and 
dynamic endogeneity.  
As illustrated by Wintoki et al. (2012), corporate governance has a dynamic 
relationship with firm performance and it is a function of past performance and 
other firm characteristics. Therefore the dynamic model for corporate governance 
is as follows; 
𝑋𝑖𝑡 =  𝑓(𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−2 … 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−𝑝, 𝑍𝑖,𝑡, 𝜇𝑖, 𝜀𝑖𝑡  ) 
Where, X represents the board governance of firm ith in year tth; Y represents the 
firm performance; Z represents the other control variables, μ denotes the 
unobserved time-invariant firm effects, ε represents the random error term and p is 
the number of lags of firm performance.  
Based on the above equation, the estimations of the effect of corporate governance 
on firm performance can be expressed as follows: 
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𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝑓(𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−2 … 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−𝑝, 𝑋𝑖,𝑡, 𝑍𝑖,𝑡, 𝜇𝑖, 𝜀𝑖𝑡  ) 
These estimators are designed for situations with a linear functional relationship, 
independent variables are not strictly exogenous, arbitrarily distributed fixed 
individual effects, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within individuals but not 
across them (Roodman, 2009a, p. 86). The key assumptions in this model are the 
use of lags as IVs (Wintoki et al., 2012). The benefit of using lag variables is that 
they control for potential simultaneity and reverse causality. This method is only 
designed for situations where there are “short T, large N” panels, which means a 
panel with few time period and many individual firms (Roodman, 2009a).  
Among the two GMM approaches, the system GMM approach, proposed by 
Blundell and Bond (1998), is a more appropriate method to reduce the small-sample 
biasness when compared with the difference GMM approach. It is also superior to 
other estimators for dealing with the high persistence of corporate governance 
variables in the model (Nguyen, Locke, & Reddy, 2015a). Therefore, this study 
utilises the system GMM method for the combined sample of Sri Lanka and India 
to mitigate the dynamic endogeneity, simultaneity and time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity because combine sample has enough data for the results to be 
meaningful. 
For the convenience of the reader, more information about this test is described in 
section 8.8 of Chapter 8. 
There are limitations in dynamic GMM due to its complexity and easiness of 
generating invalid estimates (Roodman, 2009a). This method relies on firm’s 
history which means lags of dependent and independent variables for identification, 
and this creates a problem of weak instruments by having more lags of IVs (Wintoki 
et al., 2012). It is also assumed that the errors are serially uncorrelated which may 
not persist for all the variables.  
 
5.4.4 Specification tests 
5.4.4.1 Test for heteroskedasticity 
In an OLS regression, the error term is assumed to be homoscedastic, which means 
variance of the error term is constant across observations and it cannot be violated. 
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Therefore, heteroskedasticity means a situation where the variance of the error term 
is not constant and varies across all the levels of independent variables (Stock & 
Watson, 2007). Most often, this arises with cross-sectional data and provides biased 
standard errors. Heteroskedasticity can be detected by using Breusch-Pagan/Cook-
Weisberg Test for Heteroskedasticity or White’s General Test for 
Heteroskedasticity. The null hypothesis that the error variances are all constant is 
tested by using the Heteroskedasticity test. However, the most common and 
trustworthy method to respond to the presence of heteroscedasticity is to estimate 
robustness standard errors as it relaxes the assumption that the errors are 
independent and identically distributed. This study uses the robustness standard 
error [VCE (robust)] option in STATA statistical package to obtain 
heteroskedasticity-robustness standard errors (also known as Huber/White or 
sandwich estimators).  
 
5.4.4.2 Test for regressor endogeneity  
It is important to test for the endogeneity of the regressors used in the model. A 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test for endogeneity provides a way to test whether 
a regressor is endogenous (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010). The test is under the null 
hypothesis that the specified endogenous regressors can actually be treated as 
exogenous regressors (Baum, Schaffer, & Stillman, 2007, p. 16). If there is a 
significant difference between the two coefficient vectors then the regressor is 
endogenous, otherwise it is exogenous. However, Hartarska (2005, p. 1632) states 
that the empirical evidence is not always supported the hypothesis that various 
governance mechanisms are endogenously determined. 
 
5.4.4.3 Test for over-identifying restrictions 
In a system GMM approach, the large collection of generated instruments can be 
suspected. The consistency of the estimators are highly dependent on the validity 
of instruments used. Therefore, it is important to diagnose the validity of over-
identified instruments in an over-identified model to ensure that the parameters of 
the model are estimated using optimal GMM (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010, p. 185). 
Different tests can be used to check the validity of the IVs, such as the Hansen-J 
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test of over-identification restrictions and the Hausman specification test (Arellano 
& Bond, 1991). In this study, the validity of IVs used in the system GMM estimator 
is verified through the use of the Hansen-J test of over-identification as a standard test 
for joint validity of the IVs (Roodman, 2009a). The null hypothesis that the 
instruments are valid instruments cannot be rejected when the p-value is greater 
than 0.05 level. This confirms that all the instruments employed in the model are 
appropriate (Baum et al., 2007).  
 
5.4.4.4 Stepwise regression 
A stepwise regression is used to identify the most important corporate governance 
variables for the microfinance sector. This procedure is used only as a robustness 
option to check with the OLS regression outcomes to guarantee that this study has 
not missed any important variables in the model. As a result, both OLS and stepwise 
regression models have identified the same set of variables as significantly 
important variables to determine MFI financial performance and outreach. 
However, stepwise regression method does not apply to select best independent 
variables for the study, because this method is not recommended for testing the 
significance of a relationship between certain variables or a particular variable. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
Prior research and anecdotal evidence largely suggests that there is a relationship 
between corporate governance and firm performance, but less is known about the 
microfinance sector. Based on the indicators provided in earlier empirical studies in 
developed and developing countries, this research explores the impact of corporate 
governance on MFIs’ financial performance and outreach. Does it lead to better 
services to poor people?  
This chapter presents the framework of the empirical analysis that is used to analyse 
the link between corporate governance and MFI performance. First, it describes the 
research method of this study. Second, the data collection method is described in 
relation to MFI definition. Third, the sample selection procedure, data cleaning, 
editing, transformation and normality test are all described. Lastly, the methodology 
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of the study with regards to model specification and data analysis techniques is 
discussed. Data analysis techniques consist of univariate, bivariate and multivariate 
analysis techniques and specification tests.  
The next chapter presents the findings of significant corporate governance variables 
for financial performance and outreach of MFIs in Sri Lanka, applying the data 
analysis techniques described in this chapter. 
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6 CHAPTER SIX 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND 
PERFORMANCE IN MFIS IN SRI LANKA: AN 
EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Empirical findings regarding the relationship between corporate governance 
practices and firm performance of Sri Lankan MFIs are presented in this chapter. 
First, this chapter provides a background of the Sri Lankan microfinance sector 
focusing on different organisation types and lending methods. Second, it provides 
an interpretation of the descriptive statistics relating to the Sri Lankan sample in 
order to visualise the behaviour of the dataset in a more meaningful way. Third, the 
study reports the relationships between nine key corporate governance variables 
and MFI performance, both financial and outreach. A panel data technique is 
employed as the main analytical framework to identify the corporate governance-
performance relationship of MFIs in Sri Lanka. The chapter concludes pointing to 
those corporate governance practices that appear most significant for improving the 
performance of MFIs in Sri Lanka. 
 
6.2 Background of Sri Lankan MFIs 
A sample of 54 Sri Lankan MFIs is considered in this study for the period 2007 to 
2012 and examines 300 MFI-year observations. MFIs in Sri Lanka utilise mainly 
three different lending methods (See Figure 6.2-1). Approximately 61% of 
institutions in this sample provide individual loans, 29% of the institutions provide 
group-based loans and 10% of the institutions provide both individual and group-
based loans to their clients (See Figure 6.2-1). Usually, the individual lending 
method is used by banks and other financial institutions as the traditional lending 
relationship method between a bank and a customer. However, this traditional bank-
customer relationship has not been adopted by MFIs, such as the Bangladeshi 
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Grameen Bank, which started in the 1970s, because the basis for microfinance 
lending is group-based lending not individual lending (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, & 
Morduch, 2009). Findings based on Sri Lanka data reveal that microfinance and 
group-based lending are now far from synonymous. This finding provides support 
to the view that MFIs in Sri Lanka have deviated from their core industry objective 
of providing group based lending and it is less popular in the Sri Lankan 
microfinance sector. 
 
Figure 6.2-1: Lending Method of MFIs in Sri Lanka 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A similar trend to that found in Sri Lanka has been experienced by microfinance 
borrowers around the world (Attanasio, Augsburg, Haas, Fitzsimons, & Harmgart, 
2011; Cull et al., 2009). Group-based lending involves time-consuming weekly 
repayment meetings which are onerous for borrowers in the group and it is costly 
for MFIs to reach these customers. By comparison, individual lending is more 
profitable as it uses the traditional lending relationship between bank and customer. 
According to Mersland and Strøm (2009), nearly 54% of MFIs around the world 
are disbursed individual loans. Furthermore, the individual lending method has 
become the most prominent lending approach for approximately 57% of MFIs in a 
10%
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2000-2007 sample of 280 MFIs from 60 countries (Galema et al., 2012). In addition, 
MFIs operating in Central and Eastern Europe and Newly Independent States 
provide more than 80% of their loans to individual applicants (Hartarska, 2005). Of 
42 institutions in Euro-Mediterranean countries, 73% of MFIs are highly 
concentrated toward an individual lending method of providing loans to their 
borrowers (Bassem, 2009). 
 
Figure 6.2-2: Organisation Types in Sri Lankan MFIs 
 
 
Figure 6.2-2 shows that the microfinance sector in Sri Lanka is represented by 
different types of institutions. Nearly 65% of the total sample comprises NGOs 
(45%) and guaranteed companies (20%), which are also registered as non-profit 
organisations (See Chapter 2). The representation of banks (7%), credit unions 
(1%), NBFIs (2%), and co-operative societies (4%) are low. The private and public 
listed companies represent respectively 14% and 6% of the total sample. This 
provides support for the view that most low income borrowers in Sri Lanka are 
served by not-for-profit organisations as those organisations are often thought to 
improve the lives of poor people. Furthermore, these institutions prefer being non-
45.33%
20%
14.33%
7%
6%
4% 2%
1%
NGO
Guarantee Company
Company
Licensed Specialised Bank
Public Company
Cooperative
NBFI
Credit Union
Chapter 6 Corporate Governance and Performance in MFIs in Sri Lanka: An 
Empirical Investigation 
 
149 
 
profit organisations because this status helps them to operate under minimum 
regulations and reduced taxes enacted by the Sri Lankan government.  
Similar to Sri Lanka, different types of organisations are represented in the 
microfinance sector of other countries. Hartarska (2005) states that 65.9% of MFIs 
in Central and Eastern Europe and Newly Independent States are NGOs whereas 
only 8.7% of MFIs are NBFIs. Of 42 MFI sample in Euro-Mediterranean countries, 
NGOs represent around 60% while NBFIs and banks represent 18% and 10%, 
respectively (Bassem, 2009). Strøm et al. (2014) and Mori and Mersland (2014) 
have highlighted MFIs in a worldwide sample (including Sri Lanka), and only 16% 
of them are co-operatives, 32% of them are banks and 51% of them are NGOs. 
Similarly, in Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) study (which has included only one 
Sri Lankan MFI), the NGO representation is around 50% whereas NBFI is 34% 
(Hartarska, 2009). 
 
6.3 Descriptive Data Analysis 
Table 6.3-1 provides descriptive statistics of variables used in the study for the 
period 2007 to 2012. It depicts mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and 
maximum value for each variable.  
The mean (median) of the OSS is 0.99 (0.99) and it is below one. This indicates that 
MFIs in Sri Lanka are not operating effectively and this figure is similar to the mean 
OSS (0.92) obtained for MFIs operating in Central and Eastern Europe and Newly 
Independent States (Hartarska, 2005). Moreover, a study undertaken by Bassem 
(2009) shows that 42 MFIs in Euro-Mediterranean countries have, on an average, 
OSS of 0.85 with a minimum and a maximum value of 0.20 and 1.43, respectively. 
However, in Sri Lanka, the minimum and maximum values range from 0.01 to 2.27.  
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Table 6.3-1: Descriptive statistics for Sri Lankan MFIs where n=300 
Variables Acronyms Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max  
Financial Performance Variables 
Operational self-sufficiency OSS 0.99 0.99 0.34 0.01 2.27 
Return on assets  ROA 0.01 0.01 0.055 -0.24 0.27 
Yield on gross loan portfolio YOGLP 0.25 0.22 0.15 0.02 0.95 
Operating expenses ratio OCR 0.16 0.13 0.11 0.02 0.75 
Capital asset ratio CA 0.31 0.23 0.25 -0.1 1 
Portfolio at risk more than 30 days PAR 0.098 0.07 0.091 0 0.39 
Outreach Variables 
Number of active borrowers  29144 2205 92911 25 881353 
Breadth of outreach [LN(Active 
borrower)] 
Breadth 8.16 7.70 2.03 3.22 13.7 
Female borrowers to active 
borrowers (%) 
FemBorr 0.81        0.88          0.19          0.30             1 
Depth of outreach (Average loan 
balance per borrower/GNI per 
capita) 
Depth 0.14                   0.10          0.13             0 0.89 
Explanatory Variables 
Female directors on board (%) FemDir 0.43 0.33 0.33 0 1 
Female CEO FemCEO 0.34 0 0.47 0 1 
Female chairperson FemChair 0.4 0 0.49 0 1 
Duality Duality 0.26 0 0.44 0 1 
International directors/donor 
representatives on board (%) 
IntDorDir 0.07 0 0.21 0 1 
Client/borrower representatives on 
Board (%) 
ClientDir 0.07 0 0.16 0 0.8 
Non-executive directors on board 
(%) 
IndDir 0.67 0.71 0.22 0 1 
Board size (No. of board members) Bsize 8.47 8 4.44 1 30 
Internal audit function IntAudit 0.31 0 0.46 0 1 
Control Variables 
Regulated by banking authority Regbank 0.13 0 0.34 0 1 
Firm age (No. of Years) Fage 12.8 12 8.05 1 41 
Firm size [LN(Total assets)] Fsize 18.1 17.7 2.41 12.7 25 
Leverage Lev 0.69 0.77 0.25 0 1.1 
Note: This table reports the descriptive statistics based on the Sri Lankan MFI sample. The variables are defined 
in Table 4.6-1. For interpretation purposes, number of active borrowers, international directors/donor 
representatives on board, client representatives on board and board size are calculated on the basis of levels instead 
of dummy and logarithm form. Only firm size is calculated based on logarithmic form. 
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Similar to the findings reported by Mersland and Strøm (2009) and Galema et al. 
(2012), the average ROA of MFIs in Sri Lanka is 1.3%. Also this 1.3% of ROA 
value is also obtained by half of the MFIs in Sri Lanka during 2007 to 2012. A 
sample of 202 MFIs from around the world reveals a ROA of 1.2% (Tchakoute-
Tchuigoua, 2010). Figures in Table 6.3-1 show that ROA for MFIs in Sri Lanka 
varies between -24% and +27%. This negative value occurs as a few MFIs in the 
sample are non-profit making. Hartarska (2009) also reveals a negative ROA of -
0.2% for a cross-country study. 
The average portfolio yield (YOGLP) of Sri Lankan MFIs is 25% which is lower 
than an average portfolio yield for 379 MFIs from 73 countries reported by Mori 
and Mersland (2014) as 33%. A database of 278 MFIs from 60 countries gathered 
between 2000 and 2007 had a portfolio yield of nearly 40% which is not a surprising 
value for this sector (Mersland & Strøm, 2009). However, in this study, 50% of the 
MFIs are able to achieve 22% yield from their loan portfolio with a range of 2% - 
95%.  
The average operating cost ratio (OCR) for asset value is 16% and the median is 
13%; somewhat smaller than those exhibited in other countries. The minimum and 
the maximum values for the MFIs vary between 2% and 75%. Prior research based 
operating expenses ratios on the average gross loan portfolio, which is not an 
appropriate indicator to measure operating cost because it suggests MFIs that 
provide smaller loans are inferior to those giving large loans, even though both 
groups of MFIs incur similar amounts of operating cost (Rosenberg, 2009, p. 11). 
Therefore, this study uses total assets as an alternative denominator, which is the 
approach recommended in the Microfinance Consensus Guidelines (2003).  
Capital to asset ratio (CA) of Sri Lankan MFIs averages 31%, which is much higher 
than African MFIs at 26% (Lafourcade et al., 2006). When compared to banks with 
an average tier 1 capital to total risk-weighted asset ratio of 11.34% (Vincent, 
Gabriele, & Markus, 2012), these look good and are well over the prescribed 
threshold of 10% to 20%. The median value of capital to asset ratio for Sri Lankan 
MFIs is 23% and varies between a negative value (-10%) to a positive (100%) value, 
which indicates those MFIs are fully financed by their shareholders (equity).  
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Sri Lankan MFIs have a healthy credit portfolio as their portfolio at risk for more 
than 30 days (PAR) is closer to the prescribed threshold of 10% (mean = 9.8%, 
median = 7%). In addition, the minimum and maximum values of portfolio risk 
range from zero to 39% which is indicative of a difficult situation. African MFIs 
maintain comparatively high portfolio quality, with an average portfolio at risk for 
more than 30 days of 4%, performing better than their counterparts in South Asia 
(5.1%), East Asia (5.9%) and the Latin American and Caribbean regions (5.6%) 
respectively (Lafourcade et al., 2006).  
In this study, the average number of active borrowers is approximately 29,000, 
where the median is 2,205, the minimum is 25 and the maximum is 881,353. 
Similarly, the average number of credit clients in a sample of 278 MFIs is recorded 
as 12,805 but the standard deviation is 26,861, the minimum is 74 and maximum is 
394,374 which proves there is a huge dispersion in the number of clients in MFIs 
(Mersland & Strøm, 2009). Tchakoute-Tchuigoua (2010) study results show that 
the average number of active borrowers for a world dataset is 28,897 which is 
similar to the Sri Lankan situation. Due to the huge dispersion in the number of 
active clients (Breadth) in the sample, this study used natural logarithm 
transformation to condense the dispersion. Moreover, the results of log values show 
that the mean (8.16) and the median (7.70) values are much closer when compared 
with the transformation numbers. 
In Sri Lanka, the average number of female borrowers (FemBorr) represents 81% 
of the total number of credit clients. The median value of 88% indicates that 50% 
of MFIs have less than 12% male borrowers. A study conducted by Mersland and 
Strøm (2009) highlighted that 73% of MFI customers around the world were female, 
which is a comparatively high proposition. There are some MFIs that only serve 
female clients while some are not consciously targeting female clients because 
female borrowers represent only 30% of total borrowers.  
An average Depth of outreach in Sri Lankan MFIs is 0.14 where the median is 0.10. 
This is a relatively weak value when compared with other studies. These lower 
values indicate that the poor borrowers are very well served in Sri Lanka because a 
higher value indicates less low-income clients are being served (Bassem, 2009; 
Hartarska, 2005). For 202 MFIs in the period 2001 to 2006, the Depth of outreach 
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is computed as 0.862 (Tchakoute-Tchuigoua, 2010). The minimum value for the 
Depth of outreach in Sri Lankan MFIs is zero while the maximum is 0.89. 
The percentage of average women directors (FemDir) on the MFI boards is 
approximately 43%, which is higher than the value obtained by Hewa-Wellalage et 
al. (2012) for listed companies in Sri Lanka (7.4%). However, in the microfinance 
sector Bassem (2009) and Kyereboah-Coleman (2006) highlight that on average 
40% of boards are made up of women in Euro-Mediterranean countries. In this 
study, half of the MFIs in the total sample have 33% female on their boards, 
whereas the minimum is zero and the maximum is 100%.  
MFIs with female CEOs (FemCEO) are 34% in Sri Lanka which indicates that 66% 
of Sri Lankan MFIs have male CEOs. Similarly, Mersland and Strøm (2009) and 
Galema et al. (2012) find in their study of around 280 MFIs in 60 countries that 
23% - 25% of CEOs are females.  
Findings of this study show that in Sri Lanka 40% of MFIs have a female 
chairperson (FemChair) which is almost double the 22% in a global panel of 379 
microbanks in 73 countries (Strøm et al., 2014). However, their sample contained 
only one Sri Lankan MFI.  
Based on the sample, 26% of the MFIs in Sri Lanka have a CEO who is doubling 
as chairperson (Duality) of the board and this value is relatively high when 
compared with the global sample (12%-15%) but low compared with Ghana (50%). 
Hence in this sample, 74% of MFIs in Sri Lanka have separated the roles of CEO 
and chair. A study conducted by Hewa-Wellalage and Locke (2011) revealed that 
only 15% of multinational company subsidiaries have CEO duality whereas this 
percentage is almost double when considering local public companies in Sri Lanka, 
which is consistent with the findings of this study.  
This study considers both international and/or donor directors (IntDorDir) as an 
interaction variable to identify their combined effect on firm performance. Sri 
Lankan MFI boards have around 7.4% of directors who represent international 
and/or donor directors (IntDorDir), which is very insignificant representation when 
compared with literature (Galema et al., 2012; Mersland & Strøm, 2009). Mersland 
and Strøm (2009) state that the average representation of international board 
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directors for MFIs around the world is 57.6% which is a considerably higher amount 
than Sri Lanka, and confirmed by Galema et al. (2012) with a sample of 280 MFIs 
from 60 countries at 56%. Besides, the findings of this study detail that half of the 
Sri Lankan sample has no international director and/or donor director representation 
on their boards. 
Similar to the findings reported by Hartarska (2005) and Mersland and Strøm 
(2009), Sri Lankan MFIs have a smaller number of directors (7%) on their boards 
who represent the clients of the firm (ClientDir). The customer representation on 
the board is 11% for MFIs around the world (Mersland & Strøm, 2009) but Central 
and Eastern Europe and Newly Independent States’ MFIs have only 4% (Hartarska, 
2005) which is smaller than Sri Lanka. Further, findings of this study indicate that 
50% of the sample has no customer representation on their boards.  
Around 67% of the board members in Sri Lankan MFIs are non-executive directors 
(IndDir). This average value is consistent with the findings of Hewa-Wellalage and 
Locke (2011) for Sri Lankan listed companies (61%), because with regard to the 
new listing rule, one third of board members should be non-executive directors. A 
study conducted for Central and Eastern Europe and Newly Independent States 
shows on an average 58% of board members do not have an affiliation with any of 
the stakeholders in the firm (Hartarska, 2005) which is much closer to the Sri 
Lankan figure. Further, the minimum percentage of non-executive directors in the 
Sri Lankan microfinance sector board is zero and the maximum is 100%. 
The number of board members (Bsize) in Sri Lankan MFIs is around 8.5 (median 
of 8 members) and this research finding is aligned with those of Mersland and Strøm 
(2009) who note that most world-wide MFIs have between seven and nine directors. 
European and US codes recommend the ideal board size should range between five 
and 15 members. Further, in Sri Lanka, the average board size of listed non-
financial companies is 7.6 (Hewa-Wellalage & Locke, 2011). Table 6.3-1 shows 
that the minimum value for board size is 1 and the maximum is 30 members.  
On average, 31% of MFIs have an internal auditor reporting to the board (IntAudit). 
Compared with Mersland and Strøm (2009), Bassem (2009) and Hartarska (2005) 
research findings, the internal audit practices for MFIs in Sri Lanka are low; half of 
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the MFIs around the world have an internal auditor reporting directly to the board. 
A more recent study reports only 41% of MFIs around the world have an internal 
auditor (Strøm et al., 2014). 
According to the findings shown on Table 6.3-1, around 13% of MFIs in the sample 
are regulated under central bank authority (Regbank). Of the 278 MFIs in 60 
countries, Mersland and Strøm (2009) suggest that 32% of MFIs are regulated under 
banking authority. The proportions of regulated MFIs differ between countries due 
to the structure of regulation and differences in regulatory philosophy. 
The minimum value of firm age (Fage) for MFIs in Sri Lanka is one year and the 
maximum is 41 years. The mean and the median values of age are between 12 and 
13 years. The findings of this study are fairly close to those of Kyereboah-Coleman 
and Osei (2008) with 13 years of firm operation for Ghana MFIs. According to 
Mersland and Strøm (2009), typical MFIs around the world are young with an age 
of nine years and that finding is supported by a subsequent global dataset of 379 
MFIs from 73 countries which indicates an age of 10.5 years (Mori & Mersland, 
2014). A similar result of eight years is noted by Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) 
and Hartarska (2009) from cross-country samples.  
Firm size (Fsize) is calculated based on the asset value of an MFI. Log 
transformation of asset values are used in the Table 6.3-1 due to the voluminous 
numbers and huge standard deviation. The mean value of the firm size is 18.1 and 
the median value is 17.7. This highlights that 50% of MFIs in the sample are smaller 
than 17.7. Moreover, results show that the size of MFIs in Sri Lankan ranges from 
12.7 to 25.  
Leverage (Lev) indicates the debt to asset ratio of Sri Lankan MFIs. The average 
debt to asset ratio is 69% while the median is 77%. These findings highlight that 
Sri Lankan MFIs are highly leveraged. Debt ratio for 108 MFIs in a world dataset 
is 2.52 based on equity not the total assets. The minimum value of debt to asset ratio 
is zero, suggesting there are MFIs that exist exclusively on equity. 
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6.4 Pair-wise Correlation 
The pair-wise correlation matrix for the dependent and independent variables is 
provided in Table 6.4-1. The significant correlations between financial performance, 
outreach, corporate governance and control variables are shown in this table. 
Several statistically significant correlations are observable between corporate 
governance variables and the financial performance and outreach variables of MFIs. 
This suggests further analysis is warranted.  
 
Table 6.4-1: Correlation matrix for variables 
 OSS ROA YOGLP OCR CA PAR Breadth 
OSS 1       
ROA 0.036 1      
YOGLP -0.052 0.068 1     
OCR -0.361*** 0.135** 0.470*** 1    
CA 0.138** 0.061 -0.096* -0.014 1   
PAR -0.065 -0.054 -0.036 0.058 -0.187*** 1  
Breadth 0.218*** -0.100* -0.129** -0.391*** -0.104* -0.126** 1 
FemBorr 0.029 -0.048 0.022 0.077 0.061 0.031 -0.072 
Depth -0.061 -0.013 -0.104* -0.234*** -0.133** -0.063 0.289*** 
FemDir -0.063 0.100* 0.021 0.083 -0.195*** 0.248*** -0.337*** 
FemCEO 0.050 0.141** -0.073 0.079 -0.128** 0.055 -0.187*** 
FemChair 0.144** 0.241*** -0.130** -0.081 -0.072 0.065 -0.013 
Duality -0.095 0.133** 0.071 0.274*** 0.069 -0.077 -0.133** 
IntDorDir 0.114** -0.129** -0.058 -0.073 0.100* -0.007 0.163*** 
ClientDir -0.030 0.292*** -0.051 -0.014 0.069 -0.135** -0.217*** 
IndDir -0.033 -0.005 0.016 0.040 -0.143** -0.199*** 0.021 
Bsize 0.063 0.041 -0.128** -0.317*** -0.128** -0.013 0.137** 
IntAudit 0.239*** -0.080 -0.126** -0.275*** -0.024 -0.181*** 0.551*** 
Regbank 0.157*** 0.016 0.007 -0.403*** -0.266*** -0.135** 0.586*** 
Fage 0.176*** 0.067 -0.024 -0.188*** 0.073 0.129** -0.044 
Fsize 0.156*** -0.085 -0.102* -0.404*** -0.127** -0.136** 0.939*** 
Lev -0.138** -0.061 0.096* 0.014 -1 0.187*** 0.104* 
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FemBorr Depth FemDir FemCEO FemChair Duality IntDorDir 
FemBorr 1       
Depth -0.276*** 1      
FemDir 0.303*** -0.044 1     
FemCEO 0.124** 0.076 0.459*** 1    
FemChair 0.220*** 0.023 0.539*** 0.464*** 1   
Duality -0.109* 0.002 0.075 0.263*** 0.172*** 1  
IntDorDir 0.053 0.121** -0.090 0.048 0.078 -0.085 1 
ClientDir 0.074 0.022 0.287*** 0.400*** 0.342*** 0.237*** 0.117** 
IndDir -0.095* -0.002 -0.271*** -0.061 -0.049 -0.065 0.155*** 
Bsize 0.293*** 0.078 0.334*** 0.124** 0.245*** -0.172*** 0.129** 
IntAudit -0.068 0.299*** -0.284*** -0.116** -0.013 0.004 0.040 
Regbank -0.293*** 0.547*** -0.066 0.060 0.147** -0.029 0.068 
Fage 0.308*** -0.126** 0.258*** -0.056 0.212*** -0.006 -0.124** 
Fsize -0.107* 0.529*** -0.305*** -0.169*** -0.041 -0.127** 0.143** 
Lev -0.061 0.133** 0.195*** 0.128** 0.072 -0.069 -0.100* 
 
 ClientDir IndDir Bsize IntAudit Regbank Fage Fsize Lev 
ClientDir 1        
IndDir -0.107* 1       
Bsize 0.219*** 0.072 1      
IntAudit -0.106* 0.037 0.060 1     
Regbank 0.065 -0.045 0.209*** 0.487*** 1    
Fage -0.066 -0.129** 0.330*** -0.027 0.036 1   
Fsize -0.202*** 0.008 0.168*** 0.584*** 0.650*** -0.021 1  
Lev -0.069 0.143** 0.128** 0.024 0.266*** -0.073 0.127** 1 
Note: This table reports the pair-wise correlation coefficients among the variables. *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The 
notations are defined in Table 4.6-1. 
 
The pair-wise correlation matrix also provides a check as to whether 
multicollinearity is likely to be resilient to invalidating the simultaneous inclusion 
of certain independent variables in a linear regression model. The correlations 
among independent variables have been considered in this study to detect 
multicollinearity among variables. Multicollinearity is deemed to be a serious 
concern when the correlation coefficients are above 0.7. The highest value shown 
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in the Table 6.4-1 is 0.66, nevertheless, further testing using VIF is applied. 
Commonly, the given rule of thumb is that when the VIF is 10 or more, there is 
multicollinearity among the independent variables and it is a considerable situation. 
All VIF values in Table 6.4-2 are less than 2.6.  
Table 6.4-2: Multicollinearity diagnostic tests  
Variable VIF 
FemDir 2.47 
FemCEO 1.63 
FemChair 1.79 
Duality 1.21 
IntDorDir 1.16 
ClientDir 1.55 
IndDir 1.30 
Bsize 1.63 
IntAudit 1.65 
Regbank 2.17 
Fage 1.37 
Fsize 2.59 
Lev 1.32 
Note: This table reports the VIF 
coefficients for explanatory 
variables. The notations are defined 
in Table 4.6-1. 
 
6.5 Selection of Analysis Technique 
Corporate governance variables listed in Table 6.3-1 are a mixture of 
interval/continuous and dichotomous/categorical variables. It is unclear in the 
literature which statistical analysis technique should apply if there are mixed 
interval/continuous and dichotomous/categorical independent variables in a model. 
The conventional statistical analysis technique for interval/continuous variables in 
an equation is multiple regression, and for dichotomous/categorical independent 
variables is analysis of covariance (ANCOVA). The literature remains inconclusive 
as to the appropriate model when there are both types of variables, although there 
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is a leaning toward the multiple regression formulation. This study uses both 
ANCOVA and multiple regression analysis techniques to determine whether there 
is any difference in results. According to the Table 6.5-1, results indicate that there 
is no significant difference between applying either of these two methods. The 
decision was made to use multiple regression technique for further analysis based 
on corporate governance and firm performance.  
 
Table 6.5-1: ANCOVA and multiple regression tests 
Dependent 
Variables 
ANCOVA Multiple Regression 
F 
statistics  
P value 
Adj. R-
squared 
F 
statistics  
P value 
Adj. R-
squared 
OSS 3.98 0.000 0.1931 3.98 0.000 0.1931 
ROA 2.90 0.000 0.1325 2.90 0.000 0.1325 
YOGLP 5.64 0.000 0.2713 5.64 0.000 0.2713 
OCR 9.09 0.000 0.3936 9.09 0.000 0.3936 
CA 5.82 0.000 0.2705 5.82 0.000 0.2705 
PAR 4.18 0.000 0.2033 4.18 0.000 0.2033 
Breadth 28.68 0.000 0.6896 28.68 0.000 0.6896 
FemBorr 8.87 0.000 0.3871 8.87 0.000 0.3871 
Depth 10.62 0.000 0.4353 10.62 0.000 0.4353 
Note: This table presents the test results for ANCOVA and multiple regression. The 
notations are defined in Table 4.6-1. 
 
6.6 Multiple Regression Analysis for Financial Performance 
6.6.1 Selection of regression model 
Table 6.6-1 depicts the multiple regression results for fixed-effect and random-
effect approaches. The Hausman test result suggests that it is important to employ 
a fixed-effect model for YOGLP and CA variables due to the rejection of the null 
hypotheses where p-values are significantly lower than the 0.05 level. A random-
effect model is appropriate for OSS, ROA, OCR and PAR variables.  
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Table 6.6-1: Selection of fixed or random effect model 
Dependent Variables Prob>chi2 Hausman Test Result 
OSS 0.2060 Random-effect Model 
ROA 0.3588 Random-effect Model 
YOGLP 0.0014 Fixed-effect Model 
OCR 0.3026 Random-effect Model 
CA 0.0000 Fixed-effect Model 
PAR 0.0553 Random-effect Model 
Note: This table presents the Hausman test results for financial 
performance variables. The notations are defined in Table 4.6-1. 
 
A Breusch and Pagan LM test for random effects is applied as a robustness check 
(Hartarska, 2005). The test result (Prob > chi^2 = 0.00) suggests that the pooled 
regression model is not appropriate for OSS, ROA, OCR and PAR dependent 
variables due to the rejection of null hypotheses at 5% significance level. The 
alternative hypotheses were accepted, indicating it is appropriate to use a random-
effect model.  
The study could use dynamic panel GMM estimation method as a robustness test. 
However, according to Roodman (2009a), the Sri Lankan MFI sample in this study 
does not have enough firm-year observations to conduct it. 
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Table 6.6-2: The relationship between corporate governance and financial performance of MFIs in Sri Lanka 
Variables 
OSS ROA YOGLP OCR CA PAR 
b/(p) [t] b/(p) [t] b/(p) [t] b/(p) [t] b/(p) [t] b/(p) [t] 
FemDir -0.208** [-2.172] -0.008 [-0.534] -0.155 [-1.631] -0.015 [-0.097] 0.017 [0.431] 0.017 [0.728] 
 (0.030)  (0.593)  (0.109)  (0.923)  (0.668)  (0.467)  
FemCEO 0.115** [2.237] 0.003 [0.399] -0.090 [-1.177] -0.021 [-0.290] 0.011 [0.236] 0.001 [0.050] 
 (0.025)  (0.690)  (0.244)  (0.771)  (0.815)  (0.960)  
FemChair -0.010 [-0.215] 0.014* [1.847] -0.005 [-0.103] 0.000 [0.004] -0.016 [-0.532] 0.007 [0.563] 
 (0.830)  (0.065)  (0.918)  (0.997)  (0.597)  (0.573)  
Duality -0.060 [-1.248] -0.000 [-0.006] 0.085* [1.718] 0.132** [1.966] 0.026 [1.069] -0.007 [-0.550] 
 (0.212)  (0.995)  (0.092)  (0.049)  (0.290)  (0.582)  
IntDorDir 0.034 [0.663] -0.017** [-2.029] 0.056 [0.995] 0.066 [0.960] -0.015 [-0.830] 0.012 [0.914] 
 (0.507)  (0.042)  (0.324)  (0.337)  (0.410)  (0.361)  
ClientDir 0.048 [0.888] 0.025*** [2.895] 0.031 [0.572] -0.091 [-1.264] 0.009 [0.518] -0.007 [-0.492] 
 (0.374)  (0.004)  (0.570)  (0.206)  (0.607)  (0.623)  
IndDir -0.236* [-1.910] -0.021 [-1.106] -0.297* [-1.991] 0.064 [0.341] 0.105** [2.238] -0.039 [-1.269] 
 (0.056)  (0.269)  (0.052)  (0.733)  (0.029)  (0.204)  
Bsize 0.085 [1.629] 0.002 [0.212] -0.018 [-0.224] -0.137* [-1.762] -0.004 [-0.136] -0.012 [-0.930] 
 (0.103)  (0.832)  (0.823)  (0.078)  (0.893)  (0.353)  
IntAudit 0.143*** [2.989] -0.001 [-0.076] 0.131* [1.806] 0.077 [1.256] -0.018 [-0.449] -0.010 [-0.890] 
 (0.003)  (0.939)  (0.077)  (0.209)  (0.655)  (0.373)  
Regbank 0.063 [0.259] 0.001 [0.031]   0.428 [0.839]   -0.050 [-0.806] 
 (0.795)  (0.975)    (0.402)    (0.420)  
Fage 0.001 [0.160] 0.000 [0.051] 0.030* [1.903] -0.017* [-1.852] 0.013* [1.761] 0.002 [1.462] 
 (0.873)  (0.959)  (0.062)  (0.064)  (0.084)  (0.144)  
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Fsize -0.005 [-0.280] 0.001 [0.452] -0.106* [-1.788] -0.117*** [-3.339] -0.117*** [-3.109] -0.007 [-1.323] 
 (0.780)  (0.651)  (0.079)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.186)  
Lev -0.295*** [-2.895] -0.033** [-2.212] -0.065 [-0.270] 0.152 [1.057]   0.047** [1.981] 
 (0.004)  (0.027)  (0.788)  (0.290)    (0.048)  
Constant 1.306*** [3.709] 0.020 [0.375] 0.314 [0.316] 0.259 [0.414] 2.198*** [3.319] 0.171* [1.949] 
 (0.000)  (0.707)  (0.753)  (0.679)  (0.002)  (0.051)  
year dummies yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
organisation type 
dummies yes  yes  no  yes  no  yes  
firm fixed-effects no  no  yes  no  yes  no  
Number of 
observations 294  294  295  296  297  297  
R-squared 0.151  0.091  0.151  0.150  0.165  0.0328  
F statistic     1.835*    1.961**    
Wald Chi-squared 
statistic 
65.32***  39.80**    82.14***    31.20  
Number of clusters     54    54    
Note: This table presents the results of the relationship between corporate governance and financial performance of MFIs in Sri Lanka. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***). p-Values are 
presented in parentheses and based on robustness standard errors corrected for potential heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the error term. t-Statistics are reported in brackets. The notations are defined in Table 4.6-1. 
Year dummy 2007 and organisation-type dummy private companies are treated as the benchmark categories to avoid the dummy variable trap. Year dummies and organisation-type dummies are unreported. 
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6.6.2 Empirical results for financial performance 
Empirical results of the multiple regression analysis are shown in Table 6.6-2 after 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in the context of the panel data model. 
The sign of coefficients are as expected but only a few are statistically significant 
in relation to the financial performance of MFIs in Sri Lanka, which is also 
predominantly aligned with prior studies. Only statistically significant financial 
performance variables are discussed below. 
Female directors (FemDir) on the board are significantly negatively correlated (t=-
2.17, p=0.05) only with OSS and it is similar to the studies conducted by Hewa-
Wellalage and Locke (2013) for Sri Lankan listed companies, and Adams and 
Ferreira (2009) for the US market. This suggests that MFIs have better financial 
performance if they have fewer female representatives on their boards. A rationale 
posited for the negative impact of women directors on MFI performance flows from 
their domestic responsibilities which are an outcome of their commitment to the 
family and communities (Boehe & Cruz, 2013). Especially in the South Asian 
region, women have more unpaid work to do at home, such as bringing up their 
children, preparing food, and managing the household rather than performing on a 
board. Cultural differences may also impact women’s managerial activities as it 
develops in synchronisation with the culture. Normally when there is a male-
dominant society, women are subordinate to males and often silent and inactive 
representatives on the board (Hewa-Wellalage & Locke, 2013). As a result, their 
impact on financial performance is likely to be minimal. It is therefore likely to 
infer from this study that further research has to be conducted to grasp the 
relationship between female directors on a board and MFI financial performance in 
Sri Lanka.  
However, female CEO (FemCEO) is statistically significantly positively correlated 
(t=2.24, p=0.05) with OSS of the firm and it is consistent with the prior MFI 
research findings of Mersland and Strøm (2009) and Strøm et al. (2014). This study 
also finds that female chair (FemChair) has a great level of positive association 
(t=1.85, p=0.10) with ROA. These findings support the expected relationships, that 
there will be a positive relationship between female leadership and MFI 
performance. The evidence of this study on female leadership confirms the general 
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propositions of Shrader, Blackburn, and Iles (1997); Smith et al. (2006); 
Kyereboah-Coleman (2006); and Welbourne (1999), that females in management 
have a positive impact on firm performance but this is not supported by women 
representatives on the board. However, as discussed below, having women on MFI 
boards is significantly positively correlated with female client outreach in Sri 
Lanka. 
CEO/chair duality (Duality) is statistically significantly positively correlated with 
YOGLP (t=1.72, p=0.10) and OCR (t=1.97, p=0.05). This highlights that duality 
will increase an MFI’s income generation ability on its loan portfolio. But, it is 
difficult to say that the MFI will be better governed when the CEO and chair are 
the same person. Findings reveal that the operating cost (agency cost) will increase 
when the same person is doing both roles, because the CEO can fix a higher 
compensation level with the approval of board members (Core et al., 1999). 
Furthermore, there is no statistically significant relationship in the negative 
correlations with OSS and ROA. These findings are consistent with Mersland and 
Strøm (2009) and Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell (1997), suggesting that it is not 
strongly indicated that the CEO and chair separation will result in improved 
governance for MFIs. Similarly, the results do not find statistically significant 
evidence to support the proposition that CEO/chair duality is inversely correlated 
with firm performance.  
Contrary to Oxelheim and Randøy (2003) but agreeing with Mersland and Strøm 
(2009), this study finds that international directors and/or donor agency 
representatives (IntDorDir) on the board reduce (t=-2.03, p=0.05) MFI financial 
performance through ROA as they are more concerned with improving outreach of 
the firm without considering profit-making ability. One of the main objectives of 
international donor agencies who provide funds for MFI operations is to improve 
the living standards of the poor people in developing countries. They are aware of 
the high risk in the industry and do not expect any direct financial returns from their 
funds/donations. On the other hand, this may also indicate international directors 
and donor agency representatives have less knowledge about the local clients and 
may threaten the ongoing solvency of the MFI. This indicates that the MFI board 
improves its performance when it consists of local directors.  
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Furthermore, findings of this study reveals that the directors who represent their 
clients (ClientDir) increase the MFI financial performance as it is statistically 
significantly positively associate with ROA (t=2.90, p=0.01). This supports the 
expected relationship between the two variables and consistent with prior studies 
of Mori and Mersland (2014) and Hartarska (2005), who suggest that the client 
representatives on boards improves the MFI sustainability by having a better 
relationship with MFI clients.  
According to good governance wisdom, a board is presumed to be better when it 
has outside/independent representatives on the board. Based on the findings in the 
study, this perspective is reflected with CA as it is statistically significantly 
positively correlated (t=2.24, p=0.05) to outside/independent directors (IndDir) but 
statistically significantly negatively correlated with OSS (t=-1.91, p=0.10) and 
YOGLP (t=-1.99, p=0.10). Even though outside directors are important for 
improving capital structure, they do not assist MFIs to progress their key financial 
performance (OSS and ROA). This study suggests that MFI boards in Sri Lanka will 
be better off when they have more executive directors than non-executive directors, 
presumably because executive directors are highly conscious of the operational 
activities in the firm. Similarly, non-executive directors may lack knowledge about 
the firm and industry and play a token role without adding any value to the firm 
(Nguyen et al., 2014). 
Hartarska (2005) and others suggest that firm performance can improve with 
smaller boards. Evidence for MFIs in Sri Lanka does not support this view as the 
coefficients are negative in the analysis, although not statistically significant. 
Further, this study shows a statistically significant negative relationship (t=-1.76, 
p=0.10) with OCR indicating that smaller boards (Bsize) are more costly than larger 
boards. On the other hand, it suggests that by providing effective monitoring, 
members of larger boards may voluntarily reduce the excessive operating costs of 
an MFI. Mersland and Strøm (2009) also find a negative relationship between board 
size and MFI performance, however, it was not statistically significant with any 
regressors.  
Results of this study indicate a statistically significant positive relationship between 
internal audit function (IntAudit) and financial performance of MFIs in Sri Lanka 
Chapter 6 Corporate Governance and Performance in MFIs in Sri Lanka: An 
Empirical Investigation 
 
166 
 
in relation to OSS (t=2.99, p=0.01) and YOGLP (t=1.81, p=0.10) and supports the 
expected relationship between two variables. This result is also consistent with 
Mersland and Strøm (2009), who state that a board will probably be better informed 
if it has been briefed through an internal board auditor, and this is reflected in regard 
to OSS. Additionally, this study finds there is no statistically significant relationship 
with corporate governance variables and portfolio at risk at 30 days (PAR) in Sri 
Lankan MFIs. As per the descriptive findings, even though Sri Lankan MFIs’ credit 
risk is considerably higher than their counterparts in other countries, it is not due to 
the governance practices of Sri Lankan MFIs. 
 
6.7 Multiple Regression Analysis for Outreach 
6.7.1 Selection of regression model 
Table 6.7-1 depicts the multiple regression results for fixed-effect and random-
effect approaches. The Hausman test result suggests that it is important to employ 
a fixed-effect model for Depth variable due to the rejection of the null hypotheses 
where p-values are significantly lower than the 0.05 level. The random-effect model 
has been employed for both Breadth and FemBorr variables because they fail to 
reject the null hypotheses.  
 
Table 6.7-1: Selection of fixed or random effect model 
Dependent Variables Prob>chi2 Hausman Test Result 
Breadth 0.4844 Random-effect Model 
FemBorr 0.1883 Random-effect Model 
Depth 0.0083 Fixed-effect Model 
Note: This table presents the Hausman test results for outreach 
variables. The notations are defined in Table 4.6-1. 
 
The Breusch and Pagan LM test for random effects has been used as a robustness 
check to see whether the choice of the random-effect model for Breadth and 
FemBorr dependent variables is appropriate. The test result (Prob > chi^2 = 0.00) 
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suggests that a pooled regression model is not appropriate for Breadth and FemBorr 
dependent variables as it has been rejected at 5% significance level. The alternative 
random-effect model is accepted as an appropriate model to represent the data.  
 
6.7.2 Empirical results for outreach 
Table 6.7-2 illustrates the empirical results of a multiple regression analysis of 
outreach variables in this study. These are from a regression of the whole dataset 
and controlling unobserved heterogeneity in the panel model. Even though most of 
the signs of the coefficients generated from the regression have the expected signs, 
very few are significant for outreach of Sri Lankan MFIs. However, interesting 
discoveries appear in both of these significant and non-significant regression 
results. 
Female directors (FemDir) on the board are statistically significantly negatively 
correlated (t=-1.80, p=0.10) with Breadth of outreach, and significantly positively 
correlated (t=2.10, p=0.05) with percentage of female borrowers of total active 
borrows (FemBorr) in Sri Lankan MFIs. These findings indicate that the female 
directors appear to concentrate on gender inequality in the country and promote 
microfinance loans to more female clients. Males have a wide range of sources from 
which to access credit but most women receive their first loan from an MFI. 
Even though Mersland and Strøm (2009) argue that female CEOs (FemCEO) are 
better informed, which will result a greater outreach, they did not find significant 
coefficients for the relationship between female CEO and outreach. This study also 
finds no statistically significant relationship between those two variables.  
The results for female directors on a board are opposite for a female chairperson 
(FemChair) on a board. The female chairperson on a board is statistically 
significantly positively correlated (t=2.81, p=0.01) with Breadth of outreach but 
statistically significantly negatively correlated (t=-1.80, p=0.10) with female 
borrowers (FemBorr) in MFIs in Sri Lanka. Even though they are female leaders 
they appear to concentrate on increasing the number of active borrowers rather than 
increasing only women borrowers.  
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Table 6.7-2: The relationship between corporate governance and outreach of 
MFIs in Sri Lanka 
Variables 
Breadth FemBorr Depth 
b/(p) [t] b/(p) [t] b/(p) [t] 
FemDir -0.376* [-1.800] 0.086** [2.094] 0.043 [1.383] 
 (0.072)  (0.036)  (0.172)  
FemCEO -0.003 [-0.028] 0.010 [0.495] 0.015 [1.211] 
 (0.977)  (0.621)  (0.231)  
FemChair 0.253*** [2.813] -0.032* [-1.795] -0.010 [-0.777] 
 (0.005)  (0.073)  (0.441)  
Duality 0.034 [0.352] -0.026 [-1.363] -0.022 [-1.647] 
 (0.725)  (0.173)  (0.106)  
IntDorDir -0.009 [-0.093] 0.047** [2.394] -0.006 [-0.600] 
 (0.926)  (0.017)  (0.551)  
ClientDir -0.201* [-1.886] 0.034 [1.643] 0.021 [1.374] 
 (0.059)  (0.100)  (0.175)  
IndDir -0.052 [-0.191] -0.028 [-0.524] 0.013 [0.347] 
 (0.848)  (0.601)  (0.730)  
Bsize -0.099 [-0.874] -0.007 [-0.292] 0.003 [0.234] 
 (0.382)  (0.770)  (0.816)  
IntAudit -0.051 [-0.581] 0.023 [1.302] 0.006 [0.701] 
 (0.562)  (0.193)  (0.487)  
Regbank -0.201 [-0.287] -0.018 [-0.121]   
 (0.774)  (0.903)    
Fage -0.001 [-0.100] 0.005* [1.719] -0.013*** [-4.189] 
 (0.921)  (0.086)  (0.000)  
Fsize 0.802*** [15.980] 0.024** [2.321] 0.015 [1.065] 
 (0.000)  (0.020)  (0.292)  
Lev 0.237 [1.179] 0.037 [0.930] -0.022 [-1.012] 
 (0.238)  (0.352)  (0.316)  
Constant -6.062*** [-7.281] 0.306* [1.786] -0.000 [-0.002] 
 (0.000)  (0.074)  (0.998)  
year dummies yes  yes  yes  
organisation type 
dummies 
yes  yes  no  
firm fixed-effects no  no  yes  
Number of 
observations 
294  297  295  
R-squared 0.413  0.157  0.243  
F statistic     4.135***  
Wald Chi-squared 
statistic 
651.71***  79.08***    
Number of clusters     54  
Note: This table presents the results of the relationship between corporate governance and outreach of MFIs in Sri Lanka. 
Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***). p-Values are presented in parentheses and based on 
robustness standard errors corrected for potential heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the error term. t-Statistics are 
reported in brackets. The notations are defined in Table 4.6-1. Year dummy 2007 and organisation-type dummy private 
companies are treated as the benchmark categories to avoid the dummy variable trap. Year dummies and organisation-type 
dummies are unreported. 
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The international/donor directors (IntDorDir) have a statistically significant 
positive (t=2.39, p=0.05) association with female borrowers (FemBorr) which 
shows that directors who represent international and/or donor agencies are engaged 
in providing microcredit to women in Sri Lanka. This suggests that when 
international and/or donor representatives sit on MFI boards they are able to provide 
better monitoring and advisory services to improve women’s empowerment. 
However, the results of this study show that directors who represent clients 
(ClientDir) are statistically significantly negatively (t=-1.89, p=0.10) associated 
with the number of active clients (Breadth) in MFIs in Sri Lanka. This is not 
astonishing as similar results were obtained by Mori and Mersland (2014) and 
Hartarska (2005). It is likely to infer from this finding that the representatives of 
clients on boards improve the MFI profitability at the expense of Breadth of 
outreach. Hartarska (2005, p. 1639) explains that these stakeholder representatives 
on MFI boards “may have engaged in rent-seeking behaviour, by promoting lending 
to wealthier borrowers”. 
Other corporate governance variables such as Duality, non-executive directors on 
board (IndDir), number of board members (Bsize) and internal audit function 
(IntAudit) are not statistically significantly impacting the outreach of MFIs in Sri 
Lanka. The number of MFIs that either have an internal audit function or are 
regulated under banking authority are very few and their impact on outreach is also 
negligible.  
Interestingly, Depth of outreach does not have any significant relationship with 
corporate governance variables but does have a significant negative relationship 
with firm age (Fage), suggesting that as MFIs mature their attention toward 
outreach to poor people increases. 
 
6.8 Conclusion  
This chapter contains a discussion of the background information of MFIs in Sri 
Lanka and the empirical analysis of corporate governance and both financial 
performance and outreach of MFIs in Sri Lanka. This chapter emphasises guidance 
for selecting directors for MFI boards based on a board’s characteristics. In relation 
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to the traditional internal and external corporate governance mechanisms, this study 
finds only a few variables that influence the key financial performance and outreach 
of MFIs. Even though most of the signs of the coefficients generated from the 
regression analysis are consistent with theory, very few are statistically significant. 
Internal audit function, local directors, executive directors, female CEOs, female 
chair and client representatives on the board are found to positively influence the 
MFIs’ financial performance, while female directors, female chair, and 
international and donor directors are found to positively influence outreach of Sri 
Lankan MFIs.  
The results also show a statistically significantly negative relationship between 
female directors on board, and financial performance and Breadth of outreach. Even 
though more than 30% of women are participating in Sri Lanka’s labour force 
(Department of Census and Statistics, 2011), very few have specialist managerial 
skills. Hence, the proportion of non-specialised female directors serving on MFI 
boards may higher than males (Hewa-Wellalage & Locke, 2013). It is noteworthy 
for MFIs’ to consider more training and mentoring activities for female directors to 
increase their involvement in improving financial performance and outreach of 
MFIs. However, women’s success in the workplace is always shaped by an array 
of cultural expectations, domestic responsibilities and self-perception (Women’s 
World Banking, 2013). In countries such as Sri Lanka, women often kept busy with 
family responsibilities and commitments. Therefore their impact on MFI financial 
performance and outreach is likely to be minimal. To build more effective and 
efficient diverse boards, MFIs need to consider these circumstances and develop 
women’s skills by having proper training and consultation.  
Although there are only a small number of statistically significant results, it does 
point towards the view that corporate governance does matter for the financial 
performance of MFIs. Moreover, the evidence presented in this chapter should 
encourage MFIs to consider further significant governance factors which will 
improve and sustain the industry. Also, it would have been more appropriate to have 
MFI governance studies in different countries to validate the findings of this study. 
Therefore, in the next chapter, research is presented from Indian MFI data analysis 
to complement the strength this chapter’s conclusion.  
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7 CHAPTER SEVEN 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND 
PERFORMANCE IN MFIS IN INDIA: AN 
EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 6 the discussion focused on how corporate governance practices impact 
the performance of MFIs in Sri Lanka. This chapter examines the Indian context. 
India has a large number of MFIs and may provide a useful comparison with Sri 
Lanka. An overview of the microfinance sector in India provides a starting point 
for the analysis. This is followed by an analysis of how corporate governance relates 
to the financial performance and outreach of the MFIs. The findings presented in 
Chapter 7 then compare with Chapter 6 findings to understand the differences. The 
chapter concludes with suggestions for changes in corporate governance practices 
that may favourably impact the performance of MFIs in India.  
 
7.2 Background of Indian MFIs 
A sample of 113 Indian MFIs is examined in this study from 2007 to 2012. Unlike 
the Sri Lankan MFIs, and other MFIs in Central and Eastern Europe and Newly 
Independent States, more than 70% of MFIs in India apply group-based lending 
methods for their clients. This is the basis for microfinance lending suggested by 
the Grameen Bank Bangladesh (See Figure 7.2-1). As noted by Bassem (2009), of 
42 MFIs in Euro-Mediterranean countries, 73% of them concentrate on individual 
lending methods when providing loans to their borrowers. In contrast, only 3% of 
institutions in the Indian sample provide individual loans to their customers and 
26% of institutions provide both individual and group based loans to their clients 
(See Figure 7.2-1). Such striking differences in lending methods between countries 
may have significant impacts for MFI performance. Mersland and Strøm (2009) 
study the impact of lending patterns on performance and find that individual loans 
are not a significant variable in relation to performance measures such as ROA and 
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OSS and suggest that the MFIs can improve their performance with either 
individual and/or group lending methods. 
 
Figure 7.2-1: Lending Method of MFIs in India 
 
 
MFIs in India can take many different organisational forms ranging from non-profit 
organisations to for-profit companies. Among the many forms, the percentage of 
NBFC is very high, at 51%, when compared to the other types of institutions 
depicted in Figure 7.2-2, according to Microfinance India State of the Sector Report 
2011 (Srinivasan, 2011). By contrast NGO-MFIs cover the highest contribution for 
this sector in Sri Lanka and some other countries. A likely reason for the high 
number of NBFCs in India is that they may obtain a range of benefits from the RBI. 
When the MFI is registered as an NBFC under the RBI in India, it can access formal 
funding such as bank finance through initiation of priority sector lending mandated 
by the RBI.  
 
2.609%
26.09%
71.3%
Individual lending Individual and group based lending
Group based lending
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Figure 7.2-2: Organisation Types of Indian MFIs 
 
 
7.3 Descriptive Data Analysis 
Descriptive statistics for MFI financial performance, outreach, corporate 
governance and control variables relating to this study, for the period 2007 to 2012, 
in India are presented in Table 7.3-1. 
In relation to financial performance indicators, MFIs in this sample appear to be 
financially stable as indicated by their OSS (mean=1.12). This finding is consistent 
with the empirical findings by Mersland and Strøm (2009), Tchakoute-Tchuigoua 
(2010) and Strøm et al. (2014). Mersland, Randøy, and Strøm (2011) indicate that 
the mean value of OSS is 1.13. This OSS is greater than 1.0 suggesting that 379 
MFIs in 73 countries are able to meet their obligations. Tchakoute-Tchuigoua (2010) 
states that the OSS value of a worldwide sample of 202 is around 1.15. Strøm et al. 
(2014) find a slightly higher value (1.23) for their study of 329 MFIs in 73 countries, 
including 30 Indian MFIs. However, the minimum and the maximum value of OSS 
in Table 7.3-1 ranges between 0.01 and 3.36. 
 
51%
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2%
1%
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Table 7.3-1: Descriptive statistics for Indian MFIs where n=575 
Variables Acronyms Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max  
Financial Performance Variables 
Operational self-
sufficiency 
OSS 1.12 1.11 0.38 0.01 3.36 
Return on assets  ROA 0.01 0.01 0.083 -0.36 0.38 
Yield on gross loan 
portfolio 
YOGLP 0.23 0.22 0.08 0.01 0.59 
Operating expenses ratio OCR 0.10 0.09 0.063 0.01 0.32 
Capital asset ratio CA 0.24 0.17 0.22 -0.77 1 
Portfolio at risk more than 
30 days 
PAR 0.04 0.01 0.086 0 0.58 
Outreach Variables 
Number of active 
borrowers 
 246575 44387 683292.9 31 6242266 
Breadth of outreach 
[LN(Active borrower)] 
Breadth 10.7 10.7 1.92 3.43 15.6 
Female borrowers to active 
borrowers (%) 
FemBorr 0.94 1 0.14 0.25 1 
Depth of outreach 
(Average loan balance per 
borrower/GNI per capita) 
Depth 0.21 0.15 0.57 0.02 8.75 
Corporate Governance Variables 
Female directors on board 
(%) 
FemDir 0.22 0.2 0.21 0 1 
Female CEO FemCEO 0.11 0 0.31 0 1 
Female chairperson FemChair 0.18 0 0.38 0 1 
Duality Duality 0.35 0 0.48 0 1 
International directors and 
donor directors on board 
(%) 
IntDorDir 0.16 0.1 0.2 0 1 
Directors representing 
clients/borrowers (%) 
ClientDir 0.04 0 0.11 0 0.82 
Non-executive directors on 
board (%) 
IndDir 0.56 0.6 0.2 0 0.9 
Board size (No. of board 
members) 
Bsize 7.05 7 2.65 2 19 
Internal auditor reporting 
to board 
IntAudit  0.63 1 0.48 0 1 
Control Variables 
Regulated by banking 
authority 
Regbank  0.53 1 0.5 0 1 
Firm age (No. of Years) Fage 9.17 8 7.06 1 38 
Firm size [LN(Total 
assets)] 
Fsize 19.7 19.6 1.86 14.6 24.7 
Leverage Lev 0.76 0.83 0.22 0 2.04 
Note: This table reports the descriptive statistics based on the Indian MFI sample. The variables are defined 
in Table 4.6-1. For the descriptive purposes, number of active borrowers, international directors/donor 
representatives on board, client representatives on board and firm age are calculated on the basis of levels 
instead of dummy and logarithmic form. Only firm size is calculated based on logarithmic form. 
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The ROA value suggests that a large number of MFIs in the sample do not appear 
to pay their true cost of capital because the mean value is 0.6% which is a slightly 
positive value. Mersland et al. (2011) state that a large number of MFIs are not 
financially self-sufficient as their average ROA is 0.5%. The above results are 
similar to Strøm et al. (2014), with 0.4% for 329 MFIs in 73 countries, including 
approximately a 9% representation of Indian MFIs in the total sample. The 
minimum and the maximum value of Indian MFIs’ ROA ranges from -0.36 to 0.38. 
This level of high negative value occurs due to the greater provisions for bad and 
doubtful loans and loan losses. 
The average YOGLP value of 23% is relatively small when compared to world 
statistics. Prior studies conducted by the Mori and Mersland (2014) and Mersland 
and Strøm (2009) find that the portfolio yield of those MFIs is between 30% and 
40% which is not a surprising value for the microfinance sector. Half of the Indian 
MFIs in the sample are able to achieve 22% yield from their loan portfolio, with the 
lowest portfolio yield being 1% and the highest 59%.  
Similarly with YOGLP, the OCR value of 10% is also comparatively lower than 
world statistics (Mersland & Strøm, 2009; Mori & Mersland, 2014). On average, 
operating cost to average gross loan portfolio ratio is 32.9% for about 202 MFIs in 
a global dataset. Mersland and Strøm (2009) use 278 MFIs around the world and 
disclose that the operational cost to average gross loan portfolio of those MFIs is 
31%. However, these calculations of OCR are based on average loan portfolio 
which is not the indicator suggested by the Microfinance Consensus Guidelines 
(2003). 
The CA value of Indian MFIs is 24%, which is a little outside the suggested range 
of 10% and 20% for the banking sector. In addition, half of the MFIs in the Indian 
sample have CA of 17%, which is in the prescribed range. However, Hartarska and 
Nadolnyak (2007) find the average capital asset ratio for 114 MFIs in a cross- 
country sample is 48%, but this included only five Indian MFIs. This study reports 
a minimum value CA as negative (-77%) and maximum as positive (100%), which 
highlights that there are MFIs running entirely on shareholders’ capital. 
Indian MFIs have a healthy credit portfolio with a PAR greater than 30 days of 4%, 
which is well below the recommended norm of 10%. Nevertheless, there are 
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institutions that have low portfolio quality as the maximum PAR is 58%. African 
and South Asian MFIs also maintain a high portfolio quality, with an average PAR 
for more than 30 days of 4% and 5.1% respectively (Lafourcade et al., 2006).  
In terms of outreach, the average number of credit clients (Breadth) in the sample 
is reported as 246,575 but the standard deviation is 683,293, the minimum is 31 and 
the maximum is 6,242,266, suggesting a significant dispersion in the number of 
credit clients for these MFIs. Similar situations are reflected in many MFIs around 
the world. To reduce dispersion in this variable the natural log is used. Results for 
Hartarska (2009) and Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) cross-country MFI studies 
indicate an average number of active borrowers of 6,864. Mori and Mersland (2014) 
find an average number of borrowers in a global sample to be 14,978, which is 
slightly larger than Mersland and Strøm (2009) who report 12,805. Indian MFIs 
have a large impact in terms of a world sample. After transforming breadth to 
natural log, the mean and the median values are both the same (10.7) and the 
standard deviation reduces to 1.92. 
Female borrowers (FemBorr) in India constitute 94% of active credit clients which 
is significantly greater than the world average of 73% female customers (Mersland 
& Strøm, 2009). The maximum number of female clients is equal to one and it 
indicates that some MFIs in India exclusively allocate their loans to women clients. 
However, there are institutions which give some priority to male clients as the 
minimum number of female clients in this sample is 25%. 
The average value of Depth of outreach which is computed as average loan balance 
per borrower divided by adjusted GNI per capita is 0.21. This provides an indication 
that poor borrowers are very well served (Bassem, 2009). Higher values would 
point to the MFIs serving more rich borrowers. Furthermore, 50% of the MFIs in 
India have a Depth of outreach 0.15 which is again a lower value, indicating support 
for the poor clients. These values are adjusted for the outliers in the income 
distribution in India. Tchakoute-Tchuigoua (2010) reports 0.86 as their depth of 
outreach for a worldwide sample of 202 MFIs from 2001 to 2006.  
Corporate governance variables provide a wide range of values. Of the directors in 
the sample, there are 22% female (FemDir) directors. Catalyst census shows that in 
the USA in 2001 there were only 12.4% women directors in Fortune 500 companies 
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and 6.4% in UK companies in the same year (Singh & Vinnicombe, 2004). 
However, similar proportions are observed by Hartarska (2005) for MFI boards in 
Central and Eastern Europe and Newly Independent States. In addition, the highest 
number of female representatives on an MFI board in India is 100% and there are 
also boards without any female representation. 
Leadership characteristics of the MFIs reveal that 18% of MFIs have a female 
chairperson (FemChair) and 11% have a female CEO (FemCEO). By comparison, 
in Ghana, around 50% of MFIs have a female as their CEO (Kyereboah-Coleman, 
2006) which is a comparatively unexpected number when compared with the world 
data. Mersland and Strøm (2009) find in a worldwide dataset that female 
representation as a CEO is around 24%. 
In terms of Duality, 35% of the firms have the one person as CEO and chairman. 
Agency costs associated with duality are being lowered by two thirds of the MFIs 
in this sample. Nevertheless, this is a large number when compared with worldwide 
MFI data but small when compared with Ghana. 
Only 16% of the directors in the Indian MFI sample are classified as representatives 
of international and/or donor agencies (IntDorDir) while the average representation 
internationally is 57.6% (Mersland & Strøm, 2009). However, according to 
Hartarska (2005), in Central and Eastern Europe and Newly Independent States, the 
proportion of directors who represent the donors or grant-giving organisations is 
18.3%. Surprisingly, half of the MFIs in the India sample have only 10% of 
directors who are international, representing the donor or grant-giving organisations.  
Customer representation on boards (ClientDir) is 4% and on a par with Central and 
Eastern Europe and Newly Independent States (Hartarska, 2005). Mori and 
Mersland (2014) observe that the customer representation for a sample of 379 MFIs 
is 18% of total board members. The descriptive statistics in this study indicate that 
50% of the MFIs do not have client representation on their boards. The maximum 
number on a board, however, records 82%, indicating that there are institutions that 
have a large proportion of client directors. 
More than half of the board members do not have an overt affiliation with any 
stakeholders of their MFI (IndDir =56%) and this figure is similar to Hartarska 
(2005) findings of non-affiliated outsider directors in relation to Central and Eastern 
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Europe and Newly Independent States. The analysis determines that 50% of the 
MFIs in the sample have more than 40% representation of executive board members. 
However, the minimum and the maximum value of non-executive representation 
on the Indian MFI boards ranges between zero and 90%, showing a broad range. 
The descriptive statistics also indicate that the average (medium) number of board 
members (Bsize) in the sample is approximately seven (7) with minimum of two 
and maximum of 19 members. There is a weak consensus in the literature about the 
optimal board size being seven or eight members (Jensen, 1993; Lipton & Lorsch, 
1992). Mersland and Strøm (2009) find that most MFIs in the world have a board 
of 7-9 directors.  
In this study, 63% of MFIs have an internal audit function (IntAudit) which is higher 
than the findings of Mersland and Strøm (2009) and Bassem (2009) who report 50% 
having an internal audit function, which may be indicative of its growing 
importance. 
In terms of control variables represented in Table 7.3-1, 53% of MFIs are regulated 
under banking authority (Regbank) in India which is a greater number than MFIs in 
other countries (Bassem, 2009; Galema et al., 2012). For example, out of 329 MFIs 
in 73 countries (including 30 Indian MFIs), only 28% of them are regulated by 
banking authorities (Strøm et al., 2014). However, the proportions of regulated 
MFIs differ between countries due to the structure of regulation and differences in 
regulatory philosophy. 
Summary statistics indicate that the MFIs, in the sample, are not as mature as the 
mean of 9 (median of 8) for the number of years incorporated (Fage) with a 
minimum of 1 and maximum of 38 years of operation. The institutional age of 
Indian MFIs is similar to Mersland and Strøm (2009) and Hartarska and Nadolnyak 
(2007) suggesting the world’s MFIs are younger as their age is around nine years. 
Firm size (Fsize) is measured by the natural log of total assets. The mean (median) 
log value of the total assets is 19.7 (19.6) with a minimum of 14.6 and a range of 
10.1 (See Table 7.3-1).  
As presented in Table 7.3-1, the debt (both mean and median) of the Indian MFI 
sample (Lev) is high (0.76 and 0.83 respectively) with values between zero and 2.04. 
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Value greater than 1 indicates negative assets due the accumulated losses are greater 
than equity capital.  
 
7.4 Pair-wise Correlation 
The pair-wise correlation matrix in Table 7.4-1 records the correlation coefficient 
between financial performance, outreach, corporate governance and control 
variables. The strength of correlation between dependent and explanatory variables 
suggests that the selected corporate governance variables in this study are 
interacting with the financial and outreach performance of MFIs in India. These 
significant relationships are investigated further using linear regression. 
 
Table 7.4-1: Correlation matrix for variables 
 OSS ROA YOGLP OCR CA PAR Breadth 
OSS 1       
ROA 0.537*** 1      
YOGLP 0.174*** 0.113*** 1     
OCR -0.438*** -0.330*** 0.498*** 1    
CA -0.000 -0.043 -0.028 0.191*** 1   
PAR -0.089** -0.116*** 0.070* -0.088** -0.120*** 1  
Breadth 0.185*** 0.092** 0.023 -0.212*** -0.174*** 0.228*** 1 
BemBorr -0.041 0.051 0.074* 0.077* 0.081* -0.097** 0.062 
Depth 0.104** -0.034 -0.206*** -0.276*** -0.002 0.067 -0.195*** 
FemDir 0.025 -0.005 0.052 -0.033 -0.146*** 0.057 -0.197*** 
FemCEO -0.057 -0.084** -0.037 -0.094** -0.100** 0.176*** -0.034 
FemChair -0.002 -0.056 -0.031 -0.102** -0.077* 0.028 -0.063 
Duality 0.009 0.038 0.067 0.031 -0.040 0.121*** 0.157*** 
IntDorDir 0.010 0.014 -0.074* -0.131*** -0.045 0.070* 0.344*** 
ClientDir 0.119*** 0.063 -0.089** -0.219*** -0.149*** 0.061 -0.102** 
IndDir -0.012 0.012 -0.014 -0.121*** -0.146*** 0.026 0.227*** 
Bsize 0.171*** 0.084** -0.033 -0.241*** -0.213*** 0.151*** 0.150*** 
IntAudit -0.060 -0.012 0.026 -0.006 0.103** 0.055 0.296*** 
Regbank -0.066 -0.082** -0.016 0.042 0.302*** 0.050 0.431*** 
Fage 0.105** 0.101** -0.014 -0.228*** -0.214*** 0.297*** 0.372*** 
Fsize 0.183*** 0.062 -0.008 -0.282*** -0.150*** 0.276*** 0.929*** 
Lev -0.006 0.037 0.030 -0.184*** -0.999*** 0.124*** 0.175*** 
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 BemBorr Depth FemDIr FemCEO FemChair Duality IntDorDir 
BemBorr 1       
Depth -0.335*** 1      
FemDir -0.059 0.173*** 1     
FemCEO -0.019 0.297*** 0.415*** 1    
FemChair -0.018 0.143*** 0.419*** 0.539*** 1   
Duality 0.020 0.089** -0.055 0.175*** -0.011 1  
IntDorDir -0.002 0.087** -0.015 0.103** 0.051 0.111*** 1 
ClientDir -0.031 0.179*** 0.328*** 0.171*** 0.247*** 0.038 0.063 
IndDir 0.009 0.125*** 0.092** 0.122*** 0.108*** -0.021 0.335*** 
Bsize -0.071* 0.182*** 0.301*** 0.147*** 0.157*** -0.070* 0.226*** 
IntAudit 0.042 -0.115*** -0.112*** -0.004 0.025 0.117*** 0.277*** 
Regbank 0.062 -0.023 -0.292*** -0.005 -0.117*** 0.150*** 0.273*** 
Fage -0.212*** 0.057 0.186*** 0.083** 0.168*** 0.040 0.196*** 
Fsize -0.045 0.130*** -0.115*** 0.0797* -0.008 0.201*** 0.378*** 
Lev -0.084** -0.000 0.145*** 0.098** 0.075* 0.042 0.046 
 
 ClientDir IndDir Bsize IntAudit Regbank Fage Fsize Lev 
ClientDir 1        
IndDir 0.011 1       
Bsize 0.344*** 0.353*** 1      
IntAudit -0.092** 0.113*** 0.077* 1     
Regbank -0.316*** 0.099** -0.175*** 0.425*** 1    
Fage 0.158*** 0.226*** 0.476*** 0.121*** -0.089** 1   
Fsize -0.049 0.269*** 0.226*** 0.273*** 0.439*** 0.419*** 1  
Lev 0.146*** 0.147*** 0.211*** -0.100** -0.297*** 0.214*** 0.151*** 1 
Note: This table reports the pair-wise correlation coefficients among the variables. 
Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***). The notations are 
defined in Table 4.6-1. 
 
The correlations among independent variables have been considered in this study 
to detect multicollinearity among variables. Results recorded in Table 7.4-1 show 
that the largest correlation exists between FemCEO and FemChair (0.54) and for 
multicollinearity the value is below the threshold of 0.80, suggested by Gujarati and 
Porter (2004). Although initial indications suggest multicollinearity is not likely to 
be a serious problem for multiple regression analysis in this study, VIF is used for 
confirmatory testing of the presence of multicollinearity. According to Myers 
(1990), VIF value of 10 or above is a good indication of the presence of 
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multicollinearity among independent variables. The results presented in Table 7.4-2 
show that all the independent variables had a VIF value of less than two except the 
Regbank variable which is just above two. Therefore, both tests suggest the 
likelihood of multicollinearity is low among the variables. 
 
Table 7.4-2: Multicollinearity diagnostic tests 
Variable VIF 
FemDir 1.55 
FemCEO 1.65 
FemChair 1.59 
Duality 1.14 
IntDorDir 1.35 
ClientDir 1.34 
IndDir 1.30 
Bsize 1.70 
IntAudit 1.31 
Regbank 2.09 
Fage 1.64 
Fsize 1.97 
Lev 1.25 
Note: This table reports the VIF 
coefficients for explanatory variables. 
The notations are defined in 
Table 4.6-1. 
 
7.5 Selection of Analysis Technique  
Corporate governance factors in this research equation contain mixed 
interval/continuous and dichotomous/categorical independent variables. Both 
ANCOVA and multiple regression analysis techniques are utilised to check for 
differences in the results, which will then lead to further consideration of the most 
appropriate model. According to Table 7.5-1, results indicate that there is no 
apparent difference between these two methods. A multiple regression technique is 
chosen for further analysis of the data for corporate governance and firm 
performance.  
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Table 7.5-1: ANCOVA and multiple regression test 
Dependent 
Variables 
ANCOVA Multiple Regression 
F 
statistics  
P 
value 
Adj. R-
squared 
F 
statistics  
P value Adj. R-
squared 
OSS 2.11 0.002 0.043 2.11 0.002 0.043 
ROA 1.20 0.238 0.008 1.20 0.238 0.008 
YOGLP 3.73 0.000 0.099 3.73 0.000 0.099 
OCR 9.12 0.000 0.246 9.12 0.000 0.246 
CA 6.05 0.000 0.162 6.05 0.000 0.162 
PAR 5.34 0.000 0.148 5.34 0.000 0.148 
Breadth 36.09 0.000 0.584 36.09 0.000 0.584 
FemBorr 10.02 0.000 0.265 10.02 0.000 0.265 
Depth 13.38 0.000 0.332 13.38 0.000 0.332 
Note: This table presents the test results for ANCOVA and multiple regression. The 
notations are defined in Table 4.6-1. 
 
7.6 Multiple Regression Analysis for Financial Performance 
7.6.1 Selection of regression model 
The model formulation was examined for fixed-effect using a Hausman test and 
results are presented in Table 7.6-1. These suggest fixed-effect estimation 
procedures are preferable for ROA (Chi-sq(13)=39.53; p=0.00), YOGLP (Chi-
sq(13)=70.40; p=0.00), OCR (Chi-sq(13)=76.45; p=0.00) and PAR (Chi-
sq(13)=27.08; p=0.01 as p-values are significant and are lower than the 0.05 level. 
The Hausman test results also suggest that the random-effect estimation procedures 
are appropriate for OSS (Chi-sq(13)=19.79; p=0.10) and CA (Chi-sq(13)=15.50; 
p=0.22).  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 7 Corporate Governance and Performance in MFIs in India: An 
Empirical Investigation 
183 
 
Table 7.6-1: Selection of fixed or random effect model 
Dependent Variables Prob>chi2 Hausman Test Result 
OSS 0.1004 Random-effect Model 
ROA 0.0002 Fixed-effect Model  
YOGLP 0.0000 Fixed-effect Model 
OCR 0.0000 Fixed-effect Model 
CA 0.2153 Random-effect Model 
PAR 0.0121 Fixed-effect Model 
Note: This table presents the Hausman test results for financial 
performance variables. The notations are defined in Table 4.6-1. 
 
The Breusch and Pagan LM test for random effects also confirm that it is 
appropriate to use the random-effects model for OSS and CA dependent variables. 
The test results (Prob > Chi-sq=0.00) suggest that the pooled regression model is 
not appropriate for OSS and CA. It is to be noted that alternative hypotheses were 
accepted, recommending use of a random-effects estimation procedure for OSS and 
CA variables.  
 
7.6.2 Empirical results for financial performance 
Table 7.6-2 presents the multiple regression results for the relationship between 
corporate governance and financial performance in relation to fixed-effects and 
random-effects estimation procedures. After controlling for the unobserved factors 
in the panel mode, this study reveals that best practice corporate governance 
mechanisms for for-profit firms in mature markets have little influence on 
performance of MFIs in India. Signs for coefficients are in the expected direction, 
i.e. positive or negative, but surprisingly few are statistically significant and 
predominantly align with prior studies. Therefore, the discussion below 
demonstrates statistically significant MFI financial performance.  
Prior studies highlight that board diversity is significantly positively associated with 
the financial indicators of firm performance (Erhardt et al., 2003). Results reported 
in Table 7.6-2 also highlight that international/donor directors on boards (IntDorDir) 
improve financial performance, which is contrary to the findings of Mersland and 
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Strøm (2009) but aligns with the recent discussion on MFI board diversity and 
performance. The international/donor directors on boards are statistically 
significantly positively related with ROA (t=2.12, p=0.05) and desirably negatively 
related with PAR (t=-1.84, p=0.1). This supports the view that international 
directors and funding agencies are concerned with MFI sustainability and the cost 
of institutional failures. They bring broader talents and diverse experiences to the 
local MFIs in India. It is suggested by Schreiner (2002) that international/donor 
directors may require MFIs to get higher returns in order to be able to withdraw 
their international support and funding at a later stage.  
Client representatives on the board (ClientDir) have a negative and statistically 
significant coefficient (t=-1.70, p=0.1), indicating that an increase in the level of 
ClientDir leads to a decline in PAR. Hartarska (2005) and Mori and Mersland (2014) 
find similar results for client representatives on boards. This category of board 
member may be seeking to increase sustainability and reduce the risk for the MFI 
by having a better relationship with their clients. The low level of PAR in the MFI 
helps to promote working capital by increasing the recovery rate of the MFI.  
The variable FemDir (percentage of female directors on board) is statistically 
significantly negatively (t=-1.76, p=0.1) correlated with YOGLP and this is similar 
to Bassem (2009) and Hartarska (2005). This suggests that female directors on 
Indian MFI boards are associated with low interest returns. Women directors on 
MFI boards may fight for lower interest rates because most MFI clients are women 
and they confront many difficulties when paying high interest rates. The observed 
results may not prove popular with those who argue for gender equality on 
corporate boards.  
Although Mersland and Strøm (2009) suggest that the financial performance of 
MFIs improves with a female CEO, no evidence to support the relationship between 
a female CEO (FemCEO) and financial performance is detected in this study. 
Similar to the finding in relation to women directors, the results for FemChair 
(female chairperson) are statistically significantly negative (t=-1.73, p=0.1) for 
ROA, suggesting that female chairpersons have lower incentives for MFI 
sustainability. Although corporate governance codes have highlighted inclusion of 
more women in boards, the above results suggest that their contribution to MFI 
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performance may have an industry effect which has hitherto not been adequately 
considered. 
Bassem (2009) and Kyereboah-Coleman and Osei (2008) propose that MFI 
financial performance (OSS and ROA) depends on the larger board size (Bsize). In 
the microfinance sector, by moving towards larger boards there is an intention to 
reduce operating costs through more volunteer time and make better decisions 
through range of expertise. In this study, Bsize and financial performance of MFIs 
in India show a positive relationship with OSS and ROA but they are not statistically 
significant. It suggests that larger boards of directors have no effect on MFIs’ 
financial performance. Findings of this study are more in line with Mersland and 
Strøm (2009) and can only be interpreted in the Indian context for the given time 
period.  
Consistent with prior studies (Bassem, 2009; Hartarska, 2005; Kyereboah-Coleman 
& Osei, 2008), limited employee participation on MFI boards (IndDir) is 
statistically significantly positively (t=1.72, p=0.1) related to financial 
performance (YOGLP) which means that MFIs with more independent directors 
push for higher yield. Hartarska (2005) also emphasises that MFIs can benefit from 
more unaffiliated directors. Results confirm that MFI boards with a higher 
proportion of unaffiliated directors increases the loan portfolio’s ability to generate 
financial revenue. A study conducted by Jackling and Johl (2009) for 180 top Indian 
companies listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE), suggests that a greater 
proportion of outside directors on boards is associated with improved firm 
performance. 
Jackling and Johl (2009) further note that separating CEO and chairman roles does 
not improve performance. The nexus between Duality and financial performance 
for this study also suggests that separation of CEO and chairman roles do not 
statistically significantly enhance the performance of Indian MFIs. The study 
results are in agreement with those discussed by Baliga et al. (1996) and Dey et al. 
(2011). Breaking duality may not increase returns but may lower the prospects of 
fraud and failures, which have not been tested.  
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Table 7.6-2: The relationship between corporate governance and financial performance of MFIs in India 
Variables 
OSS ROA YOGLP OCR CA PAR 
b/(p) [t] b/(p) [t] b/(p) [t] b/(p) [t] b/(p) [t] b/(p) [t] 
FemDir 0.072 [0.513] 0.013 [0.296] -0.063* [-1.759] -0.543 [-1.617] -0.109 [-1.368] -0.013 [-0.297] 
 (0.608)  (0.768)  (0.081)  (0.109)  (0.171)  (0.767)  
FemCEO -0.075 [-1.341] 0.003 [0.390] -0.010 [-0.685] -0.003 [-0.037] -0.020 [-0.700] 0.008 [0.683] 
 (0.180)  (0.697)  (0.495)  (0.970)  (0.484)  (0.496)  
FemChair 0.030 [0.616] -0.013* [-1.728] 0.004 [0.343] -0.057 [-0.860] 0.021 [0.819] -0.006 [-0.619] 
 (0.538)  (0.087)  (0.732)  (0.391)  (0.413)  (0.537)  
Duality -0.001 [-0.016] -0.004 [-0.327] 0.000 [0.016] -0.034 [-0.502] -0.003 [-0.165] 0.018 [1.479] 
 (0.987)  (0.744)  (0.987)  (0.617)  (0.869)  (0.142)  
IntDorDir 0.054 [1.309] 0.032** [2.115] -0.004 [-0.253] -0.133 [-1.434] -0.012 [-0.516] -0.037* [-1.841] 
 (0.190)  (0.037)  (0.801)  (0.154)  (0.606)  (0.068)  
ClientDir 0.031 [0.630] 0.013 [0.537] -0.007 [-0.314] 0.084 [0.854] 0.010 [0.377] -0.046* [-1.699] 
 (0.528)  (0.592)  (0.754)  (0.395)  (0.706)  (0.092)  
IndDir -0.082 [-0.802] -0.020 [-0.630] 0.057* [1.719] 0.161 [0.628] -0.010 [-0.171] -0.009 [-0.174] 
 (0.422)  (0.530)  (0.088)  (0.531)  (0.864)  (0.862)  
Bsize 0.008 [0.969] 0.003 [0.775] -0.003 [-1.009] -0.024 [-1.079] -0.005 [-1.066] -0.004 [-0.925] 
 (0.333)  (0.440)  (0.315)  (0.283)  (0.286)  (0.357)  
IntAudit 0.017 [0.454] 0.021** [2.171] 0.013 [1.222] -0.119* [-1.688] -0.007 [-0.376] 0.008 [0.802] 
 (0.650)  (0.032)  (0.224)  (0.094)  (0.707)  (0.424)  
Regbank -0.451* [-1.812] -0.005 [-0.357] 0.027 [1.290] 0.175 [0.797] -0.030 [-0.168] -0.017 [-0.897] 
 (0.070)  (0.722)  (0.200)  (0.427)  (0.867)  (0.372)  
Fage -0.013 [-0.473] 0.024 [1.603] 0.050*** [2.862] 0.269** [2.327] -0.003 [-0.211] -0.029** [-2.065] 
 (0.636)  (0.112)  (0.005)  (0.022)  (0.833)  (0.041)  
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Fsize 0.074*** [5.483] 0.034*** [4.512] -0.015** [-2.419] -0.263*** [-5.485] -0.054*** [-7.039] 0.003 [0.580] 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.017)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.563)  
Lev -0.186** [-2.532] -0.078** [-2.449] 0.011 [0.509] 0.225 [1.080]   -0.005 [-0.271] 
 (0.011)  (0.016)  (0.612)  (0.283)    (0.787)  
Constant 0.197 [0.588] -0.647*** [-4.902] 0.383*** [3.514] 1.891** [2.182] 1.410*** [6.437] 0.071 [1.155] 
 (0.557)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.031)  (0.000)  (0.251)  
year dummies yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
organisation type 
dummies 
yes  no  no  no  yes  no  
firm fixed-effects no  yes  yes  yes  no  yes  
Number of 
observations 
562  566  564  570  566  572  
R-squared 0.119  0.211  0.222  0.225  0.172  0.134  
F statistic   3.072***  4.686***  5.693***    0.863  
Wald Chi-squared 
statistic 
60.24***        125.36***    
Number of clusters   113  113  113    113  
Note: This table presents the results of relationship between corporate governance and financial performance of MFIs in India. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***). p-Values are presented 
in parentheses and based on robustness standard errors corrected for potential heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the error term. t-Statistics are reported in brackets. The notations are defined in Table 4.6-1. Year 
dummy 2007 and organisation type dummy co-operatives are treated as the benchmark categories to avoid dummy variable trap. Year dummies and organisation type dummies are unreported. 
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In terms of the internal audit function (IntAudit), results indicate that an internal 
audit function is statistically significantly positively (t=2.17, p=0.05) related with 
ROA and statistically significantly negatively (desirably) related to OCR (t=-1.69, 
p=0.1). Hartarska (2005), Bassem (2009) and Mersland and Strøm (2009) also 
observed similar relationships and this suggests that MFIs in India will be better 
governed, with improved profits and reduced operational costs, when they have an 
internal audit function. Furthermore, this study does not find any statistically 
significant relationship between corporate governance practices and financial 
performance when OSS and CA are used as financial performance variables. 
 
7.7 Multiple Regression Analysis for Outreach 
7.7.1 Selection of regression model 
Table 7.7-1 presented the Hausman test results for fixed-effect and random-effect 
approaches which are used to formulate the regression models. According to the 
test result, it is suggested that a fixed-effect estimation procedure is preferable for 
Depth (Chi-sq(13)=40.74; p=0.00) variable due to the rejection of the null 
hypothesis, as p-values are significantly lower than the 0.05 level, but a random-
effect estimation procedure is appropriate for Breadth (Chi-sq(13)=20.89; p=0.08) 
and FemBorr (Chi-sq(13)=19.00; p =0.12) variables because of failure to reject the 
null hypotheses. 
 
Table 7.7-1: Selection of fixed or random effect model 
Dependent Variables Prob>chi2 Hausman Test Result 
Breadth 0.0752 Random-effect Model 
FemBorr 0.1229 Random-effect Model 
Depth 0.0001 Fixed-effect Model 
Note: This table presents the Hausman test results for outreach 
variables. The notations are defined in Table 4.6-1. 
 
As a robustness check, this study has used a Breusch and Pagan LM test for random 
effects to see whether the choice of the random-effect model for Breadth and 
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FemBorr dependent variables are appropriate. The test results (Prob > chi^2 = 
0.00) suggest that the null hypotheses of pooled regression model is not appropriate 
for Breadth and FemBorr dependent variables as it has been rejected at 5% 
significance level. The alternative hypothesis of random-effect model has been 
accepted and can be used as an appropriate estimation procedure to represent the 
data.  
 
7.7.2 Empirical results for outreach 
The multiple regression results using Breadth, FemBorr and Depth as dependent 
variables as proxies for outreach are reported in Table 7.7-2. There is a weak 
indication, not statistically significant, that female directors on boards increase the 
Breadth of outreach (number of borrowers). The sign is in accord with Bassem 
(2009) and Hartarska (2005) who find a statistically significant result. Having a 
higher proportion of women directors on the board (FemDir) is statistically 
significantly negatively (t=-2.12, p=0.05) associated with the average loan size on 
GNI per capita (Depth), which is again similar to those results reported by Bassem 
(2009) and Hartarska (2005), who have used GDP per capita to measure the Depth. 
This enviable significant negative coefficient indicates that having female directors 
on a board encourages MFIs to serve poorer clients. This is interesting, as it may 
appear that women representatives on boards have a social mission of pushing 
greater outreach for their poorer borrowers.  
Conversely, results show that a female CEO (FemCEO) is statistically significantly 
negatively (t=-2.88, p=0.01) associated with the number of active clients (Breadth) 
of MFIs, which is contrary to the findings of Mersland and Strøm (2009) and may 
reflect a cultural difference among countries. A potential explanation is that the 
female CEO is very cautious about client creditworthiness when providing loans 
and favours catering to a smaller client group. Also female CEOs know that most 
female clients who gain access to a loan from an MFI sometimes have no control 
over their loans as their husbands or male family members make all the decisions 
about the loan while the women only bear the liability for repayment (Goetz & 
Gupta, 1996). 
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Table 7.7-2: The relationship between corporate governance and outreach of 
MFIs in India 
Variables 
Breadth FemBorr Depth 
b/(p) [t] b/(p) [t] b/(p) [t] 
FemDir 0.093 [0.410] -0.011 [-0.260] -0.500** [-2.116] 
 (0.682)  (0.795)  (0.037)  
FemCEO -0.244*** [-2.876] -0.007 [-0.496] 0.120 [1.016] 
 (0.004)  (0.620)  (0.312)  
FemChair 0.142* [1.870] 0.006 [0.424] -0.099 [-0.924] 
 (0.061)  (0.671)  (0.357)  
Duality -0.046 [-0.780] 0.017 [1.574] -0.011 [-0.137] 
 (0.436)  (0.115)  (0.892)  
IntDorDir 0.123* [1.817] 0.023* [1.809] -0.115 [-1.265] 
 (0.069)  (0.070)  (0.208)  
ClientDir -0.108 [-1.353] -0.010 [-0.670] 0.055 [0.888] 
 (0.176)  (0.503)  (0.376)  
IndDir -0.228 [-1.356] -0.010 [-0.319] 0.192 [0.998] 
 (0.175)  (0.749)  (0.321)  
Bsize -0.042*** [-2.971] 0.003 [1.304] 0.048*** [2.781] 
 (0.003)  (0.192)  (0.006)  
IntAudit 0.165*** [2.845] -0.021** [-2.057] -0.077 [-1.361] 
 (0.004)  (0.040)  (0.176)  
Regbank 0.809* [1.729] -0.019 [-0.179] -0.043 [-0.613] 
 (0.084)  (0.858)  (0.541)  
Fage 0.085* [1.865] -0.031*** [-3.484] -0.118 [-1.266] 
 (0.062)  (0.000)  (0.208)  
Fsize 0.873*** [38.687] 0.000 [0.114] 0.130*** [3.504] 
 (0.000)  (0.909)  (0.001)  
Lev 0.275** [2.517] -0.013 [-0.706] -0.300* [-1.737] 
 (0.012)  (0.480)  (0.085)  
Constant -7.185*** [-11.927] 0.964*** [7.524] -3.997*** [-5.353] 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
year dummies yes  yes  yes  
organisation type 
dummies 
yes  yes  no  
firm fixed-effects no  no  yes  
Number of 
observations 
565  571  569  
R-squared 0.763  0.103  0.231  
F statistic     8.035***  
Wald Chi-squared 
statistic 
2981.22***  85.65***    
Number of clusters     113  
Note: This table presents the results of relationship between corporate governance and outreach of MFIs in India. 
Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***). p-Values are presented in parentheses and 
based on robustness standard errors corrected for potential heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the error 
term. t-Statistics are reported in brackets. The notations are defined in Table 4.6-1. Year dummy 2007 and 
organisation type dummy co-operatives are treated as the benchmark categories to avoid dummy variable trap. 
Year dummies and organisation type dummies are unreported. 
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When performance is assessed by using Breadth as the outreach indicator, the 
association between corporate governance and performance is statistically 
significantly positively related with FemChair (t=1.87, p=0.1), IntDorDir (t=1.82, 
p=0.1), IntAudit (t=2.85, p=0.01). This indicates that increasing the leadership of 
women on the board and more international representation and/or donor agent 
participation in governance favourably impacts the outreach of MFIs. Furthermore, 
international/donor directors’ (IntDorDir) representation on MFI boards improves 
(t=1.81, p=0.1) the female share of credit clients (FemBorr). This emphasises that 
the involvement of international/donor representatives on MFI boards could allow 
MFIs to serve more customers because international/donor representatives have 
inside information about the MFI enabling them to potentially provide additional 
funds, monitoring and advisory support (Mori & Mersland, 2014).  
However, internal audit function (IntAudit) and FemBorr, which is statistically 
significantly negative (t=-2.10, p=0.05), suggests that internal auditors have more 
concerns about allocating microcredit to women clients. In terms of Duality, client 
representatives on board (ClientDir) and independent directors on board (IndDir) 
reveal no significant relationship with outreach of MFIs in India.  
According to Table 7.7-2, board size (Bsize) is statistically significant with regards 
to MFI outreach. Findings show that oversized boards have a significant negative 
(t=-2.97, p=0.01) influence on active credit clients (Breadth) and are in line with 
the results reported by Kyereboah-Coleman and Osei (2008). Larger boards (Bsize) 
tend to serve less poor clients (Depth) in Indian MFIs (t=2.78, p=0.01), suggesting 
that bigger boards pay more attention to improving MFI sustainability by providing 
loans for the people who are not so vulnerable. Consistent with prior studies of 
Jensen (1993), Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg et al. (1998), MFIs must have 
smaller boards to provide better outreach to poor people.  
 
7.8 Comparative Analysis between Sri Lankan MFIs and Indian 
MFIs 
This section presents a cross-country comparative analysis of MFIs in Sri Lanka 
and India, emphasising similarities and differences in the corporate governance 
mechanisms, financial performance and outreach of MFIs in each country.  
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Unlike the Sri Lankan MFIs and other MFIs in Central and Eastern Europe and 
Newly Independent States, more than 70% of MFIs in India apply group-based 
lending methods when providing money for their clients (See Figure 7.2-1). In India, 
NBFC is the most important microfinance provider and the second largest is NGO-
MFI (See Figure 7.2-2). However, NGO-MFIs make the highest contribution to the 
microfinance sector in Sri Lanka and in some other countries like Central and 
Eastern Europe and Newly Independent States.  
This study uses t-test and z-test for the comparison of MFIs in Sri Lanka and India. 
Table 7.8-1 presents the two sample t-test which is used to compare the difference 
in population means of the continuous variables. In Table 7.8-2 the two sample z-
test, which is used to compare the difference in population means of categorical 
variables, is shown. Consistent with Adams and Ferreira (2009), this study uses 
firm-year observations to conduct the t-tests and z-tests in order to capture both 
cross-sectional and time-series variances. Specifically, it tests the null hypothesis 
that there is no statistically significant difference between values of a given variable 
between the two countries.  
The comparisons of performance reported in Table 7.8-1 show that MFIs in India 
have greater operational self-sufficiency, smaller operating costs, lower portfolio 
risk, more active borrowers and a higher percentage of women clients than the MFIs 
in Sri Lanka. MFIs in India are more self-sufficient (mean = 1.12) than Sri Lankan 
MFIs (0.99) and is above the threshold of 1. The average operating expenses ratio 
of 10% is also comparatively smaller than the Sri Lankan figure (mean = 16%) and 
the worldwide figures reported by Mersland and Strøm (2009) and Mori and 
Mersland (2014). The average portfolio at risk of more than 30 days is better for 
Indian MFIs, which maintain lower risk than the Sri Lankan MFIs which are far 
behind the threshold of 0.10. The average number of active borrowers (mean = 
246,575) in Indian MFIs is 8.5 times greater than Sri Lanka (mean = 29,144). This 
may be a reflection of population density in India which is higher than Sri Lanka. 
The mean percentage of female borrowers to active borrowers in India is 94% and 
in Sri Lankan MFIs the average number of female borrowers represents 81% of the 
total number of credit clients.  
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Table 7.8-1: Two-sample t-test on the equality of population means (with unequal variances) 
 
Variables 
Mean values 
t-Statistics 
India Sri Lanka Difference 
Operational self-sufficiency 1.12 0.99 0.130*** 5.24 
Return on assets 0.01 0.01 -0.007 -1.44 
Yield on gross loan portfolio 0.23 0.25 -0.027*** -2.95 
Operating expenses ratio 0.10 0.16 -0.052*** -7.61 
Capital asset ratio 0.24 0.31 -0.069*** -4.01 
Portfolio at risk more than 30 days 0.04 0.10 -0.057*** -8.96 
Active borrowers (person) 246,575 29,144 217,431*** 7.50 
Female borrowers to active borrowers (%) 0.94 0.81 0.130*** 10.41 
Depth of outreach (Average loan balance per borrower/GNI per capita) 0.21 0.14 0.061*** 4.19 
Female directors on board (%) 0.22 0.43 -0.214*** -10.17 
International directors/ donor representatives on board (%) 0.16 0.07 0.081*** 5.48 
Client/borrower representatives on board (%) 0.04 0.07 -0.031*** -3.03 
Non-executive directors on board (%) 0.56 0.67 -0.109*** -7.22 
Board size (No. of board members) 7.05 8.47 -1.421*** -5.09 
Firm age (No. of Years) 9.17 12.8 -3.613*** -6.57 
Leverage 0.76 0.69 0.069*** 4.02 
Note: This table shows the results of two-sample t-test on the equality of population means with unequal variances. The test is based on the null hypothesis 
that there is no statistically significant difference between the mean of a given variable for Sri Lanka and India (assuming that the two population variances 
are inhomogeneous). The firm-year observations for Sri Lanka are 300 and 575 for India. The variables are defined in Table 4.6-1. Asterisk indicates 
significance at 1% (***) level. For Sri Lanka, raw data are downloaded from the MIX market database and/or extracted from LMFPA, and/or downloaded 
from the websites of individual firms, including annual reports and/or by contacting individual firms. For India, the data are directly downloaded from the 
MIX market database and/or extracted from the websites of individual firms, including annual reports and/or by contacting individual firms. 
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During the period 2007-2012 MFIs operating in Sri Lanka have better portfolio 
yields, higher investment capital and greater coverage of poor borrowers than the 
Indian MFI sample (See Table 7.8-1). The average yield on gross loan portfolio 
value of 23% in India is a somewhat smaller value when compared to Sri Lankan 
findings (25%) and worldwide statistics (30%-40%). The capital asset ratio of Sri 
Lankan MFIs is 31% which is higher than that of Indian MFIs (24%). This indicates 
that Indian MFIs like to utilise more interest-bearing liabilities in their financial 
structure. This may be the consequences of the wide access to funding, including 
bank finances, which Indian MFIs enjoy. With 76% of total assets in Indian MFIs 
debt financed, this is statistically significantly higher than their Sri Lankan 
counterparts. A majority of Indian MFIs have applied for NBFC licenses from the 
RBI because they continuously rely on bank finances for their resource requirement 
(RBI, 2012a). Table 7.8-1 also shows that the depth of outreach in Sri Lanka is of 
statistically significantly smaller value than India, because Sri Lankan MFIs are 
catering for a niche of poorer clients than their Indian counterparts.  
MFIs in India and Sri Lanka have a similar level of return on assets (See Table 7.8-1) 
as means of return on asset are not statistically significantly different. On average, 
both countries have approximately a 1% of return on asset which suggests that the 
profitability of MFIs in both countries is low. This may be acceptable where MFIs 
are not-for-profit organisations. The RBI (2012a) emphasises that even though the 
microfinance sector is growing rapidly, the financial performance has deteriorated 
marginally. 
In a similar vein, this study investigates whether the corporate governance variables 
differ by country. All the corporate governance mechanisms in India and Sri Lanka 
are significantly different. The percentage of women representatives on Sri Lankan 
MFI boards is approximately 21 percentage-points higher than that of Indian MFIs. 
The lower number of women participating in Indian MFIs may reflect a cultural 
difference between the countries. Sri Lanka has had a more favourable women 
empowerment environment than its immediate neighbours India and Pakistan 
(Islam & Dogra, 2011).  
The percentage of international directors and/or donor representatives on Sri 
Lankan MFI boards is nearly 8 percentage-points lower than that of Indian MFIs. 
Remarkably, 16% of the directors in the Indian MFI sample are classified as 
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representatives of international and/or donor agencies, which is almost double that 
of Sri Lanka. This suggests a higher level of international and/or donor agency 
involvement of Indian MFIs than Sri Lankan MFIs. The situation is reversed in 
terms of client representatives on MFI boards where it is 3 percentage-points higher 
in Sri Lanka than India. Customer representation on Indian MFI boards of 4% is 
equal to those in Central and Eastern Europe and Newly Independent States 
(Hartarska, 2005). 
The percentage of non-executive directors on MFI boards in Sri Lanka, on average, 
is 11% higher than that of MFIs in India. The results show that more than half of 
the board members do not have an affiliation with any of the stakeholders in the 
MFIs in both countries and this figure is similar to Hartarska's (2005) findings. Also 
this higher percentage of non-executive directors on Sri Lankan MFIs is plausible 
because the board size of Sri Lankan MFIs, on average, is statistically significantly 
greater (mean = 8.47 persons) than their Indian counterparts (mean = 7.05 persons). 
With regard to using firm age in two countries, Table 7.8-1 depicts that, on average, 
MFIs in Sri Lanka are more mature than their Indian counterparts.  
As a robustness test, a two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test, which 
does not require the normality assumption, is used to test the data used in the t-test. 
The null hypothesis of this test is that there is no statistically significant difference 
between the two median values of a given variable. The results of the Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test are similar to those of the t-test approach which suggests that the 
findings of the t-test approach are robustness. 
Table 7.8-2 compares the proportions of the categorical variables between two 
countries by using a z-test on the equality of population proportions. As presented 
in Table 7.8-2, the seven categorical variables are dummy variables which take 
values of 1 and 0. Therefore, the mean value represents the proportion of a given 
observation that takes the value of one. Leadership characteristics of the MFIs 
reveal that 11% of Indian MFIs in the sample have a female CEO and 18% of them 
have a female board chairperson, which are lower than that of Sri Lankan MFIs. 
Women’s leadership in Sri Lankan MFI boards is statistically significantly different 
from that of Indian MFIs. For CEO/chair duality, MFIs in India have a statistically 
significantly higher value (mean = 35%) than their counterparts in Sri Lanka (mean 
= 26%). The dummy variable of international directors and/or donor representatives 
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on MFI boards in India (mean = 54%) is statistically significantly different from 
that in Sri Lanka (mean = 21%). On an average basis, this 33 percentage-point 
difference reveals that the number of international directors and/or donor 
representatives on MFI boards in India is nearly 2.5 times higher than that of Sri 
Lanka. However, the directors representing clients of the MFIs in both countries do 
not show statistically significant difference, consistent with data suggesting client 
representation on MFI boards is uncommon in both countries. The 32 percentage-
point difference for the internal audit function in favour of Indian MFIs is 
approximately double that of Sri Lanka’s MFIs. Similarly, there is a 40 percentage-
point distinction in the category of regulated by banking authority in favour of 
Indian MFIs, which is four times higher than their Sri Lankan counterparts. 
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Table 7.8-2: Two-sample z-test on the equality of population proportions 
 
 
 
Variables 
Proportions 
z-Statistics 
India (N= 575) Sri Lanka (N= 300) Difference 
Female CEO (a dummy variable) 0.11 0.34 -0.231*** -8.34 
Female chairperson (a dummy variable) 0.18 0.40 -0.228*** -7.35 
Duality (a dummy variable) 0.35 0.26 0.085** 2.55 
International directors / donor directors on board (a dummy variable) 0.54 0.21 0.329*** 9.35 
Directors representing clients/borrowers (a dummy variable) 0.21 0.24 -0.028 -0.95 
Internal audit function (a dummy variable) 0.63 0.31 0.315*** 8.84 
Regulated by banking authority (a dummy variable) 0.53 0.13 0.402*** 11.56 
Note: This table presents the results of two-sample z-test on the equality of population proportions of the categorical variables. The test is based 
on the null hypothesis that the population proportions of a given categorical variable are equal across Sri Lanka and India. The firm-year 
observations for Sri Lanka are 300 and 575 for India. The variables are defined in Table 4.6-1. Asterisks indicate significance at 5% (**) and 
1% (***) levels. For Sri Lanka, raw data are downloaded from the MIX market database and/or extracted from LMFPA, and/or downloaded 
from the websites of individual firms, including annual reports and/or by contacting individual firms. For India, the data are directly downloaded 
from the MIX market database and/or extracted from the websites of individual firms, including annual reports and/or by contacting individual 
firms. 
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Table 7.8-3: Summary of empirical results: A cross-country comparison 
 
Determinants Financial Performance Variables Outreach 
OSS ROA YOGLP OCR CA PAR Breadth Femborr Depth 
SL IND SL IND SL IND SL IND SL IND SL IND SL IND SL IND SL IND 
Female directors 
on board 
-* Ø Ø Ø Ø -* Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø -* Ø +* Ø Ø -* 
Female CEO +* Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø -* Ø Ø Ø Ø 
Female 
chairperson 
Ø Ø +* -* Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø +* +* -* Ø Ø Ø 
Duality Ø Ø Ø Ø +* Ø +* Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø 
International/ 
donor directors on 
board 
Ø Ø -* +* Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø -* Ø +* +* +* Ø Ø 
Directors 
representing 
clients 
Ø Ø +* Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø -* -* Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø 
Outside directors 
on board  
-* Ø Ø Ø -* +* Ø Ø +* Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø 
Board size Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø -* Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø -* Ø Ø Ø +* 
Internal audit 
function 
+* Ø Ø +* +* Ø Ø -* Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø +* Ø -* Ø Ø 
Note: This table presents the summary of empirical evidence of the relationship between corporate governance practices and financial performance 
and outreach of MFIs in Sri Lanka and India. This table is developed based on the results reported in Table 6.6-2, Table 6.7-2, Table 7.6-2 and 
Table 7.7-2. The variables are defined in Table 4.6-1. Symbols (+), (–) and (Ø) represent positive, negative, and no significant relationships, 
respectively. Asterisk (*) indicates significance at the 10% level or better level. For Sri Lanka, raw data are downloaded from the MIX market 
database and/or extracted from LMFPA, and/or downloaded from the websites of individual firms, including annual reports and/or by contacting 
individual firms. For India, the data are directly downloaded from the MIX market database and/or extracted from the websites of individual firms, 
including annual reports and/or by contacting individual firms. 
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In Table 7.8-3, the sign of relationships between corporate governance practices, 
and financial performance and outreach of MFIs in Sri Lanka and India are 
presented. Female chair is statistically significantly positively related to financial 
performance of Sri Lankan MFIs but statistically significantly negatively correlated 
with financial performance of Indian MFIs. Similarly, international directors and/or 
donor representatives and the presence of outside directors on the board of Sri 
Lankan MFIs are significantly negatively correlated with financial performance, 
whereas they are statistically significantly positively correlated with financial 
performance of Indian MFIs. In terms of corporate governance structures, for both 
countries, this study finds that more gender diverse boards have a statistically 
significantly negative impact on financial performance. Client representatives on 
the board and internal audit function of MFIs in both countries show a statistically 
significantly favourable effect for financial performance. The figures in Table 7.8-3 
point to female CEO, CEO/chair duality and board size having a significant 
influence on financial performance of MFIs in Sri Lanka, but not in Indian MFIs.  
The breadth of outreach of MFIs in both countries improves when there is a female 
chair for the board. Similarly, the presence of international directors and/or donor 
representatives on boards is statistically significantly positively related to the 
proportion of female clients of MFIs in both countries. While client representatives 
on boards seem to have a statistically significantly negative influence on breadth of 
outreach of MFIs in Sri Lanka, there is no statistically significant effect on Indian 
MFI outreach. It is also evident that the proportion of female clients in Sri Lankan 
MFIs declines when there is a female chair. The evidence of this study highlights 
that female CEO, board size and internal audit function have a statistically 
significantly effect on outreach of MFIs in India, but have no effect on outreach in 
Sri Lanka. Even though female directors on Sri Lankan MFI boards are not 
correlated with growth of active borrowers, they do correspond with an 
improvement of the proportion of female clients in Sri Lankan MFIs. Consistently, 
the presence of female directors on Indian MFI boards supports greater depth of 
outreach. Finally, there is statistical evidence to support the contention that 
CEO/chair duality and the presence of outside directors on boards have no 
significant effect on outreach of MFIs in both countries at all. 
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7.9 Conclusion 
Prior literature on corporate governance in the microfinance sector predominantly 
consists of consultancy reports and guidelines on how to structure the board of 
directors and their procedures and warnings about the impact of weak governance 
(Labie & Mersland, 2011). These reports do identify corporate governance as 
important for MFIs but more empirics are needed to support their recommendation. 
Few studies have been undertaken on the results of translating the traditional 
governance practices to the microfinance sector. This chapter has identified those 
corporate governance mechanisms that influence the financial performance and 
outreach of MFIs in India. 
This chapter contains information on empirical findings of corporate governance – 
performance relationship of MFIs in India and a comparative analysis of findings 
in Sri Lanka and India. First, it gives a brief background of MFIs in India under 
different institutional characteristics and lending methods. Based on the descriptive 
statistics, this chapter highlights the nature of corporate governance structure, 
financial performance and outreach of MFIs in India. Inferential statistical analyses 
of the impact of governance structure on MFI performance are discussed. The 
results are demonstrated to be robustness with respect to controls for legal status, 
MFI age, size, leverage and type.  
Even though the findings are mixed, a number of interesting results have emerged 
from the study. Some of the results are consistent with those reported in prior 
studies relating to corporate governance and MFI performance. In particular, 
Mersland and Strøm (2009), Bassem (2009) Mori and Mersland (2014) and 
Hartarska (2005) find international/donor directors, female directors on the board, 
female chair, board size and internal audit function have significant impact on MFI 
performance, which are significant in supporting the generalisability of the earlier 
studies. As advocated by policy papers in microfinance, it can be determined that 
corporate governance plays a significant role in the Indian microfinance sector 
which is similar to the findings for Sri Lanka.  
It is clear from the analysis that the corporate governance–performance relationship 
of MFIs in Sri Lanka and India from a comparative perspective is not always driven 
by the same variables. Based on the multiple regression analysis of Sri Lanka and 
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India, findings discover that corporate governance structure and MFI performance 
vary across the two countries. It supports the view that the efficiency of corporate 
governance structure is highly dependent on country-specific institutional 
characteristics within which the MFI operates. Accordingly, it is important to check 
the validity of this statement by taking into consideration country-specific 
institutional characteristics in Sri Lanka and India when conducting cross-country 
corporate governance studies. Therefore, in the next chapter, both Sri Lankan and 
Indian MFI data has been used to understand the nature of corporate governance 
impact on performance of MFIs in the South Asian region, by incorporating the 
country specific characteristics. 
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8 CHAPTER EIGHT 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND 
PERFORMANCE IN MFIS: A CASE STUDY IN SRI 
LANKA AND INDIA 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The impact of corporate governance on firm performance for for-profit entities has 
been extensively examined by many scholars in recent years. Research on MFI 
performance in relation to the impact of corporate governance is a challenging area 
to be explored further. This chapter examines whether corporate governance 
indicators are related to performance measures of profitability and outreach of MFIs. 
A panel regression analysis of data for 167 MFIs over a period of six years from 
2007 to 2012 based on secondary data collection is used. In this chapter, MFI data 
for two countries, Sri Lanka and India, which are both emerging markets in South 
Asia (Beirne, Caporale, Schulze-Ghattas, & Spagnolo, 2010) are combined. This 
facilitates identification of the impact of corporate governance on MFI performance 
in the South Asia region.  
Corporate governance effects for MFIs in Sri Lanka and India individually are 
reported in Chapters 6 and 7. Chapter 7 concludes by noting that corporate 
governance structure varies between the two countries. This chapter estimates the 
corporate governance and performance relationship of MFIs, taking into account 
national-level governance characteristics. In addition, this chapter re-examines the 
corporate governance and performance relationship of MFIs in a dynamic 
framework by applying the system GMM method. This approach improves upon 
traditional estimation methods by controlling the likely sources of endogeneity.  
 
8.2 National Governance Quality Variables 
In addition to the firm-specific variables, emerging literature has identified country-
level variables that may influence corporate governance studies (Aslan & Kumar, 
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2014; Filatotchev & Jackson, 2013; Kumar & Zattoni, 2013; van Essen et al., 2013). 
Aguilera and Jackson (2010) state that it is important to include country-specific 
traditions in corporate governance studies. Filatotchev and Jackson (2013) find that 
the legal system and institutional characteristics, which are external to the firm in a 
specific country, influence the effectiveness of particular governance practices in a 
firm. Kumar and Zattoni (2013) suggest that it is necessary to investigate the impact 
of country-level and firm-level variables in studies of corporate governance. 
The implications arising from the regulation and commercial environment of MFIs 
cannot be ignored in the governance framework (Varottil, 2012). It is argued that 
better country level reforms can improve MFI performance (Christen & Rosenberg, 
2000; Hardy et al., 2003; Jansson et al., 2004; Sinclair, 2012). In MFI governance-
performance cross-country studies, Bassem (2009), Strøm et al. (2014) and 
Hartarska (2005) observe the importance of incorporating country-specific 
variables to control the differences in economic, social and legal environmental 
conditions across countries. Hartarska’s (2005) empirical research findings for 
Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States reveal the 
significance of controlling for cross-country differences. This is confirmed by 
Bassem (2009) in a study of Euro-Mediterranean countries. These prior studies 
point to the need when considering governance-performance relationships to 
include both country-level and firm-level variables in the analysis of Sri Lanka and 
India.  
Recent empirical studies (Aslan & Kumar, 2014; Nguyen, Locke, & Reddy, 2015b; 
van Essen et al., 2013) highlight how the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance may be affected by the quality of national 
governance mechanisms, such as legal system, rule of law and political situation, 
as they may influence the effectiveness of firm-level corporate governance 
strategies. This current study also investigates whether the relationship between 
corporate governance and MFI performance varies according to the quality of 
national governance systems in which MFIs operate in Sri Lanka and India.  
The national governance quality is measured by using the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, which consist of six broad dimensions of governance: Voice and 
Accountability (VA), Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism (PS), 
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Government Effectiveness (GEF), Regulatory Quality (RQ), Rule of Law (RL), and 
Control of Corruption (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2014). The national 
governance indicators are constructed using an unobserved component 
methodology, which is presented in units, ranging from approximately -2.5 (weak 
governance performance) to 2.5 (strong governance performance). This is the 
leading index as it is most widely used for cross-country comparative studies 
(Ngobo & Fouda, 2012).  
 
Table 8.2-1: The percentile ranks of governance indicators for Sri Lanka, 
India and South Asia in year 2012 
Governance Indicator 
Percentile Rank 
Sri Lanka India South Asian 
Region 
Voice and accountability (VA) 29.86 58.77 32 
Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism 
(PV) 
23.22 11.85 21 
Government effectiveness (GE) 45.93 47.37 35 
Regulatory quality (RQ) 48.33 33.97 27 
Rule of law (RL) 52.13 52.61 33 
Control of corruption (CC) 51.67 34.93 33 
Note: This table presents the percentile rank of governance indicators which ranges from 0 
(lowest) to 100 (highest) among all countries worldwide. These ranks indicate the percentage 
of countries worldwide that rate below the selected country, which is Sri Lanka or India or 
South Asia. The list of countries in the South Asia region is available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/region/sar. The data are extracted from the “Aggregate 
Indicators of Governance 1996-2013” (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2009). 
 
Table 8.2-1 provides the percentile rank of national governance indicators for Sri 
Lanka, India and the South Asia region in 2012. It indicates that the national 
governance rankings of Sri Lanka and India are higher than the average ranking of 
countries in the South Asian region, with the exception of two indicators. For the 
voice and accountability indicator, Sri Lanka has a lower value than the average 
ranking of South Asia whereas India reports the highest value among others. 
However, India lags far behind Sri Lanka and other South Asian countries in 
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political stability and absence of violence/terrorism national governance indicators. 
Sri Lanka has the highest value for regulatory quality indicator and the second 
highest for the control of corruption. India shows the second highest value for rule 
of law governance indicator when compared with other counties in the region. This 
supports a view that Sri Lanka and India have further developed national 
governance systems than other countries in the South Asia Region.  
Following a similar approach undertaken by Nguyen et al. (2015b), van Essen et al. 
(2013) and Knudsen (2011), this study focuses on narrower measures of national 
governance quality that are more pertinent to firm operations. Accordingly, among 
these six national governance indicators, three dimensions, namely government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality and rule of law, are singled out. These indicators 
are necessary for successful operation of a business and they have the potential to 
impact firm performance (Krivogorsky & Grudnitski, 2010; Nguyen et al., 2015b) 
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2011, p. 223) declare that government 
effectiveness (GE) captures “the quality of public services, the quality of the civil 
service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s 
commitment to such policies”. Regulatory quality (RQ) captures “the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit 
and promote private sector development”. Rule of law (RL) captures “the extent to 
which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular 
the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as 
well as the likelihood of crime and violence”.  
However, Globerman and Shapiro (2002) state that all these indicators are highly 
correlated with each other and it is difficult to use all indicators in a single 
regression. These three indicators, i.e., Government Effectiveness (GEF), 
Regulatory Quality (RQ) and Rule of Law (RL) are combined to generate an 
aggregate national governance indicator which is denoted as NGI (National 
Governance Index) to use in the model and it is as follows: 
NGI = Government Effectiveness + Regulatory Quality + Rule of Law  
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8.3 Background of MFIs in Sri Lanka and India 
Table 8.3-1 reports the proportions based on the dataset of 167 MFIs over a period 
of six years from 2007 to 2012. The most important organisational setting for 
microfinance activities in Sri Lanka and India is NGO-MFIs, which represent 
nearly half of the sample. The second largest (34.3%) microfinance providers in 
these countries are NBFIs, whereas all the other types of institutions are less 
important as they make up less than 10% of the sample. Even though recent studies 
(Mersland & Strøm, 2008; Tchakoute-Tchuigoua, 2010) of the microfinance 
industry reveal that most NGO-MFIs are transforming their institutions to for-profit 
institutions for better performance, evidence from this study shows that the highest 
contribution to the sector is still made by the non-profit organisations.  
The findings of this study are similar to those of other studies worldwide. Strøm et 
al. (2014) and Mori and Mersland (2014) highlight that of 379 MFIs in a worldwide 
sample, 51% are NGOs, 32% are banks and only 16% are co-operatives. Similarly, 
Hartarska’s (2009) study finds that the NGO representation is 52% and NBFI is 
34%. A worldwide MFI sample researched by Mersland and Strøm (2009) find that 
28.9% institutions are shareholder-owned firms whereas 58.1% represent non-
profit and NGO-MFIs, and is the remainder are co-operatives, state banks and other 
institutions. Nevertheless, Mersland and Strøm (2008) confirm with their findings 
that the ownership structure does not significantly affect the performance of the 
MFI which casts doubt on assertions made by Campion and White (1999) and 
Ledgerwood and White (2006) that MFIs are transforming to for-profit institutions 
for better performance. The concept of a for-profit charity seems to be a non 
sequitur and change in the MFI sector might equally be explained as an adverse 
selection resulting from poor regulatory policy. 
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Table 8.3-1: Organisation types of MFIs in Sri Lanka and India 
Organisation Type Frequency Percent 
NGO-MFI 420 48.0 
NBFC 300 34.3 
Company 65 7.4 
Co-operative 28 3.2 
LSBs 21 2.4 
Urban Co-operative Bank 18 2.1 
Credit Union 17 1.9 
Rural Bank 6 0.7 
Total 875 100.0 
Note: This table presents the different organisational settings in the 
microfinance sector in Sri Lanka and India.  
 
Table 8.3-2 illustrates the lending methods applied by MFIs in Sri Lanka and India. 
Unlike other MFIs in the world, more than half Sri Lankan and Indian MFIs utilise 
group-based lending methods to provide loans to poor people. The reason for this 
is that most Indian NGOs and NBFCs are encouraged to provide loans for their 
clients through the group-based model. However, Galema et al. (2012) find that the 
individual lending method is the most prominent lending method for around 57% 
MFIs in their sample of 280, covering 60 countries. In Euro-Mediterranean 
countries, individual lending methods apply to nearly three-quarters of MFIs 
(Bassem, 2009). It is evident in this study that only 23% of MFIs prefer individual 
lending, while 21% of them employ both individual and group-based lending to 
serve their borrowers. This supports the view that MFIs, in this sample, align with 
the original microfinance notion of “One for All and All for One” (Khanka, 2010) 
which is pioneered by the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh. This is the most widely 
used, well-known practised method of lending in the world. The group-based credit 
approach utilises the peer-pressure within the group to ensure the repayment of 
borrowers and allows them to develop a good credit standing. 
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Table 8.3-2: Lending methods of MFIs in Sri Lanka and India 
Lending Methods Frequency Percent 
Group-based lending 498 56.9 
Individual lending 197 22.5 
Individual and group-based lending 180 20.6 
Total 875 100.0 
Note: This table provides the different lending methods applied by the 
MFIs in Sri Lanka and India. 
 
8.4 Descriptive Data Analysis 
Table 8.4-1 provides descriptive statistics of MFIs in Sri Lanka and India for the 
period 2007 to 2012. This table depicts the mean, median, standard deviation, 
minimum and maximum values of each variable. 
Table 8.4-1 shows, on average, the OSS of MFIs in Sri Lanka and India are slightly 
above the threshold level of one (mean = 1.07 and median = 1.09), suggesting that 
MFIs in Sri Lanka and India are moderately meeting their obligations while 
covering their operational costs by generating funds internally. Similarly, a study 
conducted for 114 MFIs in 62 countries shows 1.08 as the average OSS value 
(Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2007). However, the minimum and maximum values 
range between 0.01 and 3.36, indicating that some MFIs are experiencing higher 
productivity than some of their counterparts.  
On average, the ROA of the total sample is 0.01 (median = 0.01) with a range of -
0.36 to 0.38. Even though the average value of ROA is reasonably low, a positive 
value indicates that MFIs do try to create a value for their investors and donors. 
This finding is similar to that of a recent study conducted by Strøm et al. (2014) for 
a world dataset including 30 Indian MFIs and only one Sri Lankan MFI. Strangely, 
Barry and Tacneng (2014) find 6.51 as their ROA which is a comparatively high 
value for the MFI sector as most of them are non-profit oriented. However, they 
subsequently adjusted the standard deviation and revealed a new average ROA as 
1.66.  
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Table 8.4-1: Descriptive statistics for MFIs in Sri Lanka and India 
Variables Acronyms Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Financial Performance Variables 
Operational self-sufficiency OSS 1.07 1.09 0.37 0.01 3.36 
Return on assets  ROA 0.01 0.01 0.08 -0.36 0.38 
Yield on gross loan 
portfolio 
YOGLP 0.24 0.22 0.11 0.01 0.95 
Operating expenses ratio OCR 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.01 0.75 
Capital asset ratio CA 0.26 0.19 0.23 -0.77 1 
Portfolio at risk more than 
30 days 
PAR 0.06 0.03 0.09 0 0.58 
Outreach Variables 
Number of active 
borrowers 
 172027.5 18645 565903.5 25 6242266 
Breadth of outreach 
[LN(Active borrower)] 
Breadth 9.81 9.83 2.29 3.22 15.6 
Female borrowers to active 
borrowers (%) 
FemBorr 0.9 1 0.17 0.25 1 
Depth of outreach (Average 
loan balance per 
borrower/GNI per capita) 
Depth 0.18 0.14 0.25 0 2.6 
Corporate Governance Variables 
Female directors on board 
(%) 
FemDir 0.29 0.25 0.28 0 1 
Female CEO FemCEO 0.19 0 0.39 0 1 
Female chairman FemChair 0.25 0 0.44 0 1 
Duality Duality 0.32 0 0.47 0 1 
International directors and 
donor directors on board 
(%) 
IntDorDir 0.13 0 0.21 0 1 
Directors representing 
clients/borrowers (%) 
ClientDir 0.05 0 0.13 0 0.82 
Non-executive directors on 
board (%) 
IndDir 0.60 0.63 0.21 0 1 
Board size (No. of board 
members) 
Bsize 7.54 7 3.44 1 30 
Internal audit function IntAudit  0.52 1 0.5 0 1 
Control Variables 
Regulated by Banking 
Authority 
Regbank  0.39 0 0.49 0 1 
Firm age (No. of Years) Fage 10.4 9 7.6 1 41 
Firm size [LN(Total 
assets)] 
Fsize 19.2 19.1 2.2 12.7 25 
Leverage Lev 0.74 0.81 0.24 0 2.04 
National governance index  NGI -0.40 -0.39 0.18 -0.76 -0.05 
Note: This table reports the descriptive statistics based on aggregate samples of MFIs in Sri Lanka and India. The 
variables are defined in Table 4.6-1. For Sri Lanka, raw data are downloaded from the MIX market database and/or 
extracted from LMFPA, and/or downloaded from the websites of individual firms, including annual reports and/or by 
contacting individual firms. For India, the data are directly downloaded from the MIX market database and/or extracted 
from the websites of individual firms, including annual reports and/or by contacting individual firms. For interpretation 
purposes, number of active borrowers, international directors/donor representatives on board, client representatives on 
board, board size and firm age are calculated on the basis of levels instead of dummy and logarithmic form. Only firm 
size is calculated based on logarithmic form. 
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This study reports 24% (22%) as the average (median) yield on gross loan portfolio 
(YOGLP) for MFIs in Sri Lanka and India. However, a world dataset of 379 MFIs, 
which includes 31 Indian MFIs and only one Sri Lankan MFI, reports that the 
average YOGLP is 0.33 with a range of -1.46 to 1.22 (Mori & Mersland, 2014). 
This study shows the minimum and maximum values as 0.11 and 0.95 respectively 
which is a relatively narrower range than the world statistics.  
The average OCR of Sub-Sahara African MFIs is 37% (Barry & Tacneng, 2014) 
which is high compared with this study, with an average (median) 12% (10%). 
These differences are obvious as they have measured OCR relative to the total loans, 
rather than to total assets. There are some MFIs in Sri Lanka and India which have 
high levels of operating cost as the maximum value appears 75% in this study. 
However, Barry and Tacneng (2014) find the maximum value of operating cost is 
195%, which is surprisingly high. The minimum value of this study and the findings 
of Barry and Tacneng (2014) for Sub-Saharan Africa are relatively similar.  
The average (median) capital assets ratio (CA) of MFIs in Sri Lanka and India is 
26% (19%). Remarkably, the maximum and minimum value of CA is one and -0.77, 
which indicates that some MFIs in the sample are making a loss. In a cross-country 
study, Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) find the average capital ratio for MFIs is 
48%, with a maximum and minimum of one and -0.98 respectively. A cross country 
study for 55 countries finds that the banks’ average capital asset ratio is 0.12 with 
a range of -1.17 to 2.96 (Barth, Nolle, Phumiwasana, & Yago, 2003). This 
underlines that the microfinance sector is much less leveraged as it is very difficult 
to leverage the risky microfinance loan portfolios (Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2007, 
p. 1214).  
Of the MFIs studied, the average (median) portfolio at risk more than 30 days (PAR) 
is 6% (3%) and it aligns with global statistics which also includes some Indian and 
Sri Lankan MFIs (Hartarska, 2009; Strøm et al., 2014; Tchakoute-Tchuigoua, 2010). 
The maximum for this financial performance variable is 58% with a minimum of 
zero. This maximum value is less than the world figures which range between 80%-
90%. On average, the credit portfolio of MFIs in Sri Lanka and India are healthy 
and less risky in recovering their loans. Possible explanations may related to the 
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number of client visits, loan collection frequencies due to the income earning ability 
of clients and tide monitoring contributing to lower PAR. 
On average, 172,028 active customers are reached in this sample while the 
maximum number of active customers is more than 6.2 million. A study conducted 
for Tanzania and Kenya shows that the average number of customers is 
approximately 72,000 (Mori & Olomi, 2012). Another global study shows that the 
average number of customers reached is nearly 15,000 with a minimum and 
maximum of 24 and 513,000 respectively (Mori & Mersland, 2014). This helps to 
illustrate that the Breadth of outreach to the people in Sri Lanka and India is 
significantly greater than for other countries and may be attributed to their 
experience in the market. Moreover, the log transformation of mean and the median 
values of active borrowers (Breadth) are 9.81 and 9.83 respectively. 
This study reveals that MFIs in Sri Lanka and India have a gender bias, as 90% of 
their loan clients are females (FemBorr), which is higher when compared to Cull et 
al. (2009) who find female representation of MFIs, on average, is only 75% of total 
clients. However, their study indicates that for more than half of the NGOs in the 
sample, at least 85% of their clients are female. Mersland and Strøm (2009) find 
that MFIs around the world have 73% female customers. Another study conducted 
for Sub-Saharan Africa states that their women borrowers are around 60% ranging 
from zero to 100%. Although the maximum proportion of female clients is 
comparable with prior studies, the minimum value (25%) is not. This supports the 
view that the unique feature of microfinance is to give priority to female clients and 
place strong focus on women borrowers for institutional development. There are 
some MFIs in both Sri Lanka and India operating micro-credit programme with 
only female clients. 
The average (median) Depth of outreach in this study is 0.18 (0.14) which is very 
low value when compared with the value obtained by Barry and Tacneng (2014) 
for Sub-Saharan Africa from 2001 to 2007, with a mean of 1.26 and range of 0.02 
and 41.21. However, the current study has a minimum value of zero and maximum 
is 2.6. Outreach to people of lower income is greater in MFIs in South Asia than 
those reached globally. 
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Female leadership of MFIs in Sri Lanka and India is also presented in Table 8.4-1. 
Higgs (2003) points out that even though around 30% of the managers in the UK 
corporate sector are female, women hold fewer than 1% of chairperson positions. 
Conversely, in this study, on average, 29% (median = 25%) of the board seats are 
held by women (FemDir) in which 25% of them have a female chairperson 
(FemChair). It also reports that 19% of MFIs have a female as CEO (FemCEO). A 
study representing 47 MFIs (23 in Kenya and 24 in Tanzania) also finds that 29% 
of board members are women (Mori & Olomi, 2012). According to Mersland and 
Strøm (2009), 23% of MFIs around the world have a woman in the CEO position. 
A sample consisting of MFIs from regions around the world38 reveal that female 
representation on MFI boards is 30% (Chakrabarty & Bass, 2014). Furthermore, 
Strøm et al. (2014) report that in their sample 27% of MFIs have female CEOs, 23% 
of them have a female chairperson and 29% of board members are women.  
Interestingly, the CEO/chair duality (Duality) average is 32% in this study. It is 
double the value obtained by Strøm et al. (2014) in terms of CEO/chair duality for 
a world dataset which includes only one Sri Lankan and 30 Indian MFIs. 
Kyereboah-Coleman (2006) and Kyereboah-Coleman and Osei (2008) find that 50% 
of MFIs in Ghana have the same person in CEO and chairperson roles. 
On average, 13% of board members, as shown in Table 8.4-1, are international 
and/or donor agency representatives (IntDorDir). This indicates that the boards of 
directors are mostly represented by local directors. The median value of 50% of 
MFIs not having any international/donor representatives on their board is consistent 
with the 13% representation. Donor representation on MFI boards appears at 9% 
for MFIs in a world dataset (Mersland & Strøm, 2009; Mori & Mersland, 2014). 
Furthermore, they reveal that only 5% of board members represent both donor and 
creditor. Galema et al. (2012) find from a sample of 280 MFIs from 60 countries 
that 56% of board members are international which is a relatively greater 
representation than Sri Lanka and India.  
                                                 
38 Eastern Europe and Central Asia, East Asia and the Pacific, Africa, South Asia, Latin America 
and the Caribbean, and the Middle East and North Africa. 
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On average, 5% of board members are representatives of clients (ClientDir) and 50% 
of MFIs in Sri Lanka and India do not have at least one person as a client 
representative. Client representation on MFI boards for a global dataset is 18% 
whereas clients and employees representation on the board is only 7% (Mori & 
Mersland, 2014). Another global study finds customer representation on the board 
is 11% (Mersland & Strøm, 2009) but MFIs of Central and Eastern Europe and 
Newly Independent States have only 4% (Hartarska, 2005). This low level of client 
representation is suggested by Luoma and Goodstein (1999) as acceptable because 
stakeholders’ representation tends to increase with the growth of the industry, but 
this does not appear to have been achieved.  
Sri Lankan and Indian MFIs have 60% (median = 63%) non-executive directors 
(IndDir) on their boards which complies with the code of corporate governance 
requirements for both countries. In the event of the CEO and chairman being the 
same person, the board should comprise a majority of non-executive directors. In 
this study, 32% of the MFIs have the same person for both CEO and chairman roles 
and the majority of their board members are non-executive directors (mean = 58%). 
It is however interesting to indicate that the lowest and the highest outside 
representatives on the boards of MFIs in Sri Lanka and India are 0% and 100% 
respectively. A study conducted for 52 selected MFIs in Ghana for the period 1995-
2004 reports that only 48% of board members are outsiders (Kyereboah-Coleman 
& Osei, 2008) and another study held for Tanzania and Kenya reports 38% (Mori 
& Olomi, 2012), which is relatively lower compared with South Asian MFIs.  
The average number of board members (Bsize) in MFIs in Sri Lanka and India is 8 
(median is 7) in this study which is on par with international experience of board 
size (Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2007; Mersland & Strøm, 2009; Strøm et al., 2014). 
Mori and Mersland (2014) find that world MFI boards range between 2 to 23 
members with an average of 7 board members. However, Jensen (1993) 
recommends that the corporate boards with more than seven or eight members are 
less effective monitors.  
On average, 52% of MFIs in the sample have internal audit function (IntAudit) 
which is relatively high compared to world statistics of 39% (Strøm et al., 2014). 
However, they collected internal audit data for one time period based on 
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assessments completed by a rating agency, applying these same figures throughout 
the research period. Similar results for Euro-Mediterranean countries reveal half of 
the MFIs have direct internal audit reporting to the board (Bassem, 2009), which is 
compatible with Mersland and Strøm (2009). Remarkably, more than half of the 
MFIs in Sri Lanka and India consider on internal audit function as an important 
internal governance element. 
In Sri Lanka and India, on average, 39% of MFIs are regulated by the banking 
authority (Regbank). Mori and Mersland (2014) state that only 27% of MFIs in a 
world dataset are regulated by central bank authorities Also a cross-country dataset 
of 114 MFIs (including 19 Indian MFIs) finds 68% of MFIs are regulated 
(Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2007). However, the proportions of regulated MFIs differ 
between countries due to the structure of regulation and differences in regulatory 
philosophy. 
The mean age for MFIs in Ghana is 13 years (Kyereboah-Coleman & Osei, 2008) 
whereas the mean age of MFIs in 59 countries (including India) is approximately 
15 years (Chakrabarty & Bass, 2014). Similar to global findings reported by Mori 
and Mersland (2014) and Strøm et al. (2014), the MFIs in Sri Lanka and India are 
younger with a mean age (Fage) of 10 (median = 9) years which may contribute to 
why most MFIs in the sample have less diversification in their loan portfolios. 
Firm size (Fsize) is measured as the log of total assets. The mean (median) log value 
of the total assets is 19.2 (19.1) with minimum of 12.7 and maximum of 25 (See 
Table 8.4-1). Comparatively similar results are observed in global studies 
(Chakrabarty & Bass, 2014; Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2007; Mori & Mersland, 
2014). 
As presented in Table 8.4-1, the mean (median) leverage of the Sri Lankan and 
Indian MFI sample (Lev) is 0.74 (0.81) with values between zero and 2.04 which 
shows negative net assets for MFIs with a value greater than 1. 
National governance index (NGI) shows an average (median) value of -0.4 (-0.39) 
with a minimum of -0.76 and range of 0.71. This highlights that the national 
governance quality of Sri Lanka and India is moderately weak as all the values are 
negative. 
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8.5 Pair-wise Correlation 
Table 8.5-1 provides the information on pair-wise correlation coefficients of MFIs 
in Sri Lanka and India. The correlation coefficients among financial performance, 
outreach, corporate governance and control variables show that the selected 
variables are interacting. This provides an indication for further investigation of 
these variables using a multiple linear regression. This approach does have 
weaknesses but is used as, on balance, it provides some insights into the 
relationships which might otherwise have been overlooked. 
 
Table 8.5-1: Correlation matrix for variables 
 OSS ROA YOGLP OCR CA PAR Breadth 
OSS 1       
ROA 0.400*** 1      
YOGLP 0.112*** 0.119*** 1     
OCR -0.420*** -0.147*** 0.459*** 1    
CA 0.026 -0.007 -0.078** 0.128*** 1   
PAR -0.148*** -0.078** 0.073** 0.093*** -0.076** 1  
Breadth 0.246*** 0.011 -0.042 -0.341*** -0.197*** -0.131*** 1 
FemBorr 0.047 0.001 0.007 0.015 0.015 -0.194*** 0.192*** 
Depth 0.080** -0.014 -0.130*** -0.390*** -0.068** 0.006 0.002 
FemDir -0.070** 0.044 0.065* 0.112*** -0.102*** 0.276*** -0.396*** 
FemCEO -0.057* 0.007 -0.016 0.047 -0.067** 0.216*** -0.230*** 
FemChair 0.009 0.044 -0.052 -0.026 -0.037 0.138*** -0.164*** 
Duality -0.007 0.057* 0.064* 0.059* -0.013 0.017 0.095*** 
IntDorDir 0.085** -0.029 -0.058* -0.193*** -0.042 -0.088*** 0.396*** 
ClientDir 0.065* 0.123*** -0.055 -0.151*** -0.060* 0.004 -0.140*** 
IndDir -0.061* 0.018 0.016 0.011 -0.105*** 0.048 -0.004 
Bsize 0.098*** 0.071** -0.038 -0.217*** -0.163*** 0.125*** 0.081** 
IntAudit  0.077** -0.040 -0.049 -0.143*** 0.011 -0.143*** 0.468*** 
Regbank  0.050 -0.075** -0.028 -0.148*** 0.068** -0.150*** 0.568*** 
Fage 0.072** 0.109*** 0.049 -0.110*** -0.118*** 0.344*** 0.060* 
Fsize 0.211*** -0.000 -0.039 -0.383*** -0.178*** -0.043 0.924*** 
Lev -0.029 0.003 0.078** -0.125*** -0.999*** 0.078** 0.198*** 
NGI 0.020 -0.000 -0.152*** -0.144*** -0.034 -0.058* -0.057* 
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 FemBorr Depth FemDir FemCEO FemChair Duality IntDorDir 
FemBorr 1       
Depth -0.266*** 1      
FemDir -0.016 0.031 1     
FemCEO -0.052 0.181*** 0.496*** 1    
FemChair -0.003 0.086** 0.522*** 0.534*** 1   
Duality 0.003 0.069** -0.030 0.173*** 0.035 1  
IntDorDir 0.131*** 0.137*** -0.154*** -0.018 -0.025 0.080** 1 
ClientDir 0.001 0.159*** 0.292*** 0.268*** 0.283*** 0.102*** 0.065* 
IndDir -0.122*** 0.028 0.017 0.102*** 0.099*** -0.056 0.176*** 
Bsize 0.057* 0.084** 0.312*** 0.145*** 0.222*** -0.121*** 0.145*** 
IntAudit  0.106*** 0.040 -0.272*** -0.131*** -0.065* 0.103*** 0.282*** 
Regbank  0.098*** 0.092*** -0.309*** -0.096*** -0.126*** 0.130*** 0.321*** 
Fage -0.104*** -0.004 0.316*** 0.120*** 0.241*** 0.023 0.014 
Fsize 0.060* 0.239*** -0.312*** -0.139*** -0.107*** 0.099*** 0.365*** 
Lev -0.017 0.066** 0.102*** 0.066* 0.036 0.015 0.043 
NGI -0.086** 0.095*** 0.015 0.019 -0.002 -0.075** -0.020 
 
 ClientDir IndDir Bsize IntAudit  Regbank  Fage Fsize Lev NGI 
ClientDir 1         
IndDir -0.024 1        
Bsize 0.277*** 0.282*** 1       
IntAudit  -0.101*** 0.006 0.035 1      
Regbank  -0.206*** -0.044 -0.076** 0.499*** 1     
Fage 0.101*** 0.147*** 0.412*** -0.003 -0.137*** 1    
Fsize -0.116*** 0.058* 0.156*** 0.454*** 0.552*** 0.132*** 1   
Lev 0.058* 0.105*** 0.162*** -0.010 -0.066* 0.119*** 0.179*** 1  
NGI 0.024 0.021 -0.028 -0.121*** -0.057* -0.137*** -0.081** 0.034 1 
Note: This table reports the pair-wise correlation coefficients among the variables. *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The 
notations are defined in Table 4.6-1. 
 
As reported in Table 8.5-1, most independent variables are statistically significantly 
correlated with the dependent variables. This offers a basic insight into the 
proposition that independent variables have an association with MFI performance. 
Notably, the national governance variables (NGI) are statistically significantly 
correlated with most of MFI performance variables which support the well-
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documented proposition that country-specific variables do matter for MFI 
performance.  
It is also evident from Table 8.5-1 that none of the correlation coefficients among 
independent variables included in the regression model exceed the threshold value 
of 0.80 (Gujarati & Porter, 2004, p. 359), triggering a concern over the likely 
presence of multicollinearity. All correlation coefficients among independent 
variables are less the 0.60.  
 
Table 8.5-2: Multicollinearity diagnostic tests 
Variable VIF 
FemDir 2.04 
FemCEO 1.67 
FemChair 1.67 
Duality 1.13 
IntDorDir 1.28 
ClientDir 1.29 
IndDir 1.18 
Bsize 1.57 
IntAudit  1.48 
Regbank  1.87 
Fage 1.41 
Fsize 1.98 
Lev 1.11 
NGI 1.04 
Note: This table reports the VIF 
coefficients for explanatory variables. 
The notations are defined in 
Table 4.6-1. 
 
A more robustness approach to investigating the possibility of multicollinearity 
among the independent variables is the use of VIF values. As presented in 
Table 8.5-2, none of the VIF values exceed 2.04 in the regressors. It is commonly 
accepted that when the value of VIF is 10 or above, these are usually considered to 
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be good indications of the presence of a collinearity problem among independent 
variables (Chatterjee & Hadi, 2012; Myers, 1990). This points to multicollinearity 
not being a problem for multiple regression analysis.  
There is a concern in the microfinance context (Morduch, 1999) regarding the trade-
off between financial performance and outreach. Microfinance is a social business 
and it has a social mission to offer financial services to poor people while being 
financially sustainable. However, in this study, the correlations between financial 
performance and outreach are less than 0.40 indicating there is weak correlation 
between two dependent variables and the goals are independent.  
 
8.6 Multiple Regression Analysis for Financial Performance 
8.6.1 Selection of regression model 
Table 8.6-1 illuminates the Hausman test results which are used to select either 
fixed-effect or random-effect estimation models. The Hausman results suggest 
fixed-effect estimation procedures are appropriate for OSS (Chi-sq(14)=25.04; 
p=0.03), YOGLP (Chi-sq(14)=55.87; p=0.00), OCR (Chi-sq(14)=46.49; p=0.00) 
and PAR (Chi-sq(14)=25.71; p=0.03) as p-values are significantly lower than the 
5% level. The Hausman test results suggest using the random-effect estimation 
procedures for ROA (Chi-sq(14)=20.13; p=0.13) and CA (Chi-sq(14)=18.01; 
p=0.16). 
Table 8.6-1: Selection of fixed or random effect models 
Dependent Variables Prob>chi2 Hausman Test Result 
OSS 0.034 Fixed-effect Model  
ROA 0.126 Random-effect Model 
YOGLP 0.000 Fixed-effect Model 
OCR 0.000 Fixed-effect Model 
CA 0.157 Random-effect Model 
PAR 0.028 Fixed-effect Model 
Note: This table presents the Hausman test results for financial performance 
variables. The notations are defined in Table 4.6-1. 
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The Breusch and Pagan LM test for random effects is applied as a robustness check 
for the use of the random-effect model for ROA and CA dependent variables. The 
test result (Prob > χ2= 0.00) suggests that the pooled regression model is not 
appropriate for ROA and CA dependent variables due to the rejection of null 
hypothesis at 5% significance level. As a result, the alternative hypothesis is 
accepted and recommended it is appropriate to use random-effect model.  
 
8.6.2 Empirical results for financial performance 
Table 8.6-2 depicts the empirical results of the multiple regression analysis after 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in the panel data model. Even though the 
sign of coefficients are as expected, few corporate governance variables are 
statistically significant in relation to financial performance of MFIs. 
Findings of this study reveal that international and/or donor agency representatives 
on MFI boards (IntDorDir) are associated with higher (t=1.69, p=0.10) operational 
self-sufficiency (OSS). This indicates that when an international director or a 
representative of a donor agency sits on an MFI board, they are in a position to 
effectively monitor the operation of MFIs. They are able to provide more resources 
by way of consultancy service, IT support, funding requirements to expand the 
operation, which all help to sustain the MFIs in India and Sri Lanka, adding more 
resources at less cost or no cost. However, Hartarska (2005) suggests that the boards 
with a higher proportion of donor representatives have poor financial performance 
when measured by ROA. Contrary to Hartarska (2005), Hartarska and Mersland 
(2009) but similar to Mori and Mersland (2014), this study shows that donor 
representatives are beneficial for MFIs. Oxelheim and Randøy (2003) also find that 
the presence of foreign directors on corporate boards improves firm performance.  
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Table 8.6-2: The relationship between corporate governance and financial performance of MFIs in Sri Lanka and India 
Variables 
OSS ROA YOGLP OCR CA PAR 
b/(p) [t] b/(p) [t] b/(p) [t] b/(p) [t] b/(p) [t] B/(p) [t] 
FemDir -0.065 [-0.575] -0.011 [-0.761] -0.110 [-1.097] -0.244 [-1.405] -0.068 [-1.642] -0.009 [-0.363] 
 (0.566)  (0.447)  (0.274)  (0.162)  (0.101)  (0.717)  
FemCEO 0.034 [0.598] 0.005 [0.578] -0.050 [-0.984] 0.010 [0.166] -0.015 [-0.759] 0.009 [0.935] 
 (0.551)  (0.564)  (0.327)  (0.869)  (0.448)  (0.351)  
FemChair 0.004 [0.092] 0.007 [1.021] 0.014 [0.395] -0.008 [-0.151] 0.015 [0.828] 0.001 [0.060] 
 (0.926)  (0.307)  (0.693)  (0.880)  (0.407)  (0.953)  
Duality -0.021 [-0.570] 0.004 [0.722] 0.039 [0.813] -0.002 [-0.033] 0.007 [0.398] 0.009 [0.922] 
 (0.569)  (0.470)  (0.418)  (0.973)  (0.691)  (0.358)  
IntDorDir 0.105* [1.694] -0.003 [-0.468] 0.048 [0.874] -0.031 [-0.545] -0.003 [-0.166] -0.011 [-0.823] 
 (0.092)  (0.640)  (0.383)  (0.586)  (0.868)  (0.412)  
ClientDir 0.006 [0.098] 0.021*** [2.884] 0.032 [0.548] 0.077 [1.145] 0.006 [0.284] -0.013 [-0.945] 
 (0.922)  (0.004)  (0.584)  (0.254)  (0.776)  (0.346)  
IndDir -0.182 [-1.284] -0.014 [-0.924] 0.062 [0.429] 0.116 [0.656] 0.018 [0.381] -0.002 [-0.041] 
 (0.201)  (0.356)  (0.668)  (0.513)  (0.704)  (0.967)  
Bsize 0.104 [1.602] 0.006 [0.763] -0.038 [-0.490] -0.119 [-1.558] -0.016 [-0.697] -0.014 [-0.849] 
 (0.111)  (0.446)  (0.625)  (0.121)  (0.486)  (0.397)  
IntAudit 0.065 [1.519] -0.000 [-0.000] 0.057 [1.382] -0.021 [-0.397] -0.008 [-0.559] 0.000 [0.023] 
 (0.131)  (1.000)  (0.169)  (0.692)  (0.576)  (0.982)  
NGI 0.564*** [3.810] 0.029 [1.475] -0.170 [-1.553] -0.897*** [-5.151] -0.072 [-1.554] -0.057* [-1.939] 
 (0.000)  (0.140)  (0.122)  (0.000)  (0.120)  (0.054)  
Regbank 0.002 [0.018] -0.036 [-1.289] 0.184 [1.609] 0.246 [1.145] 0.146 [1.241] -0.005 [-0.348] 
 (0.986)  (0.198)  (0.110)  (0.254)  (0.215)  (0.729)  
Chapter 8 Corporate Governance and Performance in MFIs: A Case Study in Sri Lanka and India 
 
221 
 
Fage 0.078 [1.221] 0.013*** [3.168] 0.272*** [4.135] 0.231*** [2.659] -0.029** [-2.124] -0.008 [-0.823] 
 (0.224)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.009)  (0.034)  (0.412)  
Fsize 0.092*** [3.496] 0.004* [1.729] -0.050 [-1.598] -0.245*** [-5.798] -0.052*** [-8.376] -0.004 [-1.123] 
 (0.001)  (0.084)  (0.112)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.263)  
Lev -0.271** [-2.563] -0.024** [-2.093] 0.040 [0.384] 0.162 [0.945]   0.011 [0.831] 
 (0.011)  (0.036)  (0.702)  (0.346)    (0.407)  
Constant -0.626 [-1.368] -0.066* [-1.838] -1.310** [-2.414] 1.592** [2.078] 1.246*** [10.963] 0.153*** [2.861] 
 (0.173)  (0.066)  (0.017)  (0.039)  (0.000)  (0.005)  
year dummies yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
organisation type 
dummies 
no  yes  no  no  no  no  
firm fixed-effects yes  no  yes  yes  no  yes  
Number of 
observations 
858  858  859  867  860  868  
R-squared 0.114  0.082  0.175  0.191  0.160  0.052  
F statistic 2.672***    4.708***  6.214***    1.571*  
Wald Chi-squared 
statistic 
  50.38***      132.11***    
Number of clusters 167    167  166    167  
Note: This table presents the results of the relationship between corporate governance and financial performance of MFIs in Sri Lanka and India. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***). p-
Values are presented in parentheses and based on robustness standard errors corrected for potential heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the error term. t-Statistics are reported in brackets. The notations are defined 
in Table 4.6-1. For Sri Lanka, raw data are downloaded from the MIX market database and/or extracted from LMFPA, and/or downloaded from the websites of individual firms, including annual reports and/or by 
contacting individual firms. For India, the data are directly downloaded from the MIX market database and/or extracted from the websites of individual firms, including annual reports and/or by contacting individual 
firms. Year dummy 2007 and organisation type dummy company are treated as the benchmark categories to avoid any dummy variable trap. Year dummies and organisation type dummies are unreported. 
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Stakeholder representation on the board is beneficial for MFIs (Mori & Mersland, 
2014). Similarly, Mori and Mersland (2014) and Hartarska (2005) note statistically 
significant positive (t=2.88, p=0.01) association with financial performance (ROA) 
for the presence of client representatives on MFI boards (CleintDir). This supports 
the contention that client representatives on MFI boards do not prevent MFIs from 
being profitable. The presence of stakeholders on MFI boards in Sri Lanka and India 
appear to bring a significant positive impact for financial performance.  
It is evident that country-level variables are significant in prior MFI governance-
performance relationship studies (Bassem, 2009; Hartarska, 2005). According to 
the results in Table 8.6-2, the national governance quality does matter for financial 
performance of MFIs in Sri Lanka and India with the coefficient for NGI variable 
being statistically significant. NGI has a statistically significant positive association 
with the OSS (t=3.81, p=0.01) and a negative association with the OCR (t=-5.15, 
p=0.01). This indicates that the higher quality of national governance indicators 
improves the sustainability of MFIs in Sri Lanka and India through the provision of 
proper rules and regulations. Similarly, it helps MFIs to reduce their operating cost 
because appropriate rules and regulations support MFIs to maintain low levels of 
operational expenses. NGI has a statistically significant and enviably negative (t=-
1.94, p=0.10) relationship with PAR. This result supports the connection that 
quality of government rules and regulations and sound policy implications in Sri 
Lanka and India are very important for MFIs to improve their portfolio quality.  
This study finds no statistically significant evidence for the relationship between 
MFI financial performance and female directors, female CEOs, female chair, 
duality, independent directors, board size and internal audit function. The estimated 
coefficients on these variables are not statistically significant even at 10% 
significance level. A study based on 240 YMCA organisations also finds that 
gender diversity on the board does not have a significant impact on performance 
while reporting a negative relationship (Siciliano, 1996). Similarly, Hartarska (2005) 
does not find reliable evidence that board size and audits matter in terms of the 
sustainability of MFIs. Contrary to the findings of Hartarska (2005), this study finds 
that independent directors on the board do not improve the performance.  
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Similarly, financial performance proxies such as portfolio yield and capital-to-asset 
do not have any significant relationship with corporate governance variables used 
in this study.  
 
8.7 Multiple Regression Analysis for Outreach 
8.7.1 Selection of regression model 
The model formulation was examined using the Hausman test to determine choice 
of either a fixed- or random-effect model as reported in Table 8.7-1. The test result 
suggests that it is preferable to employ a fixed-effect estimation procedure for 
Breadth (Chi-sq(14)=32.09; p=0.00) variable due to the rejection of the null 
hypotheses as p-values are statistically significantly lower than the 0.05 level. The 
Hausman test results also suggests that the random-effect estimation procedures are 
valid for FemBorr (Chi-sq(14)=22.40; p=0.07) and Depth (Chi-sq(14)=18.98; 
p=0.17) variables based on failure to reject the null hypothesis.  
 
Table 8.7-1: Selection of fixed or random effect model 
Dependent Variables Prob>chi2 Hausman Test Result 
Breadth 0.0039 Fixed-effect Model 
FemBorr 0.0707 Random-effect Model 
Depth 0.1656 Random-effect Model 
Note: This table presents the Hausman test results for outreach variables. The 
notations are defined in Table 4.6-1. 
 
The Breusch and Pagan LM test for random effects is used as a robustness check to 
determine the choice of the random-effect estimation procedures for FemBorr and 
Depth dependent variables is suitable. The test results (Prob > χ2= 0.00) suggest 
that the null hypothesis of pooled regression model is not appropriate for FemBorr 
and Depth dependent variables as it is rejected at 5% significance level. The 
alternative hypothesis of random-effect model is accepted and can be used as an 
appropriate model to represent the data.  
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Table 8.7-2: The relationship between corporate governance and outreach of 
MFIs in Sri Lanka and India 
Variables  
Breadth FemBorr Depth 
b/(p) [t] b/(p) [t] b/(p) [t] 
FemDir -0.077 [-0.452] 0.046* [1.930] 0.023 [1.149] 
 (0.652)  (0.054)  (0.251)  
FemCEO -0.066 [-0.490] -0.004 [-0.382] 0.026** [2.341] 
 (0.625)  (0.703)  (0.019)  
FemChair 0.196* [1.944] -0.015 [-1.473] -0.018* [-1.847] 
 (0.054)  (0.141)  (0.065)  
Duality 0.011 [0.152] -0.004 [-0.445] -0.007 [-0.799] 
 (0.879)  (0.657)  (0.424)  
IntDorDir 0.182* [1.685] 0.030*** [2.941] -0.014 [-1.600] 
 (0.094)  (0.003)  (0.110)  
ClientDir -0.156** [-2.176] 0.004 [0.345] 0.015 [1.498] 
 (0.031)  (0.730)  (0.134)  
IndDir -0.085 [-0.377] -0.055** [-2.083] 0.020 [0.903] 
 (0.707)  (0.037)  (0.367)  
Bsize -0.212* [-1.686] 0.006 [0.444] 0.006 [0.542] 
 (0.094)  (0.657)  (0.588)  
IntAudit 0.085 [1.173] 0.004 [0.462] 0.002 [0.292] 
 (0.243)  (0.644)  (0.770)  
NGI -0.293 [-1.290] 0.035 [1.388] 0.004 [0.160] 
 (0.199)  (0.165)  (0.873)  
Regbank 0.072 [1.150] -0.120 [-1.591] 0.135*** [2.871] 
 (0.252)  (0.112)  (0.004)  
Fage 0.245*** [2.744] -0.016** [-1.966] -0.015** [-2.349] 
 (0.007)  (0.049)  (0.019)  
Fsize 0.817*** [15.050] 0.007* [1.769] 0.014*** [4.589] 
 (0.000)  (0.077)  (0.000)  
Lev 0.347** [1.987] 0.002 [0.094] -0.038** [-2.443] 
 (0.049)  (0.925)  (0.015)  
Constant -6.146*** [-5.725] 0.797*** [12.113] -0.059 [-1.099] 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.272)  
Year dummies yes  yes  yes  
Organisation- type dummies no  yes  yes  
Firm fixed-effects yes  No  no  
Number of observations 859  865  865  
R-squared 0.695  0.083  0.121  
F statistic 59.631***      
Wald Chi-squared statistic   145.70***  149.34***  
Number of clusters 166      
Note: This table presents the results of the relationship between corporate governance and outreach of MFIs in Sri Lanka and India.  Asterisks indicate 
significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***). p-Values are presented in parentheses and are based on robustness standard errors corrected for potential 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the error term. t-Statistics are reported in brackets. The notations are defined in Table 4.6-1. For Sri Lanka, raw 
data are downloaded from the MIX market database and/or extracted from LMFPA, and/or downloaded from the websites of individual firms, including 
annual reports and/or by contacting individual firms. For India, the data are directly downloaded from the MIX market database and/or extracted from the 
websites of individual firms, including annual reports and/or by contacting individual firms. Year dummy 2007 and organisation type dummy company 
are treated as the benchmark categories to avoid dummy variable trap. Year dummies and organisation type dummies are unreported. 
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8.7.2 Empirical results for outreach 
Table 8.7-2 reports the multiple regression results using Breadth, FemBorr and 
Depth as dependent variables as proxies for outreach. The results show that the MFI 
outreach in Sri Lanka and India is affected by certain corporate governance 
mechanisms mentioned in the literature. 
There is a weak indication, not statistically significant, that female directors on 
boards (FemDir) increase the Breadth of outreach (number of borrowers) whereas 
a statistically significantly positive association (t=1.93, p=0.10) is indicated for 
proportion of female borrowers (FemBorr). Comparatively, Siciliano (1996) 
highlights that YMCA organisations with increased gender diversity provide high 
levels of social performance. It appears that female board members in Sri Lankan 
and Indian MFIs are supportive to female clients who are creditworthy, providing 
significant amount of loans to few female clients.  
Consistent with Mersland and Strøm (2009), this study does not find a statistically 
significant relationship between female CEO (FemCEO) and number of credit 
clients (Breadth) in MFIs in Sri Lanka and India. However, this study finds that the 
female CEO (FemCEO) is statistically significantly positively (t=2.34, p=0.05) 
correlated with Depth of outreach proxy which means if the CEO is a female then 
the MFI is not as socially efficient than when the CEO is a male. This is consistent 
with the view that female-led MFIs in Sri Lanka and India are willing to lend money 
to people who are not poor and creditworthy, which appears to indicate that MFIs 
are drifting away from their mission (Morduch, 1999).  
Female chairperson (FemChair) is positively (t=1.94, p=0.10) correlated with 
number of active borrowers (Breadth) and negatively (t=-1.85, p=0.10) correlated 
with Depth. This suggests that women chairpersons’ increase the number of clients 
in Sri Lankan and Indian MFIs and there is support for the notion they disburse 
credit to poorer borrowers. The poorer the borrowers, the greater the depth of 
outreach. Communities benefit from MFI operations gain higher value from the 
given microfinance loans (Navajas et al., 2000; Quayes, 2012). 
This study finds that international directors and/or donor representatives (IntDorDir) 
on boards are associated with a higher (t=1.69, p=0.10) number of clients (Breadth) 
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and higher (t=2.94, p=0.01) proportion of female borrowers (FemBorr), and 
therefore better outreach. Mori and Mersland (2014) also find that breadth of 
outreach can increase with more donor representatives on MFI boards. Hartarska 
(2005) finds similar results in relation to depth of outreach. Most international 
representatives or donor agents have a social mission of helping the helpless (poor 
and low income) people. When international directors and/or donors representatives 
are on MFI boards, they apply their full competencies toward that mission (Mori & 
Mersland, 2014).  
Findings of this study relating to client representatives on the board (ClientDir) are 
interesting but not surprising. Client representative directors have a positive impact 
on MFI performance and they do not improve outreach. The directors who represent 
the clients on board are statistically significantly negatively (t=-2.18, p=0.05) 
related to the number of active borrowers (Breadth) of MFIs in Sri Lanka and India. 
It is suggested that client representatives on the board have greater interest in 
borrowers who are less poor (Hartarska, 2005). Mori and Mersland (2014) comment 
that customers who serve on boards may monopolise the services for a few people. 
A larger proportion of non-executive directors (IndDir) on the board has a 
statistically significant negative (t=-2.08, p=0.05) effect on the proportion of 
female borrowers (FemBorr) and this is contrary with evidence reported in Ghana 
(Kyereboah-Coleman & Osei, 2008), Euro-Mediterranean countries (Bassem, 2009) 
and Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States (Hartarska, 
2005). Potentially, executive directors understand the MFI operations better than 
the non-executive directors. Employee directors have insight information about the 
organisation and take necessary action to improve MFI outreach.  
This study shows a statistically significant negative (t=-1.68, p=0.10) relationship 
between board size (Bsize) and Breath of outreach. Several other studies record a 
negative relationship between board size and performance (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; 
Yermack, 1996). Mersland and Strøm (2009) confirm a negative relationship 
between board size and average loan size of MFIs in a world dataset. One possible 
explanation for this outcome is that firms lose their mission on outreach due to 
longer decision-making time in larger boards. Most MFI boards in the sample of 
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this study are found to be larger than conventional boards and may suffer from free-
rider problems. This has been highlighted by Hartarska and Mersland (2009). 
This study shows that the national governance quality does not matter for outreach 
of MFIs in Sri Lanka and India. Even though NGIs have a statistically significant 
impact on MFI financial performance, there is no significant impact for outreach. 
Similar results are shown by Hartarska (2009) and Mersland and Strøm (2009). 
However, Hartarska and Mersland (2009, p. 236) comment that the lack of 
environmental influence for MFI activities may support the argument that 
microfinance is less influenced by the macroeconomic environment, culminating in 
similar findings as this study.  
Other corporate governance variables such as Duality and IntAudit are observed as 
having an insignificant relationship with outreach variables. Similarly, Hartarska 
(2005) does not find reliable evidence that audit affects the outreach of MFIs in 
Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States. 
 
8.8 Dynamic Panel Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
Estimator 
There are many empirical studies examining the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance. Most findings confirm an association between 
corporate governance and various measures of firm performance. More recently it 
has been argued that the findings are affected by potential sources of endogeneity 
(Love, 2011; Marinova et al., 2010; Schultz et al., 2010) and provide biased 
parameter estimators. In governance-performance studies there is a lack of 
consensus on the nature of endogeneity. This is because it is difficult to identify the 
exogenous factors in a governance structure (Wintoki et al., 2012).  
Corporate governance research does identify two main sources of potential 
endogeneity: unobserved heterogeneity across companies and simultaneity. 
Wintoki et al. (2012) suggest that all board structure variables are considered to be 
endogenously determined. Strøm et al. (2014) highlight that female leadership 
variables may be endogenously determined and have to be taken into account. 
Furthermore, Adams and Ferreira (2009) state that the percentage of female 
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directors on the board must be treated as an endogenous variable; male CEOs, who 
have less interest in firm growth may attract more female directors to their boards 
(Goergen & Renneboog, 2014). There is an endogeneity issue for the board 
independency variable, as better firms are more likely to adopt more independent 
boards (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2012). Board size also tends to vary based on firm 
size and firm complexity (Boone et al., 2007).  
To overcome the issue of endogenous regressors, it is necessary to incorporate an 
instrument (z) that associates only with the explanatory variable and not with the 
error term. However, it is extremely difficult to identify reliable external 
instruments for governance variables (Flannery & Hankins, 2013) and this is 
especially so for microfinance studies. Given the difficulty, this study follows the 
method suggested by Schultz et al. (2010) that “selected lags have the desirable 
instrumental variable properties of being correlated to the regressors, yet 
uncorrelated with contemporaneous errors” (p. 149).  
Another source of endogeneity identified in governance studies may arise as a result 
of past firm performance. This implies the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance is dynamic by nature depending on its own past 
realisation (Roodman, 2009a). According to Wintoki et al. (2012, p. 585); 
“board structure is a choice variable that arises through a process of 
bargaining between the various actors in a firm’s nexus of contracts, where 
the bargaining process is influenced by past performance and the actors’ 
beliefs about the costs and benefits of particular board structures”. 
This study looks at the possible link between corporate governance and MFI 
performance. One-year lagged dependent variables are added as explanatory 
variables in the right hand side of the research model to capture the unobserved 
factors that interact with the link between corporate governance variables and 
performance variables (Strøm et al., 2014). Even though Wintoki et al. (2012) 
propose two lags of the dependent variable to capture the dynamic nature of 
governance-performance relationship, this study finds that a one-year lag is 
sufficient as coefficients for a two-year lag are not statistically significant at 5% 
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level. This is in line with the studies of Nguyen et al. (2014) and Adams and Ferreira 
(2009). 
Therefore, as a robustness test, this study applies the well-developed system 
generalised method of moments (System GMM) estimator approach to control the 
endogeneity issue inherent in the relationship between corporate governance and 
performance. This is the most appropriate estimation method which provides valid 
instruments to explore the dynamic nature of corporate governance (Flannery & 
Hankins, 2013; Roodman, 2009b). Therefore, the model is used in the analysis of 
Sections 8.8.1 and 0 is as follows: 
Performance = ƒ(past performance, board structure, firm characteristics, fixed 
effects, error term) 
 
8.8.1 Empirical results for financial performance using system GMM 
The impact of corporate governance on MFI financial performance based on GMM 
analysis is reported in Table 8.8-1. The discussion covers those corporate 
governance variables that are statistically significantly linked with MFI financial 
performance when the dynamic nature of the relationship is taken into consideration. 
As shown in Table 8.8-1, this study finds that the financial performance of MFIs in 
Sri Lanka and India is quite persistent; past financial performance strongly explains 
the variation in current performance. This highlights that the inclusion of one-year 
lagged financial performance variables as explanatory variables are important to 
control the dynamic endogeneity. It is in line with the proposition suggested by 
Wintoki et al. (2012) with the coefficients on LagOSS (t=4.15, p=0.01), LagROA 
(t=4.30, p=0.01), LagYOGLP (t=4.75, p=0.01), LagOCR (t=6.07, p=0.01), LagCA 
(t=5.31, p=0.01) and LagPAR (t=6.15, p=0.01) having a statistically significant 
positive influence on OSS, ROA, YOGLP, OCR, CA and PAR. 
While controlling for the endogeneity effect, this study shows a strong negative (t=-
2.16, p=0.05) relationship between women’s representation in MFI boardrooms 
(FemDir) and MFI performance with reference to OSS. Similarly, it reveals an 
undesirable positive (t=1.93, p=0.10) relationship between FemDir and PAR. 
Matsa and Miller (2013) state that the reason for negative performance is that more 
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female representation on the board decreases the short-run profits by having fewer 
employee layoffs and higher relative employment, which results in an increase in 
labour cost. They further state that women are generally altruistic and long-term 
oriented than men and like to retain staff as a more profitable long-term strategy 
and a solution to worker’s fear of unemployment risk. Adams and Ferreira (2009) 
also find similar negative results after controlling for endogeneity for US firms 
where they are over-monitored by female directors. This highlights the view that 
ineffectiveness of gender balances in MFIs leads to less concern for enterprise profit. 
The results from the fixed-effect model have a negative sign for the relationship 
between FemDir and MFI financial performance but are not statistically significant. 
This suggests the need to conduct further research to explore the impact of female 
board directors and MFI performance. 
Client representation on MFI boards (ClientDir) is found to be significantly 
positively (t=1.95, p=0.10) correlated with MFI return on assets (ROA). This 
highlights that the result for the relationship between client representative on board 
and financial performance of MFIs in Sri Lanka and India is robustness in an 
alternative approach. The findings also agree with the predictions of agency theory, 
stakeholder theory, resource dependency theory, institutional theory and legitimacy 
theory as discussed in Chapter 3. It is consistent with Mori and Mersland (2014) 
and Hartarska (2005), who suggest that stakeholder representation does matter.  
It is evident that non-executive directors (IndDir) are statistically significantly 
negatively (t=-1.90, p=0.10) correlated with the OSS of MFIs in Sri Lanka and 
India, differing from the impact in the fixed-effect estimation procedure. It should 
be noted that board independency is not a statistically significant variable for MFI 
performance once the time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity across MFIs is 
controlled, but still the relationship is negative. Nowland (2008) also confirms a 
negative relationship between board independence and firm performance from a 
study of 221 companies in the seven East Asian nations of Hong Kong, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. The reason for this 
negative impact may be the lack of knowledge and experience of the appointed non-
executive directors in terms of the microfinance sector.  
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The size of MFI boards (Bsize) is found to be statistically significantly negatively 
(t=-2.19, p=0.05) associated with MFI operating expenses (OCR). It suggests that 
larger boards with many advocates tend to reduce the excessive administrative cost 
of MFIs in Sri Lanka and India, which ultimately leads to better performance. The 
relationship between Bsize and PAR is also statistically significant and desirably 
negative (t=-2.36, p=0.05). It is evident that the larger boards provide greater 
monitoring and expertise services to reduce the risk prevailing in the microfinance 
portfolio. This supports the propositions of resource dependency theory that suggest 
a positive relationship (Dalton et al., 1999). However, the results are not statistically 
significant under fixed-effect estimation procedure, but still the relationship is 
negative. The volunteering component of board members can reduce cost and could 
be a topic of further research. 
With regard to the internal audit function (IntAudit) variable, the system GMM 
model provides evidence of a statistically significant and negative (t=-1.95, p=0.10) 
relationship with ROA. This is contrary to the results obtained by Mersland and 
Strøm (2009) who suggest that the board improves MFI performance through 
internal auditors by directly reporting to the board or sub-committees. An inference 
from the findings of this study is that the internal audit activities in MFIs in Sri 
Lanka and India may impose additional cost to the organisation which outweigh 
financial returns to the institution. Once the time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity across MFIs is controlled, the result is negative but not statistically 
significant. 
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Table 8.8-1: The relationship between corporate governance and financial performance of MFIs: Evidence from the aggregate sample of 
Sri Lanka and India 
 OSS ROA YOGLP OCR CA PAR 
 b/(p) [t] b/(p) [t] b/(p) [t] b/(p) [t] b/(p) [t] b/(p) [t] 
LagOSS 0.414*** [4.149]           
 (0.000)            
LagROA   0.317*** [4.304]         
   (0.000)          
LagYOGLP     0.325*** [4.752]       
     (0.000)        
LagOCR       0.514*** [6.065]     
       (0.000)      
LagCA         0.449*** [5.307]   
         (0.000)    
LagPAR           0.478*** [6.152] 
           (0.000)  
FemDir -0.315** [-2.161] 0.032 [1.214] -0.191 [-0.989] 0.013 [0.066] -0.112 [-1.488] 0.051* [1.931] 
 (0.032)  (0.226)  (0.324)  (0.947)  (0.139)  (0.055)  
FemCEO 0.088 [1.431] 0.008 [0.829] 0.018 [0.249] -0.037 [-0.501] -0.005 [-0.162] 0.021 [1.555] 
 (0.154)  (0.408)  (0.804)  (0.617)  (0.871)  (0.122)  
FemChair -0.006 [-0.119] 0.003 [0.355] -0.047 [-0.795] 0.025 [0.337] -0.002 [-0.074] 0.001 [0.112] 
 (0.905)  (0.723)  (0.428)  (0.737)  (0.941)  (0.911)  
Duality -0.061 [-1.291] 0.008 [0.656] 0.092 [1.560] 0.038 [0.456] 0.041 [1.383] 0.004 [0.550] 
 (0.199)  (0.513)  (0.121)  (0.649)  (0.168)  (0.583)  
IntDorDir 0.085 [1.141] 0.000 [0.001] 0.016 [0.267] -0.067 [-0.738] -0.022 [-0.808] -0.013 [-1.058] 
 (0.255)  (0.999)  (0.790)  (0.462)  (0.420)  (0.291)  
ClientDir -0.030 [-0.410] 0.030* [1.947] -0.084 [-0.916] -0.027 [-0.292] 0.017 [0.664] -0.009 [-0.513] 
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 (0.682)  (0.053)  (0.361)  (0.770)  (0.508)  (0.609)  
IndDir -0.308* [-1.904] -0.019 [-0.668] 0.286 [1.541] 0.245 [1.291] 0.079 [1.033] 0.056 [1.507] 
 (0.059)  (0.505)  (0.125)  (0.199)  (0.303)  (0.134)  
Bsize 0.120 [1.583] 0.010 [0.770] -0.070 [-0.597] -0.263** [-2.187] -0.011 [-0.283] -0.038** [-2.355] 
 (0.115)  (0.443)  (0.551)  (0.030)  (0.778)  (0.020)  
IntAudit -0.031 [-0.560] -0.019* [-1.952] -0.012 [-0.190] 0.003 [0.040] -0.017 [-0.654] 0.018 [1.611] 
 (0.576)  (0.053)  (0.850)  (0.968)  (0.514)  (0.109)  
NGI 0.329*** [2.803] 0.031 [1.266] -0.082 [-0.739] -0.403** [-2.496] -0.005 [-0.109] -0.034* [-1.670] 
 (0.006)  (0.207)  (0.461)  (0.014)  (0.913)  (0.097)  
Regbank 0.001 [0.011] 0.017 [1.103] -0.059 [-0.695] -0.130 [-0.976] -0.000 [-0.008] -0.036*** [-2.709] 
 (0.992)  (0.272)  (0.488)  (0.331)  (0.994)  (0.007)  
Fage 0.010 [0.408] -0.004 [-0.778] -0.024 [-0.612] -0.038 [-0.840] 0.017 [0.782] 0.012** [2.379] 
 (0.684)  (0.438)  (0.542)  (0.402)  (0.435)  (0.019)  
Fsize 0.011 [0.703] 0.003 [0.911] -0.021 [-1.105] -0.053** [-2.136] -0.020* [-1.962] 0.006* [1.745] 
 (0.483)  (0.364)  (0.271)  (0.034)  (0.051)  (0.083)  
Lev -0.281** [-1.976] -0.071** [-2.086] 0.283** [2.094] 0.291 [1.596]   -0.017 [-1.088] 
 (0.050)  (0.039)  (0.038)  (0.112)    (0.278)  
Constant 0.877*** [2.848] 0.011 [0.151] -0.739* [-1.935] -0.069 [-0.147] 0.482** [2.411] -0.083 [-1.619] 
 (0.005)  (0.880)  (0.055)  (0.883)  (0.017)  (0.107)  
Number of observations 697  708  697  708  698  701  
F statistic 7.09  4.33  7.71  13.51  7.14  15.67  
Number of instruments 184  184  184  184  171  184  
Hansen-J test of over-identification (p-value) 0.80  0.85  0.75  0.80  0.76  0.74  
Note: This table presents the robustness results of the relationship between corporate governance and financial performance of MFIs in Sri Lanka and India though the use of system GMM model. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), 
and 1% (***) levels. p-Values are presented in parentheses and based on robustness standard errors. t-Statistics are reported in brackets. Hansen-J test of over-identification test is used to check the validity of the system GMM estimator and it suggests 
that the IVs used in the model are valid due to the inability of rejecting the null hypothesis as all the p-values are > 0.05 significant level. The notations are defined in Table 4.6-1. For Sri Lanka, raw data are downloaded from the MIX market database 
and/or extracted from LMFPA, and/or downloaded from the websites of individual firms, including annual reports and/or by contacting individual firms. For India, the data are directly downloaded from the MIX market database and/or extracted from 
the websites of individual firms, including annual reports and/or by contacting individual firms. Year dummies are unreported.  
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After controlling potential sources of endogeneity, the findings of national 
governance quality (NGI) in this study are consistent with findings reported under 
the fixed-effect model. It can determine that the impact of national governance 
indicators on MFI performance is strong under different econometric approaches. 
NGI is statistically significantly positively associated with the OSS (t=2.80, p=0.01) 
and significantly negatively associated with the OCR (t=-2.50, p=0.05). Similarly, 
NGI correlate negatively (t=-1.67, p=0.10) with PAR. These highlight the 
importance of the quality of government rules, regulations and sound policy for the 
microfinance sector in Sri Lanka and India. Consistent with propositions of prior 
studies (Bassem, 2009; Hartarska, 2005), it advocates that the country-level 
governance practices are significant for the MFI financial performance. 
 
8.8.2 Empirical results for outreach using system GMM 
Table 8.8-2 reports the impact of corporate governance on MFI outreach after 
controlling for potential sources of endogeneity.  
The dynamic nature of outreach variables are captured by using lagged performance 
variables as explanatory variables in the model. As shown in Table 8.8-2, the past 
outreach performance of MFIs in Sri Lanka and India significantly explains the 
variation in current performance. It is consistent with Wintoki et al. (2012), who 
illustrate the importance of using past performance to control the dynamic nature 
of the association between corporate governance and performance. The coefficients 
of LagBreadth (β = 0.392), LagFemBorr (β = 0.801) and LagDepth (β = 0.337) are 
positively associated with Breadth, FemBorr and Depth respectively at the 1% 
significance level. 
Results may vary with the estimation method as Adams and Ferreira (2009) find 
different results with the estimation methods they used, such as OLS, fixed effects 
at industry- and firm-level methods, and a two-stage least squares IV method. This 
study does not find statistically significant evidence of women’s leadership 
impacting MFI outreach after taking into account the concerns of simultaneity and 
dynamic endogeneity.  
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Once the dynamic nature of the governance-performance relationship is controlled 
by using the system GMM estimation procedure, the results show a statistically 
significant and positive (t=2.95, p=0.01) relationship between IntDorDir and 
Breadth of outreach of MFIs in Sri Lanka and India. This is consistent with results 
obtained from the fixed-effect model, suggesting that the findings are robustness. 
Mori and Mersland (2014) and Hartarska (2005) find similar results for other 
regions. It suggests that the presence of international and/or donor agency 
representatives on MFI boards reflect a higher concern for the microfinance social 
mission. This enables them to reach as many clients as possible who need 
microfinance services to sustain their lives.  
Non-executive directors (IndDir) are statistically significantly negatively (t=-2.99, 
p=0.01) associated with Breadth of outreach of MFIs in Sri Lanka and India. The 
results of the system GMM model indicate that the presence of non-executive 
directors on MFI board leads to lower social performance. Non-executive directors 
encourage MFIs to disburse great amount of loans to fewer borrowers, considering 
their repayment ability. It may be that non-executive directors in Sri Lankan and 
Indian MFIs lack knowledge about the social impact of microfinance activities. 
Further research may be able to explore the background and goals of independent 
directors of MFIs. Under the fixed-effect estimation procedure, results show a 
negative relationship between IndDir and Breadth of outreach but the results are 
not statistically significant.  
Even though the national governance index does not show a significant effect on 
Breadth of outreach results obtained from the fixed-effect estimation producer, the 
dynamic model show a statistically significantly positive (t=2.03, p=0.05) 
association between NGI and number of clients (Breadth) in MFIs in Sri Lanka and 
India. It suggests that government policies, rules and regulations do matter for MFIs 
to achieve better outreach when the concerns of simultaneity and dynamic 
endogeneity are taken into account. 
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Table 8.8-2: The relationship between corporate governance and outreach of 
MFIs: Evidence from the aggregate sample of Sri Lanka and India 
 Breadth FemBorr Depth 
 b/(p) [t] b/(p) [t] b/(p) [t] 
LagBreadth 0.392*** [5.639]     
 (0.000)      
LagFemBorr   0.801*** [8.816]   
   (0.000)    
LagDepth     0.337*** [4.424] 
     (0.000)  
FemDir -0.363 [-1.216] 0.027 [0.532] 0.024 [1.025] 
 (0.226)  (0.596)  (0.307)  
FemCEO -0.174 [-1.399] 0.001 [0.028] 0.037 [0.952] 
 (0.164)  (0.978)  (0.342)  
FemChair -0.034 [-0.304] -0.027 [-0.898] -0.013 [-0.522] 
 (0.761)  (0.370)  (0.602)  
Duality -0.130 [-1.300] 0.010 [0.508] 0.007 [0.445] 
 (0.195)  (0.612)  (0.657)  
IntDorDir 0.395*** [2.950] 0.027 [0.587] -0.004 [-0.238] 
 (0.004)  (0.558)  (0.812)  
ClientDir -0.111 [-0.822] -0.001 [-0.028] 0.011 [1.077] 
 (0.413)  (0.978)  (0.283)  
IndDir -1.034*** [-2.985] -0.020 [-0.299] 0.043 [1.237] 
 (0.003)  (0.766)  (0.218)  
Bsize 0.135 [0.885] 0.027 [0.931] -0.002 [-0.162] 
 (0.377)  (0.353)  (0.872)  
IntAudit -0.052 [-0.610] 0.013 [0.581] -0.006 [-0.612] 
 (0.542)  (0.562)  (0.542)  
NGI 0.440** [2.028] -0.001 [-0.016] -0.020 [-1.172] 
 (0.044)  (0.987)  (0.243)  
Regbank 0.695*** [4.118] 0.003 [0.140] -0.013 [-0.576] 
 (0.000)  (0.889)  (0.566)  
Fage -0.080 [-1.141] -0.011 [-0.732] -0.006 [-0.716] 
 (0.255)  (0.465)  (0.475)  
Fsize 0.482*** [7.416] -0.002 [-0.179] 0.020*** [4.501] 
 (0.000)  (0.858)  (0.000)  
Lev 0.385 [1.549] -0.014 [-0.502] -0.021 [-1.179] 
 (0.123)  (0.616)  (0.240)  
Constant -2.936*** [-3.481] 0.191 [0.743] 
-
0.321*** [-4.110] 
 (0.001)  (0.459)  (0.000)  
Number of observations 694  703  700  
F statistic 173.15  420.72  19.12  
Number of instruments 184  184  184  
Hansen-J test of over-identification (p-value) 0.81  0.84  0.81  
Note: This table presents the robustness results of the relationship between corporate governance and outreach of MFIs in Sri Lanka and India though the use of system GMM 
model. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. p-Values are presented in parentheses and based on robustness standard errors. t-Statistics 
are reported in brackets. Hansen-J test of over-identification test is used to check the validity of the system GMM estimator and it suggests that the IVs used in the model are 
valid due to the inability of rejecting the null hypothesis as all the p-values are > 0.05 significant level. The notations are defined in Table 4.6-1. For Sri Lanka, raw data are 
downloaded from the MIX market database and/or extracted from LMFPA, and/or downloaded from the websites of individual firms, including annual reports and/or by 
contacting individual firms. For India, the data are directly downloaded from the MIX market database and/or extracted from the websites of individual firms, including annual 
reports and/or by contacting individual firms. Year dummies are unreported. 
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8.9 Conclusion 
This chapter examines how corporate governance mechanisms affect performance 
of MFIs in Sri Lanka and India. Inconsistent findings in prior studies and a general 
lack of empirical results for the microfinance industry have led to leaving an unclear 
message regarding corporate governance and MFI performance.  
In this chapter, the national governance indicators in Sri Lanka and India are 
considered along with background information of MFIs in these countries. Analysis 
using fixed-effect and random-effect estimation procedures are presented. The 
dynamic panel GMM estimation procedure, which is robustness to dynamic 
endogeneity, simultaneity and unobserved heterogeneity, is discussed. 
It is evident from the results that not all known governance mechanisms in for-profit 
companies affect the performance of MFIs in Sri Lanka and India. Furthermore, 
different corporate governance mechanisms have various effects on financial 
performance and outreach, consistent with the views of Hartarska (2005), Bassem 
(2009) and Mori and Mersland (2014). An important finding of this study is that the 
corporate governance practices of MFIs in Sri Lanka and India are impacted by 
regulatory framework.  
As proponents of agency theory and resource dependency theory suggest, a 
diversified board provides more monitoring and resources, which ultimately 
increases firm performance, and this study also illustrates the importance of board 
diversity on MFI performance. The study finds that stakeholders such as 
international directors, donor agency representatives and client representatives on 
boards are important as they can exert various influences on MFIs’ performance. 
Specifically, the international directors and/or donor representatives on MFI boards 
are associated with better financial performance and outreach. Once the dynamic 
nature of the governance-performance relationship is controlled, this study shows a 
significant relationship between international/donor representation on board and 
outreach. This is expected as Yermack (1996) states that monitoring is strict among 
donors and they may actively participate in MFI movements. They have a unique 
intention of helping the helpless people in developing counties by providing 
resources and funds. More international/donor representatives on MFI boards are 
Chapter 8 Corporate Governance and Performance in MFIs: A Case Study in Sri 
Lanka and India 
 
238 
 
likely to enhance monitoring and, importantly, help to find solutions for the lack of 
resources from which MFIs suffer.  
Consistent with Mori and Mersland (2014) and Hartarska (2005), this study shows 
that client representatives are associated with better financial performance but low 
outreach. Client representatives on MFI boards show a significant relationship with 
financial performance even after the endogeneity effect is controlled. Hartarska 
(2005) states that the client representatives on MFI boards can facilitate better 
sustainability at the expense of depth of outreach. This lower outreach needs to be 
addressed by future research to see what extent these representative hinder outreach. 
Also, the advocates for client inclusion on MFI boards should be aware of this 
adverse behaviour regarding outreach and consider the need for education and 
induction programmes. 
This study finds that the impact of female leadership on MFI performance is 
inconsistent and insignificant in different estimations. While controlling for 
potential sources of endogeneity, this study shows that female directors on boards 
are associated with lower financial performance. These findings may be 
idiosyncratic to the specific sample or region. Studies in other regions have shown 
that diversified boards are desirable for MFI performance. Therefore, it is important 
to conduct further investigation into how to integrate women on boards in a manner 
that increases outreach to the poor: well-qualified female directors have unique 
characteristics to create additional value (García-Meca et al., 2015).  
This study finds that the proportion of non-executive directors achieves less 
outreach to female clients. After controlling for the endogeneity effect, results show 
that the proportion of non-executive directors on MFI boards is linked with lower 
financial performance and outreach. This may be due to the non-executive directors’ 
lack of knowledge and experience about microfinance activities as they are not 
engaged thoroughly in day-to-day operations as executive directors are. Therefore, 
it is important to provide better orientation and professional development initiatives 
for non-executive directors, or recruit people who have prior experience about the 
sector. 
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It is suggested from the findings that national governance quality matters for MFIs’ 
financial performance as NGIs are statistically significantly positively correlated 
with OSS and negatively correlated with OCR and PAR. It is shown that NGIs play 
a critical role in the financial performance of MFIs. However, outreach proxies 
show an insignificant correlation to NGI under fixed- and random-effect estimation 
models. Nevertheless, when the dynamic nature of the relationship between 
governance and performance is considered, the NGIs are significantly associated 
with the number of clients in MFIs in Sri Lanka and India. This finding indicates 
that MFI outreach is linked not only to localised events but also to the national 
governance system. This is acceptable as most government rules and regulations 
are formed for economic development of a country and the economic well-being of 
its people, which can be associated with the microfinance activities of the country.  
Duality and internal audit function does not show any statistically significant 
association with financial and outreach performance measures. These mechanisms 
have a limited role in the microfinance sector.  
In order to check the robustness of the findings, this chapter re-examines the 
corporate governance and MFI performance nexus of Sri Lanka and India by 
controlling the dynamic nature of the relationship as recommended by Wintoki et 
al. (2012) and others. Accordingly, this study confirms that the MFIs’ 
contemporaneous performance and corporate governance characteristics are 
statistically significantly positively linked with their past performance. 
Interestingly, contrary to the findings of Wintoki et al. (2012), among others, this 
study finds that the statistically significant effect of the presence of international 
directors and/or donor representatives on the board, client representatives on the 
board, percentage of non-executive directors and the quality of the national 
governance system on MFI performance remain valid even after controlling for 
dynamic endogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity. It suggests that 
the findings are robustness to an alternative econometric approach. 
Evidence suggests that MFIs in Sri Lanka and India have significant room to 
achieve sustainable operations and competence in reaching low income clients. 
However, they should make more effort to improve their performance. It is 
important for MFIs to incorporate more governance to move forward in the sector.  
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Both governments should enact microfinance regulations to maintain a competitive 
and constructive market for the microfinance suppliers. Finally, it can be concluded 
that corporate governance does matter for the microfinance sector, but the 
governance mechanisms seen as important for the corporate sector do not 
necessarily impact in the same way for MFIs in developing economies.  
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9 CHAPTER NINE 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarises the findings regarding the relationship between corporate 
governance practices, financial performance and outreach in MFIs in Sri Lanka and 
India. Section 9.2 describes the focus of the study. Section 9.3 explains the 
empirical results for the hypotheses tested in the study. Section 9.4 highlights the 
significance contribution to knowledge and how this adds to the existing body of 
literature, and a discussion of policy implications follows in section 9.5. Limitations 
of the study and possible suggestions for future directions are noted in section 9.6 
and concluding comments are presented in section 9.7.  
 
9.2 Focus of the Study 
Microfinance is a form of financial credit with roots that have a primary aim to 
alleviate poverty (Barr, 2004, p. 273). The aim is not achievable if the industry 
remains poor, lacks resources and uses the scarce funds available inefficiently. The 
microfinance industry faces challenges in two ways due to its dual objectives of 
how to reach more low-income people and how to attain sustainability. Advocates 
of the microfinance industry argue that MFIs need to be sustained to have long-term 
impacts for low-income people. In order to secure the future of the microfinance 
sector, it is important for MFIs to be sustainable financially while focusing on social 
goals. In other words, financial performance and outreach must be achieved 
concurrently. This has been highlighted by Cull et al. (2007).  
Labie and Mersland (2011) state that tremendous growth in service providers, a 
wide range of organisation types, different stakeholder involvement with their 
competing interests, liability management and international recognition all 
contribute to why corporate governance is an important area for research in the 
microfinance sector. Corporate governance is likely to assure the long-term survival 
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of an institution without losing track of its social mission. Similarly, having a good 
corporate governance structure in an MFI will contribute to a sound financial 
system and economic development of a community. Well-governed MFIs may 
contribute significantly to a country’s economic and social well-being.  
Corporate governance in the microfinance sector does not appear to be mature and 
a large proportion of literature in this area consists of consultancy reports and 
guidelines on how to structure boards and their procedures. Many recommendations 
in corporate governance practices for the microfinance sector are copied from those 
developed to aid for-profit firms in mature markets, with limited empirical supports 
to indicate applicability to MFIs (Labie & Mersland, 2011).  
There are emerging studies commenting on the link between corporate governance 
and performance. The application of normative assertions, while potentially easy to 
prepare, may lack significant consideration of multiple confounding values relating 
to the context, structure, history, system, personnel and more components of the 
jigsaw that makes for the performance of an MFI. Empirical work to date does not 
reflect consensus and this suggests a need for further empirical research, using 
micro-econometric techniques, such as regression analyses of panel data, to support 
the conceptual literature currently available. 
This study identifies corporate governance mechanisms that influence the financial 
performance and outreach of MFIs. First, this thesis provides an examination of the 
impact of corporate governance practices on financial performance and outreach of 
MFIs in Sri Lanka. Second, this study describes the impact of corporate governance 
practices, financial performance and outreach of MFIs in India. Corporate 
governance variables considered are derived from the corporate governance 
theories, principally agency theory, and empirical findings of prior studies. These 
variables contribute to an understanding of effects on financial performance and 
outreach of MFIs in Sri Lanka and India. Third, the differences between corporate 
governance practices and performance of MFIs in Sri Lanka and India are noted, 
especially in line with national-level governance quality which appears to influence 
corporate governance and performance of MFIs. Finally, this study examines the 
impact of corporate governance, financial performance and outreach of MFIs based 
on an aggregate sample of firms in Sri Lanka and India. The research expands the 
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understanding of corporate governance practices of MFIs and the impact of those 
practices on financial performance and outreach in two emerging countries in the 
South Asian region. It is now known with a greater level of certainty that corporate 
governance variables such as board diversity, board size and internal controls do 
matter for MFI performance. It is also clearer that many conventional wisdoms, 
such as more female directors relate with better financial performance and adverse 
impact of duality, do not hold. 
The data required to test the various hypotheses are sourced from MIX market, 
LMFPA in Sri Lanka and Sa-Dhan, the microfinance network in India. Board of 
directors and outreach data are collected for each individual institution through its 
annual report, individual firm website and by personally contacting the individual 
MFI. The sample period is 2007 to 2012 for both countries, containing 54 MFIs for 
Sri Lanka and 113 MFIs for India. Panel data analysis techniques and various 
diagnostic tests are used to investigate the hypotheses and to check the validity of 
the models in the study. 
 
9.3 Summary of Empirical Results 
Table 9.3-1 presents a summary of hypotheses tested in relation to corporate 
governance, financial performance and outreach of MFIs in Sri Lanka, India and 
both the aggregate sample of Sri Lanka and India and how the findings are different 
from prior findings.  
The findings of this investigation into the relationship between established internal 
corporate governance practices and financial performance and outreach in MFIs 
present challenges for practitioners and regulators. Among the traditional corporate 
governance mechanisms applied in for-profit sector of mature markets, this study 
finds few variables that influence the financial performance and outreach of MFIs 
in Sri Lanka and India. Only a few variables are significantly associated with MFI 
performance which in itself is interesting. These results are predominantly 
consistent with those reported in prior studies relating to corporate governance and 
MFI performance. The results are robustness with respect to controls for legal status, 
MFI age, size, leverage and type. 
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Table 9.3-1: Summary of hypotheses results regarding corporate governance variables, financial performance and outreach of MFIs in Sri 
Lanka, India and both countries 
 
Variables 
Financial Performance Outreach 
Sri Lanka India Both Sri Lanka India Both 
Hypotheses 
Different 
results 
Hypotheses 
Different 
results 
Hypotheses Different results Hypotheses 
Different 
results 
Hypotheses 
Different 
results 
Hypotheses 
Different 
results 
FemDir Reject H1a Positive 
(Strøm et 
al., 2014) 
Reject H1a Positive 
(Strøm et 
al., 2014) 
Reject H1a Positive (Strøm et 
al., 2014) 
Reject H1b Positive 
(Hartarska, 
2005) 
Accept H1b  Reject H1b Positive 
(Hartarska, 
2005) 
FemCEO Accept H2a  Reject H2a Positive 
(Mersland 
& Strøm, 
2009) 
Reject H2a Positive (Mersland 
& Strøm, 2009) 
Reject H2b  Reject H2b  Reject H2b  
FemChair Accept H3a  Reject H3a Positive 
(Strøm et 
al., 2014) 
Reject H3a Positive (Strøm et 
al., 2014) 
Reject H3b  Accept H3b  Reject H3b  
Duality Reject H4a Negative 
(Kyereboah-
Coleman & 
Osei, 2008) 
Reject H4a Negative 
(Kyereboah-
Coleman & 
Osei, 2008) 
Reject H4a Negative 
(Kyereboah-
Coleman & Osei, 
2008) 
Reject H4b  Reject H4b  Reject H4b  
IntDorDir Reject H5a Positive 
(Mori & 
Mersland, 
2014) 
Accept H5a Negative 
(Hartarska, 
2005; 
Mersland & 
Strøm, 
2009) 
Reject H5a Positive (Mori & 
Mersland, 2014) 
Accept H5b  Accept H5b  Accept H5b  
ClientDir Accept H6a  Accept H6a  Accept H6a  Reject H6b  Reject H6b  Reject H6b  
IndDir Reject H7a Positive 
(Hartarska, 
2005; 
Kyereboah-
Coleman & 
Osei, 2008) 
Accept H7a  Reject H7a Positive 
(Hartarska, 2005; 
Kyereboah-
Coleman & Osei, 
2008) 
Reject H7b Positive 
(Hartarska, 
2005; 
Kyereboah-
Coleman & 
Osei, 2008) 
Reject H7b Positive 
(Hartarska, 
2005; 
Kyereboah-
Coleman & 
Osei, 2008) 
Reject H7b Positive 
(Hartarska, 
2005; 
Kyereboah-
Coleman & 
Osei, 2008) 
BSize Accept H8a Negative 
(Hartarska, 
2005) 
Reject H8a Positive 
(Kyereboah-
Coleman & 
Osei, 2008) 
Accept H8a Negative 
(Hartarska, 2005) 
Reject H8b Positive 
(Hartarska, 
2005) 
Reject H8b Positive 
(Hartarska, 
2005) 
Reject H8b Positive 
(Hartarska, 
2005) 
IntAudit Accept H9a  Accept H9a  Reject H9a Positive (Mersland 
& Strøm, 2009) 
Reject H9b  Reject H9b  Reject H9b  
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A potentially controversial finding suggests that financial performance of MFIs in 
both countries can improve if there are fewer female directors on their boards. 
Econometrically, this finding still holds even after controlling for dynamic 
endogeneity, simultaneity and unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity inherent in 
the governance-performance relationship. A positive relationship is experienced by 
Strøm et al. (2014) in a global panel, covering 1998-2008. This may result from 
cultural differences in these countries compared to other countries where a positive 
effect is observed. An earlier study for Sri Lankan companies noted it is a male-
dominated society, women are traditionally subordinate to men and have a silent 
and inactive role on the board (Hewa-Wellalage & Locke, 2013). If this is to be 
accepted as a plausible stance, then there is a need for director induction, support 
and ongoing training programmes which change the attitudes of and towards 
women. In the absence of the widespread use of 180 and 360 degree reviews of 
directors, there is a need for further investigation into how to integrate women on 
boards in a manner that adds value.  
It is found that the female representation on Indian MFI board improves outreach 
to low-income people whereas Sri Lankan data provides inconclusive evidence on 
outreach impact. Hartarska (2005) finds better outreach with the presence of more 
female directors on MFI boards by using a random-effect estimation approach. 
Female CEO is found to be significantly positively related only with financial 
performance of MFIs in Sri Lanka and significantly negatively associated with 
outreach of MFIs in India. A global study conducted by Mersland and Strøm (2009) 
for the period 2000-2007 reports financial performance improves with a female 
CEO, but no impact for outreach. When the chairperson of an MFI board is female 
financial performance is improved in Sri Lanka, but not in Indian MFIs. Female 
chairperson provides significant positive effect for outreach of MFIs in India but 
finds inconclusive evidence for effect on outreach of MFIs in Sri Lanka. However, 
Strøm et al. (2014) find that when an MFI has a female chair it performs better in 
financially. In these two emerging countries, emoluments of an MFI director and 
top management are quite low compared with the corporate sector. As a result, it 
may be that these positions are not so actively sought by highly qualified women. 
MFIs can seek skilful women on their boards or offer training opportunities through 
their links, such as funding agencies, MFI networks, various associations and 
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channels. When more talented women are ascended in the boards and top 
management positions, gender difference in microfinance sector may diminish 
(Adams & Ferreira, 2009). It is important for shareholders and advocates to select 
the right women for the correct positions; women who match with their preferences 
and business objectives.  
Findings suggest that CEO/chair duality do not have a detrimental effect on MFI 
performance (both financial and outreach) except in circumstances where operating 
costs increase due to duality in Sri Lanka. A study conducted in Ghana for 1995-
2004 shows that duality has a negative impact on MFI financial performance 
(Kyereboah-Coleman & Osei, 2008). Therefore, corporate governance theories and 
recent guidelines for firms to separate the CEO and chairman roles need to be re-
considered with due care and may require to be tailored to the context of MFIs, 
because “one size does not fit all” (Hewa-Wellalage et al., 2012). Kiel and 
Nicholson (2003, p. 202) highlight that the issue of CEO duality may be contingent 
on a company’s size and challenges. However, transforming from duality to non-
duality may not increase the performance of MFIs, but may reduce the fraud risk.  
The findings indicate that more international representation and donor participation 
on MFI boards in both counties make a viable contribution to better outreach. Even 
though prior studies find inconclusive evidence regarding the relationship between 
international and/or donor representation on MFI boards and outreach (Hartarska, 
2005; Mersland & Strøm, 2009; Mori & Mersland, 2014) it can be stated that the 
findings of this study are robustness and not driven by potential source of 
endogeneity (Nguyen et al., 2014). To achieve better outreach, the governments of 
both countries could either suggest or promulgate regulation to bring MFIs into line 
with the requirement of establishing more international and donor agency 
monitoring on the board. As far as financial performance is concerned, based in the 
context of Indian MFIs, this study finds that international and donor representatives 
have a desirable impact for the financial performance of MFIs but a significantly 
negative impact on MFIs in Sri Lanka.  
Other stakeholders, such as client representatives on the board, improve financial 
performance of MFIs in both countries. This finding still holds even after 
controlling for dynamic endogeneity, simultaneity and unobserved time-invariant 
Chapter 9 Summary and Conclusion 
 
247 
 
heterogeneity inherent in the governance – performance relationship. But in the 
context of Sri Lanka, this kind of financial sustainability is achieved at the expense 
of client outreach (Hartarska, 2005). Therefore, when recommending policies or 
guidelines for the MFI sector in Sri Lanka, it is noteworthy for advocates of the 
sector to be aware of this adverse impact of client representatives on the board. 
Even though outside directors provide inconclusive evidence for financial 
performance of MFIs in Sri Lanka, this variable shows a significant positive effect 
on financial performance of MFIs in India and a significant negative relationship 
for the aggregated sample after controlling the possible sources of endogeneity. 
However, this study could not find any significant relationship between outside 
directors and outreach of MFIs in individual country studies, but finds a negative 
relationship for the combined sample. Prior MFI studies which use a random-effect 
estimation procedure find that MFIs can perform better when they have more 
independent boards. Following Nowland (2008), this study supports the view that 
outside directors have less influence on MFI activities. This is echoing the need to 
take more care when selecting suitable directors who have more knowledge about 
the sector.  
Size of the board has a significant negative effect on outreach of MFIs in India but 
no effect on MFIs in Sri Lanka. In contrast, a higher number of members on an MFI 
board improves the financial sustainability of MFIs in Sri Lanka but not in India. 
Prior studies find inconclusive evidence for board size on financial performance 
(Hartarska, 2005; Kyereboah-Coleman & Osei, 2008) but positive impact on 
outreach by using a random-effect estimation method (Hartarska, 2005). The 
aggregated sample shows better financial performance for larger boards after 
controlling for dynamic endogeneity, simultaneity and unobserved time-invariant 
heterogeneity inherent in the governance – performance relationship. Findings 
point to the fact that the larger board is more sustainable for MFIs. This is because 
larger boards provide better monitoring, greater linkage to external resources and 
are harder for CEOs to control (Adams & Mehran, 2003; Coles et al., 2008). 
Finally, the results show that the impact of internal audit function on MFIs in India 
is inconclusive with regard to outreach, and therefore it is difficult to make 
inferences. This study does not find any significant impact of internal audit function 
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on outreach of MFIs in Sri Lanka. However, both countries find that the internal 
audit function improves financial performance. The findings are consistent with the 
propositions made by Sinclair (2012) and Mersland and Strøm (2009). The 
plausible reason could be that the focus of internal controls is more towards the 
financial substance of the firm rather than the non-financial measures such as 
outreach. However, in the dynamic modelling framework, the internal audit 
function relates with low financial performance.  
 
9.4 Significance Contribution to Knowledge and Literature 
This study makes a number of significant contributions to the literature relating to 
corporate governance, financial performance and outreach, and the relationship 
between them.  
The application of normative assertions about the relationship between corporate 
governance, financial performance and outreach of MFIs is dangerous due to lack 
consideration of values relating to the individual countries. For example, 
conventional corporate governance guidelines have recommended to increase 
female representation on boards to achieve better performance, which is not proved 
in the microfinance sector in the South Asian region.  
Prior studies yield conflicting and ambiguous results due to the different 
methodological approaches. Econometric estimations derived from the simple OLS 
regression are changed with the use of fixed- and random-estimation approaches 
because these approaches control the unobserved heterogeneity across the firms. 
Once the potential sources of dynamic endogeneity is controlled, the econometric 
estimations for inference of corporate governance – performance relationship are 
changed. Therefore, it is necessary to have an appropriate method to examine the 
nexus between corporate governance and MFI performance. 
First, this study makes an advanced contribution to the international literature by 
understanding the corporate governance practices of MFIs in Sri Lanka and India 
separately and comprehensively in a combined dataset. Evidence shows that 
understanding of good corporate governance practices in relation to MFIs is still 
not well-developed. The international differences in corporate governance and 
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performance in the microfinance sector seem to be an understudied area. 
Worldwide studies that observed the relationship between corporate governance 
and performance provide narrow implications for a single country (Black et al., 
2014) because only one or a few institutions represent a country in the entire world 
sample. The application of corporate governance in the microfinance sector with 
many firm-year observations provides deep and comprehensive understanding, 
which add value to this research. This study may assist the international donors, 
funding agencies, investors and advocates to identify MFIs that are performing well, 
both financially and non-financially. Furthermore, the results of this study are 
appropriate both for individual MFIs and government policy makers as they 
indicate that firms can perform better when they comply with good corporate 
governance practices and “invisible hands” in the industry can direct MFIs to 
improve their corporate governance.  
Second, this study uses a wider range of corporate governance, financial 
performance and outreach variables than prior studies, which enhances the 
understanding of the relationship between different corporate governance variables 
and MFI performance. Little consideration was previously given to mapping 
outcomes with the MFI mission, measuring impact and evaluating processes for 
enhanced outreach. This governance structure mechanism enables MFIs to conduct 
their operations with special reference to social performance by approaching low 
income people who require economic development for their lives. By using both 
financial performance and outreach data, this research makes a significant 
contribution to the extant literature on how corporate governance directs MFIs to 
achieve their dual mission and be sustainable.  
Third, this thesis extends the knowledge of corporate governance theories from the 
for-profit sector to MFIs. Theories mainly generated through for-profit 
organisations in mature markets represent, to some extent, the corporate governance 
relationship in other sectors. This study is based on agency theory, but to a lesser 
extent includes elements of stewardship theory, stakeholder theory, institutional 
theory, legitimacy theory and resource dependency theory. Empirical investigations 
on how corporate governance practices may enhance financial performance and 
outreach in the microfinance sector, with special consideration given to the sectorial 
differences, are reported.  
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Fourth, studies of corporate governance and its relationship with firm behaviour are 
popular in mature markets. Only limited research exists relating to the corporate 
governance practices in emerging economies, especially relating to developing 
countries. No studies have been conducted in South Asian countries until now to 
identify corporate governance mechanisms that are important for performance of 
MFIs in the region. There are studies relating to the effects of corporate governance 
on MFIs’ performance based in Euro-Mediterranean countries (Bassem, 2009), 
Ghana (Aboagye & Otieku, 2010; Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007; Kyereboah-
Coleman & Osei, 2008), Central and Eastern Europe and Newly Independent States 
(Hartarska, 2005). This is the first study that contributes to the body of knowledge 
by investigating the corporate governance mechanisms that are significantly 
improving the financial performance and outreach of MFIs in two countries in 
South Asian region. Studying the relationship between the internal corporate 
governance structure and MFI performance in two emerging economies in South 
Asia may provide guidance which is generalisable, but the lessons learned in this 
study indicate that caution is necessary. 
Finally, this study focuses on two different national governance systems utilising 
national governance quality indicators to differentiate between them. This is the 
first study incorporating national governance quality indicators in a corporate 
governance – performance relationship study. Further, this study applies a dynamic 
modeling approach to the combined dataset of Sri Lanka and India, controlling for 
dynamic endogeneity, simultaneity and unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity 
inherent in the governance – performance relationship. This is the first study to do 
this for the South Asian region. There are several findings of consequence for policy 
makers to consider.  
 
9.5 Policy Implications 
In the light of the empirical findings of this study, some important policy 
implications are extracted.  
First, corporate governance practices have an impact on MFI financial performance 
and outreach even though the corporate governance codes are voluntary disclosures 
for various MFIs. These findings are robustness even after controlling for the 
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possible impact of historical performance on current performance and other 
potential sources of endogeneity such as simultaneity and time-invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity. Therefore, MFIs should be able to foresee the effect of 
their decisions on financial performance and outreach when they adopt or change 
their corporate governance mechanisms. Good corporate governance mechanisms 
in MFIs improve the handling of their resource.  
Second, findings in this study should encourage MFIs to consider significant 
governance factors further in order to improve and sustain the microfinance 
industry. MFIs have limited options to raise capital for their operations compared 
to banks and other financial institutions. Lack of funding is considered a major 
obstacle for the growth of the microfinance sector. Most funding agencies oversee 
the corporate governance practices of MFIs prior to making funding arrangements. 
In this study, it is found that there is a positive relationship between international 
donor representation on boards and outreach, emphasising that donors and funding 
agencies have a desire to outreach. In order to attract funding agencies and donors, 
MFIs need to enhance their corporate governance mechanisms to ensure an 
appropriate balance of outreach reporting as a key metric.  
Third, establishing a regulatory framework would mean MFIs have an appropriate 
minimum capital adequacy requirement. MFIs take risks in lending and a 
requirement of capital adequacy based on the capital appears to be appropriate. 
Current monitoring regulation bodies (CBSL and RBI) for banking and non-
banking sectors could have an expanded role encompassing MFIs. This is an 
important matter to protect and maintain the confidence level of depositors, lenders, 
creditors and investors, especially those from more sophisticated agencies such as 
the World Bank.  
Fourth, the importance of having proper disclosure of information relating to 
microfinance activities is observed. This research calls for further attention from 
policy makers to encourage use of an appropriate performance reporting system for 
the microfinance sector. Industry benchmarks and thresholds for financial 
performance and outreach in terms of different tier levels of MFIs can be regulated. 
There are instances where breadth of MFIs’ outreach factors are not measured with 
proper metrics. This may be attributable to a lack of reporting requirements for 
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MFIs over outreach. Usually most MFIs in both Sri Lanka and India do not collect 
information, such as the number of jobs created through loan disbursements, the 
loan circle of the client and the number of beneficiaries of the loans, etc. This type 
of information can easily be collected through documentation relating to loan 
application and disbursing loans. A credit officer can ensure the accuracy of a loan 
application when the MFI receives the completed loan application. By undertaking 
sport visits, reviewers of loan applications are able to make sure the outreach 
information proposed in the loan application is being recorded and achieved in 
practice. However, not many institutions practise keeping proper outreach records, 
which is exacerbated by a lack of monitoring or supervision of outreach information 
by statutory institutions. The reporting framework is not adequately specified for 
the measurement of outreach in terms of tier levels, based on the different criteria 
such as minimum capital adequacy, number of borrowers and loan portfolio. The 
promulgation of reporting guidelines would assist to the statutory institution or 
financial reporting standards. Social performance reporting could be a compulsory 
requirement for MFIs with an associated external audit. MFIs’ governance will 
improve through training directors and top management in best practice reporting.  
Fifth, the role of borrowers on MFI boards is significant in terms of financial 
performance and is an important area to be considered. Client representatives on 
the board may potentially challenge the conventional approach in relation to both 
financial performance and outreach. A borrowers’ representative is unlikely to be a 
spokesperson for the average poorest of the poor client. Consideration of an 
alternative governance process with a two-tier governance structure similar to 
boards in Germany may be germane. This would allow for broader input at district 
levels without significantly increasing board size and travel costs. The 
establishment of an internet communication link-up right from the outset would set 
the scene for positive transformational and leadership promotional opportunities at 
the village level. This could be much more beneficial for a large geographical 
country such as India. 
Sixth, criteria for selecting outside directors for MFIs can be developed. This might 
lead to a recognition of the need for better orientation and professional development 
initiatives. The role of board members in terms of their fiduciary responsibility can 
be extended to improve the outreach and impact for the betterment of MFIs’ overall 
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performance by undertaking progress monitoring. For instance, appointing 
directors who have finance qualifications to monitor the financial activities of the 
MFI, a social director who ensures that the MFI adheres to its social mission and a 
director representing the borrowers of the MFI; what qualifications should he/she 
have? This may also help to appoint further sub-committees to the board of MFIs.  
Finally, the legal framework is a fundamental component of the corporate 
governance system of a country. To achieve responsibility, accountability, fairness 
and transparency, a country needs appropriate rules and regulations to monitor the 
industry activities. This is indicated by the finding of a positive relationship 
between national-level governance characteristics and MFI performance.  
 
9.6 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
This study does have limitations but they do not detract from the robustness of the 
analysis; rather they push some issues towards possible future research programmes. 
The primary limitation relates to availability of data in the public domain 
concerning the make-up of boards of directors and outreach of MFIs in Sri Lanka 
and India. MIX market, Sa-Dhan and LMFPA are the best sources of data, but 
information is often limited, with sparse information about the directors of 
individual MFIs. Information covering stakeholder representatives on MFI boards 
is absent which means going to individual MFIs for information if more is required. 
Some additional data were obtained on a few types of stakeholders, vis outside 
directors, client representatives and international and/or donor representatives on 
the board. For future studies, collecting data on other types of stakeholder 
representatives on MFI boards, such as creditors, government agencies, local 
communities and rating agencies, may prove fruitful to check their influence on 
MFI performance in Sri Lanka and India.  
Due to the lack of corporate governance data, this study only concentrates on 
observable director board information. Access to more comprehensive data 
covering additional characteristics of board members, such as age, prior experience 
in the banking and microfinance sectors, academic qualifications and professional 
qualifications in the microfinance sector and other industry experience may 
enhance understanding of how individual directors’ attributes contribute to the 
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financial performance and outreach of MFIs. A range of ideas for further research 
are feasible if data can be obtained. More qualitative research might provide 
insights on leadership styles and ethical and moral behaviour of directors (Adams 
& Ferreira, 2009; Mohan, 2014). A comparison of the behaviour of different 
stakeholders will illuminate their intention to fulfill their objectives and contribute 
to a unified board. This study points to likely benefits of research exploring further 
the impact of female board members and MFI performance and how to integrate 
women onto boards in ways that will add value to MFIs. 
This study used three outreach variables - breadth of outreach, percentage of women 
borrowers and depth of outreach - as it was possible to access that data. Further 
research may formulate other metrics and obtain the necessary data to enrich 
understanding of this aspect of MFI performance. This information could include 
the ratio of rural to urban clients in the portfolio, the number of clients who obtain 
second or subsequent loans, the number of loans disbursed to lowest-income clients 
based on family income levels, the number of jobs created after the loan and the 
number of businesses started in the loan circle will contribute to policy formulation 
especially around the MFI mission drift.  
It is important to identify better performance measures that capture the dual 
objective of MFIs. Women’s World Banking has developed financial and social 
performance indicators that allow MFIs to analyse the outreach to women clients 
in more detail. This helps to consider not only how many women an MFI serves but 
how well it is serving. For example, instead of women clients as a percentage of 
total clients, scholars can use women clients as a percentage of new clients which 
would help to identify the direction of a particular MFI (Women’s World Banking, 
2013). 
Like most prior studies on corporate governance, this study suffers from sample 
selection bias which is caused by the availability of data (Stock & Watson, 2007). 
It is natural to expect a study of this nature on an emerging topic such as MFI 
corporate governance in South Asia could pose a problem of sample size. Even 
though it is ideal to have a large sample, many institutions do not fulfil the required 
primary data, especially the corporate governance information. This study 
concentrates on formal MFIs that are registered under a regulatory body for the 
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country in which they operate. The selected MFIs all have an external audit for their 
annual financial statements. There are MFIs in Sri Lanka and India that are excluded 
in this study because they are informal MFIs. Typically this form of MFI does not 
have reliable financial reports as being audited is not compulsory. The role played 
by the informal MFIs in both economies may be substantial, especially in terms of 
contribution to low income people in these countries. Further research may wish to 
take into account the effect of governance on performance of informal MFIs and/or 
non-audited MFIs, though integrity of data may be an insurmountable problem. 
The data used for this study covers six years for MFIs in Sri Lanka and India. Non-
availability or reliability issues surrounding data in many institutions going further 
back than six years is a problem. In the future, more years’ of data will become 
available permitting re-estimation of relationships between corporate governance, 
financial performance and outreach of MFIs in Sri Lanka and India. Consistent with 
Wintoki et al. (2012), a larger dataset, covering a longer period, may assist in regard 
to endogeneity of the variables.  
Inclusion of additional corporate governance variables or control variables for the 
governance – performance relationship studies in the future should provide broad 
knowledge about the microfinance sector and may lead to different conclusions. 
CEO tenure, executive remuneration, types of donors, the number of MFI branches, 
the number of loan officers are still an open ground for further research as long as 
the relevant data are available. The present study concentrates on the financial 
services offered by MFIs in Sri Lanka and India and does not investigate non-
financial services offered in microfinance sector, such as consultancy services, 
entrepreneurial training, remittances, savings facilities and insurance services. The 
omission relates only to the difficulties in collecting data and its reliability. Future 
studies of MFIs may encompass non-financial services of MFIs where obtaining 
appropriate reliable data is tractable. 
Undertaking studies in other countries is likely to clarify the impact of corporate 
governance practices on MFI performance, as each country has its own 
characteristics.  
 
Chapter 9 Summary and Conclusion 
 
256 
 
9.7 Conclusion 
This chapter incorporates discussion of the empirical results reported in Chapters 6, 
7 and 8. In general, the findings support the view that there is a statistically 
significant relationship between corporate governance and performance of MFIs. 
Interestingly, this study finds that few of the corporate governance mechanisms that 
are recommended in the industry guidelines as important, are significant in terms 
of impact on the performance of MFIs in Sri Lanka and India. This chapter further 
reveals that corporate governance practices impact differently on financial 
performance and outreach. The comparative analysis of the corporate governance-
performance relationship emphasises that the performance effects of corporate 
governance structure vary significantly between Sri Lanka and India. This supports 
the view that the performance effects of corporate governance practices are country-
specific and depend on institutional and cultural differences. The results of this 
research lead to important policy implications for the microfinance sectors in Sri 
Lanka and India.  
The vision of a poverty free world is yet to be achieved. The microfinance sector 
needs to be more effective if it wants to become the miracle cure for poverty and 
source economic development. Now the sector is attempting to reinvent itself and 
it has a long way to go as there are billions of people in the world living in extreme 
poverty. If governments can impose a regulatory framework for microfinance 
activities through dedicated and qualified regulators who understand the sector 
particularly, then the MFI sector can play a great role in poverty alleviation.  
Finally, this study concludes by highlighting the necessity for having proper 
training and development in governance initiatives for MFI boards to stimulate the 
overall financial performance and social impact of MFIs. Expanding the research 
to other countries, longer time periods, more MFIs and more MFI services may lead 
to better understanding of the governance – performance relationship. 
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APPENDIXES 
Appendix 01 shows a summary of the different regulations and supervisions applicable for institutions that are conducting microfinance 
activities in Sri Lanka 
Institution  SANASA TCCSs 
& CRBs 
SBSs RDBs LCBs, LSBs, RFCs, SLCs and ICs Guarantee limited companies, private 
companies, unlimited companies, NGO-
MFIs, societies, village banks, 
community based organisations & 
voluntary social service organisations 
Regulatory 
Authority 
DCD Samurdhi 
Authority 
CBSL CBSL and Insurance Board of Sri 
Lanka 
No regulatory authority  
Supervisory 
Authority 
DCD Samurdhi 
Authority 
CBSL CBSL and Insurance Board of Sri 
Lanka 
No supervisory authority but need to 
provide budgets and progress reports to 
the NGO secretariat of the government. 
Legislation  Co-operative 
Societies Law 
No.5 of 1972 
Samurdhi 
Authority 
Act No.30 
of 1995 
Regional 
Development 
Banks Act 
No.15 of 1985 
Banking Act No.30 of 1988, 
Finance Companies Act No.78 of 
1988 (repealed by Act. No.42 of 
2011 for Finance Business), Finance 
Leasing Act No.56 of 2000, 
Insurance Industry Act No.43 of 
2000 and Company Act No.7 of 
2007 
Companies Act, No.7 of 2007, Societies 
Ordinance No.16 of 1891, Voluntary 
Social Service Organisations Act No.31 
of 1980 
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Banking Act No.30 of 1988 (amended Act No.46 of 2006) 
This law applies to LCBs and LSBs. For an example, the SDB and RDB are LSBs 
that conduct microfinance activities on a large scale. LCBs are also involved in 
microfinance activities but they provide a very small percentage of microfinance 
loans when compared to the overall portfolio of the sector (Atapattu, 2009). 
Banking licences are issued by the Monetary Board of the CBSL with the approval 
of the Minister of Finance. The Banking Act of Sri Lanka requires any banking 
business or a public company that intents to carry out banking activities to obtain 
the authority through a banking licence.  
 
Finance Companies Act No.78 of 1988 repealed by Finance Business Act No.42 of 
2011 
With effect from 9 November 2011, companies that carry out finance activities are 
required to be registered under the Finance Business Act No.42 of 2011 prior to 
accepting deposits from clients. This Act was introduced to strengthen the 
regulation and supervision of non-banking financial activities of Sri Lankan RFCs 
and to curb the unauthorised finance businesses. 
Finance business means the “business of acceptance of deposits, and the lending of 
money, or the investment of money in any manner whatsoever, or the lending of 
money and the investment of money in any manner whatsoever” (Finance Business 
Act, No. 42 of 2011, p. 85). A company shall not be eligible to license as a finance 
company under this Act unless it is registered under the Companies Act, No.7 of 
2007. The Central Finance Company and the Alliance Finance Company in Sri 
Lanka are examples of companies that conduct their microfinance activities as a 
finance company registered under this Act. 
This Act has vested the control and administrative power to the Monetary Board of 
CBSL as the license is required to carry out financial business in Sri Lanka. The 
Department of Supervision of NBFIs of the CBSL carries out the regulatory and 
supervisory functions in respect of RFCs.  
 
Finance Leasing Act No.56 of 2000  
The Finance Leasing Act No.56 of 2000 (amended by Act No.24 of 2005 and No.33 
of 2007) states that a certificate of registration is necessary to conduct finance 
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leasing business. Four types of institutions are entitled to register as Registered 
Finance Leasing Establishments: LCBs and LSBs registered under Banking Act 
No.30 of 1988, RFCs registered under Finance Business Act No.42 of 2011, and 
public companies incorporated under the Companies Act, No.7 of 2007 of Sri 
Lanka having the prescribed amount of capital (Regulation No.1 of 2010). The 
regulatory and supervisory functions relating to SLCs are carried out by the 
Department of Supervision of NBFIs of the CBSL. LOLC microfinance company 
is an example of a leasing company which carries MFIs activities in Sri Lanka.  
In addition, this Act assesses whether the SLCs’ are compliance with statutory 
requirements, relevant laws and regulations, internal controls and the standards of 
corporate governance. Further, SLCs are not permitted to accept money from the 
public as deposits. Nevertheless, with the prior approval of the Director, 
Department of Supervision of NBFIs of the CBSL, they can borrow money by 
issuing debt instruments such as promissory notes, commercial paper and 
debentures.   
 
Insurance Industry Act No.43 of 2000 (amended Act No.3 of 2011) 
This Act (amended by No.27 of 2007 and No.3 of 2011) enables the establishment 
of an insurance board for the purpose of developing, supervising and regulating the 
insurance industry by revoking the control of Insurance Act No.25 of 1962 and the 
matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. 
 
Co-operative Societies Law No.5 of 1972 (amended Act No.11 of 1992) 
The Co-operative Societies Law No.5 of 1972 (amended by Act No.5 of 1972, 
No.37 of 1974, No.11 of 1980, No.32 of 1983 and No.11 of 1992) was passed to 
provide the development of co-operative societies and address the issues related to 
the constitution and control of co-operative societies in Sri Lanka. They are entitled 
to make loans to members and accept deposits. Women’s Bank and SSs are 
examples for which this Act applies.   
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Samurdhi Authority Act No.30 of 1995 (amended Act No.2 of 1997) 
The Samurdhi Authority of Sri Lanka Act No.30 of 1995 (amended by Act No.2 of 
1997), or else Samurdhi Authority Act was a government initiative for the provision 
of welfare services through the state and it provides the ability to mobilise savings 
and extend credit facilities to poor people for their well-being and economic 
transformational development. Samurdhi Bank Societies are established under this 
special parliament Act. 
 
Societies Ordinance No.16 of 1891 
The Societies Ordinance No.16 of 1891 makes provision for the registration of 
mutual provident and other societies. To register as a society under this Ordinance, 
the society should consist of at least seven persons. Societies can establish with the 
objective of promoting thrift, giving relief to members for their distress and aiding 
them when in pecuniary difficulties.  
 
Regional Development Banks Act No.15 of 1985 (amended Act No.30 of 2011)  
The Regional Development Bank Act No.15 of 1985 was initially introduced to 
establish 17 RRDBs. Due to the cost effectiveness and lack of sustainability of 17 
RRDBs, they were merged to six RDBs by enacting the Act No.6 of 1997. Further, 
to shrink operating costs, six RDBs were merged into a single RDB in 2010 by the 
Pradeshiya Sanwardana Bank Act No 41 of 2008. Section 4 of the previous Act was 
repealed by the Act No.30 of 2011.  
 
Companies Act No. 7 of 2007  
Many institutions who conduct microfinance business are registered under the 
Companies Act No.7 of 2007. This Act governs the creation, activities, and 
dissolution of companies in Sri Lanka. Under this Act, a company registered as a 
limited liability company, or an unlimited company or company limited by 
guarantee is able to carry out microfinance business in Sri Lanka. All the finance 
companies are required to be incorporated and registered under this Act prior to 
incorporate under Banking, Finance Business, Leasing or Insurance Acts. However, 
there is no proper supervising or monitoring for MFIs established under the 
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Company Act. However, companies who conduct microfinance businesses under 
the Company Act are prohibited by law to mobilise public deposits. 
 
Voluntary Social Service Organisations Act No. 31 of 1980 
NGOs and social service organisations in Sri Lanka are registered under the 
Voluntary Social Service Organisations (Registration and Supervision) Act No. 31 
of 1980 (amended by Act No. 8 of 1998). This Act regulates the constitution, 
registration, and supervision of voluntary social service organisations and NGOs. 
The Act does not permit any NGOs to carry out micro credit operations. However, 
some NGOs are engaging with economic transformational development. It is at 
complete variance with micro credit operations, as no repayments are received by 
NGOs.  
 
Microfinance Bill  
Sri Lanka has been working on establishing a Microfinance Bill since 2007. In order 
to strengthen the MFIs activities, a proposed Microfinance Act was first released to 
the public in August 2010, which included setting up a Microfinance Regulatory 
and Supervisory Authority to license, register, regulate, supervise and strengthen 
companies, NGOs, societies and co-operative societies carrying out microfinance 
business. In June 2015, a draft legal framework for the regulation and supervision 
of MFIs was introduced by LMFPA, adding more operational details to the first 
draft. 
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Appendix 02 below provides a summary of the different regulations and supervisions applicable for institutions that are conducting 
microfinance activities in India 
Institution Societies  Public/ 
Private 
Charitable 
Trusts 
Not-for-profit 
Companies 
(section 25 
companies)/ 
Associations 
NBFCs NIDHI 
(Mutual 
Benefit 
Society) 
Companies 
State Co-
operative Banks 
and District 
Central Co-
operative Banks 
Urban Co-operative 
Banks 
Co-operative Societies 
Regulatory 
Authority  
Registrar of 
Societies in 
each state  
No 
specialised 
authority 
Company Law 
Board 
RBI RBI RBI Registrar of Co-
operative 
Societies and RBI 
Registrar of Co- 
operative Societies 
Supervisory 
Authority 
Registrar of 
Societies in 
each state 
No 
specialised 
authority 
Company Law 
Board 
RBI RBI RBI Registrar of 
Co-operative 
Societies and RBI 
Registrar of Co- 
operative Societies 
Legislation Societies 
Registration 
Act No.21 of 
1860 
Indian 
Trust Act 
No.2 of  
1882 
Societies 
Registration 
Act No.21 of 
1860 or Indian 
Trust Act No.2 
of 1882 or 
Section 25 of 
the Companies 
Act of 1956 or 
under special 
licensing 
Companies 
Act of 
1956 and 
Section 45-
IA of the 
RBI Act of  
1934 
Section 620 
of the 
Companies 
Act of 1956 
Banking 
Regulation Act 
No.10 of 1949, 
Banking Laws 
(Application to 
Co-operative 
Societies) Act of 
1965, RBI Act of  
1934, Co-
operative 
Societies Act of 
1912 or State-
level Co-operative 
Societies Acts 
Co-operative 
Societies Act of 
1912, RBI Act of  
1934, Banking 
Regulation Act No.10 
of 1949, Banking 
Laws (Application to 
Co-operative 
Societies) Act of 
1965, State-level Co-
operative Societies 
Acts and Multi-State 
Co-operative 
Societies Act 
(MSCA) of 2002 
Co-operative Societies 
Act of 1912, State-level 
Acts on Mutually Aided 
Co-operative Societies, 
Banking Regulation Act 
No.10 of 1949 and 
Banking Laws 
(Application to Co-
operative Societies) Act 
of 1965 
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Reserve Bank of India (RBI) Act of 1934 
The RBI Act of 1934 (amended by 2009) outlines the role of the RBI in financial 
management. Onsite supervision was introduced in 1995 and CAMELS 39  was 
introduced in 1997 to strengthen the regulation and supervision of the banking 
sector in India. NBFCs are currently playing a vital role in the Indian financial 
sector and are regulated under Section 45-IA (Chapters III-B, III-C and V) of the 
RBI Act. Further they have to fulfil the requirements of board of directors, share 
capital, management structure, audits, meetings, maintenance as well as publication 
of financial statements in accordance with Companies Act 1956 (Sa-Dhan, 2006).  
However, there is no separate category for NBFCs operating in a microfinance 
sector (RBI, 2011). The Malegam Committee recommended in their report that a 
separate category of NBFC-MFIs has been created to encourage the growth of the 
microfinance sector with an appropriate legal framework. They recommended 
several regulatory requirements that need to be fulfilled by NBFC-MFIs when they 
are providing services in the microfinance sector. Under the variety of existing legal 
forms in the Indian microfinance sector, not only are NBFCs regulated by the RBI, 
but section 25 companies and co-operative banks are also regulated by RBI rules 
(Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, 2009; Sinha, 2009).  
 
Banking Regulation Act No. 10 of 1949 
The Banking Regulation Act No. 10 of 1949 (amended by 2004) forms the core 
banking law in India as Indian commercial banks are regulated by RBI under this 
Act. As prescribed by the Act, Indian commercial banks must comply with the 
formats and standards when they prepare financial statements and are required to 
obtain independent assurance reports on their financial statements. Statutory 
auditors are appointed with the approval of the RBI by the commercial banks. The 
Act also applies for the State Co-operative Banks, District Central Co-operative 
Banks and Primary Co-operative Banks (Urban Co-operative Banks-UCBs) while 
the Act recognises only the Primary Co-operative Banks as the relevant category of 
co-operative banks suitable for MFIs (Sa-Dhan, 2006). According to the Act, the 
Primary Co-operative Bank means a primary credit society other than a primary 
                                                 
39 CAMELS - Capital adequacy, asset quality, management quality, earnings, liquidity and system. 
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agricultural credit society where the primary objective or the principal business is 
the transaction of banking business.  
Co-operative Banks that are registered under the Co-operative Societies Act of 
191240 are governed by the Banking Regulations Act of 1949 and the Banking Laws 
(Application to Co-operative Societies) Act of 196541 and regulated by the RBI 
(Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, 2009). Since then, the government 
has given the authority to the provinces to enact their own co-operative laws to suit 
the province. Accordingly, the State Co-operative Banks and the District Central 
Co-operative Banks have to register under the state-level co-operative societies 
Acts in each state. In addition, UCBs that have members in more than one state 
(multi-state presence) and have extended their operations to more than one state 
must be registered under the MSCA 2002. The banking activities in the UCBs are 
regulated and supervised by the RBI whereas the managerial and administrative 
activities are regulated and supervised by the state government or the central 
government if they are registered under State Co-operative Societies Act or MSCA 
2002.  
 
Indian Trusts Act No. 2 of 1882 
A trust may be created for any lawful public objective unless it isn’t forbidden by 
the law. In India, different states have different Trust Acts which govern under the 
more detailed Public Trust Act. However, if there is no any state-specific trust Act 
then the broad principles of the Indian Trusts Act 1882 (amended by Act No.3 of 
1908, No.1 of 1961, No.21 of 1917, No.31 of 1920, No.37 of 1925 and No.18 of 
1934) will be applied for trusts operating on a national scale (Frankfurt School of 
Finance & Management, 2009). To register as a trust there need to be two minimum 
trustees but there is no upper limit. NGOs with a non-profit objective took up 
                                                 
40 Co-operative Societies Act, 1912 was introduced after the Co-operative Society Act of 1904 was 
repealed, as it only enables the formation of "agricultural credit co-operatives" in villages in India 
under Government sponsorship. 
41 Banking Laws (Application to Co-operative Societies) Act of 1965 is a further amendment to the 
RBI Act, 1934 and the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 and the purpose of Act is to regulate the 
banking business of certain co-operative societies in India. 
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microfinance activities, registered as public charitable trusts 42  or as private 43 , 
determinable trusts with specified beneficiaries/members. In the MFI context, a 
trust can be declared by a non-testamentary instrument called a Trust deed. Under 
the provisions of this Act, a trust must maintain proper and regular accounts in 
compliance with generally accepted accounting norms. Further, periodic audits of 
financial statements by a qualified chartered accountant are necessary to examine 
the validity of documents prepared by the trust. Also these are largely exempt from 
the income tax due to the charitable nature of their operations (Sa-Dhan, 2006). 
 
Societies Registration Act No.21 of 1860 
This Act was introduced for the registration of Literary, Scientific and Charitable 
Societies to improve the legal condition of the societies established for the 
promotion of literature, science or the fine arts or the diffusion of useful 
knowledge/political education or for charitable purposes. The Society Registration 
Act is mainly based on the Literary and Scientific Institutions Act, 1854. However, 
every state in India has its own legislation for societies in their state, thus the Act 
No. 21 of 1860 is the federal Act.  
Under this Act, societies can be formed by seven people via a memorandum of 
association and should file with the Registrar of Societies. The governing body of 
the society are the governors, councillors, directors, committee, trustees or any 
other body that is managing the rules and regulations of the society. The principal 
Act does not provide any guidelines to maintain account or conduct audits for 
societies. But the provisions made in various independent laws that were enacted 
by various state governments, required societies to maintain proper accounts, cash 
book and have their accounts audited once a year through qualified auditors. 
Similar to trusts, NGOs established as not-for-profit organisations are mostly 
registered under this Act and engaged in microfinance activities. Based on the 
public nature of microfinance activities and MFI support for poverty eradication, 
people interpreted microfinance activities as charitable for the purpose of this Act. 
                                                 
42 Public trusts are mainly proving their services to the public as charitable or religious trusts. 
43 Private charitable trusts provide service to one or more individuals who are definitely ascertained 
in a given time period. 
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But any society has to mention its microfinance activities clearly in the 
memorandum of association. The income generated through microfinance 
operations of a society is exempt from income tax. However, the Registrar of 
Societies does not have any responsibility for any form of prudential regulation or 
determination of microfinance activities’ financial performance or solvency (Sa-
Dhan, 2006, p. 10). 
 
Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act of 1976  
Societies and trusts which are registered under the Societies Registration Act No.21 
of 1860 and the Trust Act No. 2 of 1882 have to register under the Foreign 
Contribution (Regulation) Act 1976, if they are going to accept foreign 
contribution. This Act defines foreign contribution as the donations or delivery of 
transfer made by any foreign source or any organisation within India whose original 
source is foreign. To obtain foreign grants, MFIs need to register with the Secretary, 
Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi and periodically they have to report the 
received foreign grants (Sa-Dhan, 2006). 
 
Section 25 of the Companies Act of 1956 
This Act was established for promoting commerce, art, science, religion, charity or 
any other useful object where the profit or any other income generated from the 
entity should only be used for promoting the objects of the entity but not for any 
individual member. This Act allows companies to register as a limited liability 
company without adding ‘Limited’ or ‘Private Limited’ to their company names. 
These companies are exempted from some of the provisions in the Companies Act, 
1956 such as appointment of directors, holding of annual general meetings, 
disclosure of annual returns for income tax and appointment of the company 
secretary. These companies need a minimum of three trustees to register their 
company but there is no maximum number. 
Non-profit-organisations can be registered under this Act while some NGOs are 
also registered under this Act as not-for-profit organisations. Most of the regulatory 
requirements applied for NBFCs under the section 45 IA of the RBI Act do not 
apply for the companies registered under section 25 of the Companies Act. 
However, the entity has to be registered with RBI if it is willing to accept deposits. 
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One of the major benefits for section 25 companies is that they are exempt from the 
paying tax under Section 12(1) of the Income Tax Act. Unlike societies and trusts, 
the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority allows section 25 companies 
to become corporate agents of the IC as they are registered under the Companies 
Act 1956 (Sa-Dhan, 2006). 
 
Section 620 of the Companies Act of 1956 
A special type of company called a ‘Nidhi44’ company, which is also known as 
‘Mutual Benefit Society’, is registered under this Act. Certain provisions of the 
Company Act, such as service of documents, issue of additional capital, annual 
returns, dividends, loans and remuneration to directors and winding up processes 
have been modified (restricted or relaxed) for these companies under section 620. 
All the clients can be treated as members of the company under section 620. A 
company can only accept deposits from its members and grant loans to members 
by keeping collateral, such as property or jewellery. Nidhi companies have very 
liberal provisions when compared with NBFCs as they do not want to get 
investment grade ratings and do not require to be registered with the RBI. Similar 
to societies and trusts, Nidhi companies cannot hold share capital (Sa-Dhan, 2006).   
 
State-level Acts on Mutually Aided Co-operative Societies 
This Act enabled the registration of co-operative societies (thrift co-operatives) in 
India by providing greater autonomy and freedom for co-operatives in the states 
without depending on state funding. This Act was supported to reduce the state 
interference for co-operatives through culminating the nationwide loan pardon 
scheme of 1989, which has resulted in reduced portfolios for many co-operatives.  
Different states in India issue legislation and ordinance to regulate the activities of 
MFIs. For instance the Andhra Pradesh government incorporation with the Co-
operative Development Foundation enacted the progressive Andhra Pradesh 
Mutually Aided Co-operative Societies Act in 1995 which enabled the registration 
of Thrift Co-operatives in India. Similar provisions were made to another six Indian 
states and a central multi-state Act was formed to provide for a new type of “mutual 
                                                 
44 Nidhi is the Indian language, means “treasure”. 
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benefit” co-operative significantly controlled by the Indian government (Sinha, 
2009).  
 
The Indian Moneylenders’ Act of 1918  
This Act was introduced to monitor the usurious interest rates charged by 
moneylenders from low income farmers (Sa-Dhan, 2006). However, after the 
Independence and enactment of the Indian Constitution, the different states brought 
their own legislation to govern money lending activities. For instance the Andhra 
Pradesh Micro Finance Institutions (Regulation of Money Lending) Act was 
approved by the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly on 14th December 2010 to 
regulate the MFI activities (except government supported MFIs), and which is 
applied to NBFCs as well. Similar to Andhra Pradesh, in Kerala state, NBFCs that 
are operating microfinance activities have to register under the state money lending 
statute enacted by the Kerala government. Normally, in most Indian states, the 
Registrar General, who is appointed by the state government in India, has the 
supreme authority in the state on matters of money lending.  
The registration of this Act is exempt for banks, statutory corporations, co-
operatives and financial institutions as they fall under the purview of the RBI but 
are applicable for the MFIs registered as societies and trusts. Accordingly, Malegam 
committee recommended that NBFCs should also exempt from the provisions of 
the Money Lending Act as they are already regulated with the RBI Act. Further, the 
Malegam Committee has highlighted that if the recommendations of the committee 
report are accepted by the government then it is not necessary to have a separate 
Act for Andhra Pradesh MFIs (RBI, 2012). 
 
The Micro Finance (Development and Regulation) Bill  
The Bill, which applies to microfinance activities, was introduced in May 2012 
(Zhang & Wong, 2014) by the Central Government but has recently been rejected 
by the Indian parliament due to the overriding existing state governments’ 
legislation. The new version of the Bill is at discussion level. The Bill formed the 
first legal document that defines ‘microfinance’, setting down concise guidelines 
for the Indian microfinance industry and a promotional and regulatory framework 
for MFIs, especially those carrying out microfinance in a non-profit form. 
